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PREFACE
THE second volume of this work has swelled to an
even greater bulk than its. predecessor. Its Si7-e
must be attributed to two main causes: the first is the
fact that a much greater number of original sources,
both printed and unprinted, are available for the cam-
paigns of 1809 than for those of 1808. 'l'he second
is that the war in its second year had lost the char-
acter of comparative unity which it had possessed in
its first. Napoleon, on quitting Spain in January,
left behind him as a legacy to his brother a co~pre­
hensive plan for the conquest of the whole Peninsula.
But that plan was, from the first, impracticable: and
when it had miscarried, the fighting in every region
of the theatre of war became local and isolated.
Neither the harassed and distracted French King at
Madrid, nor the impotent Spanish Junta at Seville,
knew how to combine and co-ordinate the operations
of their various annies into a single logical scheme.
Ere long, six or seven campaigns were taking place
simultaneously in different comers of the Peninsula,
each of which was practically independent of the
others. Every French and Spanish general fought
for his own hand, with little care for what his col-
leagues were doing: their only unanimity was that
nll alike kept urging on their central governments
the plea that their own particular section of the war
was more critical and important than any other. If
we look at the month of May, 1809, we find that the
IV PREFACE
following six disconnected series of operations were
all in progress at once, and that each has to be treated
as a separate unit, rather than as a part of one great
general scheme of strategy-(I) Soult's campaign
against >Yellesley in Northern Portugal, (2) Ney's
invasion of the Asturias, (3) Victor's and Cuesta's
movements in Estrcmadura, (4) Sebastiani's demon-
strations against Venegas in La Mancha, (5) Suchet's
contest with make in Aragon, (6) St. eyr's attempt
to subdue Catalonia. V\TJ1en a war has broken up
into so many fractions, it becomes not only hard to
follow but very lengthy to narrate. Fortunately for
the historian and the student, a certain amount of
unity is restored in July, mainly owing to the fact
that the master-mind of >Yellesley has been brought
to bear upon the situation. When the llritish general,
attempted to combine with the Spanish armies of
Estremadura and La Mancha for a common march
upon Madrid, the whole of the hostile forces in tbe
Peninsula [with the exception of those in Aragon
and Catalonia] were once more drawn into a single
scheme of operations. Hence the Talavera campaign
is the centnu. fact in the annals of the Peninsular vVar
for the year 1809. I trust that it will not be con-
sidered that I have devoted a disproportionate amount
of space to the setting forth and discussion of the
various problems which it involved.
The details of the battle of Talavera itself have
engaged my special attention. I thought it wOlth
while to go very carefully over tJ1C battlefield, which
fortunately remains much as it was in 1809. A walk
around it explained many difficulties, but suggested
certain others, which I have done my best to solve.
In several other chapters of this volume I dis-
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covered that a personal inspection oflocalities produced
most valuable results. At Oporto, for example, I
found '-Vellesley's passage of the Douro assuming
a new aspect when studied on the spot. Not one
of the historians who have dealt with it has taken the
trouble to mention that the crossing was effected at
a point where the Douro runs between lofty and pre-
cipitous cliffs, towering nearly 200 feet above the
water's edge I Yet this simple fact explains how it
came to pass that the passage was effected at all-
the French, on the plateau above the river, could not.
see what was going on at the bottom of the deeply
sunk gorge, which lies in a 'dead angle' to any
observer who has not come forward to the very edge
of the cliff. 1 have inserted a photograph of the spot,
which will explain the situation at a glance. From
Napier's narrative and plan I am driven to conclude
that he had either never seen the grmmd. or had for-
gotten its aspect after the lapse of years.
A search in the .Madrid Deposita de la Guerra
produced a few imporumt documents for the Talavera
campaign, and was made most pleasant by the
extreme courtesy of the officers in charge. It is
curious to find that our London Record Office
cont.'lins a good many Spanish dispatches which do-
not survive at Madrid. This results from the laudable
zeal with which lIir. Frere, when acting as British
minister at Seville, sent home copies of every Spanish
document, printed or unprinted, on which he could
lay his hands. Once or twice he thus preserved
invaluable' morning states' of the Peninsular armies,
which it would otherwise have been impossible to
recover. Among our other representatives in Spain
Captain Carroll was the only one who possessed to a
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similar degree tills admirable habit ofcollecting original
documents and statistics. His copious 'enclosures'
to Lord Castlereagh are of the greatest use for the
comprehension of the war in the Asturias and Galicia.
Neither Napier nor any other historiar;t of the
Peninsular War has gone into the question of
Reresford's reorganization of the Portuguese army.
Comparing English and Portuguese documents, I
have succeeded in working it out, and trust that
Chapter III of Section XIII, and Appendix No. V,
may suffice to demonstrate Deresford's very real
services to the allied cause.
It is my pleasant duty to acknowledge much kind
help that f have received from correspondents on
both sides of the sea, who have come to my aid in
determining points of difficulty. Of those in England
I must make particular notice of Colonel F. A.
",Vhinyates, R.A., a specialist in all matters con-
nected with the British artillery. I owe to him my
Appendix No. XI, which he was good enough to draw
up, as well as the loan of several unpublished diaries
of offioers of his own ann, from which I have extracted
some useful and interesting facts. I must also express
my obligation to Mr. E. Mayne, for 4uormation
relating to Sir Robert Wilson's Loyal I ..usitanian
Legion, of which his relative, Colonel W. Mayne, was
in 1809 the second-in-command. The excerpts which
he was kind enough to collect for me have proved of
great service, and could not have been procured from
any other quarter. Nor must I omit to thank two
other correspondents, Colonel 'V"illoughby Vemer and
the Rev. Alexander Craufurd, for their ,notes con·
cerning the celebrated' Light Division,' in which the
one is interested as the historian of the old 95th, and
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the other as the grandson of Robert Craufurd, of
famous memory.
Of helpers from beyond the Channel I must make
special mention of Commandant Balagny, the author
of Napoleon en Espagne, who has supplied me with
a great number of official documents from Paris, and
in especial with ,a quantity of statistics, many of them
hitherto unpublished, which serve to fix the strength
and the losses of various French corps in 1809.
I also owe to him my Appendix VI (iii), a most
interesting ?'es1t1ne of the material in the French
archives relating to the strange' Oporto conspiracy'
of Captain Argenton and his confederates. This
obscure chapter of the history of the Peninsular ""Var
is, I think, brought out in its true proportions by the
juxtaposition of the English and French documents.
It is clear that Soult's conduct was far more sinister
than Napier will allow, and also that the plot to
depose the Marshal was the work of a handful of
military intriguers, not of the great hody of highly-
placed conspi.J:ators in whose existence the mendacious
ArgentOn has induced some historians to believe.
At Madrid General Arteche placed at my disposal,
with the most bountiful liberality, his immense stores
of knowledge, which I had learnt to appreciate long
before, as a conscientious student of his Gue1'ra de la
Irulependencia. He pointed out to me many new
sources, which had escaped IIIy notice, and was good
enough to throw light on many problems w~ich had
been vexing me. For his genial kindness I cannot
too strongly express my obligation.
Of the officers at the :Madrid Deposita de la Guc1'ra,
whose COtutesy I have mentioned above, I must give
special thanks to Captain Emilio Figuel'as, from
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whom (just as these pages are going to press) I have
received some additional figures relating to the Army
of Estremadura in 1809.
Finally, as in my first volume, I must make special
acknowledgement of the assistance of two helpers in
Oxford-the indefatigable compiler of the Index, and
1\Ir. C. E. Doble, whose corrections and suggestions
have been as valuable in 1903 as in 1902.
C. OMAN.
ALL SoUlll COJ..LJrol:,
JUIU: 20, 1!1OO.
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ERRATA IN VOL. II
The foUowing filets I discovered in Madrid and Lisbon when it was too
late to correct the chapte1'8 in which the mis-slatcmcuts occur.
(1) Page 82, note 2. I have found from a Madrid document that part,
though not the whole, of the Regiment of Baza was present at Valls. One
battalion was left behind with Wimpffen: onc marched with Reding, about
800 men therefore must be added ID Illy estimate of the Spanish infantry.
(2) Page 318, note 2. I found in Lisbon that the regiments which marched
with Beresrord to Lamego were not (as I had supposed) noS. 7 and 19, but
nos. 2 and U. with the 4th cnzadorcs. Those which joined from the direc-
lion of Almeida were two battalions of no. 11 (1st of Alml:idn) and ouc of
no. 9.
(3) Page 366. A dispatch of Beresford at Lisbon clears up Ill)" doubts as
to Silveira's culpability. Bcrcsford complains that the latter lost a whole
day by marching from Amurnnte to VillB POUCR without onlers; the dis-
patch directing him to take the path by Mondim thus reached him only when
he had gone many miles OD the wrong road. The time lost could never be
made up.
,
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SECTION IX
AFTER CORUNNA
CHAPTER I
THE CONSEQUE~CES OF MOORE'S DIVERSION: RALLY OF
THE SPA..,\,ISH ARMIES: BATTLE OF UCLES
'VITH thedepa:rture of Napoleon from Madrid on December 21,
the off'cllsi ve action of the French army in L-entml Spain came to
a stand. The Emperor had taken away with him the field army,
which had been destined to deliver those blows at Lisbon and
Seville that were to end the war. The troops which he had lef\;
behind him in the neighbourhood of l\fndrid were inadequate in
numbers for all)' further advance, and were forced to udopt
a defensive attitude. The only regions in which the invaders
continued to pursue an active policy were Aragon and Catalonia,
from which, on account of their remoteness, the Emperor had
not withdrawn any troops for his great encircling movement
against Sir John Maore. In both those provinces important
operations began on the very day on which Bonaparte set out
to hunt the English army: it was on December fll that Lannes
commenced the second siege of Saragossa, and that St. eyr,
after relieving Barcelona, scattered the army of Catalonia at
the battle of Molins de Rey. But the campaigns of Aragoll
and Catalonia were both of secondary importance, when com-
pared with the operations in central Spain. As the whole history
of the war was to show, the progress of events in the valley of
the lower Ebro and in the Cutalan hills never exercised much
inf!ucll(.'C· on the affairs of Castile and Portugal. It is not,
therefore, too much to assert that it was Moore's march on
Sahagun, and that march alone, which paralysed the main
scheme of the Emperor for the conquest of Spain.
Between December 21 and January 2 the central reserves
Oll,u,", U B
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of the French army had been hurried away to the Esla and
the plains of northern Leon. It was not till the new year
had come that the Emperor began to think of sending some of
them back to the neighbourhood of Madrid. The 8th Corps
had been incorporated with the 2nd, and sent in pursuit of
MOOI'C: the corps of Ney amI the division of Lapissc were left
to support Soult in his invasion of GaJicie.. The Imperial Guard
marched back to Yalladolid. Of all the troops which had been
distracted to the north-west, only Dessolles' division of the
Central Reserve returned to the capital. Such ll. reinforcement
WllS far from being enough to enable Joseph Bonaparte, and his
military adviser Jourdan, to assume the offensive towards the
valleys of the T~O'\ls and Guadiana. The consequences of
Moorc's diversion were not only far-reaching but prolonged: it
was not till the middle of March that the army of the king was
able to resume the attempt to march on Seville, and by that
time the condition of affairs had been profowldly modified, to
the advantage of the Spaniards.
The inten'elling. time was not one of rest for Joseph and
his army. Their movements require careful attention. 'Vhen
Napoleon hurried the main body of his troops across the
Somosierra in pursuit of the British, he left behind him the
corps of Victor, shorn of Lapisse's divisioll, the wholc of
the corps of Lefebvre I, and the three independent cavalry
divisions of Lasalle, Latour-Maubourg and Milhaud-in all
8,000 horse and Q8,OOO foot with ninety gun~. There was
also the Royal Guard of King Joseph, four battalions of foot,
and a regimcnt of horse, beside two skeleton regiments of
Spanish deserters, which the' [ntrusive King' was raising as the
nucleus of a new army of his own 2.
1 Save two Dutch and one German regiment of Leval's division, which
had been left bellind Oil garrison duty in Biscay and Old C"L'Ilile.
I This was done by the Emperor's OrdCN. The cadru of thcso
regiments, called RoyaJ-i.'(ranga and Jroyal-Na})Qlb;m, were formed partly
of }i'renchmen, partly of Spanish AjranceeadM. The rank and file of the
first regiment were to be raised from the Swiss and Germans who bad
served in the old Spanish army: some oftllem had adhered to the French,
others, when taken prisoners in the late campaign, had offered to sen'e
King Joscpb. The second regiment was to becomposed ofnath'e Spaniards.
Sea ~prmda1u:e de lrlupolitm, 14,531.
1808J KIKG JOSEPH'S ARMY g
Of these troops the incomplete Germa~ division of Leval
(2nd of the 4th Corps) and King Joseph's guo.nh> fOfllled the
garrison of Madrid. This force seeming too smull, the division
of Ruffin (Ist of the 1st Corps) was ordered in to reinfon:e them.
The rest of the army lay in two concentric semicircles outside
Madrid: the inner semicircle was formed of infantry: there was
II regiment at Guadalo.jara. t, a whole division under :Mnrshnl
Victor himself at Aranjuez 2, and two divisions of the 4th Corps
under Marshal Lefebvre at Tala\'era 3, Outside these troops
WllS a great cavalry screen. In tront of Victor the three rovalry
brigades of Lntour-Mnubourg's division lny respectively at
Tarancon, Ocai'ia, and l\'ladridejos, watching the three roads from
La Mancha. West of them lay Milhaud's division of dragoons,
in front of Talavera, in the direction of Navalmoral and San
Vinccnte, obscn'ing the passes of thc Siefl'iL de Toledo. Lnstly,
as a sort of advanced guard in the direction of Estremadura,
Lasalle's light cavalry had pushed on to the great bridge of
Almnraz, behind which the ,necks of the mutinous annies of
Belvedere and San Juan were beginning to collect, under their
new commander Galluzzo 4.
The Emperor's .parting orders to Jourdan had been to send
forward Lasalle and Lefebvre to deal a. blow at the Estremaduran
army. They had, he wrote, twice the llllmbel"S necessary to
break up the small force of disorganized hoops in frout of them.
On December M, I.€febvre was to cross the Tagus, scatter
Gallu1.lo's men to the winds, and then come back to Talavera,
after building a We de pant at Almaraz. Lasalle's cavalry
would be capable of looking after what ,vas left of this fol"<.."C,
for it would not give trouble again for many a week to come.
Victor, on the side of La Mancha, must keep watch on any move-
ments of the Spaniards from the direction of Cllenca or the
Sierra Morena. He would have no difficulty in holding them
off, for 'all the debris of the insurgent armies combined could
1 The 66th, a stray rcrnmmt Icft belliml by DCSilolles.
2 Division of Villattc. It had one battalion det3chell, along with the
26th Chasseul'll, at Toledo.
a Diviilion of Valence and Sebastiani.
t Lasalle's division (often altered. ill composition) uow COIl!listed of the
loth alld 26th Chasseul'll, Oth Dragoons aud l'olish LaueelS.D'
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not faL'C even the 8,000 French cavalry left in front of them ---:
to say nothing of the infantry behind 1,
The first portion of the orders of the Emperor was duly
carried out. On December 24 the Duke of Dantzig advam,,-ed
from Talavera upon the bridges 'of Arzobispo and Almara?.,
behind which lay 6,000 or 7,000 of Galluzzo's dispirited levies.
He made no more than a feint at the first-mentioned passage,
but attacking the more important bridge of Almaraz carried it
at the nrst rush, and took the four guns which Galluzzo had
mounted on the southern bank to command the defile. 'The
Spaniards, scattered in all directions, abandoned the banks of
the Tagus, and placed themselves in safety behind the rugged
Sierra de Guadalupe. So far the Emperor's design was carried
oul: but Lefebvre Ulcn took a most extraordinary 5tcp. Instead
of returning, as he had been ordered, to Talavera, and remaining
in that central position till further orders should be sent him;
he went oH' on nn inc.xplicnble oovcnturc of his own. Leaving
only Lasalle's cavalry and two Polish battalions on the Tagus,
he turned north, as if intending to join the Emperor, crossed
the mountains between New /lnd Old Castile, and on January 5
appeared at Avila in the latter pro\'ince 2, Not only was the
march in complete contravention of the Emperor's orders, but it
WIlS carried out in disobedience to five separate dispatches sent
fmm Madrid by J ourdan, in the name ofKing Joseph. Lcfebvre
paid no attention whatever to the' lieutenant of the Emperor,'
in spite of vehement representations to the effect that he was
exposing Madrid by this ecccntric movement. It was indeed
an unhappy inspiration that led him to Avila, for at this
precise moment the Spaniards were commencing a wholly un-
e..xpeeted offensive advance against the Spanish capita4 which
Lefcb\'re, if he had remained at Talavera, might have aided in
repelling. Much inccused at his disobedience Napoleon deprived
him of the command of the 4th Corps, and sent him back to
France. 'This marshal,' he wrote to King Joseph, 'does nothing
1 See for all these details Nap. Corrup., H,G09.
2 Napier misrepresents this move in the strangest way, Baying (i. 3G4.)
merely that <the Duke of Dantzig TCcrosscd tlle Tagus and took post
between 'ftl.h",ern anti Plaseneia: Avila is fifty miles liortll of tlHlse places,
aud on the other liide of the Guadarrama,
18001 THE SPA..!...UARDS AT CUENCA 5
hut make blunders: be cannot seize the melklling of the orders
sent him. It h> impossible to leave him in eommalld of a corps;
-which is a pity, for he is a brave enough fellow on the battle-
field I,' Sebastiani, Lefebvre's senior divisional general, replaced
him in command of his corps. .
The new Spanish advance upon Madrid requires a word of .
explanation. Wc have seen that the weary and dilapidated
Army of the Centre, now commanded by the Duke of Infantado,
had reached (,'uenca on December 10, after escaping from the
various snares which Napoleon had set for it during its march
from Calatuyud to the valley of the upper Tagus. When he
had escaped from Bessieres' pursuit, the duke proceeded to give
his army a fortnight's much-needed rest in the mountain villages
round Cuenca. He sent back to Valencia the wrecks of Hom's
division, which had originally been raised in Dmt kingdom. It
had dwindled down to 1,455 men, from its originalS,OOO 2. The
other troops, the Qnd, Srd, and 4th divisions of the old army of
Andalusia 3, hud not snffered qnite SO much, as they had not been
seriously engag«l at Tudela, but they were half-starved and very
disorderly. Infantado was forced to shoot an officer and two
sergeants for open mutiny before he could restore th~ elements
of discipline 4.
The provincc of Cnenca is the most thinly peopled and
desolate of all the regions of Spain G, and though some stores
and food were procured from Valencia, it was impossible to
rc-equip the army in a satisfaetOl'Y way. 'Winter clothing, in
particular, was absolutely unprocurablc, and if the men hurl not
been placed under roofs in Cuenca and the villages around, they
1 Napoleon to Joseph from Valladolid, Jan. 9, Nap. (Jorrtlfp., 14,O'i1.
, See the figures furnished by the Valencian Junta in Arguelles, ii. 74.
It must be remembered tlmt 4,800 of the division had escaped to Saragossa,
null took part ill its defence.
I 11le 1st division had only four battalions prC5Cnt, tJlC others havillg
been at Madrid, in the army of San Junn.
, The officer, a Lieutenant Santiago, had refused to march on Cuenca,
and when the order was repeated, unlimbered his battery aeroilS tlle road
and threatened to fire on the troops who were marching in that direction.
See Artechc, iii. 12.
G It had only 311 inbabitants to tbe square league in 1803, as compared
with 926 in Andalusia, aod 2,009 in Guipuzcoa.
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must have perished of cold. Dut 8. fortnighl'sIest did much for
them: many stragglers callle up from the rear, a few reinforce.
ments were received, and to the surprise of the whole army the
brignde of the Conde de Alacha, which had been cut ofI' from
the rest of the troops on the day of Tudela, turned up intact to
join its didsion. This detachment, it will be remembered 1, had
been left in the mountains near Agreda. to ob.~er\'e the advance
of Marshal Ney: after the rout it had nearly fallen into the
hands of the 6th Corps, and had been forced to turn off into
obscure bypaths. Then, passing in lw;tc between the French
divisions in New Castile, it had finally succeeded in reaching
Cuenca.
lnfuntado, finding that the French still hung back and
advanced no further into his mountain refuge, proceeded to
reorgani7.e his army; the three weakened battalions of the old
line regiments were consolidated. into two or often into one.
The four divisions of the original Andalusian host were amal-
gamated into two, with an extra 'Yanguard' and 'reserve'
composed of the best troops~. This rearrangement had not
yet been fully completed when the duke made up his mind
that he would venture on an advance against Madrid. He could
learn of nothing save cavalry in his frunt, and he had received
early notice of the departure of Napoleon to the north.
Giving the command of his vanguard and the greater part of his
cavaJry to General Venegns, he bade him descend into the plains,
and endeavour to sUi'prise the brigade of dragoons which lay
at Tarancon 3. This task Vencgas attempted to execute 011
Christmas Day: he had already turned the town with half
his force, and placed himself across the line of retreat of the
driloO'QOllS, before they knew of his approach. 'VaMled, just in
time of his danger, the Freneh brigadier resolved to cut his
way through; he charged down on the enemy, who fell into
l\ line of battalion squares with long intervals between them.
Dashing between the squares the two regiments got through
with the loss of fifty or sixty men. The Spanish cavalr)', which
arrived late on the: field, made no attempt to pursue. On the
same day Infantado had sent out another column under
1 See vol. i. p. 437. I For these changes 800 Appendix I.
~ Perreimond's hrigade of Latour-Maubourg's division.
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General Senrn, with orders to march on Aranjuez: finding
that it was held not only by cavalry but by a hea,''y force of
infantry, the Spanish brigadier wisely halted at a discreet
distance, for which he was sharply taken to task by his chief.
It is certain that if he lll\d gone 011, Victor would have made
mincemeat of his little forcc of 4,OOOJllCII.
Although the advance of Vcnegas and Senra soon stopped
short, the news that the Spaniards were descending in force
into the plain of New Castile was most discomposing to King
J oseph, who was at this moment ,'cry weak in troops. Lcfcbvre
had just starh:d on his eccentric march to Avila: Dcssolles was
not yet back from the north, and there was no disposable reserve
at Madrid save the single division of Ruffin, for the king's guards
and r.e,'al's 'Germans were barel)' enough to hold .down the
capital, and could not be moved. The situation was made
worse by the revolt of several of the small towns of the upper
'l'fLc,ous, including Chinchon and Colmenar, ;which rose under the
belief that Infantado's army would soon be at their gates.
There wo..s nothing between the duke and Madrid save the
single infuntry division of Villatte, which lay with Marshal
Victor at Aranjuez, and the six dragoon regiments of Latour-
Maubourg, a force of little more than 9,000 sabres and
bayonets,
Fortunately for King Joseph, Infantado was a most incapable
general, and allowed his opportunity to slip by. By driving in
the French cavalry screen, he had given notice of his existence,
and spread alarm up to the gates of Madrid. DlIt in order
to profit by the situation he should have dashed in at once,
before the enemy had time to draw together. Ifhe had marched
from Cuenca with his reserves, in the wake of Venegas, he could
have brought QO,OOO men to bear upon Victor, before the latter
could receive the vcry mode~tc succours that King Joseph could
send him. Instead of doing anything of the kind, he remained
quiescent at his head quarters, and did not even send Venegas
any further orders, either to advance or to retreat. From
December !W to January 11, the Spanish vanguard lay at
Tarancon, as if with the express intention of giving the French
time to concentrate. The duke meanwhile, as his dispatches
show, was drawing up a grandiose plan of operations, which
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included not only the eviction of King Joseph from Madrid,
but the cutting of Napoleon's communication and the raising
of the siege of Saragossa! He was most anxious to induce the
Cellhal Junl:.a. to move forward all their other forces to aid him.
But they could do nothing, so deplorable was the state of their
army, but bid the weak. division of 6,000 men, which was
b'Ullrding the Sierra Morena, to begin a demonstration in
La Mancha. In pursuance of this order Del Palacio made
a forward movement,-as dangerous as it was useless, to ViIlahartll
on the upper Guadiana.
Jourdan and the Intrusive King, meanwhile, were for ten
days in a state of great anxiety, expecting every moment to
hear that the whole Spanish anuy had descended from the
mountains and thrown itself upon the upper 'l'agus. They
ordered Victor to move from ArolljUCZ to Arganda to ptu'ry
such a blow, and made preparations for reinforcing him with
Huffin's dhisioll, whpe the rest of the garrison of Madrid,
with the E'rcnch civilians, and the mass of Afrancesados, were
to shut themselves up in the forts on the Retiro, being too few
to hold the entire city. Dut the expected advance of Infantado
never occurred, and Joul'dan and Victor were able to put down
the insurrection of the little to~ns in the plain without any
interruption. Chinchon was stormed, and the whole male popu-
lation put to the sword; at Colmcllllr thcre were executions
011 a large scale, and a fine of 50,000 piastres was levied. The
rest of the insurgents fled. to the hills 1.
On Jannary 8, 1809, the fears of Joseph and ~otlrdan came
to a happy end, for on that day the division of Dessolles
marched ill from Old Castile, while on the 10th the 4th Corps
appeared, having been sent back in haste from Avila by the
Emperor. 'rllis reinforcement of more than 20,000 men com-
pletely cleared the situation. The French line of defence could
now be re-established: Valence's Polish division was placed at
Toledo: Leval's Gemums, completed by the arrival of their
belated Dutch brigade, were sent to Talavera. Scbastiani's
I Jourdan confesses to this massacre in the most OPCllIl'IIY. < l.e 27-
LegeI' s'eta.~t presente aux portes de Chinehon, fut reryu aooups de £USU.
Cette pn)\'ocation oecasionna la perte des habitants : ils furent Wu8 tues,
et la villa illeelldiee.' AJemoire8 du MarecMI Jburdan J 139.
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division, with Dessollcs and the king's guard, remained to garrison
Madrid. Ruffin was sent out to join Victor, who was ordered
to march at once on Tarancon and fall upon the Spanish corps
which had remained there in such strange torpidity since
Christmas day 1, The Emperor, sending these orders from
Valladolid, expressed himself in a somewhat contemptuous strain
as to his brother's fears. 'The army of Castanos' (i. e. of
Infanta.do) •was as great a fiction as that of La Romana:
rumour made them ~O.OOO strong, while renlly there were
not more than 5,000 of them 2, Victor had ten times as many
men as were necessary for clearing off the Spaniards. The panic
at Madrid had been absurd and discreditable: all that was
wanted was to catch and hang a dozen fllauvais ,mjets, and the
capital would keep quiel'
On January a Victor marched from Aranjuez with the
twenty-one battalions of Villatte's and Ruffin's divisions, the
squadrons of light horse which formed his corps-cavalry, and
the three brigades of dragoons composing the division of 1..Jl.tour~
l\faubourg-in all some l~,OOO foot and 8,500 horse. He did
not find Venegas at Tarancon: on hearing that the Freneh were
massing in front of him, that officer had called in the outlying
brigade of Senm, and had retired ten miles to Ucles, in the foot-
hills of the mountains of Cucnca. He sent news of Vidor's
approach to Infantado, but the latter gave him no definite
orders either to fight or to retreat. He merely forwarded to
him three or four more battalions of infantry, and announced.
that he was coming up from CUCllca with the reserves: he fIXed
no date for his probable amv&J,.
Much troubled by the want of definite orders, Venegas
doubted whether he ought to hold his ground and await his
chief, or fall back into the mounmins. After some hesitation
he resolved to take the more dangerous course, tempted by
the fine position of Ucles, which offered every advantage for
a defensive action. He had with him about 9,500 infantry
in twenty-two very weak battalions, some of which had no more
than 25.0 or SOO bayonets. Of cavalry he had nine incomplete
1 All tJlese movements are mOit clearly set forth in Jourdll.u's MtJllloire8,
by far the best authority for the campaign of Vde;'!.
t Nap. Ckm'up., 14,637 and 14,684.
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regiments, giving only 1,800 sabres I, 'There were bllt five guns
with the arm)', of which one had broken dOWIl, and was not
fit for service. The town of Udes lies in the midst of a long
ridge stretching north-east and south-west, with a steep slope
towards the plain, from which the French were approaching.
Venegas drew up his men in a single long line, with the town
in the centre. FOllr ba.ttnliOllS ,,'cre barricaded in Udes: six
took post to the left of it, eight to the right. Only one was
held back in reserve, but three with four regiments of cayalry
'were left out in front, to observe the French ndvilnce, in the
neighbourhood of the village of Tribaldos. The four guns and
the remainder of the cavalry were drawn up before the town.
It is ahnost needless to point out the faults of this order-of.
battle-overgreat e.,xtension and the want of a reserve. The
position wns too long for the numbers o.vailable. Moreover
the men were not in good fighting trim: though several of
the old regiments from Baylen were among them, their spirits
werc low: they had not yct recovcred from the dreadful fatigues
of the retreat from Tudela, and they had little confidence in
their leaders.
Victor marched from Tarancon at daybreak on January 13,
with one division on each of the two routes which lead eastward
from that place, VilIatte's on the southern road which goes
directly to Uclcs, Ruffin's on the longer and more circuitous
path, which, running parallel to the other, ultimately rejoins it
at Carrascosa some way behind that town. The majority of
Latour-Maubourg's cavalry accompanied the former column.
Already on the previous uight Victor's vedettes had discovered
the Spanish outpust at TribKldos: "ery early on the following
morning it was driven in by the advance of Villatte's column,
and joined the main body of the army ofVenegas. The Marshal
then pushed forward to the foot of the llills, to reconnoitre the
enemy's position. Having discerned the lie of the ground, and
the distribution of the Spanish forces, his mind was soon made
up. Orders were promptly sent to Ruffin to leave the road
on which lie was advancing, Ilnd to close in upon the right flank
, I Beside the twenty battalions gh'ell in the Appendix to ~he, iv,
Venegas's narrative shows that at least two more (Baylen and Navns de
'1'olosa) were present,
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and rear of Venegas's army. Meanwhile Villatte and the cavalry
drew up in front of Ucles, with a strength of about 7,000
bayonets and !,500 sabrcs. The dragoons were placed in thc
centre; in front of them was ranged it battery, which commenced .
to shell the town and the Spanish horse drawn up before its
gates. This was only a demonstration: the real blow was to
be given by aD attack on the Spanish left, where the hillside
was of easier access than 011 the steep and rocky northern end
of the ridge. Villatte's second brigade, the 94th and 95th
regiments, executed a circular march under the eyes of the
enemy, and having turned their extreme flank, rapidly climbed
the hill and formed up at right angles to the Spanish line.
These six battalions fell upon the exposed wing and rolled it up
without much difficulty, till they arrived under the very walls
of Ucles, driving the enemy before them. Venega.s, who was
watching the fight from the court of the monastery which
dominates the town, had tried to hurry up reinforcements from
his right wing: but they arrived too late to be of any use.
'Vhen the attack on the enemy's left was seen to be making
good progress, and the attention of the Spaniards was distracted
to that point, Victor directed the first brigade of Villatte's
division to assail the steep hill on tbe Spanish right. They
carried it with ea.se, for half the defenders had been withdrawn
to reinforce the left, and the rest were demoralil,ed by the
evident disaster 011 the other flank. The whole of Velleglls's
army fled eastward without any further endeavour to hold their
ground, the considerable force of cavalry in the centre making
no attempt, as it would appear, to cover the retreat of the foot.
Such rearguard as there was consisted of two or three infantry
battalions under General Giron.
Suddenly the Spaniards of the right wing and centre saw
rising up in front of them, us they fled, an imposing line of
French infantry, barring their further progress. lbis fon:c
consisted of the nine battalions of Ruffin's division. They
had lost their way while seeking for the Spanish flank, and
(like Fergllson at Roli0) made too wide a circle to enable them
to intervene in the actual fighting. :BlIt the very length of
their turning mo\'ement pro,'cd advllIltageous, as they had now
got into the direct rear of the retreating army. Driven on by
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the pursublg dragoons of Latour-.l\1aubourg, the Spaniards found
themselves rushing into the vcr)' llrms of Ruffin's division. The
disaster was complete, and more than half ofVenegas's armywns
encircled and captured. Most of thecavs.lry, indeed, eScaped, by
dispersing and riding rapidly round the flanks of Ruffin's linc.
But the slow-moving infantry was trapped: a few battalions
from the left wing got oH' to the south-east, and General GiI'Oll
with a remllant of his brigade cut his way through a gap between
two French regiments. All the rest had to surrender.
Of Venegns's 11,000 men, about 1,000 had been killed or
wounded: four generals, seventeen colonels, 306 other officers
and 5,560 rank and file were captured 1. The French secured
the four gUllS which formed the sole artillery of the beaten
army, and twenty standards 2. Their ovm.loss was insignificant
-Victor returned his total casualties at 150 men, and probably
did not much understate thcm, as hc had met with no serious
resistance.
Thongh they had suffered so little, the French showed great
ferocity after the 6ght. They not only sacked the town of
Udes, but executed in cold blood sixty-nine of its notables,
including many monks, who were accused of having fired on the
assailants from their convent windows. '\¥hen the column of
Spanish prisoners was sent off to Madrid, orders were given (it
is said by Victor himself) that those who would not keep up
with the rest should be shot, and we have good French authority
to the effect that this was regularly done; thirty or more a day,
mostly the wounded and the sick, were shot by the wayside
when they dropped behind 3.
'\That, meainvhilc, had happened to the Spanish Commallder-
in-chief, and the 9,000 men whom he had retained at Cuenca?
Infantado had started to join Venegas on January 12: he slept
that night at Horcajada, fifteen miles to the es.st of Ucles.
I l1Jese IlI1Illloers are prohably exact: JourdaIl quotes them from his
own official report to Berthicr of Jan. 20. See his Ml!moirnl, p. 144.
• Z As the wrecks of fifteen or sixteen battaliollJl had surrendered, there
seems no reason to doubt the number of standards. But the Spaniards
asserted that Victor eked out his trophies, by taking down the old
battle-flags of tIle knights of Santiago from their church in Ueles.
S Cf. the Mbnoires of Rocca (of the 211d Hussars, Victor's corps-cavalry),
p. 00, and Schepeler.
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Resuming his march next morning, he had got as far as CaITas·
oosa, when n disorderly mob of 2,000 routed infantry hurtled
into his vanguard. Questioning the fugitives, he learnt the
details of the battle of Ucles, and found that the victorious .
arm)' of the French was only five lJliles away. Then with a
promptitude very different from his torpor of the last three
weeks, the duke turned his column to the rea." and made oft'
with all speed. He first returned to his base at Cuenca to pick
lip his baggage and stores, and then marched by vile cross-roads
and in abominable weather to Chinchilla in the kingdom of
Murein, which he reached on January ~O. His artillery, forced to
go at a snail's pace among the hills and torrents, and escorted
by a single cavalry regiment only, was surprised and captured
by Digeon's dragoons at TarloIa, a few miles to the south of
Cuenca (Jan. 18). Fifteen guns were lost on this occasion:
several of the Freneh authorities ingeniously add them to the
trophies of Uc1es, and write as if they had all been taken from
VenegflS in open battle 1.
Victor after occupying Cuenca, and finding that Infantado
WM now too far away to be pursued with any chance of success,
turned down into the plains of La Mancha, to strike at the
small Andalusian force which had advanced under Del Palacio,
to lend countenance to Infantado's projects for a march on
l\:ladrid. This division, some 6,000 strong, had reached Villa-
harta on the upper Guadiana, but when the news of Ucles
arrived, its commander hastily drew it back to the foot of the
passes. Finding no enemy to attack, Victor. after crossing La
?fancha unopposed, took up his post at Madridejos, on thc high~
road between Madrid and the Despeiia~PeITOs, and waited for
further orders from Head Quarters.
It was only after the victory of Udes that King Joscph was
permitted by his brother to make his formal entry into Madrid.
Up to this moment he had been told to stop at the Palace of
the Pardo, far outside the walls, and only to pay furtive and
nnostentatiOIlS visits to his official abode in the city. 'Vhen
the inhabitants of the capital had been sufficiently impressed by
1 Notably the evcr~innccurnte VidoiTell et fAmqutres, aud T11iers. rhe
uSUlI.lIy~scn!JiblcBelmllS makes the Spanish prisoncrs amount to 13,000
IDCIJ, h·o thousand more than VCOcgtlS ever put in lioc.
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the arrival of the numerous columns of the 4th Corps and of
Dessolles, and had seen the banners and the prisoners taken at
Ucles paraded through their streets, their king was Ollce more
sent among them. Joseph made his appearancc on January 22,
passed through a long lane of French bayonets to the church of
Sail Isidro, where a 1'e DBwn was chanted for the late victories,
and then entered his palace. Here he received numerous
deputations of Spaniards who swore him fealty. But the moral
effect of these oaths was not vcry great, for the local notables
attended under the pressure of the bayonet. Napoleon had
sent orders that every town in Castile of more than 2,000 souls
must dispatch delegates to Madrid, or the consequences would
be unpleasant 1. The delegates appeared, but it may be f,'l1essed
with what feelings they mouthed their oaths and their protesta-
tions of joy and loyalty. Yet Joseph, determined to play the
part of the benevolent monarch, took the whole farce seriously,
and answered with lavish declarations of his love and sympathy
for the great Spunish natioll. Sentiments of the kind were
to be the staple of his fruitless and copious oratory for the next
four years. His heart would have sunk within him if only he
could have recognized their futility: but 1809 was but just
beginning, and he was far from realizing the full meaning of his
position: it took a very long time to thoroughly disenchant this
hard-working und well-meaning prince.
1 Nap. CAn-rup., 14,729, from Valladolid, Jan. 16.
SECTION IX: CHAPTER II
NAPOLEON'S DEI'ARTUHE fROM SPAIN: HIS IJLA~S FOIl
THE TERMINATION OF THE WAR: THE COUXTER-l'LANS
OF' THE JUNTA
FOUR days after the battle of Uc1es Napoleon quitted Spain.
He had rested at Valladolid from January 6 to January 17,
after his return from the pursuit of Sir John l\foore. Though
he had faik>d to cntmp the British Army he was not discon-
tented with his achievements. He was fully convinced that he
had broken the back of the Spanish insurrection, and that he
could safely return to France, leaving the completion of the
work to his brothel' and his marshals. He was anxious to hear
that Snrngos~ had fallen, and that the English had been driven
out of the Peninsula. Wben these two events should have come
to pass, his armies might resume, under the guidance of his
subordinates, the original advance against Portugal and Anda.-
lusia which ho.d Uccn so effectually frustrated by Moore's daring
move.
Meanwhile he spent full eleven days at Valladolid. busy with
all manner of desk-work. connected not merely with Spain, but
with the affairs of the whole continent. He was evidently
anxious to lea.ve an impression of terror behind him: he hee·
tored and bullied the unfortunate Spanish deputations that
were compelled to eome before him in the most insulting fashion.
His haraUhtUes generally wound up with the declarutioIl that if
he was ever forced to come back to Spain in arms, he would
remove his brother Joseph, and divide the realm into subject
provinces, which should be governed by martial law. Some
French soldiers (probably marauders) having been assassinated,
he lU'rCSted nnd threatened to hang the whole municipality of
Valladolid, finally releasing them only when three persons
acc~sed(rightIy or wrongl)·)of the murders were delated to him
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and executed. He sent advice to King Joseph to deal in the
same way with Madrid; nothing would keep the capital quiet,
he wrote, but Il good string of executions I, It was to be many
years before he realized that hanging did no good in Spain, and
was only repaid by additional assassinations. In return for this
good advice to his brother, he extorted from him fifty of the
choicest pictures of the royal gallery at :Madrid; but in com-
pensation Joseph was invited to annex all that he might choose
from the primtc collections of the exiled Spanish nobility and
the monasteries of the capital 2•
Suggestions have sometimes been made that Napoleon
hastened his departure from Spain, because he saw tlw.t the
suppression of the insurrection would take a much longer time
than he had originall)' supposed, und because he wished to
transfer to other hands the lengthy and inglorious task of
hunting down the last armies of the Junta. This view is cer~
tainly erroueous: his three months' stay in Spain hud not opened
the Emperor's eyes to the difficulties of the business that he had
taken in hand. Though many of his couriers and 'aides-de-camp
had already been nmbuscaded and shot by the pcasnntry, though
he WM already beginning to sce that a blockhouse and a garrison
would have to be placed. at every stage on the high-roads, he
believed. that these sinister signs were temporary, !lnd that the
countr)'-sidc, ufter u few sanguinary lessons had. been giveu,
would sink down into the quiet of despair.
His final legacy to his brother, on departing, was a long
dispatch giving 0. complete plan of operations for the n~xt cam-
paign. Soult, after forcing the English to embark, was to
march on Oporto. Napoleon calculated that he ought to
capture it'on February 1, and that 011 February 10 he \I'ould be
I <Faites done pendre une douzaine d'individus a Madrid; il n'y manque
poi.nt de mauvais sujets, ot sans cela il n'y aUl'i1 rion do fait.' Nap, CQr7Cllp"
14,684. Compare Leceatrc, Letlm inMitel de Napo!ifm, i. 275, wbere
orders are given tbat thirty persons, who had already been acquitted by
the civil tribunals, should be rearrested, tried again before a court martial,
and promptly shot! Napoleon to Joseph, Jan. 16, 1009.
! (Je pr6tererais que \'OUS prissiez toUII lea tableaux qui se trollvent
dnllS leil rOJlisons confisqu6ei1 ct dans Ice convents supl'rian6s, et que VOIlS
me fi8Siez proisent d'une cinqlllllltainc do chcfs-d'OlU\'fO. Vous sentez qu'il
ne faut que de honnes chosce.' Nap, CQrrup" 14,717.
1809] NAPOLEON'S PL~'1 OF CAMPAIGN 17
in front of Lisbon. The Portuguese lc\'ics he practically disre-
garded as a fighting force, and he was ignorant that there still
remained 8,000 or 10,000 British troops on the Tagus, who
would serve to stiflen their resistance.
When Soult should have mptured Oporto, and be well on
the way to Lisbon, Victor was to go forward with his 011'11
1st Corps, the division of Leml from the 4th Corps, and the
cavalry of Milha.lld, Latour-Maubourg, and Lasalle. He was
to strike ut Esb'cmudura, occupy Mcric1a and Budajoz, and join
hands with 80ult along the Tagus. Lisbon beiug reduced,
Victor was to borrow a dh'isioll from Soult and march on
Seville with 40,000 men. With such a force, as the Emperor
calculated, he would subdue the whole of Andalusia with case.
Meanwhile Saragossa must (as Napoleon rightly thought) fall
some time in February. When it was disposed of, the 3rd And
5th Corps would provide a garrison for Aragon, and then march
011 Valencia, which would be attacked and subdued mueh about
the same time that Viewr would arrive at Seville. St. Cyr
would have made an end of the Catalans long before. Thus
the whole Peninsula would be SUbdlied ere the summer was over.
There was nowhcre a Spunish arm)' that could make hcad
against even 10,000 French troops. The only possible compli-
cation would be that Moore's army might conceivably take ship, '
not for England, but for Lisbon or Cadiz. If the English, 'the
only enemy who could create difficulties,' took this course, the
Emperor might ha\'e to give further orders. But it does not
seem that he regarded this as a likely contingency, since he had
conceived an even exaggerated idea of the losses and demorali-
zation which the Dritish had suffered in the retreat to CoruUUtl.
To Joseph he wrote, 'reserve yourself for the expedition to
Andalusia, which may start three wceks hence. With 40,000
men, marching by an unexpected route [i. e. by Badajoz, not by
La CaroHna1 you will surprise the enemy and force him to
submit. This is au operation which will make an cnd of the
wur: I leave the glory of it to you '.' To Jerome Kapolcoll he
wrote in the most laconic style, 'the Spanish affair is done
with~,' and then proceeded to discuss the general politics of the
l Napoleon to Joseph, Jau. 11, WOO, Nap. Corrt:tp., 14,684.
2 Almost the same words are found in a dispatch to Mollien of Jan. 24.
OllAX. H C
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Continent, as if his whole attention could now be gi\'en to the
doings of ~<\ustria and Russia.. On January 18 he rode out
of Valladolid, and after six days of incessant tmvel reaclloo
Paris OIl the 24th. His first care after his arrival wns to scare
the intriguers of the capital into good behaviour. His second
was to endeavonr to treat Austria nftel' the anme fashion.
He had not yet llIade lip his mind whether the ministers of
Francis 11 meant mischief, or whether they had merely been
presllming on his long absence ill Spain: Oil the whole he
thought that they could be reduced to order by bold
langua~, and b)' the ostentatious movement of troops on the
Rhine and upper Danube. But he WAS not sure of his con·
clusion: in his correspondence letters stating that Austria l1a5
been brought to reason, altcrnate with others in which ~he i~
accused of' incorrigible perversity, and a design to make ,var in
the spring 1. The Emperor's suspicions are most clcurly shown
by the fact that in February he ordered the whole of the
Imperial Guard, except two battalions and three squru:h'ons, to
be brought up from Spain and directed on Puris 2. In the same
month he sent secret orders to the prince> of the Confederation
of the Rhine, to bid thcm be ready to mobilize their contingents
at short notice.
. It is elear that as regards the affairs of Spain the Emperor
was in January and February, 1809, as much deluded as he had
been seven months before, in June,1808. The whole plan of
campaign which he dictated at Valludolid, and sent as his
parting gift to Joseph and Jouroan, was absolutely impractic-
able, and indicated a fundamental ignorance of the character of
the Spanish war. It would have been a perfectly sensible docu-
1l1Cllt if the struggle had been raging in Italy 01' Germany,
though even there the calculations of distance and time would
have been rat.her hro-.ardous. 'l\\'enty-three days were given to
Soult. to expel the English, to pacify Galicia, to take Oporto,
r Aujourd'hui lea affaires" d·Espa.,"1le sont .11. pen pres terminees.' 'Ibis was
written after the Emperor bad returned to Paris.
1 Cf., for example, Nap. CQrrup., 14,741 and 14,749, where Austria
is said to lUI\"e Cll311ged lll~r tone and swpped her preparation, with 14,121
lInd 14,779, which show a most hostile lIjlirit aguinst her.
1 For the details, see Nap. Corre.sp., 14,780, written to Dessicrcs frllll1
Paris on Feb, Hi.
1800] l\1ISCO:"lCEl~'IO~S OF THE EMPEUOR 19
and to march on Lisbon! Even grunting that ull had gone as
the Emperor desired, the estimate was too short by half. It
was midwinter; Galicia and northern Portugal form one of the
most mountainous regions in Europe: their roads are \;le; their
food supplies are scanty; their climate at that season of the
~'cnr detestable. Clearly the task given to Soult could not be
executed in the prescribed time 1.
But this is a minor point: it was not so much in his' logis-
tics' that the Emperor wellt wrong as in his general concep-
tion of the character of the war. He imagined that in dealing
with Spain he might net as if he were dealing with Austria. or'
Prussia-indced that he had an enormous c.x:tru advantage in
the fnet that the armies of Ferdinand VII were infinitely inferior
in mel'e fighting power to those of Francis II or l''rederick
Yvilliam Ill. By nil the ordinary I1Iles of modern warfare,
a nation whose capital JUld been ot.'Cupkd, and whose rcgulllr
armies had been routed and half-destroyed, ought to have sub-
mitted without further trouble. The Emperor was a little
surprised that the effect of Espinosa.. and Gamonal, of Tudila
and Ucles, had 1I0t been greater. He hud almost expected to
receive overtures from the J unm, asking for terms of submission.
But somewhat disappointed though he might be, he had not yet
realized that Spain was not as other couutries. The occupation
of Madrid counted for little or nothing. The insurrectionary
nrmics, when driven into a corner, did not capitulate, but dis-
persed, and fled in small parties over the hills, to reunite 011 the
first opportunity. Prussian or Austrian troops under similar
circumstances would haye quietly laid down their arms. But to
endeavour to grasp a Spanish corps was like clutching at a hall
of quicksilver: the mass dispersed in driblets between the fingers
of the manipulator, and the small rolling pellets ultimately
united to form a new force. Large captures ofSpaniaros only took
place Oil the actual baltIc-field (as at Uc1es or Ocmla), or whell
an army had shut itself up in a fortress and could not get away,
as happened at Saragossa and Badajoz. Unless actually penned
in between bayonets, the insurgents abandoned cannon and
1 As a matter of fact. as has been stated elsewhere, Soult though work-
ing his hardest did not leave Corunna. till .Feb. 20, 100!l, nOr take Oporto
till March 29.
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baggage, broke their ranks and disappeared, to gather again on
some lUore propitious day} either us fresh annics or as guerrilla
bands operating upon the victor's lines of communication.
Nor was this all: in Italy, Germany, and Austria Bonaparte
had dealt with regions where the population remained quieseent
when once the regular army had been beaten. Risings like that
of Verona in 1797, or of the Tyrol in 1805, were exceptional.
The Frcl1eh army was wont to go forward without being forced
to leave large garrisons behind it, to hold down the conquered
country-side. A battalion or two placed in the chief towns
sufficed to secure the eommwlication of the army with Francc.
Small parties, or even single officers bearing dispatches, could
ride safely for many miles through an Italian or Austrian dis-
trict without being molested. It was not thus in Spain: the
Emperor was to find that evcry village where there was not a
l~rellch garrison would be a focus of active resistance, and that
no amount of shooting or hanging would cow the spirits of the
peasantry. It was only after scores of aides-de-camp had been
murdered or captured, and after colllltless small detachments
had. been desbu)'ed, that he Cllmc to rcalizc that every foot of
Spanish soil must not only be conq uered but also held down.
If there was a square of ten miles unoccupied, a guerrilla. band
arose in it. If it district thirty miles long lacked a. brigade to
b"lU'rison it, a. local junta with a ragged apology for an army
promptly appeared. Three hundred. thousand men look a large
force all paper, but when they have to hold down a country nve
hundred miles bl'Oad they iU'C frittered away to nothing. TIllS
Great Britain knows well enough from her recent South African
experience: but it was not a common matter of knowledge in
1809. If the Emperor had been told, on the day of his entry
into Madrid, that even three ycars later his communication with
Bayonne would only be preserved by the maintenance of a
fortified post at every tenth milestone, he would have laughed
the idea to scom. Still more ridiculous would it have appeared
to him if he had been told that it would take a body of 300
horse to carry 1I. dispatch from Salamanca to SlU·~O"()SS8, or that
the normal garrison of Old Castile would have to be kept at
15,000 men, even when there was no regular Spanish army
nearer to it than Oviedo or Astorgn. III short he, and all
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Europe, had much to learn as to the conditions of warfare in the
Peninsula. If he had realized them in l\Iarch, 1808, there
would have been no treachery at Bayonne, and the' running
sore,' as he afterwards called the Spanish war, would never have
broken forth.
Meanwhile the CO!lqucst of Spain was hung up for a. month
and more after the victory of UcIcs. 11le Emperor had bidden
Joseph and Jourdan to wait till the February rains were over,
before sending out the great expedition against Andalusia; the
siege of Saragossa was prolonged far beyond expectation, and
Soult in Galicia (as we shall presenUy see) found the time~
allowance which his master had set him inadequate to the verge
of absnrdity. The French made no further move of impol"tancc
till March.
The Central Junta, therefore, were granted three full months
from the date of their flight from Aranjuez to Seville, in which
to reorganize their armies for the oncoming campaign of 1809-
a respite which they gfl.ined (as we have already shown) purely
und solely through Moore's splendid inspiration of the march to
Sllhagun.
The members of the Junta truiled into Seville at various
dates between December 14 and December 17. Their rapid
journey at midwinter through the Sierra de Guadalupe and the
still wilder Sierra Morena. had been toilsome and exhausting 1.
It prO\"ed fatal to their old president, Florida Blanca, who died
of broncbitis only eleven days after he had arrived at Se\'ilIe.
In his stead a Castilian Gralldee of ullimpcachnble patriotism
but very moderate abilities, the Marquis of Astorga, was eleded
to the presidential chair. The Junta had no enviable task before
it: the news of the disasters 011 the Ebro and the fall of :Madrid
had thrown the nation into a paroxysm of llllreasoning fury.
Ridiculous charges of trctlSOll were being roised against all those
who had been in charge of the war. Blakc and Cw.taiios (of all
people!) were being openly accused of having sold themseh'eg to
Napoleon. There were a number of political assassinations in the
regions to which the Prench had not yet penetrated: most of
the victims were old friends of GOOoy. It looked at first as if
1 It will bo remembered (sce vol. i. 11.029)J tlmt they wellt via TalaveraJ •
McridaJ and Llcrcna.
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the central government would be unable to restore illl)' sort
of order, or to organize any further resistance. Some of the
local juntas, whose importance had disappeared with the meet·
ing of the Supreme Junta, showed signs of wishing to resume
thcir ancient independence. Those of Seville and Jaen were
especially disobliging. But the evils of disunion were so obvious
that evcn thc most narrow-minded particularists settled down
after a time into at least a formal obedience to the central
gO\·ernment.
The enforced halt made by the French aftcr Napoleon's
departure for Madrid was the salvation of Spain. By the
month of Janunry things were beginning to f!SSllme a more
regulnr aspect, and some attempt was made to face the situation.
The most favourable part of that situation was that money at
least was not wanting for the moment. The four or five millions
of dollars which the British Govcrnlllent had distributed to the
provincial Juntas and to the' Central' had long been spent, and
h~ 1809 no more than £387,000 in specie was advanced to Spain.
Spent ulso was the enormous amount of moncy accruing from
patriotic gifts and local assessments. But there had just arrived
at Cadiz a large consignment ofspecie from America. The Spanish
colonies in the New \Vorld had all adhered without hesitation
to the cause of Ferdinand VII, and their first and most copious
contribution had just co~e to hand. Not only had the Governors
of Mexico and PCl'll und the other provillces strained every
nerve to raise money, but a vast patriotic fWld had been
collected by individuals. There were rich merchants and land-
holders in America who made voluntary offerings of sums as
large 8S 100,000 or 9l00,OOO dollars apiecc. Thc money which
came to hand early in 1809 amounted to more than ,J?!,800,000,
and much more .was received ere the close of the year. It was
with this sum, far more than with British money, that the
Spanish annies were paid and fed: but their equipment mainly
came from England. The stores of arms, clothing, and munition
which had existed in the arsenals of the Peninsula when the war
broke out, had all been exlmusted in the autumn, and had 1I0t:
even sufficed to equip fully the unfortunate armies which were
beaten on the Ebro. The governme~tand the local juntas had
set up new lllanufactories at Scville, Valcncia, and elsewhere,
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which were already turning out a large quantity of weapons,
accoutrements, and uniforms: it was now that the armies began
to appear in the rough brown cloth of the country and in leather
shako>;, abandoning the; old white unifonll and plumed hat which
had been the garb of the S}J<'l.nish linc. But the reclothing and
rearmament of the troops could never have been completed with·
out the enormous consignments of cloth, powder, muskets, lCfld,
and leather work which came from England. It is true that
much was lost by the fortune of war before it could be utilized-
notably the considerable amowlt of muskets, ammunition, and
cloth which had been landed in Galicia for La Romana's army.
This, as we ha"e seen, was either destroyed by Sir John Moore's
army or captured by Soult, because the Galician Junta hud I,cpt
it waiting too long at the base. But all that wcnt to Andalusia,
Valencia, and Catalonia came safely to hand. Palafox's army
was re.equipped, just before tqe second siege of Saragossa began,
with British stores sent up by Colonel Doyle frolD Tarragona.
The armies of the south and east also received enormous COIl-
signlllcnts of nC-CCSSlll'ics.
It rcmains to speak of thc purely military aspect of the Jlmta's
position. "'Then January began, the wrecks of the Spanish armies
were distributed in a wide semicircle reaching from Oviedo to
Geronn, while the Frcllch lay in their midst. In the Asturias
there were still 14,000 or 15,000 men under arms; the relics
of Acevedo's divisioJ.l of lllake's army had fallen back, and joined
the other levies which the local Junta had assembled.' The
whole force was WU.~Chjllg the two lines Oil which the French
could conceivably move during the winter-the coast route from
Santallder to Giholl, and the pass of l'ajares which leads from
Leon to Oviooo.
In Galicin, La ROmnll8,'s army, now engaged in the miserable
retreat from Astorgu. to OI1~nse, had fallen into thc most wrelchcd
condition. Of the 29l,OOO men who had been assembled at Leon
in December only 6,000 or 7,000 wcre now to be found: the
Galician battalions had melted home when the army fell back
among their native mountains. They cannot be much blamed,
for they were suffering acute starvation: in the spring they
CIlme back to join the colours readily enough. The regulars,
who still hung together, were fo.mis~ed, naked, typhus.ridden,
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and incapable of an)' great exertion. Their general's only care
was to keep them us fur as possible from Soult mId Ne)', till the
winter should have passed by, and food and clothing be procured.
Between La Romana's men at Orense and the anny of Estre-
matlura. on the Ttlgus there wus no Spanish force in the field.
'Vhen Lapisse and D'Avenay had occupied Zamora and Sala-
manca, the onl)' centre of resistance in Leon was the fortress
of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was held b)' a handful of local militia.
Portuguese troops were beginning to collect in its rear at
AJmeida, but with them the Junta had nothing to do.
The Estremaduran army hud now passed from the hands of
GaUuzzo to those of Cuesta. The Junta, in spite of the memories
of Cabezon and Rio Seco, had once more given the obstinate and
incapable old soldier an important command. Apparently they
had been moved by the widespread but idiotic cry imputing
treachery to the generals who had been beaten on the Ebro,
and gave Cucsta an army becausc (with ttll his faults) no onc
ever dreamed of accusing him of treachery or sympathy with
the French. His forces consisted (1) of the wrecks of Belvedere's
army from Gamonal, (2) of the debris of San Juan's arm~' from
l\1l1drid, (3) of new E;tremaduran levies, which had not gone
forward to Burgos in October, but had remained behind to
complete their organi7Atioll, (4) ot' the four dismounted cavalry
rcgiments from Denmark, which had hccn sent to thc south
when La Romana landed at Santander, in oNer to procure
equipment and horses. In all. the army of Cuesta had no more
than 10,500 foot and 2,000 or 2,500 horse. The spilit of the
old troops of San Juan and Bch(.'(lere was still very bad, and
they were hardly recovered from their December mutinies and
murders. After Lefebvre had driven them back from the Tagus,
and occupied the bridges of Almaraz and Arzobispo, the Estre·
mndurans had retired to l\:Icrid/L /Llld Truxillo: on Jilnuary 11
their most achanced position was at the last-named place.
To the east of Estremadura lay the weakest point of the
Spanish line: Andalusia. and its mountain barrier of the SieITll.
Morcna were almost undefended in January. 1809. It will be
remembered that all through the autumn of the preceding year
the local juntas, intoxicated with the fumes of Baylen, had let
the months slip by without doing much to organize the' Army
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of Reserve,' of whieh they had spokcn so mueh in August and
September. It resulbxl that, when Reding had marched for
Catalonia, and the last belated fractions of Castai1os' army had
been forwarded to Madrid, Andalusia was almost destitute of
troops. When the Junta fled to Seville, it looked around for an
army with which to defend the passes of the SieITfl. l''1orenfl.. No·
thillg of the kind existed: the only force available consisted of nine
or tell baltaliolls, mainly new lcvies, which were dispersed through
the 'FourKingdoms'completing their armament andorganization.
They were hastily mobilized and pushed forward to the Sierra
Morena, but not more than·6,000 bayonets ann 500 sabres could
be col1ected. This was the sole force that lay between the Frendl
at Madrid and the Junta at Seville. The ehargc of the division,
whose head quarters were placed at La Carolina, was given to
the Marquis del Palacio, who in the general shifting of com·
manders had just been recalled from Catalonia.
The British Government's knowledge of the danger to which
Andalusia \ViIS exposed, from the absolute want of troops to
dcfend it, led to an untoward incident, which did much to
endanger its friendly relations with the Junta. On hearing
of the fall of Madrid, and of 1\'Ioore's retreat towards Galicia,
Canning harked back to one of his old ideas of the previous
summer, the notion that British troops might be sent to the
south of Spain, if a safe basis for their operations were secmed.
This, as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs believed,
would best be pro\'ided by the establishment of a garrison in
Cndiz. It was all-important that this great centre of commerce
should not fall into the hands of the French, and early in
January it was known in London that thel"lJ was no adequate
Spanish force ready to defend the passes of Andalusia. If
Napoleon had an army large enough to provide, not only for
the pursuit of Moore, but for the dispatch of a strong corps
for au attack on Seville, it seemed probable that the French
might overrun Southern Spain ns far as the sea, without meeting
with serious opposition. Accordingly, Cmllling wrote to Frcre,
on the fourteenth day of the new yenr, ]809, to offer the assist·
illlce of 11 considerable British force for the defence of Andahlsia,
if Calliz were plut'(.>f.1 in their hands.
'The question of the employment of a British llnny in the •
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south of Spain,' he wrote, •depends essentially upon the disposi.
tion of the Spanish Government to receive a corps of that army
into Cadiz. ·Without the security to be afforded by that fOl'tr~
it is impossible to hazard the army in the interior, after the
~xample of the little co-operation which Sir John MOMe repre-
sents himself to have received from the Spaniards in the north.
. . . In consequence of the imminent danger, and of the pressing
necessity for immediate decision arising from Sir John Maore's
retreat, and from the defcneeless state in which you represent
Andalusia to be, His Majesty's Government have deemed it
right (without waiting for the result of your communiCll.tion
with the Central Junta) to send a foft'C direct to Cadiz, to be
admitted into that fortress. }~our thousand men under Major·
General Sherbrooke are directed to snil immediately, and he is
informed that he is to expect instructions from you on his
arrival, containing the determination of the Spanish Govern-
ment respecting his admission into Cadi7..... In the event of
n refusal of the Junta to aflord this proof of confidence, Major-
General Sherbrooke is directed to proceed to Gibraltar I.'
The last paragraph of this dispatch sho\\1> that Canning's
intentions were perfectly honourable, and that he did not intend
to bring any pl~ure to bear upon the Junta in the event of their
refusing to admit it British garrison into Cadiz. His views were
founded upon the infOl'lllation ll\'l\ilable in London when he
wrote, and he was under the impression that it French army
might probably be marching upon Seville at the moment when
his letter would reach Frere's hands. But-a.,> we have seen-
the diversion of the main force of Napoleon's army of invasion
against ),{oore, had rendered any such expedition impossible,
and no immediate danger was really to be apprehended.
The same idea, however, had entered into Fi-ere's mind, and
long before he l-eceiveU Canning's dispatch he had been soundillg'
members of the Central Junta as to the way in which they would
look on a proposal to send Dritish troops to Cadiz. The answcr
which he received from their secretary, Martin de Garay, was not
reassuring: Don Martin 'energetically repudiated' the project:
there would be no objection, he said, to admit a garrison, if Cadit.
became •the ultimate point of retreat' of the armies and
I Canning to r'rere, Jlln, 14,1800 (UeCQrJ Oftice).
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government of Spain. But the danger that had nppcnrcd so
pressing some weeks before hud passed by, the French had
stopped their advance, and the JunUt were now hoping to defend
Estremooura and the course of the Tagus. The invaders, as
they trusted, would be met and checked on the line of Alcantara
and Almaraz. The}' deprecated any sending of British troops
to Cadiz, and hoped that Lisbon would be the poiJlt to which
reinforcements would be dispatched, as its evacuation would
have deplorable results. De Gamy, in a second letter, spoke
of rumours to the effect that Cradock was proposing to evacuate
Portugal, and trusted that they were not true. As a matter of
fact they were, and that timid commander was already mll.killg
secret preparations to embark.
}~rere g£wc up fol' the present ally idea of prcsshlg the project
further, unless the French should rccOlllmcnl'(l tJleir advancc
on Andalusia. He had not yet received Canning's dispatch
from London, and did not know that the home government had
taken to heart the plan for occupying Ca.diz and sending a large
expedition to Andalusia. But on February 2, before any hint
of the kind lum reached him, he was informed by a dispatch
from Lisbon that troops had been already sent off' to Cadiz.
This step was the work of Sir George Smith, one of the numerous
British military l\:,rrents in the Peninsula, who had taken upon
himself to fOfce eyents to an issue, without first taking the pre-
caution of cOlTImWlicating either with the llOlIle government or
the British ambassador ut Seville. Smith was a hasty and
presumptuous man, full of zeal without discretion. The de-
fencelessness of Andalusia had impressed him, just as it had
impressed CaDuing and Frere. But instead of opening com-
munications with the Jllnt~ as they had both done, he had
merely writtcu ill VCf)' urgent terms to Cradock, and adjured
him to detach troops from the scanty garrison of Portugal in
order to secure Cadiz. The general, when thus pressed, con-
sented to fall in with the scheme, and set aside a brigade under
.Mackenzie, which he shipped off' from Lisbon at twenty-fouT
hours' notice (February!:). He also ordel'ed the 40th regiment,
then in gnrrison at Elvas. to march on Seville. Both Cradock
and Smith were gravely to blnme, fol' they had no flllthol'i ...ation
1 The 29th, 3/27t1l, and 2j9th regimeuts.
2S NAPOLEON"S DEPARTURE F1WM SPADI [F~" 6
to attempt to occupy Cadiz, without obtaining the consent of
the Spanish Goycnunent I, They should Have consulted both
Frere and the Junta before moving a mall: but it was only
when the troops had actually embarked that they thought fit
to notify theit· action to the ambasS!ldor at Seville.
On receiving their IcHcl'il Frerc Wlt~ plllL-ed in an unenviable
position. Having just seen his own proposals negatived by
the Junta in polite but decisive terms, he now learnt that
a British force had been sent off to carry out precisely the plan
which the Spaniards had refused to take into consideration.
Four days later he was informed that Mtwkcnzie's bri&'lldc, which
had chanced upon a favourable wind, was actually lying in Cadiz
harbour, Md that Sir George Smith was endeavouring to indnce
the local authorities of the place to permit them to land. The
J nnta, as was inevitable, suspected Frere of having been in the
plot,. alld imagiJled that he was trying to for<.-e their hand by
the display of anned force. Cadiz was at Smith's mercy, for it
was only garrisoned by its urban guards; and the populace were
by no meaus unwilling to sec the British land, for the fear of
the French was upon them, and they welcomed the approach of
reinforcements of any kind.
The supreme authority in Cadiz at this moment was the
Marquis of Villcl, a special commissioner sent down by the
CcntriLl Junta, of which he wus a member. He refused to be
cajoled by Smith, and very properly referred his demand for
permission to disembark to the government at Seville. The
latter, not unnaturally incensed, tUnJed for explanutions to
Frere. The ambassador's conduct when placed in this dilemma
was by no means wise or straightforward. Instead of frankly
disavowing Smith's action, he adopted the tortuous course 2 of
1 As Canning wrote to Frere, after receiving the neWB of the abortive
eXIlC!lition, 'TIle enclosed cOI>Y of tile instructions Hn.Ier wIdel1 Sir G. Smitll
was sent out, ,,,ill show you that the step taken by that officer was not to
have been taken e.'Tcept at the dirn:t 80Udtation of the Spani8A Gllthoritiu•
. . . He has been directed to lea\'e Cadiz at once, and you may assure
tbe Junta that no l!eparate or secret commission was, has been, or ever
will 00 cntruswl to au), officer or othl1r [l{lTSOn,' Feb. 20 (Record Office).
~ :FrereJ by his OWll showiug, exceeded the bOlllUls of t.liplomutic eVlISioll.
He writes to Callning (Feb. \I) to say that the dispatch of the Lisbon
troops bad been a complete surprise to bim, as he had not received any
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pretending that the expedition frOll! Lisbon bad been sent with
his knowledge and conscnt, but tllat he would not allow it to
land without the leave of the Juntn. The Spaniards replied in
terms of sOllle indignation, and .returned a fmIlk negath"e to the
demand" Their secretary, dc Gamy, wrote that the unc.."pectcd
appearance of General Mackenzie's force was • painful Rnd
dis~0TeC8.ble intelligence, Cadiz being no longer in danger from
the" .French, and two Spanish regiments being already on their
way to reinforce the garrison. The measure which had been
taken would admit of a thousand interpretations, and a consent
to hand over the fortl"CSS to the British would compromise the
Central Junta with the whole nation,' The fact was tbat
Spanish public opinion was strongly opposed to allowing the
British to obtain a foothold in Cadiz; there was a deeply-
rooted notion abroad that, if once occupied, the place might
be kept permanently in our hands, and be turned into a second
Gibraltar.
Unfortunately for the credit of Great Britain with her allies,
tumult.s broke out at Cadiz within a few days of the arrival of
Mackenzic's army, which supplied an excuse to malevolent
Spaniards for attributing the worst motives to their allies. As
a matter of fact they were not stirred up by Sir Gem·gc Smith
or any other emissary of the British GO\'ernmenl, but were the
results of the eccentric behaviour of the :'Ifarquis de Villel 1• This
personage was a very strange character, a sort of nineteenth·
century Spanish Puritan, with a taste for playing the benevolent
despot. He attributed the misfortunes of his country (and not
witbout much l"Cason) to her moral decadencc. His idea of the
way to commence her TCf:,reneration was peculiar, considering the
information on the subject. 'It occurred to me, however, that it W1l3
best to take it upou myself, and to affed to consider it a thing of course,
and to ~y that I had sent orders in eonformit)· with the note whieh I had
receh'oo from Mr. de Garay. In order to give th13 some semblance of
truth, I did afterwards write a letter to Lisbon to this effect, and sent
it off before I dispatched my lIote to Mr. de Garay. This did not prevent
me from being assailed by remonstrances.' .Finally he proceeded to tell
the JUllUl' thllt he only wished to see Cndiz occupied ill tile extreme C1LSC
of 1111 immediate attack by the French' (Ilecord Office).
I }<'or Villcl'scccclltricitics ill tlctu.il scc Toreno, i. I'P' 375-6, and Arteche,
v. p. 107.
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circumstum:es of the time. Hc issued an edict communding all
married pairs livillg apart, to reunite, issued laws repressing
theahe·going, late hours, and gambling, legislated concerning
the length of ladies' skirts, und organized a gru.nd baUtw against
women of light reputation, of whom he imprisoned some scores.
'Vhen he proceeded to engage in a SOlt of moral inquisition
into the privute life of n1l clnsses, he naLurnU}' beCilmc very
unpopular, and on the first opportunity the populace rose against
him, He had ordered into the city a newly-embodied' Swiss'
battalion, raised from the prisoners of Dupont's army and other
deserters of all nationalities. The cry was raised by his enemies
that. he WIl$ admitting Frenchmen in disguise into the sacred
fortrcs.~, with the purpose of betraying it to the enemy. Other'
rumours were put about to the effect that he was deliberately
neglecting the fortifications, and supplying the batteries with
powder adulterated with sand I.
When the foreign battalion drc\\· near to Cadiz on February 22,
and began to march l1p the long spit which connects the city
with the I.sla de Leon, the storm burst. A mixed multitude of
rioters shut the gates l\:,rrainst the troops, and then swept the
streets, maltreating Villel's subordinates, and slaying DOll Jose
HClwia the commander of the coast-guard, a person very un·
popular with the smugglers, who formed an appreciable element
in the crowd. The High Commissioner himself was besieged in
his house, hunted from it, and nearly murdered: he only escaped
by the" kind offices of the head of a Capuchin convent, who
took him within his gaocs, and made himself responsible to the
rioters for keeping the refugee in safe custody. The mob next
tried to break open the slate prisoll, for the purpose of slaying
General Caralfa and other political captives. Fortunately Felix
Jones, the military Governor, succeeded in saving these unhapp)'
persons, by the not over·\villing aid of the urban guards, man)'
of whom had joined in the outbrcllk.
The riuters expressed b>Tea.t friendliness for the British, and
many of them kept inviting the troops in the offing to come
ashore. It was very lucky that no attention was paid to these
solicitations 2, for if they had landed the worst suspicions of
I See Col. Le3lie (of the 29th),ltfellwiT8, p. 94.
, MackeD:tie wrote that' it was cI·ident that thc peoplo wore fllvournble
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the Junta would have appeared justified, and the insurrection
would hayc been attributed to the machinations of E'rere or
Smith. Fortunately the latter had died, only It few days
before the troubles broke out, the victim of It fever which
carried him off' after no more than twenty-fouf hours of illness.
If he had survived till the twenty_second, he would have been
quite capable of taki.ng the fatal step of listening to the nppeuls
of the rioters, and ordering the troops ashore.
As it turned out the whole expedition ended in an absurd
fiasco. '''11cn the riots had died down, the Junta recalled the
eccentric de Villel, but they would not listen to any proposals
from Frere for admitting Dritish troops into Cadiz, cI'cn when
he suggested that only two battalions should remain thel'e', while
the rest, including Shcrbrookc's division, which WIlS expected
to arrive in a few days, !:lhould come up and join the 40th rcgi.
ment at Seville, with the ultimate purpose of marching into
Estremadura.. The Junta replied that' the loyalty of the
British Ministry and the generosity of its efforts to assist Spain
were beyond suspicion; but the National Government must
respect natiOllal prejudices, and avoid exposing itself to censure.
If there were any urgent u.anger, they would have no hesitation
in admitting the troops of their allies into Cadiz. But the
French were still far away, and there was no immediate pros~
peet of their al)proach. The British expedition would be more
usefully employed in Catalonia, or in some other theatre of war,
than in Cadiz 1.' By March 4, when this final answer was sent
to Frcre, the state of affairs had so much changed, that the
representations made by the Junta were more or less correct.
The imminent danger which had existed in January had passed
away.
Accordingly, after lying idly for four weeks in their trollS·
ports, and gazing with much unsatisfied curiosity Oil the white
to our landing and occnpying the to\I'll, fot' it WM frequently called for
during the tumult.' But 'the utmost care WlIS takeu to prevent our
officers or soldiers from taking all)" part whatever on this OCCllSioll, and
except when 1 WIIS applied to by the Go\'ernor for the interference of some
British officers a9 mediators, we stood perfectly clear.' Dispatch to
ClIsUercagll in the Record Office, dated LisUoIl, Marc1. 13, 1800.
1 Ma.rlin de Garay to Frcre, March 4 (Record Office),
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houses, the green shutters, and the flat roofs of Cadi1., across the
beautiful bny, Mackenzie"; regiments set sail ogaill for Lisbon
all IHarch 6. As they ran out of the harbour, they met Sher-
brooke's belated convoy, whose an'ival had been delayed by
fcarful tempests in the Bay of Biscay. The whole (o['(;c, 6,000
bayonets strong, was brought back to Portugal. It might have
been of infinite service to Cradock if it had remained at Lisbon
and had neH~I' been sent to Cadiz, and its presence might have
induced him to adopt measures less timid and futile than those
which (as we shall see) he had pursued during January and
February I,
Dut this unfortunate incident has detained us too long; wc
lllust return to the state of the Spanish armies at the cnd of
the month of January. Beyond the levies of the Marquis Del
Palacio at La Carolina, there WlI!:l a long gap in the Spanish
line of defence. The next foree under arms was the army of
Infantndo, 1l0\\' engaged in its exhausting winter march from
Cuenca to the Mureian border. After the rout of Ucles it was
still 12,000 strong, though destitute of all supplies and not fit
for immediate service. 'TIle JWlta ordered it to march from
Chinchilla to join Del Palacio's force at the mouth of the
DCSpcliu Pcrros, and so to strengthen the defences of Andalusin.
I Napier enlarges on Ulis incident at grMt Icngth in pagcsl4--19 of llis
sccond volume. III his persistent dislike for Canning, Castlercagh ilud
!'Ilr. Frere, as well as for the Spaniards, he concludes that the business
'iudicated au unsettled policy, shallow combillatiOlv aud bad agents Oil
the part of the British Cabinet, and au uuwise and Ullworthy disposition
ill tlle SIl!lrerne JUllta,' while Smith was {zealous and acute' 1l1ld Cradook
'full of zeal and moml courage.' It is hard to give au unqualified asseIlt
to any oue of these views. Smith was wrong in acting without giving any
notice of his intentions to the Junta: Cradock's zeal was equally nil-
tempered by discretion. The British Cabinet, acting Oil the information
available in tile cnd of December, was rigllt to be anxious about Cadiz,
and Cljlmlly right to abandOll its attempt to OOCllPY tIIC place in 1'larch,
when the conditions of the war had changed, and the Junta had showl! itil
dislike to the proposal. As to the Spaniards, the matter was only broached
to tbcm in Febrllar}', when the danger of an immedi.1te French admJlce
IJ!ul l~l.<;!icd away, and they were entirely justified in their answer, II'llich
was framed as lJOlilcly ll.S could bo contrived. 'Vc lllllllt not blamc tllcm
uvermuch for their suspicion: Ellgland, though 1I0\\" a fricnd, had loug
bCCIlILll enemy-lLud the fate of Gibraltar was &1""3y8 before their eycs.
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This was done, and the two forces were safely united, so that
when a few more new battalions had 1x'C1l brought up from
Granada, ~O,OOO men were placed between Victor and Anda~
lusill.. The Junta removed Infantado from command, rightly
judging that he had sacrificed Venegas at Ucles by his neglect to
send orders and his sloth in coming up to join his subordinate.
The charge of the force at La Carolina (still called' the Army
o( the Centre ') was made oyer to Geneml Cnrw.ojul.
Beyond Infantndo's depIcted corps lay the army of Valencia.
Its nucleus was the remains of the old division of Llamas and
Roca, which had served with Castaiios at Tudela. The local
Junta rapidly recruited this skeleton force from 1,500 up to
5,000 men I. They added to it several new regiments raised
c:hn>ing the winter in Valencia and ]\'Iurcia, and by Febmary hfld
10,000 mell available for succouring Aragon and Catalonia,
though their quality left much to be desired.
A little further north Palafox was still holding out with
splendid desperation in Saragossa, where he had shut himself up
with the whole army of Aragon. I-lis original :32,000 men were
alreru:ly much thinned by pestilence and the sword, but iJI January
their ~pil'it wus yet unbroken, and though it was clear that the)'
were doomed to final destruction, if they were not relieved froUl
the outside, yet they were still doing excellent work in detaining
in front of them the whole of the Srd and 5th French Army
Corps.
There yet remains to be described the strongest of all the
Spanish armies, that of Catalonia. In addition to tlle original
garrison of tlle province, snd to it:! gallant '11ligueletes and som(L-
tenes, there had been gradually drafted into the principality
(1) the greater part of the garrison of the Balearic Isles, some
9,000 men; (2) H.eding's Granadan division which started from
it~ home over 10,000 strong; (3) 2,500 men of Caraffa's old
division from Portugul; (4) the Marquis of wan's Aragoncsc
division from the side of Lerida, about 4,000 bayonets. Thus
ill all some :32,000 men in organir,cd corps had been massed in
Catalonia, and the aomatenes added some 20,000 irregulars. or
course the Spanish strength in January did not reach these
figures. Many men had been lost itt the siege of Rosas and in
1 Soo the table ill Arguellcs on p. 74 ofllis Appendix-volumo.
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the battles of Cardadeu and Molins de Rey: )'et there were still
40,000 troops of one sort or another available; the spirit of the
country was irritated mther than lowered by the late defeats;
the French ani)' occupied the ground that was within the n.ctual
circle of fire of their garrisons. If the Catalans had bt>eu COli.
tent to avoid general engagements, and to maintain an incessant
guerrilla warfare, they might have held their own. Though the
enemy had a very capable commander in General St. eyr, they
had as .yet accomplished nothing more than the capture of the
antiqnated fortress of Rosns, the relief of Barcelona, and the
winning of two fruitless battles. Catalonia remained unsulxluoo
till the very end of the struggle.
Reckoning up all their armies, the Jnuta. had in the end or
January some 135,000 men in arms,-a force insufficient to face
the French in the open, for the latter (even after the departure
of the Imperial Guard) had still nearly 000,000 1 sabres and
ba)'onets south of the Pyrenees, but one quite capable of keeping
up the nntiontl.l resistance if it were only condllcted upon the
proper lines. For, as Napolcon and his marshals had yet to
learn, no Spanish district could be considered conquered unless a
garrison was left in each of its towns, and flying columns kellt
in continual motion through the open country. Of the 288,000
:Frellch who now lay in Spain more than half were really wanted
for garrison duty. A district like Galicia was capable of keeping
40,000 men employed; even the plains of Old Castile and Leon
swallowed up whole divisions.
But, unfortunately for Spain, the mania for fighting pitched
battles was still obsessing the minds of her generals. Within
a few weeks three wholly unnecessary and disastrous engage·
ments were to be risked, at Valls, Ciudad Real, and Mcdcllin.
Instead of playing a cautious defensive game, and harassing the
French, the Spaniards persisted in futile attempts to face the
enemy in general actions, for which their troops were wholl),
unsuited. The results were so deplorable that but for a second
British intervention - 'Vellesley's march to Talavera-Andalusia
would hll.ve been in ll.S great peril in July, 1809, as it had beeu
in January.
I 200,000 on Feb. 15. See Napier's extracts from the Impe,-ial muster
rolls, i. .514. lllElE'.e numbers include the sick aud detached.
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The Central Junta must take its share of the responsibility
for this fact no less than the Spanish generals. It still persiste4
in its old error of refusing to appoint a single commander·in-
chief, so that each army fought for its own hand, without any
attempt to co-ordinate its actions with those of the others.
Illde«i se\'eral of the generals were at notorious enmity with
their colleagues-nombly Cuesta and Vcncgas. It WM to no
purpose that the Central Government displuyed great energy
in organizing men and collecting material, if, when the armies
had been equipped and sent to the front, they were used piece-
meal, without any general strategical scheme, and led ere long
to some miserable disaster, such as Ucles, or MedeUin, or Ocana.
T.I'he .Junta, the generals, and the nation were all alike possessed
by the delusion that with energy and sufficient numbers they
might on somc happy morning achieve a second Baylen. But
for such a consummation Duponts and Vedcls arc required. and
when no such convenient adversaries were to be found, the
attempt to encompnss and beat a French army was certain to
end in a catastrophe.
The only Spanish fighters who were playillg the proper game
in 1809 were the Catalonian 80mo.ien£$, and even they gave
battle far too often. and did not adhere with a sufficient perti-
nacity to the harassing tactics of gucrrilla warfarc. Gcneral
Artechc has collccted in his fomth volume somcthing like a
dozen schemes for the expulsion of the French from Spain, which
were laid before the Junta, or ventilated in print, during this
year. It is interesting to see that only one of them advocates
the true line of resistance-the avoiding of battles. the harnssing
of the enemy's flanks and communications, and the employment
of numerous flying bands instead of great masses 1. Somc of
the other plans are the wild imaginings of ignorant fools-one
wiseacre wished to run down the French columns with pikemen
in a sort of Mtu:edonian phalanx, another to arm one-sixth of
the troops with hand-grenades! Dut the majority of the
.Junta's self-constituted advisers thought that numbers were
the only llecessary thing, and proposed to save Spain by crushing
the invaders with levies en '1IUl88e of all persons betw~n sixteen
1 See Arleche. iv. 116-1)1: the advocate of the guerrilla gume was a
certain FaWltino Feruallde-,.
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and fifty - one enthusiast makes the age-limit fourteen to
seventy !
These were the \,jcws of the nation, and the generals and the
Junta were but infected with the common delusion of all their
compatriots. They would not see that courage and raw multi.
tudes are almost helpless when opposed by equal courage
combined with skill, long experience of war, superior tactics,
l1nd intelligent leading.
SECTION X
THE AUTUMN AND WINTER CAMPAIGN
IN CATALONIA
CHAPTER I
THE SIEGE OF ROSAS
BEFORE we follow further the fortunes of Southern Spain, it is
necessary to turn back and to take up the tale of the war on the
Eastern coast at the point where it was left in Section V.
The same torpor which was notable in the operations of the
main armies of the Spaniards and the French during the months
of September and October was to be observed in Catalonia also.
On the 'l'er and the IJobregat the inability of the French to
move was much more real, and the slackness of the Spaniards
even more inexplicable, than Oil the Ebro and the Aragon.
III the early days of September the situation of the invaders
was most perilous. After the disastrous failure of the second
siege of Gerona, it will be remembered that Reille had with-
drawn to Figueras, close to the l'rench frontier, while Duhesme
had cut his way back to Barcelona, after sacrificing all his
o.rtiUery and his baggage on the way. Both commanders
proceeded to report to the Emperor that t.herc was need for
ample reinforcements of veteran troops. or a catastrophe must
inevitably ensue. Meanwhile Reille preserved a defensive atti-
tude at the foot of the Pyrenees; while Duhesme could do no
more than hold Barcelona, and as much of its suburban plain
as he could safely occupy without risking overmuch his out-
lying detachments. He foresaw a famine in the winter, and
devoted all his energies to seizing and sending into the town
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all foodstuffs that he could find in the neighbourhood. His:
position was most uncomfortable: the late expedition had
reduced his force from ]8,000 to 10,000 sabres and bayonets.
The men were demoralized, and when sent out to forage saw
80mateneJ behind every bush and rock. The populace of
Barcelona was awaiting a good opportunity for an t:meute, and
wus in constant communication \'.-ith the insurgents outside.
The blockade was not as yet kept up by any large section
of the Captain-General's regular troops, nor had any attempt
been made to run lines around the place. It was conducted
by an elastic cordon of four or five thousand miqueletes, sup-
ported by no more than 2,000 infantry of the regular army
and possessing five or six field-guns. The charge of the whole
liue was given to the Collde de Caldagues, who had so much
distinguished himself in the previous month by his relief of
Gerona. He had been entrusted with a force too small to
man a circuit of twelve or fifteen miles, so that Duhesmc had
no difficulty in pushing sorties through the line of Spanish
posts, whenever he chose to send out a sufficiently strong column.
But any body that pressed out too far in pursuit of corn or
forage, risked being beset and mishandled on its return march
by the whole of the somatClleJ of the country-side. Hence there
'wns a limit to the power to roam of even the largest expeditions
that Duhesme could spare from his depleted garrison. The
fighting along the blockading cordon was incessant, but never
conclusive. On September 2 0. strong column of six Italian
battalions swept aside the Spaniards for 0. moment in the
direction of San Boy, but a smaller expedition against the
bridge of Molins de Uey was repulsed. The moment that
the Italians returned to Bo.1'(:elona, with the food that they
had scraped together in the villages, Caldagues reoccupied
his old positions. There were many skirmishes but no large
sorties between September 2 and October 12, when Miloscwitz
took out 2,000 men for a cattIe·hWlt in the valley of the Besos.
He pierced the blockading line, routing the miqWJletes of l\1ilans
at San Jeronimo de la. Murtra, and penetrated as far as
Granollers, twenty milcs from Barcelolla, where he madci an
invaluable seizure, the food depOt of the eastern section of the
investing force. But he was now dangerously dist.o.nt froO}
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his base, and as he was returning with his captures, Caldagucs
fell upon him at San Culgat with troops brought from other
parts of the blockadiug line. The Italians were routed with
a loss of 300 men I, and their convoy was recaptured. After
this Duhesme made no more attempts to send expeditions far
afield: in spite of a growing scarcity of food, be could not
afford to risk the loss of any more men by pushing his sorties
into the inland.
Meanwhile Reille at Figueras was in wellnigh as forlorn
a situation. His communications with Perpignan were open,
so that he had not, like Duhesme, the fear of starvation before
hill c.yes, But in other respects he was almost as badly oll':
the somatenes were always worrying his outposts, but this was
only a secondary trial. The main trouble was the want of
clothing, transport, and equipmcnt: thc heterogeneous mob of
batailkms de 1TUlrcne, of Swiss and 'l'uscan conscripts, had been
hurried to the frontier without any proper preparations: this
mattered comparatively little during the summer; but when the
autumn eold began Reille found that troops, who had neither
tents nor greatcoats, and whose original summer uniforms were
now worn out, could not keep the field. His mnks were so
thinned by dysentery and rheumatic affections that he had
to put the men under cover jn Figueras and the neighbouring
towns, and even to withdraw to Perpignan some of his battalions,
whose clothing was absolutely dropping to pieces. His cavalry,
for want of forage in the Pyrenees, were sent back into Languedoc,
whcrc oceupation was found for them by Lord Cochrane who
wus conducting il. series of daring raids on the coast villages
betwccn the mouth of the Rhone and that of the Tcch 2. lkillc
continued to solicit the war minister at Paris for clothing and
transport, but could get nothing from him: all the resources
of the empire were being strained in September and October
to fit out the main army, which was about to enter Spain
on the side of Biscay, and Napoleon refused to trouble himself
about such a minor force as the corps at Figllcras.
The Spaniards, therefore, had in the autumn months a unique
opportunity for striking at the two isolated French forces In
1 So Vacani. Lafl'aillegives the incredible figure of 48!
, Soo C?Cbranc's Autobiography, pp. 269-8ii,
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Catalonia, Two courses were open to them: the)' might hnw:
turned their main army against Barcelona, and attempted to
besiege instead of merely to blockade J)llhesme: or on the other
hand thcy miglit have left n merc cordon of I>'Qmntetles around
Duhesme, lInd have sent all their regulars to join the le\"ies of
the north and sweep Ueille ncross the Pyrenees. The resources
at their disposition were fal' from contemptible: nlmost the
whole garrison of the Balearic Isles having disembal'ked in
Catalonia, there were now some 12,000 regulars in the Prin-
cipality, and the local Junta had put so much cncrgy into the
equipment of the numerous tercws of mique1etes which it had
raised, that the larger half ,of them, at least 20,000 men, were
more or lcss ready for the field. Moreover they were awm·c that
large reinforcements were at hand. Retling's Granadan division,
10,000 strong, was marching up from the south, and was due
to urrivc early in Noyember. The Aragonese division under
the Marquis of Lazall, which had been detached from the army
of Palafox, was already at Lerida. Valencia had sent up a line
regiment I, and the remains of the di vision of Cnrafla from
Portugal were being brought round by sea to the mouth of
the Ebro 2. Altogether 20,000 men of new troops were on
the way to Catalonia, and the first of them had already come
on the scene.
Unfortunately the l\Iarquis Del Pnlncio, the new Captain"
General of Catalonia, though well-intentioned, was slow and
undecided to the verge of absolute torpidity. Beyond allowing
his energetic subordinate Caldagues to keep up the blockade of
Barcelona he did practically nothing. A couple of thousand of
his regulars, based 011 Gerona and Rosas, lay opposite Reille,
but were far too weak to attack him. About 8,000 under
Caldagucs were engaged in the operations around Barcelona.
The rest the Captain.General held back and did not use. All
through September he lay idle at Tnrragona, to the great
disgust of the local Junta, who at IllSt sent such allgrycomplaints
1 Two bnfulious of the 2nd of Savoia: the old rcgimcat of the name hlld
been completed to four battalions, two were with Cast.:l.iios and called 1st
of Savoia, the other two came to Catalonia.
t Four batt,lioll8 of Provincial Grenadiers of Old and New Castile had
alre....ldy come up.
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to Aranjuez that the Centrnl Junta recalled him, and replaced
him by Vives the old Captain-General of the Baleari~ Islands, who
took o"er the command on October 28.
This gave a ~hange of commander but not of policy, for Vivcs
was as slow and incapable as his predecessor. We ha"e already
had occasion to mention the trouble that he gave in August,
when he refused to send his troops to the mainland till actually
compelled to yield by their mutiny. 'Vhen he took over the
charge of operations he found 20,000 foot and 1,000 horse at his
dispositioll, and the French still on the defensive both at
Barcelona and at Figueras. He had a splendid opportunity,
and it was not yet too late to strike hard. But all that he
chose to attempt was to turn the blockade of Barcelona into an
investment, by tightening the cOl'doll round the place. To lay
siege to the city does not seem to have been within the scope of
his intentions, but on November 6 he moved up to the line of
the IJobregat with U,OOO infantry and 700 horse, mostly
regulars. He had opened negotiations with secret friends within
the walls, and had aITanged that when the whole forces of
Duhesme were sufficiently occupied in resisting the assault from
outside, the populace should takc arms and cndeavour to seize
und throw open one of tbe gates. But matters nc\'er got to this
point: on Novcmber 8 sc\'cral Spanish <:olumns moved in nearer
to Barcelona, and began to skirmish with the outposts of the
garrison. Dut the attack was incoherent, and never pressed
home. Vives then waited till the ~6thJ when he had received
more reinforcements, the first brigade of neding's long*expeeted
Grtllladan division. On that day another gencral assault on
Duhesme's outlying posts was delivered, and this time with con-
siderable success: several of the suburban villages were carried,
over a. hundred li'renchmen were captured, and the line of
blockade was drawn close under the walls. Duhesme hud no
longer any hold outside the city. But Darcclona was strong,
and its garrison, when concentrated within the place, was just
numerous enough to hold its own. Duhesme had thought for
a moment of evacuating the city and retiring into the citadel
and the fortress of Montjuich: but on mature consideration he
resolved to cling as long as possible to the whole circuit of the
town. He had heard that an army of relief was at last on
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the wa)" and made up his mind to yield no inch without
compulsion.
Thus Vives wasted another month without any adequate
results: he had, with the whole field army of Catalonia, done
nothing more than turn the French out of their first and
weakest line of defence. The fortress was intact, and to all
intents and purposes might have been observed a.~ well by
10,000 8omute11e8 as by the large force which Vives had
brought against it.
Meanwhile the enemy, utterly unopposed on the line of the
Pyrenees, was getting together a formidable host for the relief
of Barcelona. When he had recognized that Reille's extem-
porized army was insufficient alike in quantity and in quality for
the task before it, the Emperor had directed on Perpignan (as
we have already seen 1) two strong divisions of the Army of Italy,
one composed of ten French battalions under General Souham,
the other of thirteen Italian battalions. The order to dispatch
them had only been given on August 10, and the regiments,
which had to be mobilized and equipped, and then to lllarch up
from Lombardy to the roots of the Pyrenees, did not begin to
arrive at Perpignnn till September 14: the (l.l"tillery, and the
troops which came from the more distant points, onl,Y appeared
on October ~8. Even then there was a further week's delay, for
the Emperor had monopolized for the main arm~', on the side of
the Bidassoa, all the available battalions of the military train:
the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees had no transport save that
which the regiments had brought with thelll, llnd it was with
the greatest difficulty that a few hundred mules and some open
carts were collected from the French border districts. It was
only on November 5 that the army erossed the Pj'renccs, by the
great pass between Bellegarde and La Junquera.
The officer placed in command was General Gouvion St. Cyr,
who aftcl"ll'ards won his marshal's Moon in the Russian war of
1812. He was a general. of first-rate ability, who had served all
through the waTS of the Revolution with marked distinction:
but he disliked Bonaparte and had not the art to hide the fact.
This had kept him back from earlier promotion. St. Cyr was
by no means an amiable characlcr: he was detested by his
I vo!. i. p. 333.
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officers and his troops as a confirmed grumbler, and selfish to an
increrlible degree 1. He was onc of those men who can alwap;
show admirable and convincing reasons for not helping their
neighbours. C'6lait tm malt'(:al.s compagnfm de lit, gaid one of
the many colleagues, whom he had left in the lurch, while play-
ing his own gamc. From his morose bearing and his dislike fur
company he had got the nickname of'le hilxJUo.' He was cautious,
cool·headed, and ready of resource, so that his troops had full
confidence in him, though he never commanded their liking.
E"en from his history of the Catalonian war, one can gather the
character of the man. It is admirably lucid, and illustrated with
original documents, Spanish no less than French, in a fashion
only too rare alllong the military books of the soldiers of the
Empire. But it is not only entirely self~centred, but full of
malevolent insinuations concerning J)'apoleon and the author's
colleagues. In his first chapter he broaches the e>,."iraordinary
theory that Napoleon handed over to him the Catalonian army
without resources, money, or transport, in order that he might
make (l fiasco of thc campaign and min his reputation! He
actually seems to have belic\'ed that his master disliked to have
battles won for him by offieers who had not owed to him the
beginning of their fortunes 2, and would have been rather pleased
than otherwise to see the attempt to relie\'e Barcelona end in
a failurc.
These are, of course, the vain imaginings of a jealous and
suspicious hypochondriac. It is true that Napoleon disliked
St. eyr, but he did not want to see the campaign of Catalonia
end in a disaster. He gave the new general a fine French
division of "cteran troops, and, as his letter to the Viceroy
Eugime Beauharnais shows, the picked regiments of the whole
1 For several curious and interesting stories conceruing St. C)'r, the
reader may scawh the third volume of .Ml1rbot's Mbnoirell, .Marbot is
.not an authority to be followed with much coufidence, but the picture
drawn oftho marshal is borno out by oUlCr and better writers.
I 'On ne pourra pas l!chapper ilia pensee que Napoleon, ave<: sa force
immeo9C, a cU; a.ssez faible poUf ne vouloir que des sucees obtollus par
lui-mcme, ou du moins sous .'IllS yeul:. Autremeot on cut t1it qUIl la victoire
(;tait pour llli utle offense: it en voulait surtout ilia fortulle quaud elle
favorisait lcslI.nnes d'offieiers qui ne lui t1evlI.ieut 1)llS leur ~1~vlI.tioll,· Journal
de rArmh de Catalog7le, p. 2(1.
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Italian army. The Seventh Corps mustered in all more than
40,000 men, and 25,000 of these were concentrated under
St. eyr's hand at Perpignnn and Figueras. It is certain that the
troops were not well equipped, and that the auxiliary services
were ill represented. But this was not from e.'l:ceptional malice
on Napoleon's part: he Wa!> always rather inclined to starve an
army with which he was not present in person, and at this
moment every resource was being strained to fit out the main
tim::e which were to deliver the great blow at Madrid. Catalonia.
was but 0. • side show': tllld when St. Cyr tries to prove 1 that it
was the most important theatre of war in the whole peninsula,
he is but ex30t:rgerating, after the common fashion of poor
humanity, the greatness of his own task and his own victories.
Before starting from Perpignan St. eyr refitted, as best he
could, the dilapidated battalions of Reille, which were, he says,
in such a state of nudity that those who had been sent back
within the French border had to be kept out of public view from
moti\'cs of mere decency 2. The whole division had suffered so
much from exposure that instead of taking the field with the
8,000 men which it possessed in August, it could present only
5,500 in November, after setting aside a battalion to garrison
Figueras 3.
But though Reille was weak, and the division of Chabot
(a mere corps of two Neapolitan battalions and one regiment of
National Guards) was an almost negligible quantity, the troops
newly arrived from Italy were both numerous and good in
quality. Souham's ten French battalions had 7,000 bayonets,
Pino's thirteen Italian battaliolls had 7,300.. Their cavalry con-
sisted of one French and two Italian regiments, making 1,700
sabres. The total force disposable conSisted of 23,680 men, of
whom 2,096 were cavnlry, and about 500 artillery. In this
figure are not included the National Guards and depOts left
behind to garrison Bellegarde, Montlollis, and other pllLCCs
I St. eyr, p. 23.
~ Ibid., p. l!l
• :For composition see the table of the 7th Corps in Appendix ofvol. i.
'111e figure6 gh'en by St. eyr are Pino 8,3G8, Souham 7,712, Chabot 1,988,
li.eille 4,000. The last is a1.l understatement, as SllOwn by the morning
~1:atc of Reille's tlivisiol.l ill Belmll8, H. 4.56, whitll showB 4,612 excludillg
the garrison of Figuerall, more than 1,000 strollg.
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within the French frontier, but anI)' the troops available for
opemtions within Catalonia.
On his way to Perpignan, St. eyr had visited the Emperor at
Paris, so as to receive his orders in person. Napoleon informed
him that he left him carte bkuu:he as to all details; the onc thing
all which he insistL>d was that Barcelona must be preserved: 'si
vous perdiez cette place,je ne la reprendrais pas avec quatre-vingt
mille hommes.' This then was to be the main object of the
coming campaign: there were about two months available for
the task, for Duhesme reported that, though food was growing
scarce, he could hold out till the end of December. To lessen
the number of idle mouths in Barcelona. he had been ghing
pennits to dcpar$ to many of the inhabitants, and expelling
others, against whom he could find excuses for severity.
The high~road from Figueras to Barcelona was blocked by the
fortress of Gerona., whose previous resistance in July and August
showed that its capture would be a tedious and difficult matter.
St. eyr calculated that he had not the time to spare for the
siege of this pln.cc: long ere he could expect to take it, Duhesme
would be starved out. He made up his mind that he would
have to march past Gerona. and as the high-road is commanded
by the guns of the city, he would be forced to take with him no
heavy guns or baggage, but only light artillery and pack-mules,
which could use the bypaths of the mountains. It was his first
duty to relieve Barcelona b)' defeating the main army of Vives.
When this had been done, it would be time enough to think
of the siege of Gerona.
But there was another fortress which St. Cyr resolved to clear
out of his way before starting to aid Duhesme. On the sea-
shore, only ten miles before E'igueras, lies the litUe town of
Rosas, which blocks the route that crawls under the cliffs from
Perpignan and Port-Vendres to the Ampurdam. The moment
that the French army advanced south from Figuera.s, it would
have Rosas on its flank. and even small e....pcditions based on the
plaec could make certain of cutting the high-road, and intcrt:ept-
iug all communications between the base and the field force that
had gone fm"ward. But it was more than likely that the
Spaniards would land a considerable body of troops in Rosas,
for it hus llU excellent harbour, llnd every facility for disembarkll-
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tion. Several English men-oC-war were lying there; it served
them as their shelter and port of call while they watched for the
l?rench ships which tried to run into Dllfcdona with provisions,
from Marseilles, Cctte, or Port-Vendres. Alrendy they had
captured many vessels which endeavoured to pierce the blockade.
St. Cyr therefore was strongly of opinion that he ought to
make an end of the garrison of Rosas before starting on his
expedition to aid Duhesme. The place was strategically impor·
tant, but its fortifications were in such bad ordel' that he imagined
that it might be reduced in a few days. The town, which counted
no more than 1,500 souls, consisted of El. single long street running
along the shore. It was covered by nothing more than a ditch
and an earthwork, resting at one end on a w,gak redoubt abo\'e
the beach, and at the other upon the citAdel. The latter formed
the strength of the place: it was a pent8.bronal work, regularly
constmeted, with bastions, and a scarp and counterscarp re\'eted
with stone, But its resisting power was scriously diminished by
the fact that the bITeat breach which the French had made during
its last siege in 1794 had never been properly repaired, The
government of GOOoy had neglected the plluo'c, and, when the
insurrection began, the Catalans had found it still in ruins, and
had merely built up the gap with loose stones and barrels fiUed
with earth, A good battering train would bring down the
whole of these futile patehings in a few days, A mile to the
right of the citadel was 0. dctached work, the Fort of the Trinity,
placed above a rocky promontory which forms the south-eastern
hom of the harbour. It had been built to protect ships lying
before the place from being annoyed by besiegers. The Trinity
was built in an odd and ingenious fashion: it was commanded
at the distance of only 100 yards by the rocky hill of Puig-Rom:
to prevent ill effects from a plunging fire from this elevation, its
front had been raised to a great height, so as to protect the interior
of the work from molestation. A broad tower 110 feet high
CO\ued the whole side of the castle which faces inland. 'No-
thing in short, for a fortress commanded by adjacent heights,
could have been better adapted for holding out against offensive
operations, or worse adapted for replying to them. The French
battery on the cliff was too elevated for artillery to reach, while
the tower, which prevented their shot from reaching the body
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of the fort, also prevented any return fire at them, e,'en if the fort
had possessed artillery. In consequence of the elevated position
of the French on the cliff, the)' could only breach the central por-
tion of the tower. 'fhe lowest part of the breach they made
was nearly sixty feet above its base, so that it could only be
reached by long scaling ladders I.' It is seldom that a besieger
Ims to complain of the difficulty caused to him Py the possession
of ground completely dominating a place that he has to reduce:
but in the course of the siege of Fort Trinity the French wefe
undoubtedly incommoded by the height of the Puig-Rom. The
garrison below, hidden in good bomb-proofs and covered by the
tower, suffered little harm from their fire. To batter the whole
towCl' to pieces, by a downward fire, wns too long and serious
a business for them; they merely tried to breach it,
If the ground in front of Fort Trinity was too high for the
French, that of the town of Rosas was too low, It was so
marshy that in wet weather the ditches of their siege works
filled at once with water, and their parapets crumbled into
liquid mud. The only approach on ground of convenient flrm~
ness and elevation was opposite a comparatively narrow front
of the south~eastem comer of the place.
The garrison of Rosas, when St. eyr undertook its siege, was
commanded by Colonel Peter O'Daly, an officer of the Ultonia,
who had distinguished himself at Gerona; it was composed of
a skeleton battalion (150 men) of the governor's own Irish corps,
of half the light infantry regiment :!nd of Darcelona, of a com-
pany of WimpfT'en's Swiss regiment, and 120 gunners. These
were regulars: of new levies there were the two fnjqlWlete terciw of
Lerida and Igualada, with some companies of those of Bcrga and
1 Lord Coehrane's Autobiography, i. 303. He adds' A prettr correct
idea of our relath'e positions may be formed if the unnautical reader will
imagine our small force placed in the nave of Westmiuster Abbey, with
the enemy attacking the great western tower from the snmmit of a cliff
100 feet higher thall the tower, &0 that the breach in course of formation
«lrrcsponds to the great west window of the Abbe)'. It was no easy
matter to them to scale the external wall of tlle tower np to the great
Ivilldow, nud more difficult still to get down from the wiudow into tho
body of tho church. These were the pointli I lmd to pro,<ide against,
for we could not prevent the I<'rench either from breaching or from
storming.•
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Figueras. The whole force was exnctly 3,000 strong. It would
be wrong to omit the mention of the British succours which
took part in the defence. There lay in the harbour the Ex-
cellent, 74, and two bomb-vessels: when the Exceflent departed
on November!!l she was replaced by the Fame, another 74-gun
ship, and during the last days of the siege Lord Cochranc in
his well·known frigate the bnpericuse was also present. It is
well to remember their exact force, for the French narrators
of the leaguer of Rosas are prone to call them 'the British
squadron,' a term which seems rather too magnificent to apply
to 1I. group of vessels never numbering more than onc line-of-
battle ship, one frigate, and two bomb-vessels.
St. Cyr moved forward on November 5, with the four divisions
of Souham, Pino, Reille, and Chabot, which (as ~ve have seen)
amounted in all to abont 28,000 men. He had resolved to use
Pino and Reille-some U,OOO men-for the actual siege, and
Souham and Chahot for the covering work. Accordingly the
weak division of the last-named officer was left to watch the
ground at the foot of the passes, in the direction of Figueras
and La Jnnquero., while Souham took up the line of the river
Flnvin, which lay llCross the path of any relieving force that
might come from the direction of Gerona. St. Cyr remained
with the covering army, and gave the conduct of the siege to
Rcille, perhaps because he had already made one attack all the
town in August.
On November 6 Rcille marehed down to the sea, driving
before him the Spanish outlying pickets, and the peasantry oC
the suburban villages, who took refuge with their cattle in
Rosas. On the scventh the investment began, Rcille's own
division taking its position on the marshy ground opposite the
town, while rino encamped more to the left,. upon the height:!
that faLoe the fort of the Trinity. The head quarters were estab-
lished at the "ilJage of Palau. A battalion of the 2nd Italian
light infantry was placed far hack, to the north-east, to keep off
the somatenes of the coast villages about Llanza and Selva de Mar
from interfering in the siege.
Next day the civil population of Rosas embarked on fishing-
\'cssels and small merchantmen, and departed to the south,
abandoning the whole town to the garrison. They just missed
1808] DEFENCE OF FORT TRINIDAD 49
seeing some sharp fighting. The covering party who had been
detached to the neighbourhood of Llanza were beset during a
dense mist by the $01TudClIe8 of the coast: two companies were
Cllt to pieces or captured; the rest were saved by General Fontane,
who led out three battuliolls from Fino's lines to their assiSl:allce.
'Vhile this engagement was in progress, the garrison sallied out
with 2,000 men to beat up the main camp of the Italians; they
were repulsed after a sharp tight; the majority got back to the
citadel, but one party being surrounded, Captain West of the
Excellent landed with 250 of his seamen and marines, cut, his
way to them, and brought them off in safety. West had his
horse shot under him (a curious note to have to make concerning
a naval officcr), and lost ten mcn wounded.
After the eighth thcre followed sevcn days of contumous min,
which tumed the camp of Reille's division into a marsh, and
effectually prevented the construction of siege works in the low~
lying ground opposite to the to\m. The only active operation
that could be undertaken was nn attempt to storm the fort of
the Trinity,which the French believed to be in far worse condition
than was actually the case. It was held by eighty Spaniards,
under the Irish LicutellCl.Ilt-Colonel Filzgcmld, and twenty-
five of the E'I.'Cellents marines. The six volligcur and grenadier
companies of the 2nd Italian light. infantry delivered the assault
with great dash and resolution. But as the strong frontal tower
of the fort was high and unbreached, they could make no impres-
sion, their ladders proved useless, aud the}' were repulsed with
a loss of sixty mell. Their leader, the chif-de-bataillon Lange,
and several other officcrs were left dead at the foot of the walls.
Seeing that nothing was to be won by mere escil.lade, Reille
had to wait for his siege artiller}', which began to arrive from
Perpignan on November l6. He at once started two batteries
on the Puig~Rom to breach the Fort of the Trinity, and when
the ground had begun to grow dry in front of the town, opened
trenches opposite its north-eastern angle. ''Vhen 0. good emplace·
nu:nt had been found a battery was established which played
upon the eitnde1, and commll.nded 80 much of the harbour tho.t
Reille hoped that the British ships would be compelled to shift
their anchorage further out to sea. The Spanil.lJ'dB and the
I James's NaooJ Hi8/.Qry, \., p, 00,
OMAN. U I::
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Excellent replied with such a heavy fire that in 0. few bours the
battery was silenced, after its powder magazine had been exploded
by a lucky shell [November 19].
Next day, however, the French repaired the damage and
mounted more guns, whose fire proved so damaging that Captain
'Vest had to'move further from the shore. 'l'he assailants had
established a marked superiority over the fire of the besieged,
and availed themselves of it by pushing out parallels nearer to
the town, and building four more breaching batteries. With
these additional resources they began to work serious damage in
the trustable bastions of the citadel. They also knocked a hole
in the Fort of the Trinity: but the breach was 00 far from the
foot of the wall that it was still almost inaccessible, the heaps. of
rnbbish which fell into the ditch did not even reach the lowest
part of the gap.
On the twenty-first the Excellent was relieved by the Famt,
and Captain ,"Vest handed over the task of co·opcrllting with the
Spaniards to Captain Bennett. The latter thought so ill of the
state of aOam, that after two days he withdrew his marines
from the Trinity Fort, an action most discoumging to the
Spaniards. But at this juncture there arrived in the bay the
Irnph-ieuse frigate, with her indefatigable commandant Lord
Cochrane, a host in himself for such a desperate enterprise lIS
the defence of the much-battered town. He got leave from hill
superior officer to continue the defence, and manned the Trinity
~rrain with his own seamen and marines. They had hardly
established themselves there, when the Jtalian brigade of Mazzu·
chclli made a second attempt to storm the fort: but it was
repulsed wilitout even having reached the foot of the breach.
Cochrane, seeing that the battery which was playing on the
Trinity Wll.$ on the very edge of a precipitous cliff, resolved to
try whether it would not be possible to surprise it at night, b,.
landing troops on the beach at the back of the Puig-Rom; if they
could get possession of the gullS for a few minutes he hoped to
cast them over the declivity on to the rocks below. O'Daly lent
him 700 'nJ-iquelete8 from the garrison of the town, and this foree
was put ashore with thirty of the ImpfricU$e'8 marines who were to
lead the assllult. The Italians, .however, were not caught sleep-
ing, the attack failed, and the assa.ilants were beaten back to
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the rocks" by the beach, with the loss of ten killed and twenty
,;,ounded, beside prisoners 1, The boats of the frigate only brought
off SOO men. but many more escaped along the beach into
the hilly country to the eJl!lt, and were neither captured nor
slain [November 25]. The sortie, however, had been disastrolls,
and the Governor, O'Daly, was so down-hearted at the loss· of
men and at the WilY in which the wnlls of the citadel were
crumbling before his eyes, that he began to think of. surrender.·
Nor was he much to blame, for the state of things was so bud
that it was evident that unless some new factor was introduced
into the siege, the end was not far off. The utter improbability
of relief from without was demonstrated on the twentywfourth.
Julian Alva.rez, the Governor of Gerona and commander of the
Spanish forces ill the Ampurdam, was perfectly well aware that
it was his duty to do what be could for the succour of Rosas.
But his forces were insignificant: Yives had only given him
fl,OOO r~"lllar troops to watch the whole line of the Eastern
Pyrenees, and of this small force half was shut up in Rosas.
Ne\·ertheless Alvarez sallied out from Gerona with two weak
battalions of Ultonia and Barben, and half of the light infantry
regiment of Barcelona. Picking up 'S,OOO local mUjlleleteJ he
advanced to the line of the Fluvia, whel'e SOllham was lying,
with the division that St. eyr had told off to cover the siege.
The Spaniards drove in the French outposts at several points,
hut immediatel)· found themselves opposed by very superior
numbers, and brought to a complete stand. Realizing that he
was far too weak to do anything, Alvarez retreated to Gerona
after a sharp skirmish. If he had pushed on he would infallibly
have been destroyed. O'Daly received prompt news of his
colleague's discomfiture, nnd SiLW that relief was impossible.
The fact was that Vivcs ought to have brought up from Barcc·
Iona his whole field army of ~O,OOO men. 'With such a host
Souham could have been driven back, and Reille compelled to
relnx the investment, perhaps even to raise the siege. But the
I Compare the nllrJ'lltil'o of Lord CO<lhraneJ i. 200-300, with thOlle of
.BelmllS, ii. 441, and St. Cyr. TIle latter is, of course, wrong in saying that
the wbole sortie W38 composed of British seamen and marinea. It is
curious that CO<lhrane states his own loss at more than the French claimed
to have killed Ot taken.
,2
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Captain-General preferred to waste his men and his time in tlu~
futile blockade of Duhesme, who could have be€n just as well
'contained' by 10,000 $(ymafenea as by the main Spanish ann)' of
Catalonia. The only attempt which Vivcs madc to 8trengthcn
his force in the Ampurdam was to order up to Gerona the
Aragonese division of 4,000 men under the Marquis of~
.....hich was lying at Lcrida. This force arrived too late for the
skirmish on the F1uvia, and when it did appear was far too
small to accomplish anything. Alvarez and Lnzan united had
only 8,000 bayonets, while St. Cyr's whole army (as we hare
already seen) was ~5,OOO strong, and quite able to maintain the
siege, and at the samc time to provide a. covering force against
a relievhlg army so weak as that which now lay at Gerona.
111e siege operations meanwhile were pushed on. Fresh batteries
were established to sweep the harbour, and to render more
difficult the communication of the citadel and the Trinity fort
with the English ships. A new attack was started against the
eastern front of the town, and measures were taken to concentrate
a heavier fire on the dilapidated bastion of the citadel, which
had be€n destroyed in the old siege of 1794 and nC\'er properl)'
repaired. On the twenty-sixth an assault was directed by
Pino's division against the town front. This was defended by
no more than a ditch and earthwork: the Italians carried it at
the first rush, but found morc difficulty in evicting the garrison
from the mined houses along the shore. Five hundred miquelda,
who were barricaded among them, made a very ohstinate
resistance, and were only driven out after shaT fighting. One
hundred. and sixty were taken prisoners, less than a hUlldred
escaped into the citadel: the rest perished. The besiegers at
once established. a lodgement in the town, covering themselves
with the IllllSQllry of the demolished hou8Cs. It was in vain tha.t
the Fame and Impb'ie/J8e ran close in shore and tried to batter
the Italians out of the ruins. They inflicted considerable loo,
but failed to prcvent the enemy from fInding shelter. Next
night the lodgement in the town was connected with the rest or
the sicb"C works, llnd used as the buse for an attack against II
hitherto unmolested. front of the citadel.
Just afl.er the storming of the town, the garrison received the
only succour, which was sent to it during the whole siege; a weak
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battalion of regulars from the regiment of BorboD was put
ashore near the citadel under cover of the darkness. It would
have been more useful on the preceding day, for the defence of
the outer works. After the arrival of this small succour the
Governor, 0'Oa1y, sent eighty men of the Irish regiment of
Ultonia to reinforee Cochrane in the Trinity fort, withdrawing
a similar number of miquelefcs to the citadel.
The gullS established by the besiegers in their new batteries
among the ruins of the town made such good practice upon the
front of the citadel that Reille thought it worth while on the
twenty-eighth to summon the Governor to surrender. 0'D111y
made a becoming answCI', to the effect that his defences were
still intact and that he was prepared to continne his resistance.
To cut him off from his communication with the sea, the only
side from which he could expect help, Reille now began to build
batteries along the water-front of tlle town, which commanded
the landing-places below the citadel. The English ships proved
unable to subdue tllese new guns, and their power to help
O'Daly was seriously diminished. It was only under co,'er of the
darkness that they could send boats to land men or stores for
the citadel. On the thirtieth they tried to take off the sick
and wounded, who were now growing very numerous in the place:
but the shore-batteries having hit the headmost boat, the rest
drew off and abandoned the attempt. The prospects of the
garrison had grown most gloomy.
Meanwhile the Trinity fort had been perpetually battered
for ten days, and the hole in the great frontal tower was grow·
ing larger. It can hardly be called a breach, as owing to the
impossibilit), of searching the lower courses of the wall by the
plunging fire from the Puig-Rom, the lowest edge of the gap
was forty feet from the ground. The part of the tower which
had been opened was the upper section of a lofty bomb-proof
casemate, which composed its ground story. Lord Cochrane
built up, with the debris that feU inwards, and with hammocks
tilled with earth and sand, new walls inside the bomb proof,
cutting oft' the hole from the interior of the tower; thus enemies
entering at the gap would find that they had only penetrated
into the upper part of a sort of cellar. The ingenious captain
also set a long slide or shoot of greased planks just under the
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lip of the hole, so that anr one stepping in would be precipitatei
thirty feet into the bottom of the CIlScmate. But the men:
sight of this mantrap, as he called it, proved enough for tht
enemy, who never pushed the atta9k into it.
On November 80 Pino's division assaulted the fort, the
storming party being composed of six grenadier and voltigeur
companies of the 1st and 6th Italian regiments. They came {t
with great courage, and planted their l<0ders below the great
hole, amid a heavy fire of qmsketry from the garrison. The
leaders succeeded in reaching the edge of the' breach,' but find·
ing the chasm and the ' mantrap' before them, would not entS',
They were all shot down: grenades were dropped ill profusiUl
into the mass at the foot of the ladders, and after a time the
stormers fled back under cover, leaving two officers and fori:'
men behind them. They were rallied and brought up agaiJ:
to the foot of the breach, but recoiled after a second and IESi
desperate attempt to enter. The garrison lost only three met
-killed and two wounded, of whom four were Spaniards. They
captured two prisoners, men who had got so far forward that
they do.rcd not go back under the terribJe fire which swept tilt
foot of the tower. 'l'hese unfortunates had to be taken into
the fort by a rope, so inaccessible w~ the supposed breach
After this bloody repulse, the besiegers left Lord Cochraoe
alone, merely continuing to bombard his tower, and throwing up
entrenchments on the beach, from which they kept up an inces-
san~ musketry fire 011 the difficult landing-place by which the
fort communicated with the ships.
Their main attention was now turned to the citadel, whEre
O'Daly's position was growing hopeless. l'l1teir practice,' 8&Jl
Cochrane, 'was beautiful. So accurately was their artillery
conducted that every discharge" ruled a straight line" al()n~
the lower purt of the walls. 'l'his being repented till the upper
portion was vtithout support, as a matter of course the whole
fell into the ditch, forming a breach of easy ascent. The
whole proceedings were clearly dsible from the Trinity I.' On
December 8 the Governor played his last card : the worst of the
damage was being done by the advanced batteries placed among
the ruins of the h?wn, and it was from this point that the
I CochrnllCJ AutooiogrophYJ i. 3Q'7.
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impending assault would evidently be delivered. O'Daly there-
fore picked 500 of his best men, opened a postern gate, and
launched them at night upon the besiegers' works. The sortie
was delivered with great dash and vigour: the trench bl'llLl.rd.s
were swept away, the breaching batteries were seized, and the
Spaniards began to throw down the parapets, spike the guns,
and set fire to the platforms and fascines. But hea,'Y reserves
came up from the French camp, and their attack could not be
resisted. Before any very serious damage had been done, the
besieged were driven out of the trenches by sheer force of num-
bers, and forced to retire to the citadel, leaving forty-five dead
behind them. Reille acknowledged the loss of one officer and
twelve men killed, and nineteen men wounded.
On the fourth the siege works were pushed forward to within
200 yards of the walls of the citadel, and the breach already
established ill the dilapidated bastion was enlarged to a. great
breadth. ~. dMk the French engineers got forward as far
as the eounterscarp, and reported that an assnult was prac-
ticable, and could hardly fail. The same fact was perfectly
evident to O'Daly, who seut out a parlementaire to Wlk for
terms. He offered to surrender in return for leave to take his
btfU'rison off by sea. Reille naturally refused, as the Spaniards
were at his mercy, and enforced an unconditional surrender.
The state of things being visible to Lord Cochrane on the
next morning, he hastily evacuated the Trinity fort, which it
was useless to hold a/'ler the citadel had fallen. His garrison,
100 Spaniards and eighty British sailors and marines, had to
descend from the fort by rope ladders, as the enemy commanded
the proper point of embarkation. 'l1lCy were taken off by the
boats of the Farm: and Impericuse under a heavy musketry fire,
but suffered no appreciable loss. The magazine was left with a
slow match burning, and exploded, ruining the fort, before the
garrison had got on board their ships.
St. Cyr, in his journal of the war in Catalonia, sug~sts that
Bcnnett and Cochmlle ought to hiLve tried to take off the garri-
SOil or the citadel in the same fashion. But this WWl practically
impossible: the communication between the citadel and the sea
had been lost for some days, the French batteries along the beach
rendering the approach of boats too dangerous to be attempted.
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If Captain Bennett had sent in the limited supply of boats that
the Pame, the lmperieu,se and the two smaller vessels 1 possessed
they would probably have been destroyed. For they would
have had to make many return journeys in order to remove
2,500 men, under the fire of heavy guns placed only ~oo or
300 yards away from the landing-place. ·It was quite another
thing to remove 180 men from the Trinity, where the enemy
could bring practically nothing but musketry to bear, and where
the whole of the garrison could be taken off ut n single trip.
Another futile charge made by the French against the British
navy, is that the Pame shelled the beach near the citadel while
the captive garrison was marching out, und killed several of the
unfortunate Spaniards. If the incident happened at all (there
is no mention of it in Lord Cochrane or in James) it must have
been due to an attempt to damage the French trenches; Captain
Bennett could not have known that the passing column consisted
of Spaniards. '1'0 insinuate that the mistake was deliberate, as
does Belmas, is simply malicious z.
O'Daly went into captivity with 2,866 men, leaving about
400 more in hospital. The total of the troops who had taken
part in the defence, including the J."Cinforeements received by
sea, had been about 3,500, so that about 700 must have perished
in the siege. The French loss had been at least as great-
Pino's division alolle lost thirty officers and 400 men killed and
wounded s, besides many sick. It is probable that the total
diminution in the ranks of Ueille's two divisions was over 1,000,
the bad weather having told very heavily on the ill-equipped
troops.
So ended an honourable if not 1\ ver), desperate defence. The
place was doomed from the first, when once the torpid and pW'.
blind Vives had made up his mind to keep his whole force
concentrated round Barcelona, and to send no more than the
1 These were the two bomb-vessels MeteOT and Lucifer. TIle Magni--
fioont 74 came up the same day, but after tlle evacuation of the Triuity.
1 St. Cyr does not say so (p. 60), but only that the Spaniards imagined
that it was doue deliberately. .BeImas (p. ii. 453) asks if it was not
irritatioll 011 the part of the British. Arteche does not repulse the silly
suggc!!tion, as he reasonably might (iv. 270).
, Bcl.mas, H. 454, and Vacani, it 316) agree ill UlCBe 6KUrCS.
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insignificant division of Alvarez and Lnzan to the help of
O'Daly. Considering the dilapidated condition of the citadel
of Ro5aSt and the almost untenable state of the town section
of·the fortifications, the only wonder is that the French did not
break in at an earlier date. The first approaches of Reille's
engineers were, according to Belmas, Ullilkilfully conducted, and
pushed too much into the marsh. "''ben once they received
a right direction, the result was inevitable. Even had the
artillery failed to do its work Rosns mllst nevertheless have
fallen within a few dnJs. for it was insufficiently provisioned,
and. as the Communication with the sea had been cut off since
November SO, must have yielded ere long to starvation. The
French found an ample store of gtms (fifty-eight pieces) and
much ammwlition in tile place, hut Ull uttcrly inadequate supply
of food.
{N.B.-Belmas, St. Cyr, and Arteche have all numerous slips in their
narration, from not having used the Britisb authorities. Vacani's account
is, on tIle whole, the best on tbe French s.ide, Much may be learnt (rom
Jamefl's. Naval Hi8iO"'J, vo1. v, but more from Lord Cochrane's picturesque
autobiograplly. From this, e. g., aloll6 can it be ascertained that the
column which attacked the Puig-Rom on November 23 'I'll.'! composed
o£miqzu.:Je/.ell, not of British soldiel'll- Cochranc is represented by sc\'eral
writers as arriving on the twenty-fourth or cven thc twellty-sixth, while
as 11 matter of fact he rcaehcd Rosas on the twenty-first. It may interest
some to know that Captaiu Marry"t, the novelist, servcd under Coohnme,
and was mcntioned in his dispatch. So the description of the siege of
HoSRll in Marryat's Frank Mildma!l, wherein his captain is so much
glorified, is a genuine personal reminisceuce, and not an invention of
fiction.]
SECTION X: CHAPTER II
ST. eYR REIJEVES BARCELONA: BAITLES OF CARDADEU
AND MQLINS DE HEY
W HE-'\' Rosus had fallen St. C)'T was at last able to take in
hand the main operation which had been entrusted to him by
Napoleon -the relief of Barcelona. While the si/\,<Te was still
in prof,'l'CSS he had received two letters bidding him hasten to
the relief of Duhesme without delay 1, but he had taken upon
himself the responsibility of writing back that he must clear his
flunk and rear before he dared move, and that he should proceed
with the leaguer of Rosas, which could only last a few days
longer, unless he received formal orders to abandon the under-
taking. He ventured to point out that the morallUld political
effect:> of taking such a step would be deplorable 2. Napoleon's
silence gave consent, and St. eyr's plea was justified by the fall
of the place all December 5.
Rosas having been captured, the French general had now at hi$
disposition all his four division$, those of Souham, Pino, Reille,
and Chabot, which even after deducting the casualties suffered
in the siege, and the IOS5e$ e."{perienced by the covering troops
from the bad weather, still amounted to ~~,OOO men. After
counting up the very considerable forces which the Spaniards
might pM in his way, he resolved to take on with him for the
relief of Barcelona the troops of Souham, Pino, and Chabot, and
to leave behind only those of Rcille. With about 5,000 or
5,500 soldiers of not very good quality that officer was to hold
Figueras and Rosas, watch Geronaj and protect the high-road
to Perpignllu. St. Cyr himself with the twenty·six battalions
I Berthier to St. Crr, Burgos, Nov. 13. (Si Roses tarde a etre pris,
it fallt marcher sur Darcelone sans s'inquieter de cette place, &c.,' and
mucll to same effect from Couoo, Nov. 16 (wrongly printed in St. Cyr,
Nov. 10].
$ St. err to the EmllCror, No\'. 17, from Figucras.
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and nine squadrons forming the other three divisions, a force of
some 15,000 infantry and 1,500 horse, took his way to the
south.
The first obstacle in bis way was Gerona: but if he stopped
to besiege and take it, it was clear that he would never reach
Darcelona in time to save Duhesme from starvation: that
general had reported that his food would only last till the cnd
of December, and Gerona would certainly hold out more than
three weeks. Indeed, as we shall see, when it was actually
beleaguered in the next year, it made a desperate defence, lasting
for nearly six months I, St. Cyr saw from the first that he must
leave the fortress alone, lUld slip past it. As it commanded the
high-road, this resolution forced him to abandon any intention
of taking forward his artillery and his wheeled transport. They
could not face the rugged bypaths on to which he would be
compelled to throw himself, and he ml.U'Ched without a single
gun, and with his food and provisions borne on pack.horses and
mules, of which he had a very modest provision.
St. C)"T was quite well aware that if General Vives w~ to
resign the blocktlde of Barcelona to his miquelctes and· 8Q1/UJ.te1I£s,
and to come against him with his whole army, the task of
relieving Duhesme would be dangerous if not impossible.
There are but two roads from Gerona to Barcelona, and across
each of them lie half a dozen positions which, if entrenched and
held by superior numbers, he could not hope to force. These
two routes are the coast·road by l\Iataro and Arens de Mar-
which the French had used for their first march to Gerona in
August-and the inland road up the valley of the Desos by
Hosht.lrich and Gmnollers. But the former had been so con·
scientiously destroyed by Lord Cochrane and the local somat£1l£a II
that St. Cyr regarded it as impassable; there were places where
it had been blasted away for lengths of a quarter or a half of
a mile. Morcover, at IIlany points the army would have to
defile under the cliffs for long distanc(."S, and might be shelled
by any British rnen-of·war that should happen to lie off the
coast a. Accordingly the French general determined to try
1 May 30 to Dec. 10, 1809.
S See vol. i. p. 331.
S St. Cyr, Jov.1'1laJ tk rArmle de OataJOf/IIe, p. 68.
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the inland road, though he would have to march round GerOIlQ
and the smaller fortress of Hostalrich, and though it was cut
by several admirable positions, where the Catalans might offer
battle with reasonable prospects of success. It was all-im-
portant that Vives should be left as long as possible in uncer-
tainty as to his adversary's next move, and that the CatalllllS
should be dealt with in detail rather than in mass. St. Cyr
resolved, therefore, to make a show of attacking Gerona, and to
try whether he could not catch 1.a:al.n and Alvarez, and rout
them, before the Captain-General should come up to their
assistance.
On December 9, therefore, St. eyr had his whole corps,
minus the division of Reille, concentrated on the left bank of
the river Ter. On the next day he manreuvred as if about to
emelop Gerona. He bad hoped that this move would tempt
Lazun and Alvarez to come out and meet him in the open.
But fully conscious that their 8,000 men would be exposed to
inevitable defeat, the two Spanish officers wisely kept quiet
under the walls of their stronghold. Having worked round
their flunk, St. eyr all the clc\'enth sent back the whole of his
artillery and heavy baggage to Figueras, and plunged into the
mountains; at La Dispal he distributed four days' biscuit to his
men, warning them that there would be no further issue of
rations till they reached Barcelona. The light carts which had
been dragged thus far with the food were burnt. A~ to mu·
nitions, each soldier had fifty cartridbres in his pouch, and the
pack-mules carried 150,000 more, a reserve of only ten rounds
for each man 1. The equipment of the army, in short, was such
that if it failed to force its wa)' to Barcelona within six days it
must starve, while if it was forced to fight three or four heavy
engagements it would be left helpless, without a cartridge for
a. final battle. The general, if not the men in the ranks, fully
realized the peril of the situation.
On the twelfth St. C)'r pushed along the mountains above
Palamos and San Fcliu, brushing away a body of miqwletes from
the coast·land under JUJlll Claros, who tried to hold the defile.
I 51.. err lIaYs that Napoleon falsified his report, when reprinting it in
the MQ7liUllT, aDd put 150 instead of 60 rounds per maD, to disguise the
risk that had been run (p. 68).
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On the thirteenth the French reached Vidreras, where they were
again on a decent road, that which goes from Gerona to Mal·
grato They now perceh'oo that they were being followed by
Lazun and the garrison of Gerona, whose camp-fires were visible
on the heights to the north, while troops, evidently detached
from the blockade of Barcelona, were visible in front of them.
It wus clear that St. Cyr hod at least succeeded in placing him-
self, between the two main forces which the enemy could oppose
to him, and might engage them separately. He might also
count on the Spania.rds looking fOf.him on the Malgrat-Mataro
road, on which he was now established, while it was his intention
to abandon it, in order to plunge inland once more, and to
fall into the main ChaWlSee to Barcelona, south of Hostalrich.
'That n path existed, nIong which such a movement could be
carried out, was only known to the general by the report of
a Perpignan smuggler, who had once kept sheep among these
hills. Dut when exploring parties tried to find it, they lost
their way, and reported that no such route existed. If this
was the fact, St. Cyr was ruined: but he refused to believe the
officers who assured him that the smuggler had erred, and
pushing among the rocks finally discovered it himself. During
his exploration he was nearly cut off by u. pnrty of somakllca,
and hig escort had to tight hard in order to save him.
But the road was found, and on the fifteenth the anny followed
it, ll)most in single file, while the dragoons had to dismount and
lead their horses. They saw the fortress of Hostalrich in the
valley below them, and passed it in sight of the garrison. Some
of the latter came out, and skirmished with the rearguard of
St. Cyr's long column, but they were too weak to do much
harm, while Lazan, whose advent from the north would have
caused more serious difficulties, had been completely eluded, and
never came in sight.
In the o.f'temoon the whole expeditionary force safely descended
into the Ban:elona c'taua~e near San Celoni, from which place
they drove out four battalions of miqueletes, the first troops that
the tardy Yives had detached from his main army. The men
were much fatigued, and the somatenea were beginning to give
trouble both in flank and rear, but St. Cyr insisted that they
should not encamp by San Celoni, but push southward through
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the difficult defile of the 'frentapassos, so that they might not
find it held against them 011 the following morning. This was
done, and the best of the many positions which the Spaniards
might have held to oppose the march of the invaders was
occupied without the least resistance. St. Cyr encnmpcd at the
southern end of the pass, and saw before him, when the night
had fallen, a line of watch-fires far down t1e valley of the Bcsos
which showed that the Spaniards from the leaguer of Barcelona
had at lnst come out to oppose him.
The conduct of Vives during the last six days had been in
periect keeping with the rest of his slow and stupid guidance of
the campaign. He had received in due course news of the
fall of Rosas, and soon after the additional information that
St. Cyr had crossed the Ter and WlIS threatening Gerona.
Opinion was divided in the camp of the Catalans as to whether
the French were about to lay siege to that fortress, or to pass it
by and make a dash for the relief of Duhcsme. If they sat down
before Gerona there was no need to "hurTy: if they should pass
it by, it would be nece.'$S8.ry to move at once, in order to occupy
the defiles against them. The opinion of the more intelligent
officers was that St. Cyr would be forced to march to aid
Duhesme, whose want of provisions was well known by secret
intelligence sent out from Barcelona. Unfortunately Vivc3
inclined to the other side: he preferred to believe the alterna·
tive which did not impose on him the necessity for instant and'
decisive action. He did nothing, and pretended to be waiting
for further news. It reached him on the night of December 11-
12, in thc form of a mCsSage from the Junta of Gerona, to the
effect that the French had sent back their artillery and were
plmlging into the mountains in the direction of La. Bispal, so that
it was clear that they must be marching to relieve Duhesme.
It might have been expected that the Captain-General would
now at last break up from his hnps, and hasten to throw himself
across the path of the approaching encmy. But after holding
a long and fruitless council of war he contented himself \\1th
serrding out Reding, with that part of the newly-arrived ,Grana·
dan division which had reached Catalonia. On the twelfth
therefore the Swiss General started by the inland road with
seven battalions of his own Andalusian levies and a regiment
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of cavalry. Ne."rt day he reached Granollers and halted there.
At the same timc Frnncisco Milans, with four tcrcios of'1ll'iquelefcs,
was sent out to guard the coast~road, the other possible line
of approach by which St. Cyr might arrive. Reding had 5,000
men, l\fi1ans 3,000: but Vives still lay before Barcelona. with
two~thirds of his army, at least 16,000 or 17,000 bayonets. It
was in vain that Caldagues, the preserver of Gerona, implored
him to leave no more than a screen of miqueletes in the lines,
and to sally forth to fight with every regular soldier that he
could muster. The Captaill~Genemlrefused to listen, supporting
his inactivity by pleading that the advice scnt from Gerona did
not speak of the enemy's force "as very large: the defiles, he
urged, were so difficult that Reding and Milans, aided by Lazan,
ought to be able to bold them against any small expeditionary
force.
Thus St. Cyr was left to work out his daring plan without
any serious opposition. The only force with which he came
in contact was Milans' brigade of m'iqueletes, who, finding the
coast-rond clear, had crossed the mountains and occupied San
Celoni. These were the troops whom Si. Cyr drove awny
011 the afternoon of the fifteenth, before entering the defile of
the Trentapassos.
On receiving news of this combat, which had takcn place only
twenty-one miles from his lines, Vives at I.ast set out in person.
But persisting in his idiotic notion of blockingBarcelona tothe last
moment, he left Caldagues before the place with 1:il,OOO men, and
marched with a single brigade of 4,000 bayonets to join Reding.
Moving all through the night of tile fifteellth~sixteentilhe joined
the Granadans at daybreak at Cardadeu on the high~road. Their
united strength was only 9,000 men, of whom 600 were cavalry,
and seven gnns l. This was the whole force which fought Si. Cyr,
for Lnzan, moving with culpable slowness, was still flU' !Iorlh of
Sail Celoni, when he should have been pressing on the rear
of the ~~rench, while l\-filans with the miqueletes, who had been
beaten on the previous day, was some miles awny in the
mountains on the right, and quite ont of touch with his com-
mallder~in~chief. Nine thousand Spaniards, in short, were
within ten miles of the field, yet took no part in tile battle.
1 Cf. Cabanes, with Arteclle, iv_ 270.
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St. C)'l' in his central position kept them apart, and they failed
to combine with Vive5 and his force at Cardadeu.
The valley of the Besos at this point has broadened out, and
is no longer the nan'ow defile that is seen a few miles further
to the north. But there is much broken ground 011 both sides
of the high-road. A little way north of Cardadeu is K low hill
covered with pin~ lying to the right of the chall.ssee: at the
foot of the hill is a ravine which the rood has to cross at right
angles, and which falls into the stream called the Ricra de la
Roca. The country-side was composed partly of cultivated
ground, partly of thickets of pine and oak, which rendered it
difficult for either side to get a general view of its adversuries'
movements.
Vives, who had only reached his fighting-ground at dawn, had
no time to reconnoitre his position, or to make any elaborate
scheme for getting the best use out of the terrain. He hastily
drew up his army in two lines across the high~road: the front
line WllS behind the ravine, the second higher up on the pinc-
clad. hill. Rcding's troops held the right wing on the lowest
ground, and extended as far as the river Mogent, a branch of
the Desos. Vives' own Catalan regiments fonned the centre
and left: they were mainly pluc.,"1..xl on the hill commwuling the
road, with three guns in front of their centre, and two further
to the left on a point from which they could enfilade a turn of the
cltaU/Jaee. The miquclcte3 of Vich, on the extreme left, held
a spur of the higher mountains which bound the valley of the
Besos. The reserve drawn up on the high-road, behind the
main position, consisted of two guns, two squadrons of horse
(Husarcs Espaiioles, lately arrived from Majorca) and two
battalions.
St. Cyr could make out very little of his adversaries' force
or position; the woods and hills masked the greater part of the
Spanish line. But he knew that he must attack, and that
promptly, for every hour that he delayed would give time for
Lazan to come up in his rear, and !\filans on his left flank.
He left behind him at the southern outlet of the Trentapassos
tlle three battalions of Chabot's division, with ordel's to hold
the defile at all costs against wan, whenever the latter should
appe&r. With the other twenty-three battalions forming the
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divisions of PinD and Souham he marched down the high-rood
to deal with Vives. It was necessary to attack at once: 'the
biscuit distributed at La Bispal was just finished: the cartridges
, were running low, for many had been spent in the preceding
skirmishes. There was, ill fact, only ammunition for ouc hour
of battle 1,' St. Cyr saw that he must win by one short and
swift stroke, or suffer a complete disaster. Accordingly, he had
resolved to form his two strong divisions-morc than 19,000
men-into onc great column, which was to charge the Spanish
centre and burst through by its own impetus and momentum.
Pino's thirteen Italian battalions formed the hend of the mass:
Souham's ten French battalions its rear. The Gcncrru's plan is
best expressed in his own words: his orders to Pino, who was
to lead the attack, ran as follows ;-
•TIle corps must fight ill the order in which I have arranged
it this morning. There is neither time nor means to make
dispositions to beat the Spaniards more or less thoroughly. The
country-side is so broken and wooded that it would take three
hours to reconnoitre their position, and in two hours Lazan may
be on the spot attacking our rear. Not a minute can be lost:
we must simply rush at and trample down 2 the corps in our
front, whatever its strength may be. Our food is done, our
ammunition almost exhausted. The enemy has artillery, which
is a reason the more for haste: the quicker we atl:a<:k, the less
time will he have to shell us. There must be no attempt to feel
his position; not onc battalion must be deployed. Though his
position is strong we must go straight at it in column, and burst
through the centre by striking at that one point .".'ith our whole
force. The enemy must be given no time to prepare his defence
or bring up his reserves. You must not change the disposition
ill column in which we march, even in order to take great
numhers of prisoners. Our sole end is to break through and
to get as close as we can to Barcelona this evening, Our camp-
fires must be visible to the garrison by night, to show that we
are at hand to raise the siege.'
This order of battle was most hazardous: if St. Cyr had found
I St. Cyr, Journal de r ..d.rm« de Oatalogne, p. 64.
I (11 faut passer sur le ventre au corps de troupes en face, quel que sait
son nombre.' St. C}'r, p. 66.
,
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in front QC him two steady English divisions instead of Reding's
raw Granadan le\ies and the gallant but untrained Catalnn
miqlleletes, it is certain that affairs would have gone l\S at Dusaco
or Talavera. Dense columns attacking a fair position held by
good troops in line are bound to suffer terrible losses, and ollght
never to succeed. But St. eyr knew the enemies with whom he
had to deai, and his method was well adapted to his end. If he
ran some risk of failing at the commencement of the action, it was
simply because his subordinates did not follow out his dircetiolls.
General Pino, on whom the responsibility of opening the
attack devolved, started with every intention of obedience. But
when he arrived at the foot of the Spanish position, and the
balls began to fall thickly among his leading battalions, he lost
his head. His column only faced the Spanish right centre, and
the heavy flanking fire from the hostile wings daunted him.
Instead of pushing straight before him with his whole fo~
lIS St. Cyr hud ordered, he thrcw out five battalions of Mazzu-
chelli's brigade to his left 1, and two battalions under General
FOllUlne to his extreme right 2; the six battalions of his rear
brigade werc not yet up to thc front, and took no part in thc
first assault. 'Thus he attacked on a front of three-quarters
of n mile, instead of at one single point. His columns, after
driving in the Spanish front line, came to a stand hulf\\'ay up
the hill, in a very irregular array, the flanks t1lrq.wn forward, the
centre hanging somewhat back. Reding, against whom thc' main
attack of Mazzuchelli's brigade had been directed, brought up
his second line, and when thc Italians wcre slackening in their
advance hurled at them two squadrons of hussars, and led forward
his whole division. The assailants broke, and fell back with loss.
St. Cyr, coming up to the front at this moment, was horrified
to mark the results of Pino's disobedience of his orders. But
he had still Souham's division in hand, and flung it, in one solid
mass of ten battalions, upon Rcding's right; at the same time
he commanded Pino to throw the two regiments of his intact
re.'l.r brigade upon the Spanish centre 3, while :Fontane's two
1 Three. battalions of the 4th of the line, aml two of the 2ud Y.iglit
InflUltry.
2 One battalion of the 2nd Light Infantry and one of the 7th of the line.
.. Three battalions each of the 1st and.6th of the linc.
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battalions continued to demonstrate against the enemy's left.
The result was what might have been expected: the column
of Souham burst through the Granadan division, and completely
routed the right wing of the Spanish arm)': at the same
moment Pino's main column forLro back Vives and the Catnlans
along the line of the high-road. All at once fell into confusion,
and, when St. Cyr bade his two Italian cavalry regiments charge
up the chau88~e. the enemy broke his ranks and fled to the
hills. Five of the seven Spanish guns were captured, with, two
standards and some 1,500 unwounded prisoners. Booing, who
stayed behind to the last, trying to rally a rearguard for the pro-
tection of the routed host, was nearly taken prisoner, and had to
draw his sword and cut his way out. Vives, whose conduct on
this day was anything but creditable, scrambled up a cliff' after
turning his horse loose, and came almost alone to the sea-shore
near Mongat, where he was picked up by the boats of the
Cambrian frigate, and forwarded to Tarragona, Besides the
prisoners the Spaniards lost at least a thousand men, Md many
of thc miquelete8 dispersed to thcir homes, St. Cyr acknowlcdf:,rcd
600 casualties, nearly all of them, as might have been expected,
in Pino's division.
Reding at last succeeded in -rallying some troops at l\1onmalo
near San Culgat, and covered the retreat of the main lllllSS of
the fugitives to join the troop~ who had been left in the lines
before Barcelona. As to the detached Spanish corps under Milans
and the Marquis of Lazan, the fonner never came down from the
hills till the fighting was over, though it was only four or n"e
miles from the scene of action I. The latter, which was following
in St. eyr's rear, moved with such extreme slowness that it had
not yet reached San Celoni when the battle was fought, and
did not even get into COlltact with Chabot's division, which had
been l~ft behind to guard against iUi approach 2. On learning
of the defeat the Marquis marched back to Gerona, and rejoined
Alvarez. Thus Vives got no assistance whatever from his Ollt~
lying corps: if Lazan is to be trusted, this was largely the fault
1 Sce the lWCouut of Cabaues, who wus with J.malls this tiny, iu his
History of/M War in Catalonia.
t See tlle narrative of an officer in the division or Lazan, printed by
Cabanes all an appendix.
.2
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of the Commander~in·chiefhimself, for no dispatch from him
rcnched his subordinates after December 14, Md they had no
knowledge of his movements or designs.
Meanwhile Caldagues, who had been left in charge of the
blockade, had maintained his post, and repulsed a heavy sortie
which Duhesme and the garrison had directed against his posts
on the sixteenth. But when the news of the battle of Cardadeu
reached him in the evening, he evacuated all the parts of his
line which lay to the east of the Llobregat, and concentrated
his 12,000 men a.t Molins de TIey and San Boy, on the further
bank of that river. He WWl forced to abandon at S~ria the
large depOt of provisions from which the left wing of the invest-
ing force had been fed.
The road from Cardadeu and San Culgat to Barcelona being
thus left open, St. Cyr marched in triumph into Barcelona on
the morning of the seventeenth. He complains in his memoirs
that he did not discover one single vedette from the garrison
pushed out to meet him, and that Duhesme did not come forth
to receive him, or give him a single word of thanks. Indeed,
when the Governor at last presented himself to meet the com-
mander of the Seventh Corps, he spent his first words not ill
expressing his appreciation for the service which had been
rendered him, but in demonstrating that he had never been in
danger, and could have held out for six weeks more. He was
somewhat abashed when St. Cyr replied by presenting him with
a copy of one of his own former dispatches to Derthicr, which
painted the condition of' the garrison in the blackest l'Olours,
and asked for instant succours lest the worst might happen!.
It was clear that the two generals would not work well
together, but as St. C)T held the supreme command, and was
determined to assert himself, Duhesme could do no more than
sulk in silence. The l'Ouduct of the operations against the
Catalans had been taken completely out of his hands.
St. Cyr's daring march to Barcelona had been crowned with
complete success. It was by far the most brilliant operation on
I St. Cyr, as any reader of hill M&1loiru ean see, was malicious and
sarcastic. But Duhesme has a bad reputation for carelessness and selfish-
ness, and his writings make an even worse impre~sion than those of St. Cyr.
Probabl)· the latter's narrative is fairly correct.
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the French side during the first year of the war. That it was
perilous cannot be denied: if the commander of the Seventh
Corps had found the whole nrmy of Vh,cs entrenched ut the
passage of the Tonlera, or across the defile of the Trelltapassos,
it seems impossible that he could have got forward to Barcelona.
Thirty thousand men, of whom half were regular troops, might
have been opposed to him, and they could have brought artillery
tLo"tlinst him, while he had not a single piece. If once checked
he mnst have retreated in has~ for he had only ammunition
for a single battle. But the ropid and unexpected character
of his movements entirely puzzled the enemy, and he was for-
tunate in having a Vives to contend against. •When the enemy
has no general,' as Schepeler remarks while commenting on this
campaign, 'any stroke of luck is possible.' Against 0. capable
officer St. Cyr would probably have failed, but he had a shrewd
suspicion of the character of his opponent from what had hap-
pened during the siege of Rosns: he dared much, and his daring
was rewarded by a splendid victory.
The campaign, howe\"er, was not yet completed. Barcelona
had been relieved, but only a fraction of the Spanish army had
been met and beaten. Caldagues lay behind the Llobregnt
with 11,000 1 men who had not yet been engaged. Reding
had joined him with the wrecks of the troops which had fought
at Cardadeu, some 3,000 or 4,000 men. They lined the eastern
bank of the river, anI)· six or seven miles from the suburbs of
Barcelona, occupying the entrenchments which had been COll-
structed to shut in Duhesme during the blockade. These were
strengthened with several redoubts, some of them Armed with
heavy artillery, and the positions were good, but too extensive
for a force of 14,000 or 15,000 men. Their weak point was
that the Uobregat even in December is fordable in many places,
and that if the French attacked in mass at one point they were
ulmost certain of being able to fo~ their way through thc
linc. Booing, and his second-in-command Caldagues, were
both of opinion that it would be wise to evacuate the lines,
if St. eyr should come out in force against them, and to fall
back on the mountains in their rear, which separate the valley
I Some of his migllekte8 had absconded during the withdrawal from the
eastern half of the rh"er.
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of the Llobregat from the coast-plain of'l'arragona. Here there
was 11 strong position at the dcme of Droal, where it was
intended to construct an entrenched camp. But there was
a strong temptation to hold on in the old lines for as long
a time as possible, for by retiring to Ordal the army would
leave open the high-road to Lerida and Saragossa, and give
up much of the plain to the incursions of the French foragers..
Reding sent back to Vives, who had now landed in his rear
and placed himself at Villanueva de Sitjas,. to ask whether he
was to reheat at once, or to hold his ground. The Cttptniu-
General sent back the inconclusive reply that' he might fall
back on Ordal if he muId not defend the line of the Llobregat,'
Thus he threw buck the responsibility on his subordinate,
.and Reding, anxious to vindicate bis courage before the eyes
of the Catalans, resolved after some hesitation to retain his
positions, though he had grave doubts of the possibility of
resistance.
He was not allowed much time to ponder over the situa-
tion. The reply of Vivcs only reached hill~. 011 the night of
December 20-21. On the next morning St. Crr came out
of Barcelona. and attacked the lines. I-le had brought with
him every available man: Duhcsme had been left to hold the
city with Lecchi's Italians alone: his other division (that of
Chabran), together with the three which had formed the army of
succour-those of Souhllm, Pino, and Chabot-were all directed
against the lines. The plan of St. Cyr was to demonstrate
against the bridge of Molins de Rey, the strongest part of the
Spanish position, with Chabran's 4,000 men, while he himself
crossed the fords lower down the Uobregat with the 14,000
bayonets of the other three divisions, and turned the right flank
of the enemy.
At five o'clock on a miserable gusty December moming the
French came down towards the river: Chabran led off by
making a noisy demonstration opposite the redoubts at the
bridge, on the northern flank of the position. This, as
St. Cyr had intended, drew Rcd.ing's attentiou to that flank:
he reinforced his left with troops drawn from his right wing
on the lower and easier ground down stream. An hour later
the other attacking columns advanced, that of Souham crossing
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the ford of San Juan Despi, while Pino and Chabot passed by
that of San Feliu. No proper attempt wa,s made to dispute
their whancc. Outnumbered, and strong out along a vcry
extensive position, the Catalans soon saw their line broken
in several places. The only serious opposition made was by
the centre, which udvtul(~ed down hill ngninst Souhum and tried
to charge him, but gaye back long before bayonets had been
crossed.
The most fatal part of Rerung's position was that on his
extreme right Chabot's three battalions had got completely rowld
his flank, and kept edging in on the rear of his southern wing,
:which abandoned hill after hill as it saw its retreat threatened.
Pino and Souham had only to press 011, and each regiment ill
their front gave way in turn when it saw its exposed f1tulk
in danger. At last the whole of the Spanish right and centre
was pushed back in disorder on to the still intact left behind
the bridge of Molins de Rey. Now was the time for Chabran
to turn his demonstration into a real attack: if he had crossed
the river and advanced rapidly, he would have caught the shaken
masses in front, while the rest of the anny chased them forward
into his arms. But being timid or unenterprising, he Jet the
flying enemy pass across his front unmolested, and .only fordcd
the river when they had gone too far to be caught. The
unhappy Vives came up at this moment, just in time to see
his whole army on the run, and headed their flight to the
hills.
Thus the Spaniards got away without any vety crushing
losses, though their historian Cabanes confesses that if Chabran
had moved a qllfirler of all hour earlier he would have captured
half the army of Catalonia. As it was, St. eyr took about
1,9tOO prisoners only, though his dragoons pursued the routed
enemy for many miles. It was a great misfortune for the
Catalans that among these captives was the Conde de Caldagues,
the one first·rale officer in their ranks,. He was taken by the
pursuers at Vendrell, ma.ny miles from the field, when his
e....hausted horse fell under him. St. eyr captured the whole
artillery of the Spaniards, twenty.five cnnnon 1, of whieh sc\'crlll
1 St. Cyr says twenty.five in his report to Napoleon, but increases tile
number to fifty in his Mtmoire8J p. 87.
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were pieces of heav), calibre, mounted in redoubts. The field.
pieces were more useful to him, tl.S he wns very short of artiller)';
he had brought none with him, while Duhesme had been obliged
to destroy the greater part of his during the retreat from
Gerona in A ugust. I-le also made prize of a magazine of
3,000,000 curtridges and of many thousands of muskets, which
the routed enemy cast awa), in their hnste to escape over the
hills. Some of the fugitives fled south, and did not stop till
they reached Tortosa and the Ebro; others dispersed in the
direction of Igualada. and Lcrida, but the main body rallied
at Tarmgona.
The victorious French divisions were pushed far out from the
battlc-field so tl.S to occupy not only thc·whole plain of the
L1obrcgat, but also the defiles over the hills leading to Tarra-
gona. Chabran was placed at Martorell, Chabot at San Sadurni,
Souham a.t Vendrell, and Pino at Villanue\'a de Sitjas 1ll1d
Villafranca. Thus the pass of Oroal 'I'M in the victor's hmids,
and he had it in his power to march against Tarragona without
having any further positions to force. Dut the siege of that
place did not form, at present, all)' part of St. Cyr's designs.
His aim was first to collect such magazines at Barcelona as
would feed his whole army of 25,000 men till the harvest was
ripe, and secondly to reopen his communication with France.
The sea route was rendered. dangerous by the English ships, which
were continually ho,·ering off the coast. The land route was
blocked b), the fortresses of Hostalrich and Gerona. St. Cyr
imagiJ?ed that it was more important to make an end of these
places, and open his route to Perpignan, than to attack Tarra·
gona. The latter place was strong, and the greater part of the
CataIal1 army had taken refuge in it. The siege would need, as
he supposed, many months, and could not be properly conducted
till a battering-train and a large store of ammunition had been
brought down from France.
It is possible that the French general might have come to
another conclusion if he had been aware of the state of panic
and disorgani?..atioll among the Catalans at this moment. The
miquektelJ had mostly dispersed to their homes, tllC regular
troops were mutinous, and the populace was crying treason and
looking for scape-goats. The incapable Vives was frightened
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into resignatiou, and finally replaced by Reding, whose courage
at least was beyond suspicion, if his abilities were not those
of a great general. . The smaller to\\"l15 were full of tumults and
assassination: at Lerida a certain Gomez declared himself
dictator and began to seize and execute all suspected persons.
He did not stop till he was caught and beheaded by a battalion
which Reding sent out against him. In short, anarchy reigned
in Catalonia for ten days, and it is possible that if St. Cyr had
marched straight to Tarragonll he might have taken the place,
though its inhabitants were working hard at their fortifications,
and vowing tu emulate Saragossa. Many historians of the war
have blamed the }~rench general for not making the attempt:
but there was much to urge in his defence. It is perfectly
possible that the Tarmgoncse might have made n gallant stand,
in spite of all their troubles, for the garrison Wtul large if
disorderly. If they held out, St. Cyr had neither a siege
equipage nor sufficient magazines to feed his army when con-
centrated in a single spot. 'fhe French troops were exhausted,
and suffering dreadfully from the inclement winter weather.
Laum and Alvarez were in full force in the Ampurdam, and
were giving Reille's weak division much trouble.
l'robably therefore St. eyr was justified in halting for a month,
which he employed in clearing the whole country-side for thirty
miles round Barcelona, and in collecting the stores of food
which his army required before it could make another move.
The halt allowed time for the Catalans to rally, and for Reding
to reorganize his army: bt February he was ready once more to
try his fortune in the field. Indeed, he was ere long more
foonidable than St. Cyr had expected, for he was joined by
the second brigade of his own Gmnadan di\'ision, which came
up from Valencia not long after the battle of Molins de Rey,
s.nd the last reserves from Majorca had also sailed to aid him,
after giving over the fortifications of the Balearic Isles to the
marines Q[ the Beet, and the urban guards of Palma and Port
Mahon. The mique/etes, too, returned to their standards when
the first panic was over, and in a month CAtalonia could once
more show an army of 30,000 men. The first incident which
occurred to encourage the insurgents was that on January 1.
Lazan fell upon and ver)' severely handled a detached battalion
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of Reille's dhision at Castellon in the Ampurdam \ and when
lleille came up against him in person with ~,500 men, inflicted
on him II sharp check at the fords of the Muga. Not long
after, however, the 'Marquis withdrew from this region, and
marched back toward Aragon, taking with him his own division
and leaving only the weak corps of Alvarez to deal with Heille.
His retreat was caused by the news of his brother's desperate
position in Saragossa. Hoping to make a diversion in favour of
Palafox, Lazan marched to Lerida, where he began to gather in
all th~ men that he could collect before moving back to his
nath'c province. Thus the pressure on Reille was much
reduced.
St. C)"r's men, moollwhile, made many expeditions into the
valleys above Ban.'c1on8. They cleared the defile of Bruch
leading into the upper valley of the Llobregat, which the
somatcl!£8 had held so gallantly against Schwartz and Chabran
in June. They took, but did not hold, the almost inaecessible
peak of l\Iontserrat, and on the coast-road dominated the
country as far as .Mataro. Dut they could not reopen the
communications with France: thcir general did not dare to
set about the siege of Gerona while Reding had still the makings
of an army in the direction of Tarragona. It was not till that
brave but unfortunate officer had received his third defeat in
February that St. Cyr was able to turn his attention to the
north, and the road to Perpignan. For the present, the
French general found himself mainly occupied by the imperious
necessity for scraping together food 1I0t only for his own army,
but for the great city of Barcelona, where both the garrison
and the people were living from hand to mouth. For the
resources of the neighbouring pltlin were nearly exhausted, and
the only exten18.1 supply came from occasional merchantmen
from Cette or Marseilles, whose captains were tempted to run
the British blockade by the enormous price which they could
secure for their corn if it could be brought safely through. It
1 This was the 4th battalion of the 2nd of the line, which llad joined
Reille in the late autumn, and did not form part of his original division as
detailed in the Appendix to vol. i. St. CrI' sars that it oul)' lost sixty
prisoners besides some casualties. Lazan wrote that he took ni:llety
prisoners) and killed or wounded over 200 more Frenchmen.
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was only somewhat later that the Emperor directed the na\'al
authorities in Provencc to dispatch regular convoys to Dart,'elona
under a strong escort, whenever the British crniscr:s werc
reported to have been blown out to sea. Meanwhile the
problem of food snpplies remained almost as urgent a question
for St. eyr as the movements of his adversaries in the field.
SECTION X: CHAPTER III
THE CAMPAIGN OF FEBRUARY, ]809: BA'ITLE OF VALLS
MORE than a month had elapsed since the battle of Malins de
Itey before any important movements were. made in Catalonia.
Early in February St. Cyr drew in his divisions from the ad-
valleed pol;itiollS in the plain of Tarragona, which they had
taken up after the victory of Malins de Uey. They had eaten
up the country-side, and were being much harassed by the
11Iiqueletea, who had begun to press in upon their communications
with Barcelona, in spite of all the care that was taken to scour
the country with small flying columns, and to scatter any
nucleus of insurgents that began to grow up in the French rear.
Owing to the dispersion of the divisions of the 7th Corps these
operations were very laborious; between the new year and the
middle of February St. Cyr calculated that his men had used up
2,000,000 cartridges in pctty skirmishes, and suffered a VCf)'
appreciable loss in operations that were practically worthless 1.
Accordingly he drew them close'J: together, in order to shorten
the dangerously extended line of communication with Barcelona.
Heding, during this period of waiting, had been keeping quiet
in Tarmgona, where he was reorganizing and drilling the
harassed troops which had been beaten at Cardadcu and MolillS
de Hey. He had, as we have already seen, received heavy
reinfor~ments from the South 2 and the Balearic Isles 3; but it
WI\S not in numbers only that his army had improved. St. eyr's
inaction had restored their morale. They were too, as regards
food and munitions, in a much better condition than their
adversaries, I\S they could freely draw provisions from the plain
1 St. eyr, Campagne de CatalrJgn8, p. 98,
I Regiments (If Santa Fe, and 1st of An1equcra, tllree battalions with
3,600 men in November, ami probably 3,000 in February.
I Swis3 Regiment of llesehard, about 2,000 strong, and Majorca Militia
[sometimes called' l'alma '],600 strong.
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of the Lower Ebro and the northern parts of Valencia, and were
besides helped by corn brought in by British and Spanish vessels
from the whole eastern Mediterrancun. Rcd.ing had also got a
good supply ofarms and ammwlition from England. As he found
himself unmolested, he was finally able to rearrange his whole
force. so as not only to cover Tarragonll, bnt to extend a screen
of troops all round the French position. Hc now dividcd his
army into two wings: he himself, on the right, kept in hand at
Tarrngona the ht Division, consisting mainly of the Granadan
troops: while General Castl'O was sent to establish the hend
qUUl'ters of the 2nd Division, which contained most of the old
battalions of the army of Catalonia, at Igualada. Their line of
communication was by Santa Coloma, SaITeal, and Montblanch.
TillS disposition was probably a mistake: while the French lay
t'Oncentrated in the middle of the scmicircle, the Spanish army
was foreed to operate on outer lines sixty miles long, and could
not mass itself in less than three or four days. By a sudden
movement of the enemy, either Reding or Castro might be
JlSsailed by superior numbers, and forced to fall back on an
eccentric line of retreat before he could be succoured by his
colleague.
It would seem that, encouraged by St. Cyr's quiescence, his
own growing strength, and the protestations of the Catalans,
Reding had once more resolved to resume the offensive. The
extension of his left to Igualnda was mnde with no less ambitious
a purpose than that of outflanking the northern wing of the
l?rench army, and then delivering a simultaneous concentric
attack on its scattered divisions as they lay in their canton-
ments. Such il. plan presupposed that SI;. Cyr would keep quiet
while the preparations were being made, that he would fait to
concentrate in time, and that the Spanish columns, operating
from two distant bases, would sueceed in timing their co-opera~
tion with perfect accuracy. At the best thcy could only have
brought some 80,000 men against the 25,000 of St. Cyr's field
army-a superiority far from sufficient to give them a rational
chance of success. It is probable that at this moment RE:ding's
best chance of doing something great for the causc of Spain
would have been to leave a strong garrison in Tarragona, and
march early in February with flO,OOO men to the relief of Sara-
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gossa, which was 1I0W drawing near the end of its powers of
resistance. Lannes and J unot would have had to rai~ the
siege if an army of such size had come up against them. But.
though intending to succour Saragossa. in a few weeks, Reding
was induced by the constant entreaties of the Catalans to under.
take first an e...peditiol1 against St. eyr. He sent off no troops
to aid the Marquis of Lazan in his fruitless attempt to relax
the pressure on his brother's heroic garrison, but devoted all his
attention to the 7th Corps.
St. eyr was not an officer who was likely to be caught un-
prepat(.-d by such a movement· as Reding had plaruled. The
extension of the Spanish line to Igualada and the upper Llo-
brcgat had not escaped his notice, and he was fully aware of the
advanlaoo-e which his central position gave him over an enemy
who had been obliging enough to draw out his fighting strength
on an arc of a circle sixty miles from end to end. V\rithout
fully realizing Reding's intentions, he ~ould yet see that the
Spaniards were giving him a. grand opportunity of beating them
in detail. He resolved to strike a blow at their northern wing,
convinced that if he acted with sufficient swiftness and energy
he could crush it long ere it couJd be succoured from Tarrngona.
It thus came to pass that Rcding and St. Cyr began to move
simuJtaneously-the one on exterior, the other on interior
lincs----with the inc\,jtablc result. On February 15 Gastra, in
accordance with the instructions of the Captain-General, began
to con'centrate his troops at 19ualada, with the intention of
advancing D{,7fl.inst the French di visions at San Sudurni and
Marlorel. At the same time orders were sent to Alvarez, the
Governor of Gerona, to detach all the men he could spare for
a demonstration ~aninst Ban;:clonll, in order to distract the'
attention of Duhesme and the garrison. Reding himself, with
the troops at Tll!Tao<rOna, intended to march against Souharn the
moment that he should receive the news that his lieutenants
were ready to strike.
At the same moment St. Cyr started out on his expedition
against 19ualada. He took with him Pino's Italian division 1,
and ordered Chabot and Chabran to concentrate with him at
I Troops from Barcelona under Leech[ came out to replace Pino at
VillafniUca.
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Capellades, seven or eight miles to the south·cast of Castro's
head quarters. By taking this route he avoided the northern
bank of the Noya and the defiles of Brucb, and approached the
enemy from the side where he could most easily cut him off
from reinforcements coming from Tarragona.
The concentration of the three French columns was not per·
fectIy timed, those of Pino and Chabran finding their way far
more difficult than did Chahot. It tbus chmH..ed that the latter
with his skeleton dh1Sioll of three battalions, arrived in front of
Capellades many hours before his colleagues. His approach was
reported to Castro at 19ualada., who sent down 4,000 men
against him, attacked him, and beat bim hack with loss 1 into
the arms of Pino, who came on the scene later in the day
[Feb. 17]. The Spaniards were .then forced to give back, and
retired to Pobla de Claramunt on the banks of the Noya., where
they were joined by most of Castro's reserves. St. Cyr had.
now concentrated his three divisions, and hoped that he might
bring the enemy to a pitched battle. He drew up in ITont of
them all his force, save onc of Pino's brigades, which he sent to
tum their right [Feb. 18]. The Spaniards, having a fine position
behind n ravine, were at first inclined to fight, and skinnished with
the enemj"s main body for some hours. They narrowly missed
capturing both St. Cyr and Pino, who had ridden forward with
their staff to reconnoitre, and fell into an ambush of'mupteletes,
from which they only CSCllJ.Xd by the speed of their horses 2.
But late in the day the Spanish Geneml received news that
Mazzuche11i, with the detached Italian brigade, was already in
his rear and marching hard for Igualada. He immediately
evacuated bis position in great disorder, and fell back on his
head quarters, closely pursued by'St. Cyr. The main body of
the Spaniards, with their artillery, just succeeded in passing
through Igualada before the Italians came up, and fled by the
road to Cervem. The rear was cut Qff', and had lo escape in
anothC!r direction by the path leading to Manresa. Both
I Cllabot loet a Neapolitan colonel (Carnsco~a) and m.:my other
prisoners. \
~ St. Cyr says nothing of his OWII danger, but the incident is gi"en
atlcngtll by Va~ui, iii. 93, who mentiollS that onc of l'i1\o's aides-de-camp
W1lS wounded.
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columns were much hustled and lost many prisoners, yet they
fairly ontmarched their pursuers and got away without any
crushing disaster 1. But their great loss was that in 19ualada
the French seized all the magazines which had been collected
from norlhcl1l Catalonia for the use of Costro's division. This
relieved St. Cyr from all trouble as to provisions for many days:
he had now food enongh not only .to provide for his field army,
but to send buck to Barcelona.
St. Cyr had now done all the harm that was in his power to
the Spanish leA; wing-he had beaten them, seized their maga-
zines, driven them apart, and broken their line. He imagined
that they were disposed of for many days, and now resolved to
tUn! 01T for a blow at Rcding and the other half of the Cata-
Ionian army, who might meanwhile (for all that he knew) be
attacking Souham with very superior numbers,
Accordingly on Feb. 19 he started 01Y with Pino's division to
join Souham tuld fall upon Reding, leaving Chabot Ilnd Chabran,
with all the artillery of the three dh;sion8, to occupy 19ualada
and guard the captured magazines from allY possible offensive
returll on the part of Castro. He marched by cross-roads along
the foot·hills of the mountains of the great central Cataloniall
sierra, intending to descend into the valley of the Gays. by San
Magin and the abbey of Santas Cruces, where (as he had learnt)
lay the northernmost detachments of ROOing's division 2. Thus
he hoped to take the encmy in flank and beat him ill detail. He
sent orders to Souham to move out of Vendrell and meet him at
Villarodoiia, halfway up the course of Gaya., unless he should
have been alTendy attacked by RediJlg !l;ud forced to takc some
other line.
At San Magin the French commander came upon some of
ROOing's troops, about 1,200 men with two guns, under a
brigadier named Imnzo. They showed fight, but were beaten
I 'Si nous ne rimes pas dans cette afFaire le nombre de priS<lnnien que
noug eussions dO. y faire,' says St. Cyr, 'e'est que dans cette journee
l'ennemi fit plus usage de ses jambes que de sas annes. Quelques centaines
sculcment, la plupnrt blesses, tombhent entre nos maius' [C'Ul1lpag7lt! de
CaWJOfl'le, p. 101].
2 'The det."\ils of this cross·march in a badly-surveyed country, where
the maps are very deficient, are more easily to be made out from Vllcani'S
narrative (pp. 95-8) than from St. Cyr's own account.
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and sought refuge further down the valley of the Gllya in the
fortified abbey of Snutas Cruces. So bare was the countlJ'·side,
and so bad the maps, that St. CrI' found considerable difficulty
in trucking them, Ilnd in discovering the best way down the
"alley. But next day he got upon th~ir trail', and beset the
abbey, which made a good defence and proved impregnable to
a force wlprovided with artillery. St. Cyr blockaded it for
two days, and then descended into the plain, where he got ill
touch with Souham's division, which had advanced from Vendrell,
and was now pillaging the hamlets round VillarodOlla, in the
l'Cntl'oJ valley of the Gaya Z [February 21].
Meanwhile Rcdillg was at last on the move. On receiving
the news of the combat of 19ualada, he had to choose between
the opportunity of making a counter-stroke at Sollham, and
that of marching to the aid of his lieutenant, Castro. He
adopted the latter alternativ~ and started from Tarragona on
}~ebruary 20 with an escort of about ~.OOO men, including
nearly nl.l his ayailable cavalry 3. It was his intention to pick
up all the way the outlying northern brigades of his division.
This he succeeded in doing, drawing in to himself the troops
which were guarding the pass of Santa Cristina, and Iranzo's
detachment at Santa.~ Cruces. This force, warned of bis
approach, broke through the blocktw.c at night, and reached
its chief with little or no loss [February 21].. Thus reinforced
Ueding pushed on by Sarreal to Santa Coloma, where eastro.
joined him with the rallied troops of his wing, whom he had
collected when the French attack slackened. They had between
them nearly ~O,OOO men, an imposing force, with which some
of the officers present suggested that it would be possible to
1 St. eyr (p. 109) has '" curious story to the effect that he had failed
eutirely W fiud the road, but ultimately discovered it by giving leave to
'" wounded Spanish officer w return to Tarragona, He was followed at
a discreet distance by scouts, who noted the way that he took, and he
thus served as a guide of Pino's dhision as far as the COll\'Cut of Santas
Cruces.
'I Souham had anticipated St. eyr's orders, and started to advance from
Vet.ldrell before his chiefs dispatch from Igualada came to haud.
o Two battalions of miqueleu8 (Lerida at.ld 1st of Tarragona), 300 cavalry,
a field-battery, and a battalion of Reding's own regiment of Swiss, about
2,100 men in all.
OMAN. D ,
82 nAl~'LE OF VALLS [F,,,, "
fall upon 19ualada, crush Chabot and Chabran, and recover the
. lost maguzines. BlIt ROOing was ner~'ollS about Tarragollu,
dreading lest St. eyr might unite with Souham and fall upon
the city during his absence. After holding It lengthy council
of war 1he dclcl'mined to l'Cturn to Pl"Otcct his base of operations.
Accordingly, he told off the Swiss General Wimpffen, with some
4,000 or 5,000 of Cash-a's troops, to observe the French divisions
at Igualada, and started homeward with the rest ofhis army,about
10,000 infantry, 700 ca\'alry, and two ~tteries of field artillery?,
1 CoL Doyle was present at tllis council: his account of it is in the
Record Office. He declares that he himself was all for fighting, that
Heding wavered, and the majority refused to take risks.
i There is a detailed estimate of Reding's army given by Sf. Cy.r
in Ilis AI,pclldix no. n. He says that the figures were givclI him by
'a Spanisll general taken prisoncr at Valls,' which must mean the .Marquis
of Casteldosrius, the only officer of that rank captured. :Ille names of
nearly all the battalions cited in this lirtare to be verified, either in Reding's
dislmtch or ill tile Mrr.,tive of c:.hanes-:,ll indeed excellt the regiment
of Baza, and 'the three Mique1et Tercios, 1st and 2nd of Tarragona and
Lerida. But it is probable that Casteldosrius gave St. Cyr a morning
state of the whole army collected at Santa Coloma on the twentr-fourth,
and that tlu-,;e corps (witll a total force of 3,000 men) formed part of the
force left with \Vimpffcn at Santa Coloma. 1 am drivcn' to this conclusion
by the statement of Doyle in his letter written from Santa eoloma, on
the day before the battle, that Reding was marching « with 600 hon;e and
a little over 10,000 foot," for Tarragona. Doylc is arguing ill fal·our of
fighting, and has no object in understating the IlUIllOOrs. His figures
are borne out by all the Spanish narratives. The force must have stood
as follows :-
ISI'ANTlI\". llrouglit forward 3,500
Granadan Division: Wimpffen's Swiss (two
Ueding's Swiss (one batt.) 60O batts.) . . 1,140
lliberia (or 1st of Granada) 1,860 Palma Militia. . 350
Santa ."e (tIVO batts.) 2,300 li,020
1st of Antequera 1,100 CAVALRY.
6,7GO H U9<1.rCl:! of Granada 450
HusnrCl:!Jo1spafiolCl:! . 250
From the Old Catalan Amy: --700
Guards [150 Spanish, 200 ARTIlLERY.Walloons], . . 430 200Soria 1,000 2 batteries, 8 guns.
2nd of s..woia . 800 SA.PPERS.Prm'illcial GrcmllllCrf; of
OltllllLd Ncw Castilc 1,300 1 Company 100
Carry forward 3,.530 To"" 11,800
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He had made up his mind to return by the route of Mont-
blanch and Valls, one somewhat more remot~ fmm the position
of St. C)'l' on the Gaya than the way by PIu, which he had
taken in setting out to join Castro. Reding could only have
got home without fightillg by taking a circuitous route to the
cast, via Selva und Reus: the suggestion that he shoulrJ do so
was made, hut he replied that having baggage and artillery
with him he was forced to keep to a high-road. He chose
that by Valls, though he was aware that the place was occu-
pied: hut apparently he hoped to crush Souhnm before Pino
could come to his aid. He was resolved, it is said, not to
coOl-t; it combat, but on the other hand not to refuse it if
the enemy should offer to fight him on advantageous ground.
[February !24.] The truth is, that he was bold even to rashness,
could never forget the great day of Baylen; in which he had taken
such a splendid part., and was anxlOus to wash ~ut by a victory
the evil memories of Cardadcu and Molins de Rey. He set out
on the evening of February 24, and by daybreak next morning
was drawing llear the bridge of Go)', where the high-road to
Tarmgona crosses the river .FrAncoli, some two miles north of
the town of Valls. His troops, as was to be expected, were
much ex.hllustcd by the long march in the darkness 1.
St. Cyr, meanwhile, had not been intending to strike a blow
at Tarragona. He regarded it as much more necessary to beat
the el~emy's field army than to close in upon the fortress, which
would indubitably have oficred a long and obstinate resistance.
When he got news of fuding's march to Srultn Coloma he
l'l>solvl.u to follow· him: he WM preparing to husten to the
succour of his divisions at Igualada, when he learnt that the Swiss
general had turned back, and was hurrying borne to 'l'arragona.
He resolved, therefore, to try to intercept him on his return
march, and blocked his two a\'uilable roads by placing Sociham's
division at Valls and Pino's at PIa. They were only eight or
nine miles apart, and whichever road the Spaniards took the
unl\AA8.iled French division could easily come to the aid of the
other.
Reding's night march, a move which St. Cyr does not seem to
havc foreseen, nearly enabled him to carry out his phul. In fact,
1 These details are from Doyle'sletter of Feb. 24, in the Record Office.
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as we shall see, he had almost made an end of the French division
before the l\Iarshai, who lay himself at Piu with the Italians,
arlived to succour it 1.
In the early morning, between six and seven o'clock, the hend
of the long Spanish column reached the bridge of Goy, and
there fell in with Souhll.m's vooettcs. The sharp musketry fire
which at once broke out warned each party that a combat was
at hand. Souham hastily marched out from Valls, and drew up
his two brigades in the plain to the north of the town, placing
himself across the line of the enemy's advance. Reding at first
ma.de up his mind to thrust aside the French division, whose
force he somewhat undervalued, and to hurry on his march
toward Tarragona. The whole of his ll.dvaneed guard and part
of his centre crossed the ri \'er, deployed on the left bank, and
attacked the French. Souham held his ground for some hours,
but as more and more Spanish battalions kept pl'cssing across
the bridge and reinforcing the encmy's linc, he began after
a time to give way-the numerical odds were heavily against
him, and the C£Ltalans were fighting with great steadiness and
confidence. Before noon the French division was thrust back
against the town of Valls, and Ueding had been able to file not
only the greater part of his army but all his baggage across
the Francoli. The way to Tarragona was clear, and if he had
chosen to disengage his men he could have carried off the whole
of his. army to that city without molestation f1'olll Souham; who
I The much forces engaged at Valls we~e:-
Soulmm's Division:
1st Uge~ (lllree rotu,.).
42ud of the l.ine (three batts.).
Provisional regiment:
(One halt. each of 3rd .lAger, and
67th Line, two batts. 7th Line.]
.10 battalions, about 0,500 men.
24th Dragoons, aoout 500 mell,
two batteries.
})ino's Division:
1st Italian Light Regiment (three
hatt.s. ).
2nd Italian Light ltegiment (tbree
baWl.).
4th Line (three batts.).
6th u " "
7th " (one halt.).
13 k1ttaliollS, tLoout 6,500 meu.
7th Italian Dragoons (' Dragoons
of Napoleou 'land Italiau Royal
CliasseurlJ, togelhe~ about 800
men.
Total about 13,800 men, a force somc"'hat SIl}lcrior to that of till)
Spaniards, ifthc latter had only the corps given iu the last table.
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was too hard hit to wish to continue the combat. It is even
possible that if he had hastily brought up all his reserv~ he
might hav.e completely routed the French detachment before
it could have been succoured.
But Reding adopted neither one course nor the other. After
drhring back Souham, he allowed his men a long rest, probably
in order to give the rear and the baggage time to complete the
passage of the Fl.'uncoli. Vt'hile things were standing still,
St. Cyr arrived at full gallop from PIa, where he had been lying
with l'ino's division, to whom the news of the battle had arrived
vcry late. He brought with him only Pino's divisional cavalry,
the 'Dragoons of Napoleon' and Royal Chasseurs, but had ordered
the rest of .the Italians to follow at full speed when they should
have got together. As Pia is no more than eight miles from
Vulls, it was expected HUlt they would appclU' within the spare
of three hours. But, as a matter of fact, Pino did not draw
near till the afternoon: one of his brigades, which lay far out,
received contrndictory orders, and did not come in to PIa till
past midday \ and the Italian gencrol would not move till it lute}
rcjoilled him. Threc hours wcre wasted by this contretcmp8, and
meanwhile the battle might have been lost.
On arriving upon the field with the ltalian cavalr)', St. Cyr
rode along Souham's line, steadied it, and displayed the hOl'Scmen
in his front. Seeing the French rallying, and new troops arriving
to their aid, the Spanish commander jumped to the conclusion
that St. Cyr bad come up with very heavy reinforcements, and
instead ofcontinuing his advance, or pressing on his maTch toward
'farragona, suddenly changed his wllOlc plan of operations. He
would not stand to be attacked in the plain, but he resolved to
fight a defensive action on the heights beyond the Francoli, from
which he had descended in the morning. Accordingly, first his
baggage, then his main body, and lastly his vanguard, which
covered the retreat of the rest, slowly filed back over the bridge of
Goy,and took position on the rolling hills to the east. HereReding
drew them up in two lines, with the river flov.ing at their feet
as a front defence, and their batteries drawn up so as to sweep
the bridge of Goy and the fords. The right wing was covered
by a lo.lero.l ravine falling into the Frnncoli; the left, facing the
I Vacani, iii. 105-G. This fact is mentioned by no oUler author.
86 BATTLE OF VALLS [Ft:u. 25
villtlf:,J'C of Pixamoxons, was somewhat' in the air,' but the whole
position, if long. was good and eminently defensible.
St. eyr observed his achersary's movement with Joy, for he
would have been completely foiled if Booing had refusl.>O to fight
and passed o.n toward Tarragona. Knowing the Spanish troops,
a pitched battle with superior numbers was precisely what he most
desired. Accordingly.he took advantage of the long time of
waiting, while Pi no's division was slowly drawing near the field,
to rest and fau Souham's tired troops, and thCli to draw them
up facing the southern half of Reding's position, with a vacant
space on their right on which the Jtalians were to take up their
ground, when at last they should arrive.
When St. Cyr had lain for nearly three hours quiescent at the
foot of the heights, and no reinforcements had yet come in sight,
Reeling began to /:,"l'OW anxious. He hud, as he now realized,
retired with unnecessary haste from in front of a beaten force,
and had assumed a dcfcnsive posture whcn he should have pressed
the attack. At about three o'clock he made up his mind that
he had committed an error, but thinking it too late to resume
the ilght, resolved to retire on Tarragolla by the circuitous
route which passes through the village of Costanti. He sent
hack Generall\1arti to Tarragona to hring out fresh troops from
the garrison to join him at that point, and issued orders that
the army should retreat at dusk, He might perhaps have got
off'scatheless if he had moved away at once, though it is equally
possible that St. eyr might have fallen upon his rearguard
with Souham's division, and done him some damage. But he
waited for the dark befOl'e marching, partly because he wished
to rest his troops, who were desperately fatigued by the night
march and the subsequent combat in the morning, pmtly be-
Clluse he did not despair of fighting a successful defensive action
if St. eyr should venture to cross the Francoli and attack him.
Accordingly he lingered on the hillside in battle array, waiting
for the darkness 1.
l Arteche, v. 207-9, makes Uedillg deliver a second attack on Souham
ill the early afteruoon, This is, I think, an error, caused by a misreading
of CnbanlJS' somewlmt confused ooeoUllt of tllll fight, from wltich it might
be possible (ifno other lIOUl'(,'CS existed) to dc\lucc 11 secoud Spallish advauce,
Hut CaballCS is really dealing with· the latcr pIJusC':! of the first combat
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This gave St. eyr his chance; at three o'clock Pina's belated
division had begun to come up: first Fontane's brigad.e, then, an
hour find tl half later, that of Mazzuchelli, whose absence from
PIa had caused all the delay. It was long past fOUT, and the
winter afternoon was far spent when St. Cyr had at last got
all his troops in hand.
_bJIowing barely enough time for the Italians to form in order
of battle 1, St. CYf now led forward his whole army to the banks
of the Francoli. The two divisions -fofmed fOlli" heavy columlls
of a brigade each: and in this massive formation forded the
river and advanced uphill, dri"ing in before them the Spanish
skirmishers. The Italian dragoons went forward in the interval
between two of the infantry columns; the French cavlllr)' led
the attack on the e~-treme right, near the bridge of Goy.
For a moment it seemed as if the t}l'O armies would actually
cross bayonets all along the line, for the Spaniards stood firm
and opened a regular and well-directed fire upon the adl'tlIlCillg
columns. But St. eyr had not miscalculated the moral effect of
the steady approach of the four great bodies of infantry which
were now climbing the hill and drawing Ileal' to Reding's front.
Like so Illany other continental troops, who l1I.Id striven 011
earlier battle-fields to bear up in line against the French
column-formation, the Spaniards could not find heart to close
with the formidable and threatening masses which were rolling
in upon them. They deli"ered one last tremendous discharge
at 100 )'urds' distam,'C, and then, when they suw thc ellcmy
looming through the smoke and closing upon them, broke in
a d07.en different places and went to the rear in helpless dis-
order, sweeping away the second line, higher up the hill, which
only. It is conclu!liI"C that neithcr Reding himself, in his official dispatch,
St. Cyr, Doyle, nor Vl!.Cllui mention any engagement in the earlyafter-
l1ooll.
I St. Crr in his Memoirs (p. 123) makes the curious statement that
he silenced his artillery after it had fired only three rounds, lest he should
frighten off the Spaniards before he could reach them with his infantry.
and so prevent the latter from closing and winning as decisive a victory as
possible. One is almost prone to doubt the story. aud to suppose that
the cessation of fire was due to the fear of killing his own men when they
were getting close to the Spanish line. Arteehe puts this incident too
early in the fight, during Heding's supposed second attack.
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ought to have sustained them. The only actual collision was
011 the extreme left, near the bridge of Goy, where Reding
himself charged, with his staff, at l.he head of his cavalry, in
a vain attempt to save the desperate situation. He was met
in fllll career by the French 24th Dragoons, and thoroughly
beaten. In the melee he was ~urrowlded, t1ux."C of his aid.cs-de-
camp were wounded 1 and taken, and he himself only cut his way
out after receiving three sabre wounds on his bend and shoulders,
which ultimately proved fatal.
If there hnd not been many steep slopes and ravines behind
the Spanish position, nearly the whole of Booing's army must
have perished or been captured. But the country-side was so
diflicult that the Im0ol'ity of the fugitives got awny, though
many were overtaken. The total loss of the Spaniards amounted
to more than 3,000 men, of whom nearly half were prisoners 2.
All the guns of the defeated anny, all its baggage, and several
stands of colours fell into the hands of the \'ictors. The French
lost about 1,000 men, mostly in the early part of the engage·
ment, when Souham's division was driven back under the walls
of Valls.
The Spaniards had not fought amiss: St. Cyr, in a dispatch to
Berthier, acknowledges the fact"""":llot in order to exalt the merit
cl his own troops, but to demonstrate that the 7th Corps was
too weak for the task set it and required further reinforcement,s3.
Dut Reding did not gh·e his men II fair chance; he hurried
them into the fight at the end of a long night march, drew them
ofI' just wheu they were victorions, and ll~tered his plan of battle
1 Among them was an English officer 1lllllled neid.
I Including Colonels Dumont and Autune~ commamling respectively
the 'Valloon and Spanish guards, the Marquis of Casteldosrius commanding
the ca\'alry brigade, 1I1roo of Redillg's aides-de-camp, and eiglLty other
officers, Two colonels were killed, a brigadicr-general (Saint Ellier) and
many other superior officers wounded.
3 'VotreAltesse me dit qu·it n'y a rien autour de nous qai puisse resister
a G,OOO llOmmes. Je lui tlemande panlon. La dil'ision Souham a ete
quelque temps sculo le 25, ct nOIlS 'WOllS \'11 qu'il etait temps qllo
l'autre division arrivat. ..• 011 ne peut nier que les troupes espagnoles
gagnent tOilS les jours, et nous sommes forces de leur rendre justice; ala
bataille de VaUs elles se sont tris-bieu battues.' St. Cyr to Derlhier, ValLs,
T\Jarch 6, 1009.
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thrice in the course of the day. ~o army could have done itself
justice with such bad leading. .
The wrecks of the beaten force straggled into 'l'arragona,
their spirits so depressed that it was a long time before it was
pos<lible to trust them ugain in battle. 'Vhen they once more
took the field it was under another leader, "for Reding, after
lingering some weeks, died of' his wounds, leaving the reputation
of 0. bl'!~VC, honest, und humane officer, but of It very poor
general.
St. Cyr utilized his victory merely by blockading Tarrll.oouua.
He moved Souhnm to Reus, and kept Pino at Valls, each
throwing oul-detachments as far as the sea, so as to cut off the
city from an its communicatiolls with the interior. An epidemic
had broken out in the plncc, in c,onsequcnce of the mosses of
ill-attended wounded who cumbered the hospitals. It would
seem that the 'French General hoped that the pestilence might
turn the hcarts of the garrison towards surrender. If so, hc
W/lS much dl'tCi\'ed: they bore their ills with stolid patience,
Md being always victualkod from the sea suffered no practical
inconvenience from the blockade. It seems indeed that St. Cyr
would have done far better to use the breathing time which he
won at the battle of Valls for the commencemcnt of a movement
against Geroua. Till that pltu:e should be captured, and the
high-road to Perpignan opened, there was no real security for
the 7th Corps. Long months, however, were to elapse before
this necessary opcmtioll was tuken ill hand.
SECTION XI
THE SECOND SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA
CHAPTER I
THE CAPTURE OF THE OUTWORKS
,~rmLE Napoleon was urging on his fruitless pursuit of Sir
John :Maore, while St. Cyr was discomfiting the Catalans 011
the Besos and the IJobrcgat, and while Victor was dealing his
lnst blow to the dilapidated army of Infuntado, there was one
point on which the war was standing still, and where the French
arms had made no great progress since the battle of'1'udela.
Saragossa was holding out, with the same tCllucity that she had
displayed during the first siege in the July and August of the
preceding summer. In front of her walls and ban'icades two
whole corps of the Emperor's army were detained fmm December,
1808, till February, 1809. .As long as the defence endured, she
preserved the rest of Aragon and the whole of Valencia from
invaslOn.
The battle of Tudela had been fought on November ~g, but
it was not tillnea.rly a month later that the actual siege began.
The reason for this delay was that the Emperor had called oIT
to Madrid all the troop~ which had taken part in the campaign
against Castaiios and Palafo~ save l\!oncey's 3rd Corps alone.
This force was not numerous enough to invest the city till it had
been strengthened by heavy reinforcements from the North.
After having routed the Armies of Aragon and the Centre,
Marshal Lannes had thrown up the command which had been
entrusted to him, and hud gone back to France. The injuries
which he had suffered from his fall over the precipice near
Pampeluna 1 were still far from healed, and served as the excuse
1 See \'01. i. p. '136.
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for his retirement. lHonooy, therefore, resumed, on Novem_
ber ~, the charge of the victorious army: OIl the next da~' he
was joined by Ney, who, after failing to intercept Castanos in
the mountains l, had descended into the valley of the Ebro, with
l\1archulld and Dessolles' divisions of infantry, and Beaumont's
light cavalry brigade. On the twenty-eighth the two maruhals
advanced along the high·road by Mallen and Alagon, a!1d on
the second day after appeared in front of Saragossa. with all
their troops, save l\fusnicr's division of the Srd Corps und the
division of the 6th Corps lately commanded by Lagrange, which
had followed the retreating army of Castanos into the hills on
the road to Calatayud. They were about m commence the
investment of -the cit;,. when Ne)' received orders from the
Emperor, dispatched from Aranda, bidding him leave the siege
to Moncey, and cross the mountains into New Castile with
all the troops of the 6th Corps: he was to find Castailos, and
hang on his llcels so that he should 1I0t be ablc to mu.rch to
the help of Madrid.
Accordingly the Duke of Elchingen marched from the camp
in front of Saragossa with the divisions of Marchalld and Dcs-
soIles, and the cavalry brigades of DOOUlDont and Digeoll. At
Calatll)'ud he eame up with the force which had been dispatched
.in pursuit of Castanos,-Musnier's division of the Srd Corps, and
that of the 6th Corps which Maurice Mathiell bad taken over
from Lo.grallge, who had been severely wounded at Tudela t.
Leaving Musnier at ClI.latayud to protect his communications
with Aragon, Ney picked up Mauri<.'e Mathiell, and passed the
mountains into New Castile, where he fell into the Emperor's
sphere of operations. 'Yc have seen that he took a prominent
part in the pursuit ofSir John Moore and the invasion of Galicia.
Moncey, meanwhile, was left in front of Saragossa with his
1st, Srd, and 4th Divisions-the 2nd being still at Calatnyud.
This force consisted of no more than twcnty~thrce battalions,
about 15,000 men, and was far too weak to undertake the siege.
The Marshal was informed that the whole corps of Morlier was
1 See vo1. i. pp. 446-7.
I Few of the French historians mention tbese cbanges, but they are
quite certain. 011 Nov. 23 'the division Maurice l'I1athieu' means tho
1st of tbe 3rd Corps; on Dec. I, it means the 2nd of the 6th CorllS.
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to be sent to his aid, but it was still far llwCty, and with very
proper caution he resolved tu draw back /lnd wait for the arrhal
of the reinforcements. If the Spaniards got to know of his
condition, they might sully out fwm Saragossa and attack him
with more than 30,000 men. Monrey, therefore, drew back to
Alagon, and there waited for the arrival of the Duke of'l'reviso
and the 5th Corps. It wus not till DCt:embcr 20 that he WM
able to present himself once more before the city.
Thus SllrogOSsa gained four weeks of respite between the
battle of Tudela and the commeOl'elllelll; of the actual !>iege.
This reprieve was invaluable to Palafox and the Aragonese.
They would have been in grave danger if Lanncs had marched
011 and !LSsaultecl the city only two days after the battle, amI
before the routed army had been rallied. Even if Ney and
l\:lonccy hlld been permitted to begin a serious attack on
Noyember 30, the day of their al'rival before the place, they
would have had some chance of success. But their sudden
retreat raised the spirits of the defcnders, and the twenty extra
days uf preparatiun thus granted to them sufficed to restore
them to full confidence, and to re-establish their belief in the
luck of Sarngossa and the special protection vouchsafed them
by its patron saint Our Lady of the Pillar. Napoleon must
take the blame for all the consequences of Ney's withdrawal.
He had ordered it without fully realizing the fact that Moncey
would be left too weak to t:OllllllCllce the siege. Probably he
had over-estimated the effect of the defeat of Tudela on the
Army of Aragon. For the failure of Ney's attempt to surround
Castanos he was only in part responsiblc, though (as we havc
seen) he had sent him out on his circular march two days too
late l . Dut to draw oft' the 6th Corps to New Castile (where
it failed to do any good), before the 5th Corps had arrived to
take its place before Saragossa, was clearly a blunder.
Palafox made admirable U/iC of" the unexpected 'reprie\'e that
had been granted him. He had not, it will be remembered,
taken part in person in the battle of Tudela, but had returned
to his head quarters on the night before that disaster. He was
occupied in organizing a reserve to take the field in support
of his two divisions already at the front, whcn the sudden
I See vol. i. pp. 446-7.
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influx of fugitives into Sar~ct'()ssa showed him what had OCCllrred.
In the courSe of the next two days thcre poured into the plaee
the remains of the divisions of O'Neille and St. Mal·ch from his
own Army of Aragon. 'Vith them came Roca's men, who properly
belonged to Castafios, but having fought in the right willg llUd
been separated from the main body of the AnduJusian army I.
[n nddition, fragments of mallY othcr regiments of thc Army
of thc Centl·c struggled into SantgQSSlI. At least 16,000 or
11,000 men of thc wrecks of Tudela had come in ere four days
were expired. To help thcm, Pa.lafox could count on all the
newly organized battalions of his reserve, which had never"
marchcd out to join the field army: thcy amounted to some
10,000 or 12,000 men, but many of the regiments had only
lately been 0l'galli7'oo and had not received theil· uniforms or
equipmcnt. Nor was this nIl: several belated battnlions from
Mureia and Valencia came in at various times during the ne."(t
tCll days 2, so that long ere the actual siCc.a-e began I'alafox could
COllnt 011 SQ.OOO bayoncts and ~.OOO sabres of marc or less
regularly organized corps. ·He had in addition a number of
irregulars-armed citizens and peasants of the country-side-
whosc numbers it is impossible to fix, for thongh some had
becn collecteti in parMdfJ,8 or volunteer companies, others fought
in loose bands just iUl they pleased, and without all)' proper
organization. They may possibly have amounted to 10,000
men at the time of the commencement of the siege, but so many
were drafted into thc locu.l Amgollesc battalions before the
end of the fighting, that when the place surrendered in Feb-
Mmry. there were less than a thousand 3 of these unembodied
irregulurs undcr 8.l:UlS.
But it was not so much for the reorganization of his army
as for the strengthening of his fortifications that Palafox found
, Br far the larger part of Roca's dh"isiou reached Saragossa; the
Spanish returns show that 4,500 mell joined Palafoxc, and only 1,500
escaped to Cuenca with tlle rest of the 'Army of the Centre.'
~ Among these were the 1st and 2nd Tiradores de Murcia, the regiment
of Florida Blallca, the 3rd alld 6th Volunteers of nIurcia, alld the 3.rd
Volunteers of ValenCia, all of which had arrived too late for Tndela.
S To be e:'l[act,756 was the number of pai3GIlN 3!1 opposed to tr()j"Ja in the
return of the garrison on Feb. 20. See Art:e<:he, Appendix to vol. iv.
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the respite during the first three weeks of December profitable.
During the nrst siege it will be remembered that the factin.
cations of Saragossa had been contemptible from the engineer's
point of view: the flimsy mcdiac\·nl enceinte had crumbled awn)'
at the first fire of the besiegers, and the real defence had been
carried out behind the barricndes. By the comm~ncement of
tile second siege everything had changed, and the city was
coyered by fl. formidable line of defences, e."ecuted, as was re·
marked by onc of the French generals 1, with more zeal and
energy than scientific skill, but presenting nevertheless most
serious obstacles to the besieger.
After the raising of the first siege by Verdicr, the Spaniards
had been for some time ill a state of such confidence and exult;a..
tion that they imagined that there was no need for further
defcnsivc precautions. The ncxt campaign was to be fought,
as they supposed, on the further side of the Pyrenees. But
the long suspension of the expected advance during the autumn
months began to chill their spirits, and, as the year drew 011,
it was no longer reckoned unpatriotic or cowardly to take
into consideration the wisdom of strengthening the inland
fortresses in view of a possible return of the French. In Sep-
tember, Colonel San Genis, the engineer officer who, had worked
for Palafox during the first siege, received pennis.~ion to com-
mem:e a series of regular fortifications for Saragossa. The work
did not progress rapidly, for the Aragonese had not as yet
much belief in the possibility that they might be called on
once again to defend their capitaL San Genis only received
a moderate sum of money, and the right to requisition men of
over thirty-five from the city and the surrounding villages.
'.rIte lI\bou1' had to be paid, and therefore the labourers were
few. The new works \~'ere sketched out rather than e."(ccuted.
Things progressed with a leisurely slowness, till in November
the dangers of the situation begllll to be appreciated, and the
approach of the French reinforcements drove the Saragossans
to greater energy. Dut it was only the thu,nderclap of 'l\ldela
tl;at really alarmed them, arid sent soldiers and civilians, men,
women, and children, to labour with feverish haste at the corn-
1 See Cavallero's criticism of this statement of Uoguiat on p, 17 of Ilis
interesting little work.
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pIction of the new lines. Between November ~5 and Decem-
ber !lO. the amount of work that was Cl\rried out was amfLZing
and adminible. If Ney and MOllCCY hud been allowed to
commence the regular siege before the month of November
had e..'l:pired, they would have found the whole system of works
ill an incomplete condition. Three weeks Inter Saragossa had
been converted into a formidable fortress.
The only point where Sari ~nis' scheme had not been fully
developed was the Monte Torrero. It will be remembered that
this important hill, whose summit lies only 1,800 yards from
the walls of SaragoSS8.t overlooks the whole city, and had been
chosen during the first siege as the emplacement for the main
breaching batteries. To keep the French froUl this commanding
position was most important, and the Spanish engineer had
intended to cover the whole circuit of the hill with a large
cntrenched camp, protected by continuous lines of earthworks
and.numero~s redoubts, with the Canal of Aragon, which runs
under its southern foot., as a wet ditch in its front. But, when
the ncws of Tudela arrived, little or nothing had been done
to carry out this scheme: the fortification of the city had
absorbed the main attention of the Aragonese, and while that
was still .incomplete the Monte 'l'orrero had been neglected.
In December it was too late to begin the building of three or
four miles of newearthworks, Ilnd in consequence nothing was
constructed on the suburban hill save one large central redoubt,
and two small works serving as Utes~-pont, at the points where
the Madrid and the La Mnela roads cross the Canal of Aragon.
St. March's Valencian division, still.6,OOO strong, was told off
for the defence of the hill, but had no continuous line of works
to cover it. The only strength of the position lay in the canal
which runs round its foot: but this was not very broad, alld
was fordable at more than one point. In short, the Monte
TOl'rero constituted an outlying defence which .might be held
for some time, in order to keep the besiCo"Crs far off from the
body of the place, rather than an integral part of its line of
defence. .
It was on the works of Saragossa itself th,fl.t the energy of
more than 60,000 enthusiastic labourers, military and civilian,
had been expended during the month that followed Tudcln.
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The total accomplished in this time movcs our respect: it will
be well to take the various fronts in detail.
On the lVestern front, from the Ebro to the Huerba, there
hud been in August noUling more than a weak woll, muny
parts of which Wel'C composed of the reaNides of convents
and buildings. In front of this line there had been COllstnlCted
by November 10 a very different defence. A solid rampart
reveted with bricks taken fmm ruined houses, and furnished
with a broad terrace for lutillcry, and a ditch forty-five feet
deep now covered the entire western side of the city. The
convents of the Allgustinians and the Trinitarians, which had
been outside the walls during the earliel' siege, had been taken
into this new cm:einte and serycQ as bastions in it, There being
a space 600 )'IUUs long betwecn them, where the eurtain would
have been unprotected by flanking fires, f1 great semicircular
batter)' had been thrown out, which acted as a third bastion
Oil this side. Strong earthworks had olso been built up to
cover the Portillo and Carmen gates. As an outlying fort
there was the castle of the Aljafferia, which had received
extensive repairs, and was connected with the eIIceinte by a ditch
and a covered way. It would completely enfilade any attacks
made on the north-western part of the new wall.
On the Southern front of the defences the wOl'k done had
been even more important. Here the new fortifications had
been ca.rried down to the brink of the rnvine of the Huerba,
so as to make that stream the wet ditch of the town. Two
great redoubts were pushed beyond it; one called the redoubt
of' Our Lady of the Pillar' lay at the bridge outside the Santa
Engracia gate. It was providt..'<1 with. a deep narrow ditch,
into which the water of the riyer had been turned, and armed
with eight gUlls. The corresponding fort, at the south-enst
angle of the town, Wllij made by fortifying the convent of San
Jose, on the Valencia road, just beyond the Huerba. This was
a quadrangle 120 yards long by eighty broad, furnished with
a ditch, and with a (.'OVCl'(.'<l way with palisntlcs, cut in the
counterscarp. It held twelve heavy guns, and a garrison of no
less than 8,000 men. Between St. ,Jose and the Pillar redoubt,
the old town wall above the HuCl'oo had been strengthened and
thickened, and several new batterie8 had been built upon it.
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It could not well be nssailed till the two projecting works in
front of it should be reduced, and if they should fall it stood
on higher ground and completely commanded their sites. The
collven"t of Santa Engracia, so much disputed during the first
sie&re, had been turned into a sort of fortress, and heavily armed
with guns of position.
On the eastern front of the city from SUIl Jose to the Ebro,
the Huerba still serves as a ditch to the place, but is Dot so
steep or so difficult as in its upper course. H~re the suburb
of the Tmmeries (Las 'I'cllerias), where that stream falls into
the Ebro, had been turlll..'<1 into a strong projecting redoubt,
whose fire commanded both the opposite bank of the Ebro on
one side, and the lower reaches of the Huerba on the other.
Half way between this redoubt and Sun Jose was a great
battery (generally called the' Palafox Battery') at the Porta
Quemada, whose fires, crossing those of the other two works,
commanded all the low ground outside the eastern front of
the city.
It only remains to speak of the fortifications of the trans-
pontine sllburb of San Lazato. This W88 by nature the weakest
part of the defences, as the suburb is built in low marshy
ground on the river's edge. Here deep euttings had been made
and filled with water, three heavy batteries had been ereded, ·and
the convents of San WArO and .Jesus had been strengthened,
crenellated and loopholed, and turned into forts. The wlrole
of these works were joined by palisades and ditches. They
formed a great tete-de-pont, requiring a garrison of 3,000
mcn. As an additional defence for the flanks of the snburb
three or four gun-boats, manned by sailors brough.t up from
Cartagena, had been launched on th~ Ebro, and commanded
thc reach of the river which runs alon,g the nor.thel:ll side of
the city.
Yet great as were the works which now sheathed the body
of Saragossa, the people had not forgotten the moral lesson of
the first siege. When ber walls had ~n bea~n down, she had
resisted behind her barricades and the solid houses of her narrow
streets. They fully realized that this might again have to be
done, if the French should succeed in breaking in at some point
of the long em::eillte. Accordingly, every preparation was made
0.uA.>;. 11 Q
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for street fighting. Houses wecc loopholcd, and eomUlwli{'atiolls
were pierced between them, without any regard for private
property or convenience. Ground-floor windows were built
up. and arrangements made for the speedy and solid closing
of all doors. Tra,'erses were erected in the streets, to guard
as far as was possible against the dangers of n bombardment,
and un elaborate system of barricades, arranged in proper tactical
relation to each other, was sketched out. 'The walls might be
broken, but the people boasted that the kernel should be harder
than the shell.
Outside the city, where the olive groves and suburban villas
and summer houses had given much cover to the French during
the first siege, a clcnh swc<:p had been made of every stone and
stick for 800 yards around the defences. The trees were felled,
.and dragged into the city, to be cut up into palisades. The
bricks and stones were CArried off to revet the new ramparts and
ditches. The once fertile and picturesque garden·suburbs were
left bald and bare, and could be perfectly well searched by the
cannon from the walls, so that the enemy had to contrive all
his cover by pick and shovel, or gabion and fas~ine.
The soldiery, whose spirits had been much dashed by the
disaster of Tudcla, soon picked up their courage when they
noted the enthusiasm of the citizens and the strength of the
defences. Indeed, it was dangerous for any man to show outward
signs of doubt or fear, for the Aragonese had been wrought up
to a pitch of hysterical patriotism which made them look upon
faintheartedness us treuson. Palafox himself did his best to keep
down riots and asstlSSinations, but his followers were ulways
stimulating him to apply martial law in its most rigorous form.
A high gallows was erected in the middle of the Coso, and
short shrift was given to any man convicted of attempted deser-
tion, disobedience to orders, or cowardice. Delations were innu-
merable, and the Captain-General had the greatest difficulty in
preserving from the popular fury even persons whom he believed
to be innocent. The most that he could do for them was to
shut them up in the prisons of the Aljafferin, and to defer their
trial till the siege should be over. The faLt wu that Palafox
was well aware that his power rested on the unlimited confidence
reposed on him by the people, and was therefore bent on
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crossing their desires as little all he could help. He was careful
to take counsel not only with his military subordinates, but
wiUl all those who had power in the streets. Hence came the
prominence which is assigned in all the narratives of the siege to
obscure persons, such as the priests Don Basilio (the Captain-
~lIcrnl's chaplain) and Santiago Suss, and to the dem~O"()gucs
'Tio Jorge' and 'Tio Marin.' They represented public opinion,
and had to be conciliated. It is going too far to say, with
Nupicr, that a regular' Reign of Terror' prevailed in Saragossa
throughout the second siege, and that Pnlafox was no more than
a puppet, whose strings were pulled by fanatical friars and
bloodthirsty gutter-politicians. Bul'it is clear that the Captain-
General's dictatorial power was only preserved by a careful
observation of every gust of popular feeling, and that the acts
of his subordinates were often reckless and cmel: The soldiers
disliked the fanatical citizens: the work of Colonel Cavallcro,
the engineer officer who has left the best Spanish narrative of the
siege, is fuU of this feeling. He sums up the situation by
\lTiting that 'The agents of the Commander-in-chief sometimes
abused their power. Everything was demanded in the name of
King and Country, every act of disobedience was counted as high
treason: on the other· hand, known devotion to the holy cause
gave unlimited authority, and nssurcd impunity for any act to
those who had the small<..>st shadow of delegated power. Even
if the citizens had not been unanimous in' their feelings, fear
would have given them an appearance of unanimity. To the
intoxication of coufidenec an~ national pride caused by the
results of the first siege, to the natural obstinacy of the Ara-
gonese, to the strength of a dictatorial government supported
by dcmocmtic enthusiasm, there was added an exalted religious
fanaticism. Our Lady of the Pillar, patroness of Saragossa, had,
it was supposed, displayed her power by the raising of the first
siege: it had been the greatest of her miracles. Anything could
be got from a people in this frame of mind 1.'
Palafox knew well how to deal with his followers. He kept
himself always before their eyes; his activity was unceasing, his
supervision was felt in every department. His uneuding series
1 Ca\'allero, pp. 68-1). Belmas translates the parngrnllh nlmost word
Cor word in ii. 144-6 O(lI;S work, witiJout acknowledgcmcnt.
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of eloquent, if somewhat bombastic, proclamations was well
suited to rouse thei.r enthusiasm. He displayed, even to osten-
tation, a confidence which he did not always feel, because he saw
that the strength of the defence layil1 the fact that the Aragonese
were convinc«l. in the certainty of their own triumph. The first
doubt as to ultimate success would dull their courage and
-weaken their arms. 'Vc cannot blame him, under the cir'cum-
.stances, if he concealed from them everything that was likely
to damp their ardour, and allowed them to believe everything
that would keep up their spirits.
Meanwhile he did not neglect the practical side of the defence.
The best testimony to his capacity is the careful accumulation
which he made of all the stores and material needed for a long
siege. Alone among all the Spanish garrisons of the war, that
of Saragossa never suffered from. hunger nor from want of
resources. It was the pestilence, not starvation, which was
destined to prove the ruin of the defence. Before the French
, investment began Palafox had gathered in six months' provisions
for 15,000 men; the garrison was doubled by the arrival of the
routed arm)' from Tudela: yet still there was food for three
months for the 'military. The citizens had been directed to lay
in pri ....ate stocks, and to feed themselves: this they had done,
and it was not till the end of the siege that they began to run
short of comestibles. Even when the place fell there were still
large quantities of corn, maize, salt fish, oil) brandy, and forage
for horses in the magazines 1. Only fresh meat had failed, and
the Spaniard is ne....er a great consumer of that commodity.
Military stores had been prepared in vast quantities: there '.I'M
an ample stock of sandbags, of timber for palisading, of iron
work A.nd spare fittings for artillery. Instead of gabions the
garrison used the lnrge wicker baskets employed for the vintage,
which were available in profusion. Of artillery there were some
160 pieces in the place, but too many of them were of small
calibre: only about sixty wcr:e 16~poundcrs or heavier. Of
these more than half were French pieces, abandoned by Verclier
in August in his siege.works, or fished out of the canal into
which he had thrown them. Of cannon-balls there ~as also
an ample pro\'isioll: a great part, like the siege-guns, were spoil
1 Camllero, pp. 81 and 148.
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taken in the deserted camp of the French in August. Shells,
011 the other hnnd, were ycry deficient, and the workmen of the
local arsenal could not llllll).ufacture them satisfactorily. The
powder was made in the place throughout the siege: the accident
in Jul~., when the great magazine in the Seminary blew up with
such disastrous results, hud induced Palafox to order that no
great central store should be made, but that the sulphur, salt·
petre, and charcoal should be kept apart, and compounded daily
in quantities sufficient for aU requirements. So many thousand
civilians were kept at work on powdcr- Md cartridge.mnking
that this plan never failed, and 110 great c-...plosiolls took place
during the second siege.
It will be remembered that want of muskets had been onc
of tile chief hindranccs of the AragollesE! during the operations
in July and August. It was not fclt in Decembel' and January,
for not only had Palafox collected a large store of small arms
during the autumn, to equip his reseryes, but he received, just
before the imestment began, a large convoy of British muskets,
sent up from Tarragona. by Colonel Doyle, who had. gone down
to the coast by the Captain-General's desire, to hurry on their
transport. As the siege went on, the mortality among the
garrison was so great that the stock of muskets more than
sufficed for those who were in a state to bear arms.
Such were the preparations which were made to re<:eive the
French, when they should finally present themselves in front
of the walls. All had been done, saye in one matter, to enable
the city to make the best defence possible under the circum-
stances. The single omission was to provide for a field force
beyond the walls CApable of harassing the besiegers from with.
out, and of cutting their communications with their base. }~rom
his 40,000 men Pulafox ought lo have detacbed a strong division,
with orders to base itself upon Upper Aragon, and keep the
French in constant fear as to their supplies and their touch
with Tudela and P~peluna. Ten thousand men could easily
have been spared, and the mischief that they might have done
was incalculable. Tbe city had more defenders than were needed :
in the open country, on the other hand, there was no nucleus
left for further resistance. Almost every available man had
been sent up to Saragot;sa, with the exception of !...azan's division
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in Catalonia, and of three other battalions 1, the whole of the
32,000 men rai8ed by the kingdom of Aragon were inside the
walls, Outside there remained nothing but illlOrgani7.ed bands
of peasants to keep the field and molest the besiegers. 'l11C ouly
help from without that was given to the city was that supplied
by Lazan'51 small force, when it was withdrawn from Catalonia
in January, and 4,000 men could do llotlling against two French
army corps. Even as it was, the French had to tell off the best.
part of two divisions to guard their communications. What
could they have done if there had been a solid body of 10,000
men ranging the mountains, and descending at every favourable
opporbmity to fall upon some post on the long line AJagon.
Mallen-Tudela-Pampeluna by which the besiegers drew their
food and munitions from their base?
It wOlild seem that the neglect of Palafox to provide for this
necessary detachment arose from three causes. The first was
his want of real strategical insight-which had been amply
displayed during the autumn, when he was always urging on
his t.-olleagues his ridiculous plan for 'surrounding' the French
army, by an impossible march into Navarre and the Pyrenees.
The second was his comiction, well-founded enough in itself,
that his troops would do much better behind walls than in the
open 2. The third was a strong belief that the siege would be
mised not by any operations from without, but by the rigours of
the wmter. In average years the months of January and February
are tempestuous and rainy in Aragon. The low ground about
Saragossa is often inundated: even if the enemy were not
drowned out (like the besiegers of Leyden in 1574), Palafox
thought that they would find trench-work impossible in the
constant downpour, and would be so much th.inlll..od by dyscntery
lI.lld rheumatism that they would have to draw back from their
low-lying camps and raise the siege. Unfortunately for him the
winter turned out exceptionally mild, and' (what was worse)
exceptionallydl'y. The French had not to suffer from the awful
deluge which in Galicia, during this same month, was rendering
1 The battalions of Alcanitz, Tauste, and Tiradoru de D()]jle j the last
were at Jaca, and afterwards served with Dlake's army at Mal'ia and
Delebite. They are wrongly put in Saragossa, in Arleehe, iL Appendix.
, See the remarks ill defcnco of Palafox in Al'toche, iv. 332-4.
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the retreat of Sir John Moore so miserable. The rain did no
more than send many of the besiegers to hospital: it never
stopped their advilm:c or flooUed their trenches.
""Vhen Palafox had nearly completed his defences-the works
on the Monte 'l'orrero alone were still hopelessly behindhand-
the French at last begun to move up against him. 011 Decem-
ber 15 Marshal Mortier arrived at Tudela with the whole of the
5th Corps, veterans from the German garrisons who had not
yet fired n shot in Spain. Their ranks were so full thnt though
only two divisions, or twenty-eight battalions, fonned the corps,
it counted 21,000 bayonets. It had also a brigade of two regi-
ments of hussars nnd chnssenrs as corps-cavalry, with a strength
of 1,500 sabres. The condition of MOll(''eY'S 3rd Corps was
much less satisfactory: it was mainly composed of relics of the
original llrmy of Spain-of the conscripts fonned into pro-
visiollol regiments with whom Napoleon had at first inteuded
to conquer the Peninsnla 1. Its other troops, almost without
exception, had taken part in the first siege of Saragossa under
Verdier, a not very cheerful or inspiriting preparntion for the
second leaguer 2• All the regiments had been thinned by severe
sickness in the autumn; on October 10 they had already 7.741
men in hospital-far the largest figure shown by any of the
French corps' in Spain. The number had largely increased as
the winter had drawn 011, and the battalions had grown so weak
that Moncey consolidated his four divisions into three during
his halt at Alagon. The whole of the 4th division was distri-
hutOO between the 9lnd and Sni, so as to bring the others up to
a decent strength. On ~ember ~O the thirty-eight battalions
only made up M,OOO effective men for the siege, while more
than 10,000 lay sick, some with the army, some in the base
hospitals at Pampeluna. The health of the corps grew pro-
gressively worse in January, till at last in the middle days of the
siege it had 15,000 men with the colours, and no less than 13,000
sick. We find the French generals complaining that one
division of the 5th Corps was almost as strong and effective at
1 The 114t1l, 116th, 116th. 117th, 12ht, and 2nd Legion of Reserve
were all formed in this way.
1 These were the In, 2nd and 3rd of tlle Vislula, 44th and 14th of the
liue, and one battalion each oftlle 70th aDd 6th lAger.
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this.time as the whole combined force ofthe Srd Corps 1, Never.
theless these weary and fever-ridden troops had to take in charge
the main part of the siege operations.
During the twenty dOJs of his halt at AlagOll, Monccy had
employed his sappers and many of his infantry in the manufacture
of gabions, wool-packs, and sandbags for the projected siege. He
was continually receiving convoys of heavy artillery and mumn-
nition from Pampeluna, and when Martier came up on Decem-
ber 20, had a sufficiency of material collected for the commence-
ment of the leaguer. The two marshals moved on together on
that day, and marched eastward towards Saragossa, with the
whole of their forces, save that four battalions were left to
guard the camp and depOts at Alagon, and three 1ll0l'C at
'l'udela to keep open the Pampeluna road 2. Ga7.an's division
crossed the Ebro opposite Tauste, to invest the tmnspontine
suburb of Sar~O'OSSa: the rest of the army kept to the right bank.
Late in the evening both columns came in sight of the city.
They mustered, after deducting the troops left behind, about
38,000 infantry, 3,500 cavalry, and 3,000 sappers and artillery-
men. They had sixty siege*gnns, over and above the eighty~four
field-pieces belonging to the corps-artillery of Mortier and
Monce)'. The provision of artillery was copious-far more than
the French had tumed against many of the first-class fortresses
of Germany. The Emperor was determined that Saragossa
should be well battered, and had told off' an extra proportion
of engineers against the place, entrusting the general charge of
the work to his aide-de-camp, General Laoost(\ one of the most
distinguished officers of the scientific corps.
When the rcill\'estment began, Gn.zan on the left bunk estab-
lished himself at Villanueva facing the suburb of San lazaro.
Mortier with Suchet's division took post at San Lamberto
opposite the western front of the city. Moncey, marching
rowld the place, ranged Gmndjeall's troops opposite the Monte
TotTcro, on the southem front of the defences, and Morlot
further east near the mouth of the Huerba. His other division,
I See Ule table in Belm3ll, ii. 381.
2 TIlCsc were all detac1lcd from MOllOOy. '11c Alagon garrisoll con~
sisted of four battaliOIlS of the 2ud kgiou of ~rve, 2,.000 strong. At
Tudcla were three battalions of the i21st regimellt, 1,800 b&yoneta.
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that of Musnier, formed the central reserve, and guarded the
artillery and the magazines. The Spaniards made no attempt
to delay the completion of the investment, and kept quiet within
their walls.
On the next morning the actual siege began. It was destined
to last from December 20 to February !W, and may be divided
iuto three well-marked sections. The fIrst eomprises the opera-
tions against the Spanish outworks, and terminates with the
capture of the two great bridge-heads beyond the Huerba, the
forts of San Jose and QUI.' Lady of the Pillar: it lasted dowll to
January 15. The se<:ond period includes the time during which
the besiegers attacked and finally broke through the main enannte
of the city: it lasts from January 16 to January 27. The third
section consists of the street-fighting, after the walls had been
pierced, and ends with the fall of Saragossa on February flO.
Havhig reconnoitred the whole circuit of the Spanish defences
on the very evening of their arrival before the city (December
flO), Mon(.'eY and Mortier recognized that their first task must
be to evict the Spaniards from the Monte Torrero, the one
piece of dOllllnating ground in the whole region of operations,
and the spot n"Om which Sa~<1'()ssa. could be most eflbctivcly
attacked. The)· were rejoiced to see that the broad hill WUS Dot
protcd(.-u by any continuous line of entrenchments, hut was
merely crowned by a large open redoubt, and defended in front
by the two small bridge-heads oh the Canal of Aragon. There
WllS nothing to prevent un attempt to storm it by main force.
This was to be made on the following moming; at the same
time Gazan, on the left bank of the Ehro, was ordered to assault
the suburb of San Lazaro. Here the marshals had underrated
the strength of the Spanish position, which lay in such low
gronnd and was so difficult to make Ollt, that it presented to
the obscn'er from a distance an aspect of weakness that was far
from the reality.
At eight on the morning of December ~1 three French
batteries, placed in favourable advanced positions, began to shell
the redoubts on the Monte Torrero, with satisfactory results, as
they dismounted some of the defelldcl:'s gullS and exploded
a timaU depOt of reserve ammunition. An hour later the
infantry came into action. Moncey had told off for the assault
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the divisions of Morlot and Grandjean, t\\'enty battaliOllS in
alI t • The formcr atmcked thc eastcrn frOl1t oí the position,
fording the callal and assailillg the left-hand téte-de·pOJlt on the
Valencia road from the flank. The latter, which hOO passed
the canal far outside the Spunish lilles, find aperate<! between it
and the Huerba, attacked the south-western slopes oí the hil!.
The defence was weak, and when a brigadc of Grandjean's mcn
pushed in between the mitin redoubt on the erest and the
Huerba, und took the wcstern part oí the Spanish line in the
rear, the day was won. Sto March's battalions wavered aH along
the line; and as his reserves could not be induced to fall upon
the French advance, the Valencian general withdrew his whole
division iuto the city, abandoning the entire cireuit of the Monte
Torrero. The assailants eaptured seven guns-some of them
disabled-in the three redoubt.s, and a standard of thc 5th rcgi-
ment of Murcia. They had only lost twenty killed alld fifty
wounded; the Spanish loss was also insignificant, considcring
the importance oí the position that was at stake, and hardly
any prisoners were taken 2. 'rhe besiegers had no\\' the power
to bombard aH thc southern front oí Saragossa., and dominated,
from the slopes of the hill. thc two advanced forts of San José
and the Pillar. 'rile leaders oí the populace were strongly of
opinion that the Valencian division had misbchaved, alld they
were not fal" wrong. Palaíox had great difficulty in protecting
St. March, whose personal conduct had been unimpeachable.
from the wrath oí the multitude, who wished to make him
responsible for the weakness shown by his men 3. The offieer
who lost the Monte Torrero in the first siege had bcen tried and
shot 4: St. March was lucky to escape even without a reprimand.
Meanwhile things hOO gone verydi/ferelltly at the other point
where the French hOO tried to break down the onter dcfences oí
the city. The attack on the transpontine suburb oí San Lazaro
hOO been allotted to Gazan's division. This was a very formid-
able force, 9.000 veterans of the best quality, who were bent
on showing that they hOO uot degenerated since they fought nt
1 Mor10t'g division was short of the 121st and the 2nd Legion of Reserve,
1eft behind at Alagon and Tudela, and had ou1y nine battaliol1!l presento
t Moncey to Berthier, Dec. 23.
, Cavallero, pp. 89-90. • See vol. i. p. 1.53.
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Friedland. Owing to sorne slight mistake in the combination,
Gazan only delivcred his atta.ek at one o'clock, two hours aftcr the
flghting on the Monte Torrero had ceased. His leading brigade,
that oí Guérin, six battalions strong, advanced against the
northom nnd eastern fronts oí the defences oí the suhurb. The
Spaniards were holding as nn outwork ti. lurge building called
the Archbishop's Tower (Torre del Armbispo) 1 on the Villa-
nueva road, 600 yards in front oí the main ¡ine oí entrench~
ments. This Gazan's men carried at the first rush, killing or
capturing sao men oí a Swiss battalion 2 which held ¡t. They
thcll pushed forward towards the inner fortifications, but were
taken in flank by a heavy artillery fire from a rOOoubt which they
Illld overlooked. This cause<! them to swerve towards the Barce-
lona rond, where they got possession of a house close under the
convellt of Jesus, and threatened to cut off the garrison of that
strollghold from the rest of the defenders of the sllbllrb. At
this moment a disgraceful panic seized the defenders of the San
Lazaro convent, which lay directly in front of the assailants.
They abandoned their post, and began to fly across the bridge into
Saragossa. But Palafox carne up in person with a reserve, and re·
occllpied the abandoned post. He then ordered a sortie against
the buildingswhich theFrellch had seized,and succeeded in drivillg
them out and compelling them to retire into the open ground.
Gazan doubted for a morncnt whether he should not send in his
second brigade to renew the attack, for the six battalions thnt
had bome the brunt of the first fighting hnd now fallen iuto
complete disorder. But remembering that if this force Cailed
to break into the suburb he had no reserves let\, and that
Palafox might bring over the bridge as many reinforcements as
he chose, the French general resolved not to push the assault
a~y further. He drew baek and retired behind the Gallego
strenm, where he threw up entrenchments to cover hirnself, como
pletely abandoning the offensive. For two or three days he
did not dare to move, cxpccting to be attacked at any moment
by the garrison. A sudden rise of the Ebro had cut off his
communication with Moncey, and he could Ileither send the
I Belmas calls it a factory (ii. 151), hut Palafox in bis dispateh giyes
the llame ahoye.
2 I Suizos de Aragon.'
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marshal an account of his check, nor get any orders from him '.
His casualty-list was severe, thirty oflicers and 650 men killed
and wounded: the Spaniards lost somewhat less, even includ-
ing the 300 Swiss who were cut to pieces at the Archbishop's
Tower.
Palafox next morning issued a proclamation, e..xtolling the
valour shown in the defence of the suburb, treating the loss
of the Monte Torrcro ll.S insignificant, and exnggcratillg the
losses of the French. The Sa.racrroS!mllS were rather encour~"ed
than otherwise by the results of the day's fighting, aJld spoke
as if they had merely lost un outwork by the unsteadiness of
St. March's Valencians, while the main hostile attack had been
repulsed. But it is clear that the capture of the dominating
heights south of the city was an all-important gain to the
French. Without the Monte Tort-ero they could never have
pressed the siege home. As to the failure at the suburb, it came
from attacking with headlong courage an entrenched position
that had not been properly reconnoit,red. The assault should
never have been delivered without artillery preparation, and
was a grave mistake. But clearly ;Mortier's corps had yet to
learn what the Spaniards were like, mId to realize that to turn
them out from behind walls and ditches was not the light task
that they supposed.
Moncey so thoroughly miscalculated the general effed; of the
fighting upon the minds of the Spaniards, that next morning
he sent in to Palafox a flag of truce, with an officer bearing
a formal demand for the surrender of the city. 'Madrid had
fallen,' he wrote: 'Saragossa, invested. on all sides, had not the
force to resist two complete corpa d'arm£e. Re trusted that
the Captain-General would spare the beautiful and wealthy
capital of Aragon the horrors of a siege. Ample blood had
already been shed, enough misfortunes already suffered by
Spain: Palafox replied in the strain that might have been ex~
pected from him-'The man who only wishes to die with honour
I All officer oC sappers named Hcnri, and oue oC hi.ll privates, tried to
reopen communication by swimming the river on an ice-cold night. They
rca.ched the Curther bank, but died oC exhaustion among the reeds, where
their corpses were found next morning: thus the message \VaS never
delivered. Delmas, ii. 163.
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in defence of his country cares nothing about his position:
but, as 1\ matter of fa.ct, he found that his own was eminently
favourable and cncouragillg. In the first siege he had held out
for sixty-one days with a garrison far inferior to that now under
his command. Was it likely that he would surrender, when he
lmd os many troops as his besiegers? Looking at the results
of the fighting on the previous day, when the assailants had
suffered so severely in front of San Lazaro, he thought that he
would be quite as well justified in pl'Oposing to the Marshal
that the besieging anny should surrender "to spare further
effusion of blood," as the latter had been to make such a pro-
position to him. If Madrid had faJlen, Madrid must have been
sold: but he begged for leave to doubt thc truth of the rumour.
Even at the worst Madrid was but a town, like any other. Its
fate had no influence on Saragossa I.'
Having received such an answer Moncey had only to set to
work as fast as possible: his engineer-ill-chief, General woste,
after making a thorough survey of the defences, pronounced in
tayonr of choosing two fronts of attack, both starting on the
Monte Torrcro, and dil'cded the one against the fort of Srni
Jose and the othel' against that of the Pillar. These projecting
works would have to be carried before any attempt could be
made against the inner enceinte of the town. At the same time.
La.coste ordered a third attack, which he did not propose to press
home, to be made on the CilStle of the Aljafferia, Qn the west side
of the town. It was only intended to distract the attention of
the Spaniurds from the points of rcul dunger. Ou the fUrther bank
of the Ebro. Gazan's division was direded to move forward again,
and to entrench itself across all the three roads, which issue from
the suburb, and lead respeeth'el)' to Lencia, Jaca, and Monwn.
He was not to attack, but merely to blockade the northern exits
of StlIagossn. Communications with him were established by
means of a bridge of boats and pontoons laid abo\'e the town.
Gazan succeeded in shortening the front which he had to protect
~<>ainst sorties by letting the water of the Ebro into the low.
lying fields along its banks, where it caused inundations on each
of his flanks.
1 TIle two letters may he found in full in the appendices to BeImaa,
vol. ii.
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On the twenty-third the preliminary works of the siege began,
approaches and covered ways being constructed leading down
frolU the Monte Torrero to the spots from which Lacoste intended
to commence the first parallels of the two attacks on the Pillar
and San Jose. Preparations of a similar sort were commenced
for the false attack on the left, opposite the AljaHi~ria. Six days
were occupied in these works, and in the bringing up of the
heavy artillery, destined to arm the siege-batteries, from Tude1a.
The guns had to come by rood, as the Spaniards had destroyed
all the buI'bteS on the Canal of Aragou, and blown up mallY of its
locks. It was not till some time later that the French succeeded
in reopening the navigation, by replacing the sluice-gates IUld
building large punts and fluab for the carriage of guns or
munitions.
Just before the first parallel was opened Marshal Moncey WI\S
recalled to Madrid [December fl91 the Emperor being apparently
discontented with his delays in the early part of the month.
He was replaced in command of the 3nI Corps by J unot, whose
old divisions had been made over (as we have seen in the first
volume) to Smut's Qlld Corps. This change made Mortier the
senior officer of the besieging anny, but he and Junot seem to
have worked more as partnersthan as commander and su borrlinate.
Junot, in his report to the Emperor 1 011 the state in which he
found the troops, enlarges at great length on the deplorable
condition of the 3m Corps. Many of the battalions had never
received their winter clothing, hundreds cntered the hospitals
every day, and there was no corresponding outflow of conva,..
lcscents. No less than 680 men had died in the base hospital
at Pampeluna in November, and the figure for December would
be worse. He doubted if there were 13,000 infantry under arms
in his three divisions-here he exaggerated somewhat, for even
a fortnight later the returns show that his' present under arms,'
after deducting all detachments and sick, were still over 14,000
bayonets: on January 1, therefore, there must have been
15,000. He asked for money, reinfort:ements, and a supply
of officers, the commissioned ranks of his corps showing a terrible
proportion of gaps. On the other hand, he conceded that the
pth Corps was in excellent condition, its veterans suffering fur
1 Junot to Berthier, Jan. 1, 1809.
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less from disease than his OWI1 conscripts. Either of Gllum's
and Suchet's divisions· was, by itself, as strong as any two of the
divisions of the 3rd Corps.
On the night of th~ twenty-ninth-thirtietb, within twelve
houI'!:/ of Moncey's departure, the first parallel was opened', both
in the attack towards St. Jose and in that opposite the Pillar
fort. When the design of the besiegers became evident, Palafox
made three sallies on the thirty-first, but apparently more with
the object of rtX.'Onnoitrillg the siege-works and distracting the
workers than with any hope of breaking the French lines, for
there were not more than 1,500 men employed in /lilY of the
tliree columns which delivered the sorties. The asstLult all the
trenches before San Jose was 110t pressed home, but opposite
the false attack at the Aljafferia the fighting was more lively;
the l~rench outposts were all driven in with loss, and Il. squadron
of rovalry, which had slipped out from the 8lUlcho gate, close
to the Ebro, surprised and sabred thirty men of a picket on the
left of the l''rench lines. Palafox made the most of this small
success in a magniloquent proclamation published on the succeed-
ing day. He should ha\'e senl out 15,000 men instead of 3,000
if he intended lo get any profit out of his sorties. An attack
delivered with such a force on some one point of the lines must
have paralysed the siege operations, and might have pro....ed
disastrous to the French.
Meanwhile the besiegers, undisturbed by these sallies, pushed
forward their works on the northern slopes of the Monte
Torrero. The attack opposite San Jose got forwanl much
faster than that against the Pillar: its second parallel was
commenced on January 1, and its batteries were all ready to
open by the ninth. The other attack was handicapped by the
fact that the ground sloped down more rapidly towards the
Huerba, so that the trenches had to be made much dewer, and
pushed forward in perpetual zigzags, in order to avoid being
searched by the plunging fire from the Spanish batteries 011 the
other side of the stream, in the enceinte of the town. '1'0 get
a flanking position against the Pillar redoubt, the left attack was
continued by another line of trenches beyond the Huerba, after
it has made its sharp turn to the south.
Before the engineers had completed their work, and long ere
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the bre'aching batteries were ready, a great strain was thrown
upon the besiegers by fresh orders from Napoleon. On Janu-
ary 2, Marshal :Mol"tier received a dispatch, bidding him march
out to Calatayud with one of his hI'o divisions, and open
up the direct communication with Madrid. Accordingly he
departed with the two strong brigades of Suchet's division,
10,000 bayonets. This withdrawal threw much harder work
on the remainder of the army: J unot 'I'M left with not much
more than fl4,OOO men, including the artillerymen, to maintain
the investment of the whole city. He wus forced to spread
out the 3rd Corps on a very thin line, in order to oecupy all
the posts from which Suchet's battalions had been withdrawn.
Morlot's division came down from the Monte Torrero to occupy
the ground which Suchet had evacuated: Musnier had to cover
the whole of the hill, and to support both the lines of approach
OIl which the engineers were busy. Gralldjeau's division re-
mained on its old front, facing the eastern side of the city, and
Gar..tln still blockaded the suburb beyond the Ebro. As the
lnst·named general had still 8,000· men, there were only 15,000
bayon.ets and the artillery available for the siege, a force far
too small to maintain a front nearly four miles long. If Palafox
had dared to make a general sortie with all his disposable men,
Jnnot's position would have been more than hazardous. But
the Captain-General contented himself with making numerous
and useless sallies on a petty scale, sending out the most reckless
and del:crmined of his men to waste themselves in bickering
with the guards of the trenches, when he should have san~d
them to head a general assault in force upon some weak
point of the siege lines. The diaries and narratives of the
French officers who served at Saragossa arc full of llne<.-dotes
of the frantic cour~n-e shown by the besieged, generally to no
yurpose. One of the strangest has been preserved by the very
prosaic engineer Bclmas, who tells how a priest in his robes
came out 011 January 6 in front of Gazan's lines; and walked
among the bullets to within fifty yards of the trenches, when
·he preached with great unction for some minutes, his crucifix
in his hand, to the effect that the French had a bad cause
and were dra\ving down God's anger npon themselves. To the
credit of his audience it must be said that the)' let him go off
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alive, contenting themselves with firing over his head, in order
to see jf they could scare him into CL run.
At daJbreak on January 10, the whole of the French batteries
opened upon San Jose and the PiUar fort. The fire agnillst
the latter was distant an4 comparatively ineffective, hut the
masonry of San Jose began to cnImble at once: its walls, solid
though they were, had never been built to resist siege artillery.
The roofs and tiles came crashing down upon the defenders'
heads, and most of their guns were silenced or injured. The
besiegers suffered little-Delmas says that only onc officer and
tell men fell, though two guns in the most advanced battery
were disabled. The loss of the Spaniards on the other hand
was numbered by hundreds, more being slain by the fall of
stones and slates than by the uctnal CIlllllon balls and shells
of the assailants. At nightfall Palafox: withdrew most of the
guns from the convent, but replaced the decimated garrison by
three fresh battalions. It was clear that the work would fall
nc.'t.t day unless the bcsicgt:!r8 wel"C driven off from their bat-
teries. At 1 A.)I., therefore, 300 men made a desperate sally to
spike the guns. But the French were alert, and had brought
up two field-pieces close to the convent, which repressed the
sortie with a storm of grape.
Next morning the bombardment of San Jose recommenced,
and by the afternoon a large breach had been established in
its southern wall. At four o'clock General Grandjean launched
a picked force, composed of the seven voItigenr companies of the
14th RlId 44th regiments, upon the crumbling defences 1. The
garrison had already begun to quit the untenable post, and
only a minority remained behind to fight to the lust. The
stonning column entered without much loss, partly by laying
scaling-ladders to the foot of the ·breach, partly by using a
small bridge of planks across the ditch, which the Spaniards
had forgotten to remove. They only lost thirty-eight men,
and mude prisoners of about fd'ly of the garrison who had
refused to retire into the city when the rest fled.
Though San Jose was thus easily captured, it .was difficult to
establish a lodgement in it, for the batteries on the enceinte of
Saragossa. searched it from end to end, dominating its ruined
1 .Belmas, ii. 176.
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quadrangle from n superior heighl But during the night the
besiegers succeeded in blocking up its go~ and in connecting
the breach with their second parallel by a covered way of
sandbags and fascilles. The convent was now the base from
which they were to attack the town-walls behind it.
Dut before continuing the advance in this direction it was
necessary to CUlT)' the fort of Our Lady of the Pillar, the other
great outwork of the southern front of Saragossa. The main
.attention of tlle besiegers was directed against this point from
the twelfth to the fifteenth, and their sapping gradually took
them to within a few yards of the counterscarp. 'fhe Spanish
fire had been easily subdued, and a practicable breach established.
On the night of the fifteenth-sixteenth the fort was stormed
by the Poles of the 1st regiment of the Vistula. They met with
little or no resistance, the greater part of the garrison having
withdrawn when the assault was seen to be imminent. A mine
under the glncis exploded. but failed to do any harm: another,
better laid, destroyed the bridge over the Huerba, behind the
fort, when the work was seen to be in the power of the assailants.
woste reported to Junot that the Poles lost only Qnc killed
and two wounded--an incredibly small casualty list I.
The fall of the fort of the Pillar gave the :French complete
possesgion of all the ground to the south of the Huerba, and
left them free to attack the enceinte of the city, which had now
lost all its outer works save the Aljafferia: in front of that
castle the' false attack' made little progress, for the besiegers
did not press in close, and contented themselves wi.th battering
the old mediaeval fortress from a distance. On that part of the
line of investment nothing of importance was to happen.
1 Lacoste to Junot, Jan. 16. in Belmas, ii. 378.
SECTION XI: CHAPTER 1I
SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA: THE!"RENCH WITHIN THE WALLS:
THE STREE'T-nGHTING: THE SURREKDER
LACOSTE'S first care, when the Pillar and San Jose had both
fallen into his hands, was to t:OllUCct the two works by his' third
parallel,' which was drawn from onc to the other just above the
edge of the ra:lrine of the Huerba. In order to assail the walls
of the city that stream had to be crossed, a task of some difficulty,
for its bed was searched by the great batteries at Santa Engracia
along the whole foont between the two captured forts, while
north of San Jose the'Palafox Battery' near the Porta Quemada
completely overlooked the lower and brooder part of the river
bed. The Spaniards kept up a fust aml furious fire upon the
lost works, with the o~ject oC preventing the besiegers from
moving forward from them, or constructing fresh batteries among
their ruins. In this they were not successful: the French, bur-
rowing deep a.mong the debris, successfully covered themselves,
and suffered little.
The second stage of the siege work, the attack 011 the actual
enceillte of Saragossa, now began. The two points on which it
was directed were the Santa Engracia battery-the southern
salient of the town-and the extreme south-eastern angle of the
place, where lay the Palafox Battery and the smaller work
generolly known ns the buttery of the Oil Mill (Molino de
Aeeitc). The former wns less than 200 yards from the Pillar
fort, the latter not more than 100 from San Jose, but between
them ron the deep bed of the Huerba.
From the twelfth to the seventeenth the French were busily
engaged in throwing up batteries in the line of their third
parallel, and on the morning of the last-named day no less than
nine were ready. Five opened 011 SantA Engracia, four on the
Palafox battery: at both points they soon began to do exten-
,2
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sive damag~ for here the walls had not been entirely recon-
structed (as on the western front of the city), but only patched
up and strengthened with earthworks at intervals. The masonry
of the convent of Santa Engracia suffered most, and began to
fall in large patches. Palafox saw that the enceinte would be
pierced ere long, and that street-fighting would be the next
sb\,o-e of the siege. Accordingly he set the whole ci\'il popu-
lation to work 011 constructing barricades across the streets and
lanes of the south-eastern part of the city. in the rear of the
threatened points, and turned every block of houses into an
independent fort by building up all the doorways and windows
facing towards the enemy. The spirits of the garrison were
still high, and the Captain-General had done his best to keep
them up by issuing gar.ettes containing very roseate accounts of
the state of affairs in the outer world. His communication
with the open country was not completely cut, for thrice he had
been able to send boats down the Ebro, which took their chance
of running past the French batteries at night, und always
succeeded. One of these boats had carried the Captain-Gcncl'al's
younger brother, l~rancisco Palafox, who had orders to appeal to
the Cat:alons for help, and to raise the peasants of Lower Aragon.
Occasional messengers also got in from without: one arrived on
January 16 from Catalonia, with promises of aid from the
Marquis of Lamn, who proposed to return from GCI'OIU\ with
his division, in order to fall upon the rear of the besiegers.
Pnlnfox not only let this be known, but published in his Official
Gazette some utterly unfounded rumours, which the courier
had brought. Reding, it was said, had beaten St. eyr in the
open field: the Duke of Infantado was marching from Cucnca
on Aragon with 20,000 men. Sir John Moore had turned to
bay on the pursuing forces of the Emperor, and had defeated
them at a battle in Galicia in which :Marshal Ney had been
killed 1. '1'0 celebrate th.is glorious news the church bells were
set ringing, the artillery fired a general salute, and military
music paraded the town. These phenomena were perfectly
audible to the besiegers, and caused. them many scarchings oC
I 'Vas tllis a distorted rumour of the combat of Cacabelloa, and the
death of General Colbert, the commander of Ney's corpll-cul'nlry, on
Jan. :3?
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heart., for the)' could not guess what event the Saragossans could
be celebrating.
The garrison needed all tbe eneoumgcment that could be
given to them, for after the middle of J anuaT)' tbe stress
of the siege began to be felt very heavily. Food was not
wanting-for, excepting fresh meat and vegetables, everything
was still procurable in abundance. But cold and overcrowding
were beginning to cause epidemic disorders. 'The greater part
of the civil population had taken refuge in their cellars when
the bombardment began, and after a few days spent in those
durk and. damp retreats, from which they only issued at night,
or when they were called on for labour at the fortifications,
began to develop fevers and dysentery. This was inevitable, for
ill most of the dwellings from twenty to forty persons of allll.c,"e8
were crowded in mcre holCil, no morc than seven feet high, and
almost unprovided with ventilation, where they lived, ate. and.
slept, packed together, and with no care for sanitary precau-
tions I. The malignant fevers bred in these refuges soon spread
to the garrison: thOllgh under cover, the soldiery were destitute
of warm clothing (especially the l\.lurcian battalions), and <:ould
not procure enough lirewood to cook their meals. By January
20 there were 8,000 sick among the 30,000 regular troops, and
every day the wastage to the hospital grew more and more
noticeable. Many officers of note had already fallen in the
useless sorties, anq in especial a grave loss had been suffered on
January 13, whcu Colonel San Gcnis, the chicf engineer of the
besieged, and the designer of the whole of the defences of the
city, was killed on the ramparts of the Palafox battery, as he
was directing the fire against the new entrenchment which the
French were throwing up across the gorge of the San Jose fort 2•
He had 110 competent successor as a general director, for his
underlings had no grasp of siege-strategy, and were only good
at details. Thcy built batteries and barricades and ran mines
I For the descriptiou of these miserable and most iusalubriuus refuges,
see CavalleroJ pp. 90-100.
il I give the date of Sail Genis' death from ArtcellC, iv. BclmasJ 011 the
ot11er band, pUls it on Jail. 26, and Cav'Lllcl"() 31'11o'lorCUtly Oil Jan. 28,
for he says tlmt it was three days before tbat of LaeoBte, who was shot on
Feb. 1.
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in pure OppOl·tullism, without any comprehensive scheme of
defence before their eyes.
The French meanwhile were very active, though the constant
increase of sickness in the 3rd Corps was daily thinning the
regiments, till the proportion of men stricken down by fever was
hardly less than that among the Spaniards. On the seventeenth
and eighteenth La.coste began to contrive a descent into the
bottom of the ravine of the Huerba, by a ~ies of zig.mgs pushed
forward from the third parallel, both in the direction of Santa
Ellgmcia llnd in that of the Palafox battery. The latter was
repeatedly silenced by the advauL-ed batteries of the besiegers,
but they could not an Wue the incessant musketry fire from
windows and loopholes which swept the whole bed of the
Huerba, and rendered the work at the head of the new sap
most difficult and d~dly, Sometimes it had to be completely
abandoned because of the plunging fu'C from the city 1, Yet it
was always resumed after a time: the French found that their
best and easiest work was done in the earl}' rooming, when, for
day after day, a dense fog rose from the Ebro, which rendered it
impossible for the Spaniards to see what was going all, or to aim
with any certainty at the entrenchments. Irritated at the
steady if slow progress of the enemy. PalaCox launched 011
the afternoon of January ~3 the most desperate sortie that his
army had yet essayed against the advanced works of the French.
At four o'clock on that day 2 three columns dashed out and
attacked the line of trenches: one, as a blind. was sent out
opposite the Aljafferia, to distrnct the attention of Morlot's
division from the main sally. The other two were serious
attacks. but both made with too smallllumbers-apparently no
'more than ~OO picked men in each. The left-hand column
became hotly engaged with the trenches to the north of San
Jose, and got no further forward than a house a little beyond
the Huerba, from which they expelled a French post. But the
right-hand force carried out a "cry bold programme. Crossing
I BelrnllS, ii. 108,
g Oddly enough, Belmas plaCe:! this sortie on Jail, 21, on which day,'
as Arteche shows, none of the Spanish accounu speak of a sortie, while
tlle latter give at great length details of the fighting on the twenty-third.
Probably the Spanish date is tllc correct one.
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the Huerba below Santa Engrada, they broke through the third
parallel, and then made a dash at two mortar-batteries in the
second parallel which had particularly mmoycd the defence on
that morning. The commander of the sortie, Mariano Galindo,
a captain of the Volunteers of Aragon, led his men so straight
that they rushed in with the bayonet on tIle first battery and
spiked both its pieces. They were making for the second when
they were overwhelmed by the trench guard and by reinforce-
ments hurrying up from :Musnier's camp. Of a hundred men
who had gone forward with Gll.lindo from the third parallel
twelve were killed and thirty, including their brave lender, taken
prisoners. The French stated their loss at no more than six
killed and five wounded, a figure that seems suspiciously 10w,"-
considering that the first line of trenches had been stormed by
the ussnilants, and a battery in the second line captured and
disabled. Galindo had gone forward more than 500 yards, into
the very middle of the French works, before he was checked and
surrounded. It was a. very gallant exploit, but once more we
are constrained to ask why Palafox told off for it 110 more than
a mere handful of men. ·Wbat would lJave happened had he
thrown a solid column of 10,000 lllen upon the siege-works,
instead of a few hundred volunteers ?
On the twenty-second, the day before Galindo's sortie, Junot
was superseded in command of the besieging army by Lannes,
who had been restored to health by two months' holiday, and
was now himself again. He anived just in time to take charge
of the important task of storming the main enceinte, for which
Junot'ti preparations were now fiu: advanced. lJut though the
siege operations looked not unpromising, he found the situation
grave and dangerous. Belmas and the other French historians
describe this as the most critical epoch of the whole Saragossan
episode 1. The fact was that at last there were beginning to be
signs of movement in the open country of Aragon. During the
month that had elapsed since the siege bcglUl, the peasantry
had been given time to draw together. Fmncisco Pulafox, after
escaping from the city, had gone to Mequincuza, Md was
arming the local levies with muskets procured from Catalonia.
He had already a great horde assembled in the direction of
1 Belrnas, ii. 203.
120 THE SECOND SIEGE OF SAllAGOSSA (J.,. 26
Alcafiiz. On the other bank of the Ebro Colonel ,Perena had
been organizing a forc'e at Huesca, from northern Aragon and
the foot-hills of the Pyrenccs. Lastly, it wus known that Lazan
was on his way from Gerona to aid his brothers, and had
brought to Lerida his division of 4,000 men 1, a comparatively
well-organized body of troops, which had been under arms since
Octobe.r. Even far back, Oil the way to Pampeluull, insurgents
had gathered in the Sierra de 1\Ioncayo, and were tlU'eatelling
the important halfway post of Tudela., by which the besiegiJlg
army kept lip its communication with France.
Hitberto these gatherings had look<.-d dungerous, but had
done no actual harm. General 1V"athier. with the cavalry of
the Srd Corps, had scoured the southern bank of the Ebro
and kept ofi' the insurgents; but IlOW they were pressing closer
in, and on January ~O a battalion, which Gazan had sent out to
drive away Perena's levies, had been checked and beaten oft' at
Perdiguera, only twelve miles from the camp of the besic;,,~rs.
Lannes could not fuil to se<! that if he committed himself to
the final assault on Saragossa, and entangled the 3rd Corps in
street~fighting, he might find himself assailed from the rear 011
all points of his lines. Thcre werc no troops whatever in front
of Saragossa to form a' coYering~force'to beat off' the insur·
gents, if they should come down upon his camps while he was
storming the city, for the Srd Corps and Gazan's dhdsion had
now only 20,000 infantry for the conduct of the siege.
Accordingly the Marshal resolved to undo the Emperor's
arrangements for keeping up the line of communication with
Madrid, und to draw in l\{onier, with Suchet's strong tUld
intact division, from CaJatayud, where he had been lying for
the last three weeks. This was the only possible force which he
could use to provide himself with a covering army. The totlch
with Madrid, a thing of comparatively minor importance, had to
be sacrificed, except so far as it could be kept up by the division
of Dessolles, which had now come back from the pursuit of
Sir John Moore, and had pushed detachments back to its old
posts at SigucllZll. and Guudalujara.
MonieI' thcrefore evacuated Calatayud by the orders of
I Napier (i. 376) calls them' CatalouiaulI': but they were all Aragonese,
sent to aid Catalonia in October.
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Lnnllcs, and Cllme back to the Ebro: passing behind the besieg-
ing army he crossed the river and took post at Perdiguera with
10,000 men, facing the levies of Perena in the direction of
HuesC6. It was only when he had made certain of having this
powerful reinforcement close at hand, ready to deal with any
interference from without, that Lannes dared to proceed with
the assault. At the same time that MorHer arrived at Per-
diguera, he sent out 'Vathier, with two battalions and two
regiments of cavalry, to deal with the insurgents of the Lower
EbI'o, where Francisco Palafox had been busy. Four or five
thousand peasants with one newly-levied regiment of Aragonese
volunteers tried to resist this small column, but were beaten on
the twenty-sixth in front of the town of Alcafii~ which fell
into 'Yathier's hands, and with it ~O,OOO sheep and 1,500 sacks
of flour, which had been collected for the revictualling of Sara-
gossa, in case the im-estment should be broken_ They were
a welcome windfnll to the besieging army, where food was none
too plentiful, since tlle plain country where it lIly encamped
had now been eaten bare, and convoys of food from 'l'udela and
Pampe1una were rare and inadequate.
On January ~4 the l"'rench had succeeded in pushing three
approaches across the Huerba, and.were firml)' established under
its northern bank. Two days later they made lodgements in
ruins, cellars, and low walls where buildings had been pulled
down, in the narrow space betwecn the town wall and the ri vcr
bank, below the Palafox battery. The cannon of the defenders
could only act intermittently: every night the parapets were
repaired, but every morning after a fe.\' hours of artillery duel
the Spanish guns were silenced by the dreadful converging fire
poured in upon them. Meanwhile Pnlnfox was heaping barri-
cade upon barricade in the quarters behind the threatened
points, and fortifying the houses and convents which connected
them.
The final crisis arrived on the twenty-seventh. '['here were now
three practicable breaches,-two were on the side of the Palafo'lC
battery, one in the convent of Santa Engra.cia. To storm
the first and second LlllnCS told off the light companies of the
first brigade of Grandjean's division; to the third was allotted
the 1st regiment of the Vistula from Musnier'!> division. Heavy
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supports lay behind them, in the third parallel, with orders to
rush in if the storming parties should prove successful.
The assault was delivered with great dash and s\viftness at
noon on the twenty-seventh. On two points it \I'as sUl;cessful.
At the most northern breach the assailant<l reached the summit
of the wall, but could not get down into the city. on account of
the stonn of musketry from barricades and houses that swept
the gnp into which they had advanced. They merely made a
lodgement in the breach itself, and could penetrate no further.
But in the central breach, close beneath the Palafa);; battery,
the voltigeurs not only PUSSI.'t1 the walls, but seized the' Oil
Mill' which abutted on them, and a triangular block of houses
projecting into the town. At the Santa Engracia breach they
were even more fortunate: the Poles carried the cony€nt with
their first rush: its outer wall had been battered down for a
breadth of thirty yards, and entering there the stormers drove
out the Spaniards from the interior buildings of the place, and
got into the large square which lies behind it, where they seized
the Capuchin nunnery, Thus a considerable wedge was driven
through the e7l£Cinte, and the Spaniards had to evacuate the
walls for some little distance on each side of' Santa Engmcia.
From the stretch to the west of that convent they were driven
out by an unpremeditated assault of Musnier's supports, who
ran out from the trenches on the left of the Huerba, and esca-
laded the diiapidated wall in front of them, when they saw
the garrison drawing back on account of the flanking fire from
Santa Engracia. They got possession of the whole outer
enceinte as far as the 'l,'rinitarian convent by the Carmen gate,
These successes were bought at the moderate loss of 350 men,
of whom two-thirds fell in the fighting on the Santa Engracia
front; the Spaniards lost somewhat more, including a few
prisoners, In any ordinary siege the day would have settled
the fate of the place, for the besiegers hud broken through the
enceinte in two places, and though the space seized inside the
Palafox battery was not large, yet on each side of Santa En- '
grads. the assailants had penetrated so far that a quarter of
a mile of the walls was in their possession. But Saragossa was
not as other places, and the garrison were perfectly prepared
with a new front of defence, composed of batteries and crenel-
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1atOO houses in rear of the lost positions. Two wedges, one
large and one small, had been driven into the town, but they
hud to be broadened and driven fiuther in if they were to have
any effect.
On the twenty·eighth, therefore, a new sULocre of the siege
began, and the.street-fighti!lg, which was to last for twenty-rour
days DlOre, had its commeneement. Lanllcs hud heard, from
those who had scr..ed under Verdicr in the first siege, of the
deplorable slaughter and repeated repulses that had followed the
attempt to carry by main force the internal defences of the city.
To hurl solid columns of storrucrs at the barricades and the
crenellated houses was not his intention. He had made up his
mind to advance by sap and mine, as if he were dealing with
regular fortifications. His plan was to use each block of houses
that he gained as a base for the attack upon the next, and uever
to send in the infantry with the bayonet till he had breached by
artillery, or by min~ the building against which the assault was
directed. This form of attack was bound to be slow, but it
had the great merit of costing comparativel)' little in the way
of casualties. The fact was that the Marshal had not the
numbers which would justify him in wasting lives by assaults
which might or might not be successful, but which were certain
to prove very l?loody. The whole Third Corps, as we have
already seen, did not now furnish much more than 18,000
bayonets, while Gazan's men were all occupied in watching the
suburb, and Suchet's lay far out, as a covering corps set to
watch Perena and Lazan:
There was no one single dominating position in the city
whose occupation was likely to constrain the besieged to SUITen·
del'. The whole to~n is built on a level, and its fifty-three
solidly-built churches and convents formed so many forls, each
of which was defensible in itself and could not be reduced sa,'e
by a direct attack. All that could be done was to endeavour to
captw-e them one by one, in the hope that at lust the Saragossans
would grow tired of their hopeless resistance, and consent to
surrender, wben they realized that things bad gone so far that
they could only protract, but could not finally beat ofl-~ the slow
ndvance of the besieging army.
The work of the French, therclore, consisted in spreading out
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from their two sepill'ntc lodgements 011 the eastern and southern
sides of the city, with the simple object of gaining ground each
day and of driving the Spaniards back towards the centre of the
place. On the right attack the most imporl:.ant objective oC
the besiegers was the block of monastic buildings to the north
of the Palafox battery, the twin convents of San Augustin and
Santa Monies, which lay along the' northern side of the small
wcdg<l that they had driven into the Ilorth-cnstcm corner of the
lown, As these buildings lay OIl ground slightl,y higher than
that which the French had occupied, it was difficult to attack
them by means of mines. But nn intense converging fire was
brought to bear upon them, both from oottcrics outside the
walls, playing across the Huerba, and by guns brought inside
the captured angle of the enceillle. The outer walls of Santa
Monica were soon tl. mass of nuns; nevertheless the fIrst attack
on it [January ~9) was beaten off, and it was only on the next
day, after twent)··four hours more of furious bombardment, that
Grandjroll's men succeeded in storming, 6rst the convent and
then its church, after a furious hand-ta-hand 6ght with the
defenders.
After establishing themselves ill Santa Monica the French
were able to capture some of the adjoining houses, antI to tunl
their attention against its neighbour San Augustin. They ran
two mines under it, and at the same time battered it heavily
from the external batteries beyond thc Hucrbn. On FebruaI)' ]
the explosion took place: it opened. a breach in the east end of
the convent church, and the stonning party, entering by the
sacristy, got possession of the choir chapels and the high altar.
But the Spaniards rallied in the nave, ran a burricade of chairs
and benches across it, alld held their own for some time, firing
down from the pulpit and the organ loft with effect. Some
climbed up into the roof and picked off the French tIu"Ough the
holes which the bombardment had left in the ceiling. For some
hours this strange indoor battle raged within the spacious
church. But at last thc French mrried the ntwc, and at night
only the belfry remained llutaken. Its little garrison pelted the
}~rench with grenades all day, and saved themselves at dusk by
a sudden and unexpected dash through the enemy.
In the first flush of success, after San Augustin had been
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stormed, the 44th regiment, from Grandjeall's division, tried to
push on through the streets towards the centre of the to\\'Jl.
They captured several barricades alld houses, and stmggled on
till they had netlrly reached the Coso. But thi3 sort of fighting
was always dangerous in Saragossa: the citizens kept up such
a fierce fire from their windows, and swarmed out against the
flanks of the column in such numbers, that the 44th had to give
back, lost all that it had taken beyond San Augustin, and left
200 dead alld wounded behind. Even the formal official reports
of the French engineer3 speak with respect of the courage shown
by the besieged on this day. The houses which they had lost
in the afternoon they retook in the dusk, by an extraordinary
device. Finding the l?rench solidly barricaded in them, and
proof against any attack from thc street, hUlldre<l.3 of the
defenders climbed upon the roof;;, tore up the tiles and entered
by the garrets, from which they dC3Cended and drove ont the
invaders by a series of charges which cleared story after storyt.
Many monks, and still more womCIl, were seen among the armed
crowds which swept the assailants back towards Santa Monica.
It was especially noticed that the civilians did fal' more of the
fighting than the soldiers. This was their own special battle.
Irritated at his losses on this da~', Lannes issued Il. general
order, expressly forbidding any attempts to storm houses and
balTicades by main force. After an explosion, the troops were
to seize the building that had been shattered, and to <:over
themselves in it; they were not to go forward and fall upon
intact defences further to the front.
"While the struggle was raging thus fiercely from January 28
to February 1, in the eastern area of street-fighting, there had
been a no less desperate series of combats all around Santa
Engracia, on the southern front of attack. Here Musnier's
division was endeavouring to drive the Spaniards out of the
blocks of houses to the right and left of the captured collvent.
They worked almost entirely by mines, running tunnels forward
from beneath the convent to blow down the walls of the adjoin-
ing dwellings. But even when the mines had gutted the doomed
buildings. it was not easy to seize them: the few men who
1 Report of Geueral Laval (commanding in the trenches this day) to
Lannes, in Appendix xxvi, of Delmas, voJ. H. Cf. VOD Draudt, p. 34..
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survived the explosion did not fly, but held out among the
ruins, and had to be bayonetted by the assailants who rushed
out from the convent to occupy the new lodgements. Time
nftcr time the defenders, though perfectly conscious tha.t they
were being undermined, and that by staying on guard they
were courting certain death, refused to evacuate the threatened
houses or to retire into safety. Hence their losses were Llwful,
but the French too suffered not lL little, while pushing forward
to occupy each building as it was cleared by the explosion. The
constant rnin of musket balls from roofs and church towers
searched out the ruins in which they had to effect their lodge-
mCflts, and many of the assailants fell before they could cover
themselves among the dtiliris.
On the thirty-first the Spaniards made u sudden rush from
the Misericordia buildings, to recover the Trinitarian convent,
the most western point on the enceinte which had fallen into
the hands of the French at the assault of the twel1ty.seventh.
They charged in upon it with the greatest fury, and blew open
the gate with a four-pounder gun which they dragged up by
hand to the very threshold. But the French had built up the
.....hole entram:e ..... ith sandbags, which held even when the doors
had been shattered; and, after persisting for some time in
a fruitless attempt to break in, the Sarngossans had to retire,
foiled and greatly thinned in num~t'!!.
On the following day (February 1) the French began to move
for.....ard from Santa Engracia towards the Cow, always clearing
their way by explosions, and risking as few men as possible.
Nevertheless they could not always keep under cover, and this
day the)- suffered a severe loss __ their chief engineer, General
Lacoste, was shot through the head, while -reconnoitring from
a window the houses against which his n~-t attack was to be
directed 1. He was succeeded in command by Colonel Rogniat,
one of the French historians of the siege. That officer, as he
tells us, discovered that his sappers were using too large charges
of powder, which destroyed the roofs and four walls of each
I There is a full account of Ms deatll in Legendre, i. 149 ; tll:lt officer
was in the room witll him, wllen he and his lIide-de-c.1mp, T..alobc, were
simultaneously shot through the head IL9 they peered out of a side window
where they thought themseh'es unobserved_
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house that they undermined, so that the infantry who followed
hud no cover when they first took possession. He therefore
ordered the substitution of smaller measures of powder, so as to
throw down only parts of the wall of the building nearest
to the French lines, and to leave the roof und the outer walls
uninjured. In this way it was much more easy to establish
a lodgement, since the storming-party were covered the moment
that they had dashed into the shattered shell. The only plan
which the Spaniards could devise against this method of pro~
cedure, was to set fire to the ruins, and to prevent the entry of
the assailants by burning down all that WM left of the house.
As the buildings of Saragossa contained little woodwork, and
were not yery combustible 1, the besieged daubed the walls with
tAr and resin to make them blaze the better. Men an
explosion had taken place, the surviving defenders set fire to
the debris of floors and roofs before retirillg 2• In this way
they sometimes kept the French back for as much as two days,
since they could not make their lodgement till the cinders had
time to cool. Countermining against the French approaches was
often tried, but seldom with success, for there were no trained
miners in the city: the onc battalion of sappers which Palafox
possc~ had been formed from the workmen of the Canal of
Ar~O'On, who had no experience in subterranean work. On the
other hand the French had three whole companies of miners,
beside eight more of sappers, who were almost as useful in the
demolition of the city. Thcy maintAined iL distinct ascendent
undcrground, though they llot uufrequcntly lost mcn in the
repeatcd combats with knife and pistol which ensued when
mine and countermine met, and the two sides fought for the
possession of each other's galleries.
The (lfSt week of February was now drawing to its close, and
the advance of the French into the city, though steady, had been
e..xtreme1y slow. Every little block of five or six houses cost
a day to break up, and another to entrench. The waste of life,
though not excessive, was more than Lannes could really afford,
and he waited impatiently, but in vain, for any signs that the
I The ceilillgs ill all the better sort of houses were made of "a.ulted
arches, not of beams and boards.
I See Cavallero, p. 120, and compare Belmas, ii, 263.
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obstinacy of the defence was slackening. But though he could
not sec it, the garrison were being tried far more hardly than
the besiegers. It was not so much the loss by fire and sword
that was ruining them as the silent ravages of the epidemic
fevers. Since the French had got within the walls, and the
bombardment of the city \\'tl.S being carried on from u. shorter
range than before, the civilian population had been forced
to cling more closely than ever to its fetid cellars, and the
infectious fever which had appeared in January was developing
at the most fearful rate. Living under such insanitary con-
ditions, and feeding on flour and salt fish, for the \'egetables
had long been exhausted, the SarugosSlllls had no strength to
bear up against the typhus. Whole families died off, and their
bodies lay forgotten, tainting the air and spreading the contagion.
Even where there were survivors, they could not easily dispose
of the dead, for the urban cemeteries were gorged, and burials
took place in trenches hastily opened in streets or gardens.
Outside the churches there were hundreds of corpses, some
coffined, others rolled in shrouds or sheets, waiting in rows for
the last services of the chute_h, which the surviving clergy were
too few to read. The shells from the inces.<>ant bombardment
were continually fulling in these open spuc..'CS, and tearing the
dead to pieces. Ere the siege was over there was a mass of
mutilated and decaying bodies heaped in front of every church
door. Hundreds more lay in the debatable ground for which
the Spaniards and French were contending, and the whole town
recked with contagion. The weather was generally still and warm
for the time of )"eur, with II thick. fog rising every moming from
the low ground by the Ebro. The smoke from the burning
houses lay low over the place, and the air was thick with the
mingled {nmes of fire and pestilence. If it nauseated the French,
who hlld thc open country behind thcm, and were relieved by
regiments at intervals, and allowed a rest in theil' camps outside
the walls, it was far more terrible to the Spaniards. The death
rote rose, as February drew 011, from 300 up to 500 and
eYen 600 a day. The morning state of the garrison on the
fourth day of the month showed 13,131 sick and wounded, and
only 8,495 men under arms. As the total had been 3~OOO
when the siege began, nearly 10,000 men must already have
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perished by the sword or disease. The civil population, con-
taining so mallY women, children, and aged persons, was of
course dying at a much quicker rate. Yet the place hell;! out
for sixteen days longer! Palafox himself was stnlck down by
the fever, but still issued ordcI'3 frolll his bed, and poured out
a string of hysterical proclamations, in which his delirium is
clearly apparent.
The terrible situation of the Samgossans was to a lal'ge
extent concealed from the besiegers, who Duly saw the line of
desperate fighting-men which met them in e\'ery house, and
could only guess at the death and desolation that lay behind.
Every French eye-witness bears record to the low spirits of
the troops who wc~ compelled to fight in the long series of
explosions and assaults which filled the early weeks of February.
The engineer Belmas, the most matter-of-fact of all the historians
of the siege, tums aside for a moment from his traverses and
mining-galleries, to desc.ribe the llllmTIurs of the wenr)' infontry
of the Srd Corps. "Yho ever heard before,' they asked, •of an
army of ~O,OOO men being set to take a town defended by
50,000 madmen? We have conquered a quarter of it, and now
we are completely fought out. We must halt and wait for
reinforcements, or we shall all perish, and be buried in these
cursed ruins, before we can rout out the last of these fanatics
from their last stronghold I,' unnes did his best to enCOUfllc"'e
the milk and mc, by showing lhem that the Spaniards were
suffering far more than they, alld by pointing out that the
moment mnst inevitably come when the defenee must break
down from mere exhaustion. He also endeavoured to obtain
reinforcements from the Emperor, but only received assurances
that some conscripts aJld convalescents for the 3rd Corps should
be sent to him from PampelulliL alld Bayonlle. No fresh
regiments could be spared from Fmncc, when the affairs of
Central Europe were looking so doubtful 2. The best plan
which the Marshal could devise for breaking down the resolution
of the Spaniards was to lengthen his front of attack, and so
endeavour to distract the attention of the besieged from the
main front of advance towards the Coso.
I Delmas, ii. 294. Cf. llogniat and Legeudre.
, Derthier to Lannes, Paris, Feb. 10.
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This was only to be done by causing the illvision of Gazan,
which had so long remained passive in front of the suburb, to
open an energetic attack on that outlying part of the fortress.
The advllntnge to be secured ,jn this direction was not merely
that a certain amount of the defenders would be drawn away
from the city. If the suburb were captured it would be possible
to erect batteries in it, which would senrch tlle wholc northern
side of Saragossa, the onc quarter of the city which was still
comparatively unaffected by the bombardmenl Here the bulk of
the civil population was crowded together, and here too Palafox
had collected the greater part of his stores and mngnzillcs.
If the last safe corner of the city were exposed to a bombard·
ment from a fresh quarter, it would probably do much to lower
tIle hopes of the defenders.
During the last days of January Gazan's division had pressed
back the Spanish outposts in front of the suburb, and on the
thirtieth of that month WIlIlCS had sent over two companies
of siege artillery, to construct batteries opposite the convents
of .Tesus and San L61.aro. It was not till February :!-3,
however, that he ordered a serious and active attack to be
pressed in this quarter. From the trench which covered the
front of Gazan's investing lines a second parall~l was thrown
out, and two breaching batteries erected against the Jesus
convent: on the fourth an advance by zigzags was pushed still
further forward, and more guns brought up. Some little delay
was caused .by an unexpected swelling of the Ebro, which inun-
dated that part of the trenches which lay nearest to the river:
but by the eighth all was ready for the assault. The Jesus
coment, as a glance at the map will readily show, was the m~
projecting point of the defences of the suburb, and was not well
protected by any Banking fire from the other works-indeed it
was only helped to any appreciable extent by a long fire across
the water from the northern side of Saragossa, and by the few
gunboats which were moored near the bridge. It was a weak
structure-merely a brick convent with a ditch beyond it-and
the breaching batteries had found no difficulty in opening many
large gaps in its mllSonry. On the eighth it was stormed by
Taupin's brigade of Gamu's division: the garrison made a
creditable resistance. which cost the French ninety men, and then
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retired to San Luzaro and the main fortifications of the suburb.
The French established themselves in the coment, and con-
nected it with their siege-works, finally turning its ruins into
part of the third parallel, which they began to draw out against
the remaining tmnspontinc works. They would probubly have
prol'cedcd to complete their operations in this direction within
the next two or three days, if it had not heen for an interrup-
tion from without. The two brothers, w..nn and }"rancisco
Palafox, had now united their forces, and had come forward to
tile line of the Sierra de Alcubierre, only twenty miles from
Saragossa, the former with his 4,000 men from Catalonia, the
latter with a mass of peasants. Mottier, from his post at
Perdiguern, reported their approach to Lannes, and the latter
well! out in person to med them, taking with him Gucrin's
brigade of Ga>llln's division, and leaving only that of Taupill to
hold the lines opposite the suburb. Faced by the 12,000 veteran
bayonets of the 5th Corps, the two Palafoxes felt that they
were helpless, Ilnd retreated towards Fl'aga and Lerida, without
attempting to fight. On the thirteenth, therefore, Lnnncs came
back to the siege with the troops that he had drawn away from
it. While he was absent Palafox had a splendid opportunity for
a sortie on It large scale against Taupin and his isolated brigade,
for only 4,000 men were facing the suburb. But the time had
already gone by in which the garrison was capable of such an
advance. They could not now dispose of more than 10,000
men, soldiers and peasants and citizens all included, and none
of these could be drawn away from the city, where the fighting-
line was always growing weaker. Indeed, its numbers were so
thinned by the epidemic that Palafox was guarding the Aljaf-
feria. with no more than :300 men, and manning the unattacked
western front with eOllYalescents from the hospitals, who could
hardly stand, amI often died at their posts during the cold and
damp hours of the night. All his available efficients were
engaged in the street-fighting with the 3rd Corps.
For while the attack on the suburb was being pressed, the
slow advance of the besiegers within the walls was never
slackened. On some days the)' won a whole block of houses
by their milling operations: on others they lost many men
and gained no advantage. The right attack was extending
.z
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itself towards the river, and working from the convent of San
Augllstin into the quarter of the Tanneries.. At the same
time it was also moving on toward the Coso, but with extreme
slowness, for the Spaniards made a specially desperate defence
in the houses about the University and the Church of the
Trinity. One three-storied building, which cO\'crcd the travcr.>c
across the Coso to the south of the University, stood ten
separate assaults and four explosions, and held out from the
llillUt to the eighk'Cuth, dlectually keeping back the advance
of th~ besiegers in this direction 1. Nor could the French ever
succeed ill connecting their field of operations on this front with
that which centred around SlUlta Engracia. Down to the very
end of the siege the Saragossans clUl~g desperately to the SQuth·
eastern corner of the city, and kept control of it right down to
the extel'lla1 walls and thc bank of the Hueroo, where they still
possessed a narrow strip of 300 yards of the enceinte.
The left -attack of the French, that from the Santa Engracia
side, made much more progress, though even here it was slow
and dearly bought. On February 10, however, in spite of
!'ieveral checks, the besiegen for the first time forced their Wfl,y
as far as the Coso, working through the ruined hospital which
had been destroyed in the first siege. On the same day, at the
north·western angle of their advance, they made a valuable
conquest in the. church and convent of Sail Francisco. A mine
was driven under this great building from the ruins of the
hospital, and filled with no less than 3,000 pounds of powder.
It had not ~ll discovered by the Spaniards, and the com·ent
was full of fighting-men at the moment of thc cxplosion. The
whole grenadier company of the 1st regiment of Valencia and
SOO irregulars were blown up, and peti~bcd to a man~. Norwas
this all: in the northern part of the building was established
the main factory for military equipmcnt of the Army of Arngon:
it was crammed with workpeople, largely women, for Palafol:
had forgotten or refused to withdraw the depOt to a less con-
venient and spacious but more safe position. All these wlfortu-
nate non-combatants, to the number of at IC8.!lt 400, perished,
I Belmas, ii. 314, and before.
~ In LejeuneJ i. 100, the reader will find some horrible anecdotes of this
explOl;ion.
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and the roof-tops for hundreds of yards around were strewn with
their dismembered limbs.
It might have been expected that, as the immediate couse·
quence of this awful catastrophe, the French would have made
a long step forward in this direction. But such was not the
C/lSe: before the smoke had cleared away Spaniards rushed
forward from the inner defclll:es, and occupied part of the ruins
of San Francisco. A body of peasants, headed by the emigre
colonel de l'1eury, got into the bell-tower of the convent, which
had not fallen with the rest, and kept up from its leads a
vigorous plunging fire upon the besiegers, when they stole for-
ward to burrow into the mass of debris. But with the loss of
some thirty men the French succeeded in mastering two-thirds
of the ruins: next day they cleared the rest, and stormed the
belfry, where de Fleury and his men were all bayonetted after
a desperate fight on the winding slairs. It was first from the
colllmanding height of this steeple that the French officers
obtained a full view of the city. The sight was encouraging to
them: they could realize how much the inner parts of the place
had suffered from the bombardment, and noted with their
telescopes the small number of defenders visible behind the
further barricades, the heaps of corpses in the streetli, and the
slow and dejected pace of the few passengers visible. Two great
gn110ws with corpses hanging from them especially attracted
the eyes of the onlookers 1. Other"circumstances united on this
and the following day (February 11-12) to show that the defence
was at last beginning to slacken. A great mob of peasants,
mainly women, came out of the Porlillo gate towards Morlot's
trenches, and prayed hard for permission to go thl1)ugh the
lines to their villages. They were not fired on, hut given a loaf
apiece, and then driven back into the city. It was still more
significant that at night, on the eleventh, four or five bodies of
deserters stole out to the French; they were all foreigners,
belonging to the 'Swiss' battalion 2 which was shut up in
Saragossa: several officers were among them. To excuse them-
selves they said that Palttfox and the friars were mu.d, and that
1 Lejeune, i. 177.
1 The 'Sui.llos de Aragon; of which the unfortunate Fleury had been
colonel, had not a11 perished on De<:. 21.
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they judged that all further defence had become impossible.
Yet the siege was to endure for nine days longer I !
Though the two main attacks continued to press slowly
forward, and that 011 the left had now reached the Coso and
covered a front of 100 yards on the southern side of that great
street, it was not on this front that the decisive blow WllS
destined to be given. On the eighteenth Lannes determined to
deliver the great assault on the suburb, where the batteries in
the third pru:nllel Md about the Jesus convent had now com·
pletely shattered the· San Lazaro defences. All Gazall'S men
being now back in their trenches, since Mortier's expedition had
dl'i\'en off the Marquis of Lawn, Lanncs considered that he
might safely risk the stonn. Fifty.two siege-guns pmyed on
San Lazaro throughout the morning of the eighteenth, and no
less than eight practicable breaches were opened in it and the
works to its right and left. At noon three storming columns
leaped out of the trenches and raced for the nearest of these
entries. All three burst through: there was a sharp struggle
in the street of the suburb, and then the French reached and
sei7.ed a block of houses at the head of the bridge, which cut the
defence in two and rendered a retreat into Saragossa almost
impossible. The Spaniards, seeing that all was lost, split into
two bodies: one tried to force its way across the bridge; but
only 300 passed; the rest were slain or captured. The main
part, consisting of the defenders of the western front of the
suburb, formed in a solid mass and, abandoning their defences,
tried to escape westward up tile bank of the Ebro, into the open
country. They got across the inundation in their front, but
when they had gone thus far were surrounded by two regiments
of French cavalry, and forced to surrender. They numbered
1,500 men, under General Mamo, commanding the 3rd divi.
sion of Palafox's army, the one which furnished the garrison of
the suburb. The officer commanding the whole trnnspontillc
defence, Baron de Versage, had been killed by a cannon-ball on
the bridge.
TillS \l'o.s not the only diso.ster suffered by the Sal'agossulls
on the eighteenth: at three in the afternoon, when the news of
the loss of the suburb had had time to spread round the town,
I Arteehe, k 472, and Lejeune, i. 179.
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and the attention of the besieged was distracted to this side,
Grandjeall's division attacked the houses and barricades in the
north-eastern part of the city, which had so long held them at
bay. A great mine opened a breach in the University. which
was stormed, and with it fell the houses on each side, as far as
the Caso. At the same time another attack won some ground
in the direction of the Trinity convent, and the Ebro. Next
.day the Spaniards in this remote corner of the town, almost cut
oft' from the main body of the defenders, and now battered from
the rear by new works thrown up in the suburb, in and about
San Lazaro, drew back and abandoned the quarter of the
Tanneries, the quays, and the outer enceinte looking over the
mouth of the H uerba.
On the nineteenth it was evident that the end had come:
a third of the ever-dwindling force of effective men of which
Palafox could dispose had been killed or captured at the storm
of San La7.JlTO. The city was now being fired on from the
north, t.he only side which had hitherto been safe. The epidemic
WILS worse thun cvcr-600 a dl\Y ttre said to have died during
the final week of the siege. The last mills which the garrison
possessed had lately been destroyed, and no more flour was
issued, but unground com, which had to be smashed up between
paving-stones, or boiled and eaten as a sort of porridge. The
supply of powder was beginning to run low; not from want oC
.material to compound it, but Crom the laboratories hu\"ing been
mostly destroyed and from the greater part of the arsenal work.
men having died. Only about 700 pounds a day [si."{ quintals]
could now be turned. oul:., and t.he daily expenditure in the
mines and barricades came to much more.
On this moming the French noted that at many points the
defence seemed to be slackening, and that parts of the line
were ,'ery feebly manned. They made more progress this day
than in any earlier twenty-four hours of the siege. Their main
work, however, was to run six lal'bTC! mines WIder the Cosa, till
they got below the houses on its further side, somewhat to the
right of San :F'r-a.ncisco. Rogniat placed 3,000 pounds of powder
in each, a quantity that was calculated to blow up the whole
quarter.
It was not ncccssnry to use them. The spirits of the defenders
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had at last been broken, and surrender was openly spoken of-
though its ment,ion ten days earlier would have cost the life of
the pl'Oposer. Pala(ox on his sick bed understood that all was
over; he sent for General St. :March and resigned the military
corom'and to him. But in order that he might not seem to be
shirking his responsibility, and trying to put the ignominy of
asking for terms on his successor, he sent his aide-de-camp
Casseillas to Lannes, offering surrender, but demanding that
the troops should march Qut with the honours of war Rnd join
the nearest Spanish army in the field. Then he turned his face
to the wall, and prepared to die, for the fever lay heavy upon
him, and broken with despair and fatigue he thought that he
had not many hours to live. St. :Marcll's appoi.lltment not
being well taken-the loss of the Monte Torrero was still
remembered against him-Palafox's last act was to give over
charge of the city to a Junta of thirty-thl'cc.persolls 1, mainly
local notables and clergy, to whom the finishing of the negotia-
tions would fall.
Of course Lannes sent back the Captain-General's aide-de-
camp with the message that he lllust ask for unconditional
surrender, and that the proposal that the garrison should be
allowed to depart was absurd. 'The fighting was resumed on
the morning of the twentieth, and the French were making
appreciable progress, when the Junta OllCC more sent to ask
termsfrolll the besieger:;. It was not without some bitter debate
among themselves that they took this step, for there was still
a minorit)" including St. l'.'1arch and the priest Padre Con-
solation, who wished to continue the resistance. They were
bucked by a section of the citizens, who began to collect and to
raise angry cries of Treason. But the whole of the soldiery
and the major part of the civilian defenders were prepared to
yield. At four o'clock in the afternoon they sent out to ask
for a twenty-four hours' trucc to settle terms of surrcndCl'.
Lanncs gmntcd them two hours to send him out a deputation
charged with full powers to capitulate, and ordered the bombard-
ment and the mining to cease. His aide-de-camp, who bore
the message, WilS nearly murdered by fanatics in the street 2,
I TIlCir unmOl! call he founu Oll p, 494 of Artoohe, vo!. iv,
S III LejCUllC j i. 194--.5, will be fO\Uld a moot picturesque aCCoullt of thc
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and was rescued with difficulty by some officers of the regular
arnly. But the Junta sent him back with the message that
the deputation should be forthcoming, and within the stipulated
time eleven of its members came ont from the Portillo gate 1,
to the Marshal's head qutlrters on the Calatayud road. l11crc
was not mudl discussion: l.annes contented himself with pointing
out to the Spaniards that the place was at his mercy: he had
the plan of his siege-works unrolled before them, and pointed
out the position of the six great mines under the CoS02, us
well as those of the advanced posts which he had gained during
the last two days. The deputies made some feeble attempts to
secure that the name of Ferdinalld VU should appear in the
articles of co!)itulnlion, and that the clergy should be guaranteed
immunity and undisturbed possession of their bencfiees. Lalllll.."S
waved all such proposals aside, and dictated a form of surrender
which was on the whole reasonable and even generous. The
gnn·ison should march out on the following day, and lay down
its arms 100 yards outside the Portillo gate. Those who would
swear homage to King Joseph should have their liberty, and
might take service with him if they wished. Those who refused
the oath should march as prisoners to l"rance. The city should
be granted a general pardon: the churches should be respected :
private property should not be meddled with. The citizens
must surrender all their weapons of wlmtevcr sort. Any civil
magistrates or employes who wished to keep their places must
take the oath of allegiance to King Joseph.
On the following morning the garrison marched out: of
peasants and soldiers there were altogether about 8,000 men,
],500 of whom were convalescents from the Hospitals. 'Never
inrerview of the French enl'oy with the fever-ridden and despairing Junta,
almost hysterical with rage and shame, but accepting the inevitable.
I It is notable that there WRli not a single churchman among them,
though there were eight amollg the thirty.three members of the Junta.
The c1erg}' represented to the last the ligliting section.
1 Lejoune, ill his interesting narmtive of this interl'iew, says that lIe
saw one of tho deputies pore over the map and recognize his own llOUS(l
among the milled buildings; I,e crossed himself live or six times, ILml
cried in lI.CCenl8 of bitter grief' Ak la Cali.' (Mc(dn..' The Ilamo of Don
Joachim L'iscala does occur amOllg the eleven signatures, so the story is
probably true. Lejeune) i. 108.
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had any of us gazed on a more sad 0; touching sight,' writes
Lejeune; 'these sickly looking men, bearing in their booies the
seeds of the fever, all frightfully emaciated, with long blnck
matted beards, and SCllI'{.'Clyable to hold their weapons, dragged
themselves slowly along to the sound of the drum. Their clothes
were torn and dirty: everything about them bore witness to ter-
rible misery. Dut in spite of their livid faces, blackened with
powder, and scarred with rage and grief, Uley bore themselves
with dignity and pride. The bright coloured sashes, the large
round hats surmounted by a few cock's-feathers which shaded
their foreheads, the brown cloaks or ponchos flung oyer their
varied costumes, lent a eertain picturesqueness to their tattered
garb. When the moment cnme for them to pile their arms and
deliver up their flags, many of them gave "iolent expression to
their despair. Their eyes gleamed with rage, and their savage
looks seemed to say that they hud counted our ranks, and deeply
regl'Ctted having sw-rcndcrcd to such a small army of enemies i.'
Another and more matter-of-fact eye-witness adds, 'They were
a most motley crowd of men of all ages and conditions, some in
Wliform, more without it. The officers were mostly mounted
on mules or donkeys, and were only distinguished from the men
by their three-cornered hats and their large cloaks. Many were
smoking their cigoriUo.1 and talking to each other with an aspect
of complete indifferelll'C. But all wcre not so resigned. The
whole garrison, 8,000 to 10,000 strong, defiled in front of us:
the majority looked so utterly unlike soldiers, that our men saitI
openly to each other that they ought not to have taken so long
or spent so much trouble in getting rid of such a rabble 2,'
The column was promptly put in motion for France, untIeI' the
escort of two of Morlot's regiments. Many died on the way
from the fever whose seeds they carried with them. Few or
none, as might have been supposed, took ad\'ant.age of the ofter
to save themselves from captivity by taking the oath to King
Joseph.
It is sad to have to confess that the French did not keep to the
tenns of the capitulation. That Lannes could not· restrain his
men from phmdcr, as he had promised, was hLUuly surprising.
I Lejcune, i. 202.
t VOll Brlllldt, AIU rneinem Uben, pp. 43--4.
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There were so mallY empty houses awl churches containing
valuables, that it was not to be wondered at that the victors
should help themsehes to all they could find, But they also
plundered occupied houses, and even stole the purses of the
cupli\'e officers. 'Vhat was worse was that many assassinations
took place, especially of clergy, for the French looked upon the
priests and friars as being mainly responsible for the desperate
defence. Two in especial, Padre Basilio Dogiero, the chaplain
of Palnfox, and Santiago Sass, a pnrish priest, were shot in cold
blood two days after the surrender 1, Public opinion in the
French ranks was convinced that they, more than any onc else,
had kept the Captain-General up to the mark. Palafox himself
was treated with great brutality. .As he lay apparently mori-
. bUild, tbe French oflkoer who had oc'<!n Ihade interim governor
of Sar~"Ossa came to his bedside, and bade him to sign orders
for the surrender of Jaca and Monzon. When he refused, this
colonel threatened to have him shot, but left him alone when
threats had no effect. Ere he wus eouvaleseent he was sent oft'
to Franee, where the Emperor ordered that he should be treated,
not as a prisoner of war, but as guilty of treason, and shut
him up for. many years as a close captive in the'donjon of
Vincennes.
The state in which Saragossa was found by the French hardl)'
bears dcscription. It was a foclls of C0l111ptioll, Olle mass of
putrefying corpses. A{.'Cording to a report whieh Lunnes
elicited from the municipal officers, nearly 54,000 persons had
died in the place since the siege began 2. Of these about ~O,OOO
were fighting-men, regular or irregular, the rest were non-
combatants. Only 6,000 had fallen by fire and sword: the
remainder were victims of the far more deadly pestilence. A
few d~ys after the siege was ended Lannes slated that the total
population of the town was now only 15,000 souls, instead of
the 55,000 which it had contained when the siCe,"'e began. But
his estimate does not include some thousands of citizens who
had fled into the open country, the moment that the)' were
released from investment, in order to escape from the contagion
in the city. 'Il est impossible que Sllragosse se releve,' wrote
I For details, see Arteche, iv. 512-3.
f Lannes to Berthier, March 19, 1009.
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the marshal; 'cette "ille fait horreur it voir.' It was week!;
indeed before the dead were all buried; months before the
contagion of the siege-fever died out from the miserable cit),.
Even after five years of the capable and benevolent government
of Suchet it was still half desolate, and no attempt had been
made to rebuild the third of its houses and churches which had
been reduced to ashes by the mincs and the bombardment.
The French losses in front of Saragossa are not easy to calcu-
late. Belmas says that the total of casualties was about 3,000
in the infantry. bnt he takes no notice of the losses by siege-
fever, excellt Lo say that many died from it. He does not gh·c
the losses of the artillery, e.'(cept of that small part of it which
was not attached either to the Srd or to the 5th Corps. Con-
sidering that the 3rd Corps alone had 13,123 sick on January 15,
lInd that typhus is (l. notoriously deadly disease, it is probable
that the total losses of the French during the sie/:,te amounted
to 10,000 men. It is hard otherwise to explain the difference
between the 31,000 men that the Srd Corps COtrnted in October,
and the 14,000 men which it mustered when Suchet took over
its cOlllulOnd in April. The sufferings of the 5th Corps were
small in complll'ison, for till February began it took no very
serious part in the siege, and its health was notoriously far
better than that of Junot's divisions I. Dut we Co.'lnnot be far
wrong in concluding with Schepeler and .A.rtcche that the total
French loss must have been 10,000 men, rather than the 4,000
given by Napier, who is apparently relying on Rogniat. That
officer gives ouly the CilSualties in battle, and not the losses in
hospital.
So ended the siege of Saragossa-a magnificent display of
civic courage, little helped by strategy of tactics. li'or Palafox,
though a splendid leader of insurgents, was, as his conduct ill
1 It seems (luite clear that tlle' 1,.500 men ill Il08!lit&l' which BelmllS
mentions 011 ii. 327 is a misprint for 16,000. For his own figures show
that (p. 381) there were 13,000 invalids six weeks earlier, and before the
deadly street-fighting had begun. HolI' many died we cannot say, het
Sucllet in April had only 10,527 men present in nineteen battalioes
(MtmlQiru, i. 331), with eight morc battalions {on command,' Wllicll would
give another 4,000. Von Brandt (p. 60) carefully lIllyll lhllt tIlC tot.'l.1 of
3,000 dead does not include' the thousands who perished in hospital.'
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October and November had shown, n very poor gencral. He
made a gross initial mistake in shutting up 40,000 fighting-men
in a place which could have been easily defended by 25,000.
If he had sent one or two divisions to fonn the nucleus of an
army of relief ill Lower Aragon, with orders to harass, but 1I0t
to fight pitched battles, it is hard to see how the siege could
have been kept up. His second fanlt was the refusal to make
sorties on a large scale during the first half of the siege, while
he was still ill possession of great masses of superfluous fighting~
men. He sent out scores of petty sallies of a few hundred men,
but never moved so many as 5,000 011 a single day. Such a
policy won·ied hut could not seriously harm the ]!"rench, while
it destroyed the willing men of the garrison; if the Captain~
General had saved up all the volunteers whom he lost by tens
and twenties in small and fruitless attacks on the trenches, he
could have built up with them a column-head that would ha,'e
pierced through the French line at any point that he chose.
Anything might have been done dming thc thrce weeks while
MOIticr was ut Calatayud, and especia.lly during the days when
Gazall with his 8,000 men was cut off by the floods, and isolated
on the further bank of the Ebro.
The Captain-General'!; conduct, in short, was not that of
1\ capable officer. But it is absmd to endeRvour to represent
him as a coward, or as a puppet whose strings were pulled by
fanatical friars. He knew perfectly well what he ww; duing,
and how to manage the disorderly but enthusiastic masses of
the population 1. There can be no doubt that his personal
influence was all·imporlant, and the effect of his constant
harangues and proclamations immense. It would be. quite as
true to say that the friars and the mob-orators were his tools,
as that he WruI theirs. Hc had to humour them, but by
humouring them he got out of them the utmost possible sen·ice.
Against the stories that his proclamations were written for him,
l The foundation for IllOst of the stories agaillst Palafox seems to be
Lannes' letter to Napoleon of 19 mars: 'Cc llaUI'ro miSllrable pretait
seulcment SOil Ilom aux moilJe3 et nux iJltrignutS.' I cannot find lIn}'~
where the source from which Nllllier drnws his statement that PaInfUl( Md
Ilimself in a bomb-proof, and li"cd < in a disgusting state of sensuality,'
shirking all the dangers of the siege (i. 389).
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and that he had to be goaded into issuing every order that came
from his head quarters, we have the evidence ofVaughan and
others who knew him well. It is unanimous in ascribing to him
incessant activity and an exuberant fluency in composition.
Arleche has preserved some minutes on the siege which he
wrote long after the Peninsular ,"Var was over: they are inter-
esting and well-stated, but more creditable to him as a patriot
than as a military maul. There can be no doubt that the
g!mison might have been much more wisely handled: but it is
doubtful whether under any other direction it would have shown
so much energy and staying power. There is certainly no other
Spanish siege, save that of Gcronu, where half so much resolution
was shown. If the defence had been conducted by regular
officers and troops alone, the place would probably have fallen
three weeks earlier. If the monks and local demagogues had
been in command, and patriotic anarchy alone had been opposed
to the French, Saragossa would possibly have fallen at an even
earlier date, from mere want of intelligent direction. Palafo:x,
with all his faults, supplied the connecting link bctw~1I the two
sectiolls of the defenders, and kept the soldiery to work by
means of the example of the citizens, while he restrained the
citizens by dint of his im,mense personal influence over them,
won in the first siege. In short, he may have been min, bom-
bastic, and a bad tactician, but hc was a good .Spaniard. If
there had been a few dozen men more of his stamp in Spain, the
task of the French in ]808-9 would have been infinitely more
difficult. The example of SlLl'tl.o<7Qssa W(LS invaluable to the
nation and to E~rope. The knowledge of it did much to
sicken the French soldiery of the whole war, and to make every
officer and man who entered Spain march, not with the light
heart that he felt in Germany at· Italy, but with gloom and
disgust and want of confidence. They never failed to do their
duty, but they fought without the enthusiasm which helped
them so much in all the earlier wars of the Empire.
I Arteche, iv. 607-8.
SECTION XII
THE SPRING CAMPAIGN IN LA MANCHA
AND ESTREMADURA
CHAPTER I
THE ROUT OF CIUDAD REAL
:By the middle of the month of February, as we have already
seen, Andalusia was once more covered by two considerable
Spanish armies: Cartaojal, with the wrecks of Infantado's host
and the new levies of Del Palacio, was holwng the great passes
at the castcm cnd of the Sierra l\1orena. Cucsta had. rallied
behind the GuadianA the remains of the army of Estremadul'a.
He was at present engaged in reducing it to order by the only
method of which he was master, the shooting of any soldier who.
showed signs of disobedience or mutiny 1. The army deserved
nothing bette:P: its dastardly murder of its unfortunate general
in December justified any amOllnt of severity in his successor.
Meanwhile Victor, aflcr his victory at Udes, and his vain
attempt to surprise Del Palncio, had plWed away to the west,
leaving nothing in the plains of La Mancha save the dragoons
of l\lilhaud and Latour-Maubourg, who were placed as a cavalry
screen across the roads to the south, with their divisional head
quarters at Ocafia and l\J1adridejos respectively.
The :Marshal drew back to the valley of the Tagus, and
marched by Toledo on AJmaraz; this was in strict execution of
the plan dictated by Napolcon before he left Spain. It will be
remembered that he had directed that, when the February rains
were over, Victor should move on Badajoz, to assist by his presence
I There are details in the diary of a citizen of Badajo~ in the Vaughan
Paper,.
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in that dircelioll the projected attack of Soult on Lisbon. Only
whell Estremadum and Portugal had been subdued was the
attack on Andalusia to be carried out. Soult, as we shall see,
was (by no fault of his own) much slower in his movements than
Nllpoleon hnd expected, and Victor w£tiled in vain at Talavera
for any news that the invasion of Portugal was in progress.
Hence the Spaniards gained some weeks of respite: the ranks of
their armies were filled up. and the spirits of their generals rose.
Carw.ojal remained for some time at La Cru'olina, reorganizing
and recruiting the depleted and half-starved battttliOlls which
Infantado had handed over to him. He had e.'l:pected to be
attacked by Victor, but when he learnt that the Marshal had
gone off to Toledo, and that Ln Manchn was covered only by
a thin line of cavalry, he began to dream of resuming'the offen-
sive. Such a policy was most unwise: it shows that Cartaojal,
like so many other Spanish generals, WM still possessed with the
faml mania for grand operations and pitched battles. He hOO
in his head nothing less than a plan for thrusting back the
cavalry screen opposite to him, and for recovering the whole of
La Mancha. If Victor's corps had been the only force available
to oppose him, there would have been something to My for the
plan. An advam:e on Toledo and Madrid must have brought
back the Duke of Belluno from his advance towards Estrema·
dura. Dut, as 11 matter of fact, Jourdan and King Joseph had
1I0t left the l'Oads to La Ml.l.llcha ungualXled: they had drafted
down from Madrid two infantry divisions of the 4th Corps,
whose command Sebastiani had now taken over from Lefebvre.
The first division lay at Toledo: the third (Valence's Poles) at
Aranjuez; thus the former supported Latour.Maubourg, the
latter l\Iilhnud.
Ignorant, apparently, of the fact that there was anything but
cavalry in his front, Cartaojal resoh·ed to beat up the French
outposts. "Yith this object he told off half his infantry and
two-thirds of his horse, under the Duke of Albuquerque,
a gallant and enterprising, but somewhat reckless, officer, of
whom we shall hear much during the next two years of the war.
Marching with speed and secrecy, Albuquel'quc, with 2,000
horse and 9,000 infantry, fell upon Digeon's brigade of dragoons
at Mora on February 18. He tried to cut it off with his
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cavalry, while he attacked it in front with his foot. But
DigeOll saw the danger in time, and fell back in haste, after
losing a few men of the QOth Dragoons and some of his baggage.
I-lis demand for assistance promptly brought down Sebastiani,
with the 1st division of the 4th Corps, and the two remaining
brigades of Latour-Maubourg's cavalry. The moment that he
hCilrd that a heavy force had arrived III his front, Albuquerquc
retired as far as Consuegra, where the French caught up
his rear, and inflicted some loss upon it. He then fell
still further back, crossed the Guadiana, and took post at
MaIl1..nnares. Sebastiani did not pursue him beyond Con-
suegro, giying as his e.'\":cuse the c..-;;:hausted condition of the
count.ry-side 1.
Cartaojal meanwhile, with the rest of his army, had come up
from the passes to Ciudad Real, following in wake of Albu-
querque's advance. Wben he met with his lieutenant they fell
to quarrelling, both as to what had already occurred, and as to
what should now be done, for the Duke was anxious to induce
his chief to make a general ad vance on Toledo, while Cartaojal
dcsired him to take a single division of infantl'y aud to try the
advcnture himself. "Vllilc they wcrc disputing, order;; came
from the Supremc Junta that troops were to be detached from
the Army of La Mancha to strengthen that of Estremadura.
Cartaojal took the opportunity of getting rid of Albuquerque,
by putting him at the head of the detachment which was to be
sent to Cuesta. The Duke, not loth to depart., went oft' with
Cl. division of 4,500 infantry and a regiment of cavalry 2, and
marchL-d down the Guailiallu into Estrcmudura.
Cartaojal remained for the first three weeks of :March at
Ciudad Real and Manzanares with the main body of his force,
about 2,500 horse and 10,000 foot, keeping behind him, at the
foot of the passes, a reserve of 4,000 men under La Peila. This
was tempting providence, for he was now aware that the whole
J For these operations compare Jourdan'lI Memoirt8, pp. 178-9, and
Arte<:hc, v. 228-31.
t The cavalry regiment had only 264 sabres: the infantry battalions
were Campo Mayor, Tiradores de Cadiz, Granaderos del General, militia of
Cordova, Guadix and Osuna. Only tho first-named was an old regular
corps.
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4th Corps, as well as Et great mass ot ca\'alry, was in front of
him, Rnd that he might be attacked at any moment. His
position, too, was a faulty one; he had descended into the
very midst of the broad plain of La l\fancha, and had occupied
as his head quarters an open town, easy to turn on either flank,
and with 0. perfectly fordable river as its sole defence, As if
this peril was not sufficient, Cartaojal suddenly resolved that
he would make the dash at Toledo which Albuquerque had
proposed to him, though he had refused to send his whole army
against that point when the scheme Wall pressed upon him by
his late second-in-command. The nearest hostile troops to him
were a regiment of Polish lancers, belonging to Lasalle's division,
which lay at Ycbenes, twenty miles outside Toledo. Making a
swift stroke at this force, while it was far from expecting any
advance on his part, Cartaojal drove it in, killing or taking
nearly 100 of the Poles (March !t4). But Sebastiani came up
to their aid with an infantry division and three regiments of
Milhaud's dragoons. The Spaniard refused to accept battle, and
feU hastily back to Ciudad)teaJ, where he established his whole
tll"my behind thc ~i\'er GundilUln, in and about the open town.
He was most unsafe in the midst of the vast plain, and was soon
to rue his want of caution. Sebastiani had been joined by his
Polish division and by part of his corps-cavalr)", and having
sollle 12,000 or 13,000 men in hand 1, had resolved to pay
back on Cartaojal the beating up of his outpost at YCbenes.
On March 26, Milhaud's division of dragoons seized the
bridge of Pemlvillo, close to Ciudad Real, and crossed to the
southern bank of the Guadiana. The Spanish gencral called up
all his cavalry"and some of his foot, and marched to drive the
dragoons back. They withdrew across the water, but still held
the bridge, behind which the)" had planted theit· artillery. Next
rooming Sebastiani's infantry came up, lln~ he determined to
attack Ciudad Real. Cartaojal, who was taken completely off
his gnard, was suddenly informed that column afl:er column WI\$
pressing across the bridge and marching against him. He did
I He had his own original division of the 4th Corps (twelve hatts.),
V::IlenCe'll Poles (six' batts.), the 3rt! Dutch Hussars (part of his corps-
ca\'alrY)J the regiment of Polish lancers, and i\Jilhaud's three regiments,
the, 12t1J, 16th and 21st Dragoons: 31lparently in all 12J H4 men,
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not dream for a moment of fighting. 9ut brave orders for an
instant retreat towards the passes. He thre\\' Qut his cavalry
and horse artillery to cover the withdrawal of his infantry, who
hurried away in half a dozen small bodies across the intenuin·
able plain. Scbnstiani charged the SptUlish horse with his
Polish lancers and Dutch hussars, supported by Milhaud's
dragoons. The covering force broke and fled, and the pursuers
came up with several of the columns of the retreating infantry.
Some of them were dispersed, others were surrounded and taken
prisoners. The pursuit was continued next moming, till it was
interrupted by a fearful burst of rain, which darkened the
horizon, hid the fugitives, and stopped the chase, or Cartaojal's
army might have been entirely destroyed. He lost in this rout,
which it would be absurd to call a battle, five guns, three
standards, and more than !i!,OOO prisonel's, among whom were sixty-
onc officers. The loss in killed and wounded was probably not
very great, for there had been no attempt at a stand, and the
troops which were cut off had surrendered without resistance 1.
The loss of the French was insignificant, probably less than 100
men in all. They had stayed their pnrsuit at Santa Crnz de
:Mudeln, from whence they returned to Ciudrui Real, where they
lived on the magazines which Cartaojal had collected before his
unfortunate march on Ycbelles. Sebastiani dared not follow
the fugitives into the mountains, as he had received orders to
clear La Mancha, but not to invade Andalusia: that was to be
the task of Victor.
Cartaojal recrossed the DeSpCi1fL. Perros, and established his
head {juarters at Sta Eleua, in front of La Carolina. His Ilrmy
had been more frightened than hurt, and when the stragglers
came in, still numbered !i!,OOO horse and l~,OOO infantry. But
he was not allowed to retain its command. Justly indignant
at the carelessness with which he had aJlowed himself to be
surprised in tront of Ciudad Heal, and at his general mis-
management, the Supreme JuntA deposed him, and replaced
I It soomIJ de3r that the 2,000 killed lIlld wounded, gh'eu hl' JOUrdllll
(p. 180) and VicMres et CQnqufhM, is metel)' u. rough estimate. BelmllS'
figures (i. (9) lIril still more absurd: 110 makes the Sl)lIuiardIJ IOIie 9,000
men from an army which did not e"ceed 16,.500 all told, including the
rear divisiou of La Peiia.
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him by Venegas, though the record of the latter's operations
at Ucles was hardly encouraging to the soldier)'. By the
middle of April the army had been reinforced by new Gran.
adan levies, and could take the field, although its state of
discipline was bad and its morale much shaken by the late
Cl·cnts.
SECTION XII: CHAPTER II
OPERATlO),'S OF VICfOR AND CUBSTA: BATTLE 0/:0'
MEDELLIN
'VRILE Cartaojal and bis Andalusian levies were faring so ill
in La Mancha, the arm}' of Estremadura and its obstinate old
general were going through experiences of an even more disas·
trous kind. Cuesta, it will be remembered, had rallied about
Badajoz and Merida the demoralized troops that had served
under San Juan and Galluzzo. He was, contrary to all expec-
tation, allowed to remain unmolested for some weeks. The
irrational movement of Lefebvre to Plasencia and Avila 1 had
left him for the moment almost without an enemy in his front.
Along the middle Tngus he had nothing opposed to him $iLve
Lasallc's four regiments of light cavalry, supported by Lentl's
German division at Talavera. '''bile Victor was engngoo in the
campaign of Ueles, and in his subsequent circular march through
La Mancha to Toledo, the army of Estremadura enjoyed a time
of complete rest. Cuesta's fault was not want of energy: after
shooting a competent number of mutineers, and disgracing some
officers who had shown signs of cowardice, he distlibuted his
t.roops into three new divisions under Henestrosa, Trias, and
thc Duke Del Parque, and began to movc thcm back towards
the Tagus. As there was nothing in his way except Lasalle's
light horse, he was able to take up, at the end of January,
the same line which Gallu7,zo had been forced to evacuate
in December. The French cavalry retired behind the river to
Gropesa, abandoning the great bridge of Almaraz. the main
passu.gc of the Tagus, on Januo.ry 29. Thereupon Cucsta broke
the bridge, a difficult task, for his mines failed, and the work
had to be completed with the pick. It was so badly managed
that when the key~stone at last gave way, an engiheer officer
1 See lIP. 4-5 0'£ tllis volume.
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and twenty-six sappers were still upon the arch, and were pre·
cipitated into the river, where they were every one drowned.
The Captain-General then established his head quarters at
Deleytosa, a centrnl point in the mountains, from which he
commanded the two passages of the Tagus, that at Almaraz
and that by the ]luente del Conde, near Me7.a de Ibor. He
arranged his 15,000 men with advanced guards at the water's
edge, opposite each of the possible points of attack, and resencs
on the high ground to the rear. This forward position gave much
encouragement to the pensn.ntry of New Cnstile, and bands of
guerrillas began (for the first time) to be seen on the slopes of the
Sierra de Gredos and the Sierra de Toledo. There was a feeling
of uneasiness even up to the gates of Madrid.
To restrain the advances of the Spaniards, King Joscph $Cllt
out Lnsalle's cavalry and Lcval's ~rmans on February 19, with
orders to clear the nearer hills. They crossed the Tagus at the
bridge of Arr.obispo, a little below Talavera., Rlld forced back
the division of Trios, which was watching this flank of Cuesta's
position. But the country was almost impassable for cavalry,
a mere mass of ravines and spurs of the Sierra de Guadalupe,
and after advancing as far as the pass of San Vincente, and
seeing the Spaniards begin to gather in force 011 his front
and flank, Lasalle retreated, and reerossed the Tagus without
having effeeteO. anything of importance.
It was not till a month later that the French took the offen-
sive in earnest. Victor was now returned from his excursion
into La Mancha, with his two divisions of the 1st Corps, and
the six dragoon regiment.s of Latour-Maubourg, whom he had
drawn off' to Toledo, handing over the charge of observing
Car~jal to Milhaud und Sebastiani. Uniting these for<.'Cs
to those of Lcval and Lasalle, he massed at Talavera an army
of some 22,000 or 23,000 men, of whom 5,000 were admirable
eavall'j'1.
Joseph and Joul'dan were now of the opinion that it was
time for Victor to move forward on Estremadura., in accord-
ance with the great plan for the conquest of southern Spain,
which the. Emperor had left behind as his legacy when he
I This is the estimate of Jourdan (Mbnoiru, p. 181), and exactly agrees
with the figures which I gh'e on p. 152.
1809J VICTOR'S CONTROVERSY WITH JOURDAN 151
departed from Valladolid. It was true that this movement
was to have been carried out in co·operation with the advance
of Marshal Soult upon Portugal;. but no news could be got of
the Duke of Dalmatia's 1)~llt position. The last dispatch
from him was nc£u'lya month old. 'Vritiug from Orcnse on
February 24 he had stated that he hoped to be at CM,,!..'S by
March 1, and should then march on Oporto and Lisbon.
According to Napoleon's calculations he was to be at the last-
llamed city within ten days of the capture of Oporto. It was
therefore, in the opinion of Joseph and Jourdan, high time that
Victor should start, in order to get in touch with Soult when
the Portuguese capital should "be occupied.
The Duke of Bclluno, however, raised many difficulties, even
when he had been shown the Emperor's orders. He complained
that he ought to have the help of Lapisse's division, the ~ond
of his own Corps, which still lay at Salamanca. He doubted
whether he could dare to take 011 with' him, for an expedition
into Estremadura, the German di"ision of Leval: he ought,
perhaps, to leave it at Talavera and Ahnal'8.z, in order to keep
up his communications with Madrid. If this were done he would
muster only 16,000 men for his great forward movement, and he
had the gravest doubt whether Soult could or would give him
the assistance of which the Emperor had \\Titten, even if lie
seized Lisbon within the appointed. time, Finall)', he was sholt
of engineer officers, sappers, horses, and resen"e ammunition.
Much of what the Duke of BelIuno wrote was true: in par~
ticula.r, the idea of co-operation with Soult wns perfectly
chimerical: Napoleon had worked out all his logistics to f'-ll
erroneous result, from want of a real conception of the con-
ditions and difficulties of wnr in the Peninsula. But some
of the pIcas which Victor urged merely serve to show his
disinclination to accept the task which had been set him; and
in especial he under-rated the numbers of his troops beyond the
limit of fair statement. He had with him nine battalions of
Uuffin's division, twelve of Villatte's, eight of Leval's; of cavalry
he had six regiments of Latour-Maubourg's dragoons, three
of I...usalle's light cavalryl, two regiments of his own corps·
1 26th and lotll Chasseul"!I and DUI Drngoons ; the fourtll regimeut, tile
Pulish lancers, was WiUl Seb<lstiani (sce pp. 146-7).
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cavalry, and the ,~,restpha1ian regiment of the 4th Corps which
was attached to Levars Germans. The total must have amounted
to 15,000 infantry, and about 5,500 cavalry: hc had also sixty
guns with 1,600 artillerymen 1.
In spite of his reluctance Victor was forced to yield to the
pressure of JOllrdnu and the Emperor's explicit orders. On
:March 14 he began to make his preparations to cross the Tagus
aud to attack Cuesta: it was reported to him that the roads
starting from the two bridges which were in his power, those of
Tnlavcl'tl and Arzobispo, wcre neither of them practicable for
artillery, and that only the route by _<\lmaraz was suitable for
the guns and heavy baggage. But the bridge of Almaraz was
broken, and beyond it were visible entrcnchments thrown up by
the Spaniards, and a considerable body of troops-the division
of General Henestrosa. The Duke of Belluno determined to
dear the way for a crossing at Almara7., by sending infantry
across the Tagus by the passages higher up-stream, ..vith orders
to sweep the southern bank till they cmllC opposite to the
broken bridge. They were to dislodge the force behind it, and
then the artillery, the baggage, and caval!'y were to cross on
a bridge of rafts, which was being prepared close to Ahnnrnz,
in order to be ready the momcnt that it should be wanted.
On l\.farch 15, therefore, Leval's Germans crossed the T8.0"lls
by the bridge of Talavera, with some of LasalJe's cava1ry, while
on the next moming Victor himself pussed at Ar.lObispo with
the divisions of ViUatte and Ruffin. The combined column
pushed westward by a bad road on the hillside o\"erhallging the
river, in a difficult country of rocks and woods, seamed with
countless ravincs, where CIlvalry could barely act and artillery
would have been perfectly useless. Cucsta, 011 hearing of this
movement to tUnt his flank, threw back his right wing, and bade
6,429
6,376
I TIle February fi~ures for Victor's mCll fJTillfmu lOUt fell 1I1"7J1C4 are:-
BrougM forward ]6,318
Latour-Maubourg'sdragoons 2,527
Lasalle's three regiments 1,121
Westphalian Oheva'J$-Ugert 487
Artillery of 1st Corps 1,523
Leval'sartillcrr(two batteries) 184
Total 22,160
1st Division, Ruffin
3rd Division, Villatte
German Division [deducting
one battalion] 3,127
Corps-<:avalry[tworegilUcnts] 1,386
Carry fOlward 16,318
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it make a stand behind the ravine of the little river Ibor, which
falls into the Tagus half-way between Arzobispo and Almara.z.
His force in this direction consisted of the division of the
Duke del Pllrque, about 5,000 strong, with six gUlls. On
the seventeenth Victor's columns, with the Germans of Leval
at their head, arrived before the defiles of Me7A de lhoT, and
fonnd themselves confronted by the Duke, who was firmly
established on the other side of the ravine, in a fine position,
with his bJ'UllS on II projecting rock which enfiladed the high-road.
Victor directed Leval's eight 1 battalions to cross the ravine, and
storm the heights 011 the other side. Thi.. they did in very
gallAnt style, but not without heavy losses, for the F.stremw:hrrans,
eonfident in the strength of·their rugged fighting-ground, made
a long and vigorous resistance, till the Germans actually came
to close qnarters with them and ran in with the bayonet.
Del Parque's line then crumpled up, and· dispersed oyer the
hillsides: nDding it impossible to bring off his guns, he cast
them over the precipice into the ravine below. The Germans
lost se,·enty killed and 428 wounded while climbing the difficult
slopes: Del Parque's men probubly suffered far less, as they
absconded when the enemy closed, and had been under cover till
that moment. The supposition of some French authorities that
the defenders of Meza de 1001' lost 1,000 men is most improb-
ahle. The country was one e:'{uctly suited for a cheap defence,
and for an easy scattering over the hills in the moment of defeat.
The Duke fell back 011 Delcytosa, higher up the side of the
Sierra de Guadalllpe, where Cuesta had established his head
quarters. Here he was joined by another of the Estremaduran
divisions, that of General Trias, nearly 5,000 strong. Henestrosa,
with the rcst of the army, was still watching the pnssagc at
Almaraz, where Cuesta had made up his mind that the main
attack of the French would be delivered. He persisted for some
time in believing that Victor's movement across the Talavera
and Arzobispo bridges was merely a feint; and thus it was that
Del Parque had been left lllone to bear the first brunt of the
attack.. 'Vhen he was at last convim:ed tlmt the bulk of Victor's
infantry was 011 his fla.nk, and tha.t Almaraz was hopel~ly
lOne Hessian battalion was still absent, in garrison at Segovia, so the
total of the division was not much over 3,000.
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turned, the old Captain-Gencral hastily sent orders to Henes·
troM to abandon his entrenchments opposite the bridge, and
to retreat on Truxillo across the mountains. He himsclf took
that path withont delay, and got off in safety with his two
leading divisions, but Henestrosa had to brush across the front
of the advancing French, and was in some danger. Luckily for
him Victor was more set on clearing the road from AJmaraz
than on pursuing the enemy.
"'hen Henestrosa had disappeared, the passage was open, and
the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg aud Deaumont, guarding the
artillery and baggage-train of the 1st Corps, crossed on the rafts
which had been prepared long before, and joined the infalltry
and the Marshal. The passage presented more difficulties than
had been expected, for it proved impossible to construct a
permancnt bridge; the stream was "ery fierce, and the anchors
by which the floats were moored found no hold in the smooth
rocky bottom. The guns passed. either by being sent over 011
rafts or by means of a rope ferry, which was with some difficulty
rigged up. It was not till some time later that a solid bridge
of boats was built at this most important passage 1. One cavalry
regiment was left behind to protect it 2.
Cuesta., when he had united his three divisions, would have
dearly loved to gil'c battle to Victor behind Truxillo, in the
excellent position of the Pumo de Santa Cruz, where the chaussee
from Madrid to Badajoz crosses the Sierra de Guadalupe. His
love for general engagements was by no means cured by the
cvent of his expcriment'> at Cabe7,Qn nnd Medina de Ilio Seeo.
But he was withheld from offering battle not by mere prudence,
but by the fact that he was expecting to receive two considerable
reinforcements. The Marquis de l'ortago was bringing up a
deta.ehment from Badajoz-three battalions 3 which hud been
intcnded to form thc nucleus of a new Fourth division that
was being organized in that fortress. At the same moment
Albuquerque was expected from the east, at the head of the
4,500 men whom the Supreme Junta had detached from the
I Jourdan's J/imoiTu, p. 182.
, Apparently the.\Vestphalian Chet'GlIx UyeT8, which had hitherto been
attaclll~d to Laval's German di\·i",ion.
S Four mure had to be left behind in the fortress.
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army of La Mancha, and had sent down the Guadian(\. to join
that of Estremadura. Cuesta wished to pick up these 7,000
men before he gave battle.
Accordingly he evacuated tlie pass of Santa Crul'., and feU
back southwu.rd towards his reinforcements, leaving Henestrosa
with the bulk of his cavalry to aet as a rearguard. That officer
carried ont his duty with a dnsh and a vigour that were rare in
Spanish armies at this date. 'When the fiery Lasalle came
pressing up against him with his usual fury, the Spanish general
contrived to inflict on him two distinct checks. At Derrocal,
half-way down the defile of Santa Crul'., he made a sudden halt
and dro\'e in the leading squadron of the French by a charge of
his Royal Carbineers, a small remnant ofthe Guard-Cavalry which
had been servingwith theAnnyofEstremadurn since its formation
[March flO]. The Freneh lost tell killed and fifteen wounded I.
This was a trifte, but 011 the next day Henestrosa scored
a far more tangible advan~lYC. Noting that Lasalle's leading
regiment, the 10th Chasseurs, had got far ahead of the rest of
the division, und was pushing on with reckless haste, he laid
a trap for it in front of the village of l\1iajadas. Presenting a
small body of cavalry on the high-road, he hid on each side of
it a strong regiment of his own horse, with orders to fall upon
the flank and rear of the French when th~y should have passed
the ambush. The two corps set aside for this surprise were
Infante and AlmaJlZll, both regiments of La Romana's flImy
from Denmark, which had not yet drawn their sabres since the
war commenced.
Colonel Subervie of the lOth Chasseurs,advancingwith heedless
confidence to charge the body of Spaniards in front of him,
suddenly saw himself enveloped and surrounded by the two
regiments placed in ambush. There was a furious mfll:e, in
which the chasseurs lost one officer and sixty-two lllen killed and
about seventy more wounded, before they eould cut their wa)'
out of the snare. The sight of Lasalle's main body coming up
in haste to the rescue made HCllestrosn give the order for a
prompt retreat, which he accomplished without loss. 'We
arrived,' writes a French officer ofone ofthe supporting regiments,
•too late, and saw nothing but a cloud of dust in the distance,
I Jounian, p. 182.
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made by the Spaniards as they rode away, and the colonel of
the 10th tearing his hair at the sight of his numerous wounde<J!,'
This lesson taught Lasalle more caution: it was creditable to
Henestrosa, though it must be confessed that he had two men
to one in the skirmish, in addition to the advantage of taking
his enemy by surprise. Oddly enough the regiments which
accomplished this successful coup on the twenty-first were the
same which behaved worst in the great battle of the next week 2.
At Miajadas, where this skinnish had taken place, the road
descending from the pass of Santa Cruz forks in two directions.
Onc brallch goes towards :Mcrida and Badnjoz, the other and
less important to Medellin, La Serella, and the upper Guadiana.
It would have been natural for Cuesta to take the former route,
which brought him noorer to his base at Badajoz, ntHI at the
SUlllC time cnabk'<1 him to cOllcr the main road to Andalusia,
at which Victor was presumably aiming. liut the old general
left this line unprotected, and retired by the eastern path to
1\Iedcllin. His main object was to secure his junction with
the reinforcements from La Muncha, which Albuqucrque was
bringing to him.. They were nearing La Serena, and would be
cut oft· from him if he took the road to Dadajoz. At the SlLme
time he argued that, as he had thus placed himself on the flank
of the French, the)' C9uld not afford to m,arch past him, since
the moment that they left Merida. behind them he would
be enabled to cut their communications with Madrid. He
imagined that Victor would prefer to fight him, and would
not dare either to take in hand the siege of Dadajoz, or to
advance ~~inst Andalusia, without clearing his flank by a gencral
action. The moment that he should ha"e picked up Albu-
querque, Cuesta was prepared to indulge the enemy with a fight,
and if he were not attacked himself he intended to take the
offensive. This was sheer madness; even when he had drawn
in his last reserves the old general had but QO,OOO foot and
3,000 horse 3, a number which only exceeded Victor's total by
1 fuMJea, p. 2G8. 2 See pp_ 162-3.
S The Spanish statements that CUOilta had only 2,200 horse seem dis-
pro\-ed by a.letter from Cuesta's camp, CoL D'Urbau to Cradock (April 7),
to the effect that Cuesla had already rallied, after Medelliu, fully 3,000
horse, hut only 6,000 or 7,000 foot [Uecord Office].
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three or four thousand men because the latter had been dropping
detachments between Almaraz and l\Ierida. Considering the
relative Yalqe of the individual soldiery of the two armies,
Cuest..,\'s behaviour was that of a criminal lunatic. "Ve shall see
that his tactics were as bad us his slmlcgy.
The l'.1arshal had left the two Dutch battalions of Leval's
division at Truxillo, in charge of his sick: he dropped the
Ist Dragoons of Latour-Maubourg's division at Miajndas, to
guard the cross-roads, and sent out the 4th and 9th from the
same division along the upper Guadiana, where they soon learnt
of Cuesta's presence on the other side of the river. Lasalle'g
light horse rode down to Merida, and occupied the old noman
capital of western Spain without having to strike a blow.
Learning that the Spaniards had not retreated in this direction,
but by the eastern road, the Marshal (as Cucsta had supposed
likely) directed the bulk of his infantry 011 Medellin; only
the division of Ruffin remained behind, at the cross-roads of
Miajudas.
Meanwhile Cuesta had evacuated Medellin, and fallen back to
La Serena, where Albuquerque joined him on the twenty-seventh.
The moment that the army was united, he turned back, and
retraced his steps towards his fonner position. On the twenty-
cight.h he rcached thc town of DOll Denito, only five miles from
Medclliu, and lcanlt to his great pleasure that Victor was before
him and quite ready to fight. The Marshal had swept the
whole country-side with his numerons cavalry during the last
foul' days, and discovering that there was no Spanish force
opposite him in any direction &Lve that of La Serena, had
ordered Lasalle and Ruffin to march up and join him from Merida
and Miajadas. On the morning of the twenty-ninth he had
his entire army united, save the two Dutch battalions left at
Tru.'CiUo, two more of Lenl.l's battalions lcft at Merida \ the
1st Dragoons at Miajudas, and one other cavalry regiment which
had been told off' to guard the bridge of Almaraz. He cannot
have had less than 13,000 infantry and 4,500 horse, even when
allowance is made for the sick and the losses at MC7.tl. de Ibor
and Miajadus. Cuesta outnumbered him by 6,000 infantry,
1 }'rankfort and the 1st of Ressc. Sce Sauscz's JutJiment tU: Prune/on.
11, 30.
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but was O"ermatched in cavalry by more than three to two,
since he had but 3,000 sabres, and even more hopelessly in
artillery, since Victor had brought over 6fty guns to the field,
while he had only thirty.
Having been joined in the enrly morning by Lasalle's and
Ruffin's detachments, Victor had drawn out his arUlY in front
of Medellin, when his cavalry brought him the news of the
approach ofthe Spaniards. Medellin, an ancient town dominated
by a :Moorish citudcl on a lofty hill, lies in the angle between
the river Guadiana and the Hortiga torrent. The latter, easily
fordable in March and dry in June, is an insignificant stream
but flows at the bottout of a steep ravine. The Guadiuna,
on the other hand, is a river of the firSt class: the great bridge
which leads into ~-'ledellin is no less than 450 yards long.
There were several fords up-stream from the bridge, but in
March, when the river was high, it is doubtful whether they
were practicable. Victor's line, drawn in a quarter of a circle
from the Hortiga to the Guadiana, was well protected on either
flank by the broad rh-er and the steep ravine. His order of
bll.ttle was mther odd: its front line was composed of a division
of infantry (Villatte's of twelve battalions) in the centre, with
two proje<:ting wings, each composed of a cayalry division
supported by two hattu!iolls of Leval's Germans. On the
right, near the Hortiga, was Latour.Maubourg with 6ve of his
SL"{ regiments of dragoons 1 and ten horse artillery gUllS. On
the left, beside the Guadiana, was waUe with three of his own
light cavalry regiments, and the ~nd Hussnl'S of Victor's corps-
cavalry. The remaining battalion of Leval's division 2 WIlS with
Villatte in the centre. Ruffin's division, forming the reserve,
lay far to the rear on the further side of the Hortiga. He had
with him onc cavalry regimcnt 3 and a reserve of artillery: one
I The sixth regiment (1st Dragoons) was still absent at Miajadas.
t The division 113(1 started with nine battalions, but two (as will be
remernhcred) were left hcllilld lit Truxillo, 11/lU two mure at :'Ilerida.
Those with Lasalle were the two lladen battalions, those with Latour-
Maubourg a Nas...oa.u battalion, and oue (ormed of the united light
companies of the division. The second Nassau battalion was to the
rear, with Villatte. See &;mcIe's Ilarrntil"e, p. 463.
) O1h ChasseuI"S, of the corps-cll\"alry of the 1st Corps.
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battalion was detached to guard the baggage, which was parked
at the bridge-head below the town.
Victor's army, therefore, formed a short and compact arc of
•a circle, a mile and El half outside of Medellin. :Facing him,
three or four miles away. was the Spanish army, ranged in
a much larger are, also extending from the Hortiga ~o the
Gundiana, in front of the town of Don llenito. It was deployed
along a series of gentle heights, ou either side of the main road
from Medellin. The position, though rather long for the
Spanish numbers, presented man)' advantages for a defensive
battle: but it was Cuesta's intention to go forward, not to
receive the attack of the French. He saw with pleasure that
the enemy had cOllie half-wIlY to meet him, and was about to
fight with a difficult defile (the bridge of Medellin) in his rear:
Secure from being outflanked by Victor's numerous cavalry, for
the two St.'ClUDS co\'ered his wings, he resolved to march straight
before him and to bear down the French line by a direct
frontal attack. On his left were the divisions ofDel Parque and
Henestrosa, eight battalions in a single line, all deployed four
deep, They had no supports whatever, save one battalion of
grelladiers which marched behind their centre, On their outside
flank rode three regiments of cavalry, close to the ravine of thl:!
Hortiga 1. The centre was composed of the four battalions of
the division of TrillS, all drawn up in the same fashion as the
left wing. The right WlIS formed by Portago's incomplete
divi~ion2 (only three battalions) und by the continbrent from La
Mancha which Albuquerque had just brought up-seven strong
batWions with 4,500 bayonets. OutsideAlbuquerque's extreme
right, and on the banks of the Gundiann, was placed a cavahy
forcc corresponding to that on thc extreme left, and also formed
of three regiments 3. A few remaining squadrons of cavalry were
I These were the regiments Infante and Almanza (from Denmark) and
the new cavalry regiment of Toledo. Letter of Sir Benjamin D'Urban to
Cradock, April' 8, 1600 (ReeoI'd Office). '
11 Its remainder was garrisoning lladajoz. Those on tIle field were
lladajo;r; (two bntts.), and 3rd of Seville (one batt.).
3 Apparently these regiments were Albuquerque's regiment from the
Andalusian anny, with the Cazadores de Llerena (a new Estremadurau
corps) and Del Re)' (one of the Baltic regiments),
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posted in the intervals between the wings and tlle centre 1.
The artillery went forward, each battery with the division to
which it was attached. This W/Ui a most extraordinary order
of battle: with t,he object ofsecuring his flanks and of covering
the whole space between the rivers, Cuesta was advancing with
a front of nearly four miles llnd a depth of ouly four men!
There is no parallel in modem history for such a dangerous
array. If nny single point in the long line gave way. there was
no reserve with which to fill the gap and save the day. And it
was morally certain that a weak point would be found some-
where, for many of the battalions were raw troops which had
never seen fire, and the greater part of the others had graduated
ill the school of panic under Belvedere and San Juan.
Cuesta, however, was eminently satisfied with himself and
with his order of battle: he intended to envelop the shorter
French line with converging fire, to thrust it back on to the
defile of Medellin, anu. if possible to seize the bridge behjnd its
left flank, und to endeavour to cut off' its rctreat. Blind self·
confidence could go no further!
When Victor advanced from Medellin he was aware of the
proximity of the Spaniards, and could see their cavalry vedettes
on nIl the hills in front of Don Benito, but it was not till his
army had marched some distance across the bare and level fields,
that Cuesta revealed his order of battle. When the French
were well advanced in the plain, the whole Army of Estremadura
crowned the heights, and then swept downwnrd from them, in ouc
continuous line forming an e.xaet quarter of acil'cle. The infantry
was well closed up; each regiment had its mounted officers
in front, and the generals were riding up and down the Hne,
perpetually supervising the dressing of their OOtt.u1iOllS, for they
were quite conscious that in the order which Cuesta had chosen
any gap or wavering in the line would be ruinous. Each division
had its battery in front, and in the long intervals between the
gUlls a very thick linc of skirmishcl'S covcred thc advance of thc
main body.
Facing this imposing line, as it will be remembered, the
I These were the two hussar rcgimeutiI, Volulltarios tle Espafia, and
.Maria Luisa, the latter of which had been re-uamed (Huss....rs of Estrc-
madura.
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F'rench had the five dragoon regiments' of Latour-Maubourg
on the right, and the four light camlry regiments of walle on
the left, each supported by two of Lava!'s German battalions.
The centre under Villatte was somewhat' refused,' and was much
further from the Spaniards than were the two powerful wings of
cavalry. As the enemy advanced, Victor bade Latour-Maubourg
and Lasalle to seize any good opportunity for a eharge, but not
to risk, unless circumstances favoLUro them, a gcncl'ul attack on
the Spaniards, until they should have begun to lose their order.
The wings of the enemy being covered by the two rivers, there
could be no question of flank attacks, and frontal charges by
cavalry on unbroken infantry arc proverbially dangerous.
Men, however, the armies drew near, Latoul'-Maubourg
thought that he saw his chance, and bade one of his brigades
(2nd and 4th Dmgoons) charge Del Parque's infantry in the
Spanish left-<."Cutrc. The attack completely failed: a fortunate
discharge of the Duke's divisional battery blew a gap in the
centre of the charging line; the battalions on each side stood
firm and opened a heavy fire, and the dragoons went 'to the rear
in disorder. Their flight exposed the flank of the two German
battalions which formed the centre of Latour-Maubourg's line.
The Spanish infantry pressed forward, and engaged them with
Yigour. This determined Victor to order his right wing to fall
back and to get into line with Villalte, before making another
stand. Accordingly Latour-Maubourg retired, his Ullbroken
regiments mO\'ing off in very good order, but suffering con·
siderably from the fire of the Spanish skirmishers, who ran
forward with great rapidity and pressed them hard.
The retreat of the right wing made it necessary for Lnsalle
on the left to conform to the general movcmcnt. He also
began to draw back towards Medellin. 'For two hours,' writes
one of his officers I, 'we gave back slowly and quietly, facing
uhout at evel'Y fUty )',uds to show a front, und to dispute the
ground. Amid the endless whizzing of bullets flying over our
heads, and the deafening roar of the shells, which rent the air
and tore up the earth around us, we h(,'Cded only the voice of
our commanders. The further we retired the louder shouted
0111' foes. Their skirmishers were so numerous and daring that
1 Roeca (of the 2nd Hussars), MelMirel de fa Guerre (j,'E8fXJ!JM, 60.
O;ll-lN. Il
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they sometimes compelled ours to foll back for protectitnl into
our ranks. They kept calling to us from a distance that no
quarter should be given, and that Medellin should be the
Frenchman's grave. General Lasalle was riding backward and
forward in front of his division, with a lofty, fearless air. In the
space which separated us there might be seen the horses of
dis/tbled friends llnd foes, running on every side, most of them
wounded, some of them dragging their dead masters by the
stirrup, and struggling to free themselves from the unmanageable
load.'
In this fashion the French retired before the advancing army
of Cuesta, till they drew near the point where Victor intended to
make his stand. The right wing reached the new line of defence
first: it halted on the crest of the rising-ground to the north
of the point where Villatte's infantry stood. The :Marshal placed
~ ten guns in line, ordered the two German battalions to stand
firm on each flank of the artillery, and sent up the 94th of the
Line from Villatte's division to aid them, as well as a battalion
of picked grenadiers. Latour~:M:aubourg's horsemen, now all in
good order ~rrain, covered their flanks.
Then came the critical moment of the battle. If the Spaniards
could still push their advance, and tbrust back the French
infantry, Victor's position would be very serious. For a moment
it seemed that they might succeed. The battalions of Henestrosa
and Del !}arque came forward with l\ steadiness that Spanish
troops had not yet often shown during the war. They closed
upon the guns, in spite of their rapid fire, and attacked the
three battalions on their flanks, which had been thrown into
square for fear of cavalry attacks, and were therefore not in
very good order for defending themselves against infantry.
The leading Spanish oflk'C1'S had actually ridden into the
battery I, and were cutting down the gunners, when Latonr·
Maubourg ordered his dragoons to charge. The moment
that he saw them on the move, Cuesta, who had been riding
on this flank, with the three regiments of cavalry which covered
the end of his line, ordered a counter-charge against the flank
1 Cuesta in his disp.....tcb mentions ttlat General Heuestrosa, Captain
Yturrigarey, Bud the English Lieutenant-Colonel Bel.ljamin D'Urban were
the first three into the battery.
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of the advancing French. Then followed a disgraceful ~ne:
the Spanish squadrons rode forward in an il'rcsolute way for
a few score .yards, and then suddenly halted, turned, and
gallopefl to the rear in a disorderly mass before they had arrived
anywhere nCtlr the French dragoons. 'l11cycollided with Cucsta,
upset him and rode over him 1: the old man was with difficulty
saved and set upon his horse by his aides-de-camp. The fugitives
never drew rein, and fled far away to the north, almost without
losing a man. Their conduct was all the more disgraceful,
bcca.use two of the three regiments were old troops from the
Baltic, which had come back with La Romana and had not
shared in any of the early disasters of the Spanish armies.
The result of this shameful panic WM instant disaster to the
whole Spanish a"kfuT wing. Of Latour-Maubourg's division
one brigade went off in pursuit of the routed ca"alry, but the
other three regiments charged in flank the battalions of Henes·
trosa and Del Parque, just as they slormed the French battery
on which they were intent. A long line ",-ithout supports, such
as that which these two divisions presented, was helpless when
attacked by cavalry on the flank-it suffered exactly the same
fale which befell Colbornc's brigade at Albuera two yearS laler.
While engl1oaro in front with the three battalions already belore
it, and with the regiment which Villatte had sent up to aid
them, it could not throw back its flank to face the horsemen:
nor had it any reserve whatever that could be ulili:7.ed to
hold off Latour·Maubourg. The whole line was rolk"'<1 up, and
dashed into atoms. Many men were cut down, a few captured,
the remainder fled in utter disorder towards the north. The
French urged the pnrsuit with cruel vigour, merciless all the
more because thc}' had for n momcnt doubted of thcir victory.
While this struggle was raging on the northern part of the
field, Lasalle had been still falling back before the divisions
of Albuquerquc, Portago, and Trias, across the plain which
borders the Guadiana. The Spanish line were still moving
fonvard with great steadiness, but had begun to fall into a sort
of echelon formation, with the cavalry near the river most in
1 Tu a dispatch iu the Record Office. Cuesta says that the particular
corps whicll rode down himseIr and his staff was the raw (Toledo'
regiment.
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Myance, the infantry of Alhuquerque a little behind, lUld tllC
Estremaduran battalions of the centre still further to the rear.
The fact was that General Eguia, to whom Cuesta had given
the charge of his whole right wing. was trying to edge his
cavalry between Ltsalle alld the Gundinnn, in order to cut him
. off from the bridge of Medellin. This end of the line, therefore,
'was pushing forward \-ery rapidly, while rn'ins, on the other
hand, was coming forward rather slowly, ·from a desire not to
lose touch with Del Parquc's division, the nearest troops to him
in the other half of the army.
Lasnllc was keeping an anxious eye on the development of the
action further to the north, and the moment that he saw Latour-
Maubourg halt and prepare to charge, followed his example.
His first blow ~vas delivered at the CAvalry next the river; he
flung against them the 2nd Hussars, with a chusscul' regiment
in support. These two corps, charging with great fury, easily
broke the Andn.l.usian lancers, who were leading the pursuit, and
hurled them back upon the other squadrons of the Spanish
right. The whole body was thrown into disorder and driven off
the field, leaving the flank of .Albuquerque's division completely
uncovered. Lasalle then re-formed his men and prepared to
charge the infantry: He had been reinforced meanwhile by one
of ViUatte's hrigades (63rd and 95th of the Line) and by the
one battalion of Leval's Germans, which had hitherto remained
with the centre. ',Vhile these seven battalions of fresh troops
delivered a frontal attack on .Albuqucrque and Trias, Lasalle
hurled his four regiments of cavalry upon their unprotected
right flank. The Spaniards were doomed to destruction, but
for some time kept up a show of resistance; Albuqllerque
hud got two or Lhrec of his battalions out of line into column,
and foya moment these held back Lasalle's chasseurs. But the
fight lasted for a few minutes only; a new French force was
coming up. Latour-Mauhourg, returning from the pnrsuit
of Cuesta with two of his dragoon regiments, appeared upon
the flank and rcar of Trius' division and chargt.'<1 in upon it
from behind. This last assault was decisive: the whole Spanish
tiue broke up and fled eastward ovcr the open ground along
the river. The six regiments of French CAvalry were soon in
})llI'Suit, alld rode in among the flying horde, using the sabrc
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with reckless cruelty, and far more intent on slaughter than
on taking prisoners. Lasalle's chnssenrs were specially savagc,
having to a,'cngc the bloody check which they had received
at Miajadas in the preceding week 1. 'Our troops,' says a. French
witness, • who had been threatened with no quarter by the
Spaniards if they had been overpowered, and who were enr8e1J'Cd
by five hours of prelimiIlIl.ry fighting, at first sparol no onc.
The infantry, following behind at a distance, dispatched the
wounded with their bayonets. 1\1o~t of all they were pitiless
to such of the Spanish regiments as were without a propcr
military uniform 2.' Another eye-witncss describes the pursuit
as •one continuous slaughter till night fell.' Some of the
Spanish battalions di~persed in the most helpless confusion, and
fled in all dircd:ions when the line was broken. Others triL-'J
to close up and to defend themselves: this made their flight
slower, and sometimes led to their complete extermination. Rocca
says that he saw the two regiments of Spanish and 'VaUooll
GU!l.nb lying dead en 1l!a88e in the order which they had <X:cupied
at the moment of the breaking of the line 3. The statement is
borne out, at least as to the Walloolls, by the fact that the
next morning-state of Cuesta's army which has been preserved
shows that rl'gimcnt with only 300 mcn surviving out of two
whole lmttalions 4. If any of the infantr)' of the Spanish right
wing escaped at all, it was partly owing to the fACt that the
two cavalry regiments in the centre of the line 6 showed a much
better spirit than their comrad£!S on the wings, and proteded
the Bight of some bn.tbtliol1S. Moreovcr a frightful thunder·
storm swept over the plains late in the afternoon, darkened the
whole horizon, and caused the French squadrons to halt and
cease their pursuit.
1 Half-a.o.owu French authorities speak of tile wrath of the chasseurs as
justifiable, because their comr-...des at :\Iiajadas had been murdered (igrrrye"
or liichement (l8taui,,,!,). But tlLO Spaniards llad killed them iu fair
fight.
t Rocca, Ntmoil'C8, p. 82. ' Ihid., p. 84.
• Sl.'C l1Le Table in Artoohc, vi. 4i6.
o ThCl!e were the hussar regiments' Volunteers of Spain' and' Estre--
madum' (late Maria Lui8ll.). Cuesta 8Il.)'S in his dispatch that they Sowed
the lJ:lttaliou9 of Merida, ami Provincial of Badajoz, which had been
l;urroullded and nearly cut off.
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The slaughter, nevertheless, had been terrible. Of the 10,000
men whom the Spaniards lost onlhis fatal day three-fourths fell
by the edge of the sword: only 1,850 prisoners were sent back to
Talavera,and even if some others had succeeded in escaping during
their march to the rear, it is certain that the Spanish CllSuaJty-list
amounted to at least 7,500 men. Nine standards were takcn-
less than might have been expected, for the twenty-three Spanish
battalions present must have brought forly-six: to the field.
Twenty pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the French, out
of the thirty which Cuesta had possessed. Some few batteries
therefore (perhaps the horse artillery of the evasive cavalry
brigades) had succeeded in escaping from the rout.
Most French authors unite ill stating that the total loss
on their side was only 300 men I. This figure is as absurd
lIS that given for Soult's lo~~es at Coronna: there were five
hours of fighting, and for a long time the battle hud gone by
no means in favour of Victor's men. It is improbable that they
suffered less than 1,000 casualties, and the figure may have been
higher, for one brigade of Latour-Mallbourg's dragoons was
beaten back while charging guns-always a bloody business
for cavalry-while the German battalions which retired across
the plain in column, played on by artillery and harassed by
skirmishers, must also hnve suffered severely.
Cucsta's cavalry, owing to the disgraceful cowardice shown
by the majority of the regiments, had got off comparatively
intact. The whole of his dreadful los~es had fallen on his
infantry, uud they had been scattered so ftll" and wide o\'el' the
Estremaduran plain that it was many days before he could get
together a respectable force. He took refuge at l\fonasterio 2
in the mountains in the direction of Andalusia, alld sent urgent
appeals for reinforcements to the Central Junta. It might
I This is the figure gi\'tlll by JOUrdall, and General SCmClc, who ought
to have known the facts. It is, of course, reproduced by Thiers, and the
other historians. But I agree with Napier (ii. 71) in considering the
figure 'scarcely credible.' Hocca says that the French lost 4,000 men,
but from the context, I suspect this to be a misprint for 400. Schepeler,
alwa}'S a very well-informed and imllartial writ.cr, guesses at 2,000, and he
Illay !lot be far wrong.
t By April 8 he had collected there 3,000 horse and 6,000 or 7,000 foot.
Letter of D'Urbau to Cradock, April a.
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have been expected that the Juuta would disgrace him and
remove him from command, as they had Cartaojal, Infantado,
and Castanos. But apparently the)' were rather cheered by the
fact that Cuesta had seriously disputed the victory with the
French, than angered with the want of generalship which he
had shown. They voted that he and his army had deserved
well of the State, and distributed honours and promotion to
all the officers wbom he recommended for good conduct during
the action, RocClL remarks that they must have had in their
minds the doings of the Romans after Cannae, when the
steadfast Senate thanked the consul Varro < for not having
despaired of the republic; instead of removing him for rashness
amI incompetence 1. At an}' rate, they conferred 011 Cucstn the
post of Captain.General of Estremadura, and hurried: up to
reinforce him all the troops that they could spare, a strong
brigade of ncw Granadan levies 2, and a division drawn from
the army of Cartaojal consisting of nine old battalions of regular
troops with a force of 6,000 bayonets 3, Thus reinforced the
host of Cuesta was as strong as on the eve of Medelliu, and once
more mustered flO,OOO foot and 3,000 horse. Dy the middle of
April thc whole had been drawn together, and reorganized into
five divisions of foot and two of horse. This was the army that
was to co-operate with Wellesley iJ? the campaign of Talavera.
'In any other country of Europe,' 'lTote Marshal Jourdun,
'the gaining of two such successes as Medc1lin aud Cimlud Real
would have reduced the cOWltry-side to submission, and have
enabled the victorious armies to press forward to new conquests.
In Spain the reverse was the case; the greater the disaster
suffered by the national troops, the more willing were the
population to rise and take arms. Already the communications
between Victor and Scbastiani were cut: several bearers of
dispatches were massacn.>d, tmu C\'cn some dcttu:hmcnts cut oft:
An insurrection almost burst out at Toledo, where a garrison
of insufficient strength had been left. It was only averted by
1 Rocca, Mwwires, p. aG.
1 Hegiment of Velez-Malaga (three batts.), and 2nd battalion of Ante-
quem, 3,GOO bayonets ill all. .
, Also some stray squadrons of cavalr)' whicll llad gone to tIle rear to get
horses ill Alldalusia (Letter of Fre.re to Castlereagh in Record Office).
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the providential arrival of an officer with a reinforcement of 500
men. The communications of the 1st Corps with Madrid were
ill no better state: bands of insurgents gathered in the valley
of the Tietar, and threatened to fall upon Almaraz and to break
the bridge of boats. The King had to send down in haste 600
bayonets from Madrid to preserve this all-important post 1.'
At the same time the road from Almaraz to Salamanca was
closed by a trifling Spanish force of two battalions under the
brigadier Carlos d'Espana which had been levied about Caceres
and Dejar, and occupied the pass of Dafios. It was aided by
a battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian legion, which Sir Robert
Wilson had sent forward from Almeida. Thus La})isse at
Salamanca could only communicate with Viclor at Merida by
the circuitous route of Are....alo, Madrid, and Almaraz.
The Duke of Belluno had been ordered by the' Emperor to beat
the Army of Estremadum, and then to get into touch with
Soult, who should have been due at Lisbon long ere this. But
no news of the 2nd Corps had come to hand: it was known to
have penetrated into northern Portugal, but its e.'{act position
could not be learnt. Victor, refusing to move till he had news
of his colleague, cantoncU his army at l\ferida and l\fedellin,
and put the old castles of both these places, as well as that of
'1'ruxillo, in a state of defence. He would probably have done
well to utilize U1C time of necessary waiting in laying siege to
Badajoz. But he contented himself with watching that fortress
and observing the reorganized army of Cuesta, which had now
grown once lllOrc to a respectable force, and might ha\'e harassed
considerably any part of the ht Corps which should attempt
to molest the capital of Estremadura. Instead of attacking the
place, Victor contented himself with sending to it vain summonses
to surrender, and with endeavouring to discover whether it
might not contain traitors ready to negotiate with King Joseph.
He brought down from Madrid, as his agent, a Spanish magistrate
named Sotelo, who had become a zealous Afran£t8adc. Through
this person he addressed letters both to the governor of Badajoz
and to the Central Junta at Seville. After setting forth all the
evils which the continuance of the war was bringing upon
Spain, Sotelo stated that his killg was ready to grant the most
I JourdanJ Mllll(lim, pp. 187-8.
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liberal and benevolent terms to the Junta, in order to spare
further effusion of blood. The letter was duly forwarded to
Seville, where it was laid before the goveMlment. The ironical
allswer was promptly returned' that if Sotelo possessed full
powers to ncgotiate for peace on the basis of the rcstomtioll
of Ferdinand VII, and the prompt evacuation of Spain by the
French armies, peace would be possible. If not, the Junta lOust
continue to carry out the mandate conferred upon it by the
Illltion; according lo which it could conclude no truce or treaty
except on the two conditions stated above.' Sotelo tried to
continue the negotiation, but his offers were disregarded, and
Victor soon realized that he would obtain no further ad\'antages
save by his sword. He remained at Merida waiting in vain for
the news of Soult's advance 011 Lisbon, whiell, WM, llCcording lo
Napoleon's orders, to be the signal for the Ist Corps to resume
its advance.
N. B.-For tIle campaign of Medellin I have used the narratives of Uocca
and Sem.He (tIle latter often very inaccurate), the j(l-moiru of Jourdan,
the day-hook of the Jo'rankfort regiment of I..nva1'8 divisioll, and Victor'!:!
OOrrellIIOndeuce with King JO!:ICph, aud on the Spanish side the dispatches
of Cuesta, also two letters from D'Urban (British attache on Cutsta's stall)
to Cradock, and some enclosures sent by .Frere to Castlereagh.
SECTION XIII
SOULT'S INVASION OF PORTUGAL
CHAPTER I
SOULTS PRELIMINARY OPERATlO~S IN GALrCB.
(JANUARY 19-!\L-\RCH 6, 1800)
A.TIER the departure of Bonaparte for Paris there were, as
we have already shown, only two points in the Peninsula where
the strength of the French armies was such as to allow them to
continue the great movement of advance which their master
had begun. We have already seen how Victor, after advancing
from the Tagus to the Guadiana, found his initiative exhausted,
even after his victory at Medellin. He had halted, and refused
to take the offensive against Lisbon or Andalusia till he should
be heavily reinforced.
It remains to be seen how the other French acmy available
for immediate field operations had fared. Maore's daring
march and the ensuing retreat had drawn up into the extreme
north-west of the Peninsula the 2nd, 6th, Rnd 8th corps d'al"m{-e.
Of these the last-named had been dissoh'ed ut the new year, and
the bulk of its battalions had been transferred to Soult'e corps,
which on January 20 had a nominal effective of more than
40,000 men. Ney's Corps, the 6th, was much smaller, and does
not seem to have amounted to more than 16,000 or 18,000
sabres and bayonets. But between Astorga, the rearmost point
occupied by Ney, and Cornnna, which Soult's vanguard had
entered on Junllary 19, there were on paper 60,000 men a.va.ilable
for acti\'e operations. Nor had they to guard their own corn·
munications with Madrid or with }'runce. Lapisse's numerous
division had been left at Salamanca; there WiIS a provisional
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brigade at Loon I; BOJlllet held Santnnder with another
division; there were detachments in Zamora, Valladolid) and
the other chief towns of the Doum valley. Somewhat later, in
April, the Emperor moved another whole nrmy corps, that of
Martier, into Old Castile, when it became a\'ailable after the fall
of Saragossa. Even without this reinforcement he thought that
the rear of the army in Galicia was adequately covered. '111e
pa.rting instructions of Bonaparte to Soult have already been
cited: wbell the English shoul.cl have embarked, the Duke of
Dalmatia was to march on Oporta, and ten days later was to
occupy Lisbon. 'Vc have 'already seen that the scheme of
dates which Napoleon laid down for these operations was impos-
sible, even to the borders of absurdity; Oporta WllS to be scizl..-d
by February I, and Lisbon by February 10! But putting aside
this errOF, which was due to his persistent habit of ignoring the
physical conditions of Spanish roads and Spanish weather, the
Emperor had drawJI up a plan which seemed feasible enough.
Ney's corps was to move up and occupy all the chief strategical
points in Galicia, taking over both the ganison duty and the
task of stamping out allY small lillgering insurrections in the
interior. This would leave Soult free to cmplo)· the whole of
his four divisions of infantry and his three divisions of cavalry
for the invasion of Portugal. Even allowing for the usual
wastage of men in a winter campaign, the Emperor lllust have
supposed that, with a nominal efiective of 43,000 men, Soult
would be able to provide more than 30,000 cfficients for the
expedition against Lisbon 2. Considering that the Portuguese
army was still in the making, and that no more than 8,000
1 It Wall composed of the few battalions of the 8th Corps which had Dot
been draftOO into the 2nd.
1 \Vben the Emperor looked at Uta IJalf-montltly returns of the army,
\\·hiciJ were forwarded to Ilim us regularly us possible, al1lI which llllrllued
ltit)'l wltcresoever lIe might go, he must have seen the followillg stalistics-
those of .Tau. 15 in the Fr().llch War Office-for the 2nd Corps, taking Uta
gross totals :-
Infantr)': .Merle 12,UO; Mermet 11,810; Dclabonle 5,038 ; Heudc1et
6,592: '1'otal36,559.
. Ca,·alry: Lorges 1,769 j LahoU!l!ll\ye 3,087; FrlWeeschi 2,512: Total
7,368. Artillery aud Trnin 1,468.
Total of the whole corps 44,395. By Jan. 30, it had risen to 45,820.
1.0",,,
Lahoussaye
Franccschi
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British troops remained in and about Lisbon, the task assigned
to the Duke of Dalmatia did not all the face of it appear
unreasonable.
But in Spain the old saying that •nothing is 50 deceptive as
tigures--€xcept facts,' was pre-eminently true. No map-those
of 1809 werc intolcrably bud-l..'ould givc the Emperor allY idea
of the hopeless condition of Galician or Portuguese mOWltain-
roads in January. No tables of statistics could enable him to
foresee the way in which the population would receive the
invading anTI)'. 'Ve may add that even an lInrivalled know-
ledge of the realities of war would hardly have prepared him tu
expect that the campaign of Galicia would, in one month, have
worn down Soult's available effectives to a bare ~,OOO men.
Such WM the modest figure at which the ji!nd Corps stood on
January 30, for it had no less than 8,000 men detached, amI
the incredible number of over lO,OOO-one man in four-in
hospital. For this 6gure it was not the muskets of l\!oore's
host which were responsible: it was the cold and misery of the
fOrl..-ed marches from .Astorga to Corullna, which seem to have
tried the pursuer even more than the pursued. The 8,000
'detached. 'were strung out in small parties all the way from
J..eon to Lugo-wherever the Marshal had been obliged to
abandon stores or baggage that could not travel fast, he hud
been forced to leave a guard: he had also dropped small garri-
sons at Villafranea, Lugo, and Betanzos, to await Ney's arrival;
but the most important drain had been that of his dismounted
dragoons J. In his cavalry regiments half the horses had
foundered or perished; the roads so deadly to Moore's chal'brers
had taken a corresponding toll from the .French divisions, and
a.t eyery halting-place hundreds of horsemen, unable to keep up
I TIle slate of tlle cavalry of the 2nd Corps 011 JII.I1. 30 gil"es the following
nstoulIllillg result:-
P1Uetlt under Arm8. AbIent. Sick.
800 617 100
1,130 1,400 250
1,120 991 208
3,059 3,008 612
The drain under the second column represents mainly the men who
had dropped to the rear, from losing their horses or being ~ble to take
them on.
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with the main body, had been left behind. In any other country
than Spain these involuntary laggards would have found their
way to the front n.gnin in a comparativel.y short time. Bllt
Soult was commencing to discover that onc of the main features
of war in the Peninsula was that isolated men, or even small
parties, could not move about in safety. The peasantry were
already beginning to rise, even before Moore's army took its
departure; they actually cut the road between Bctam:os and
Lugo, and between Lugo and Villafranca, within a few days
after the battle of Corunna. This forced the stragglers to
mass, under pain of heing assassinated. Hundreds of them
were actually cut oll': the rest gltthered in small wayside
garrisons, and could not get 011 till they had been formed into
parties of considerable strength. 'flle rearmost, who had been
collected at Astorga hy General Pierre Soult, the 31arshal's
brother, did not join the corps for months-and this body was
110 less than 2,000 or 2,500 strong. The other detachments
could Ilot make their way to Corunna even when Marshal Ne)'
had come up: it was only b), degrees, and after delays covering
whole weeks. that they began to rejoin. The only solid reinforce-
ment received by Soult, soon aftcr the departure of the Euglish
army, consisted of his rear division, that of Hcudelet, whicheame
up from LUb'Xl, not many days after the battle of January 16.
Soult was still far from suspecting the full difficulty of the
tfL.,k that was before him. He had been much encourn.ged by
the taille way in which the Governor of Corunna had surrendered
on January 19. If Alcedo had made the least scmblance of
fight he could have detained the Marshal before his walls for an
indefinite time. The city was only approachable by a narrow
and well-fortified isthmus. and the French could not have
battered this formidable front to any effect with the six-
pounders which formed their only artillery. The surrender of
the place gave Soult some food, the considerable resources
of a l;ch harbour town, and (most important of all) a large
number of guns of position, suitable for use against the other
fortress which he must take ere he moved on against Portugal.
This plaec was Ferrol, the second naval nrsenru of Spain.
which faces COrullllfl. lWross the broad inlet of Ares Bay-only
thirteen miles distant by water, though the land road thither
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by Betanzos, round the head of the fiord, is forty miles long.
To make sure of this place was 'obviously Soult's first duty: if
left unmolested it would prove a dangerous nucleus round which
the Galician insurgents could concentrate. For it contained
a regular garrison, consisting of the depots and half-trained
recnlits of La llomnlla's army, and of 4,000 or 5,000 sailors.
'There were lying in the harbour, mostly half-dismantled and
unready for sea 1, no less than eight linc-of-battle ships and
three frigates. Their crews, much depleted, but still numerous,
had been landed to assist the soldiers in garrisoning the forts 2•
In addition several thousand citizens and peasants had taken
arms, for muskets abounded in Ferrol, from the stores lately
received from England. With these resources it is clear that
a governor of courage and resolution might haye made a long
defence; they were far greater than those with which Palafox had
preserved Sarugossa; and Ferrol was no open town, but a fortress
which had been kept in good repair for fear of the English.
But, for the misfortune of Galicin, the commander of FermI,
Admiral MeIgarejo, was a traitor at heart. He was one of the
old bureaucrats who had only followed the patriotic rouse
because it seemed for the moment to be in the ascendant; if
patriotism did not pay, he was perfectly prepared to come to
tenns and to do homage to JOS<lph Bonaparte.
On January ~3 Soult marched against Ferrol with the
infantry division of Mermet, the dragoons of Lorges, and
the heavy guns which he hud found in Col'lmna. He left
Delaborde in gal'rison at the latter place, posted Merle at
Betanzos, a half·way house between the two fortresses, and
directed Franceschi's cavalry division on Santi~"'O and Lahous-
saye's on Mellid, in order to see whether there was any Spanish
field-force visible in western Galicia. On the twenty~fifth the
Marshal presented himself in front of Ferrot, and summoned
the place to surrender. Melgarejo was determined not to fight,
and several of his chief subordinates supported him. The
I For tile moo of tllis squadron see tile report by Admiral Do Courcy
ill the Parliameniary Papers for 1800, Spain, March 29, 1009, I). 4.
I The marines 118d been taken away in July, ]808, and fOffllOO 1l8lf
a brigade in the division of the Anny ef Galicia. But the seamen were
available.
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llrmcd citizens persisted in their idea of defending the place,
but when the French broke ground in front of the walls and
captured two small outlying redoubts, they allowed themselves
to be overpersuaded by their treacherous chief. On January 26
the place surrendered, and on the following day Soult was
ret.'<:ived within the waUs. The capitulation had two shameful
. clauses: by the first the civil and military authorities under-
took to take the oath of allegiance to King Joseph. By the
se<:ond the splendid men-oC-war in the harbour were handed
over intact, n most valuable acquisition for the Emperor if
Galicia was to remain under his control. AllY onc but a traitor
would have burnt or scuttled them before surrendering. But
l\1elgarejo, after receiving high testimonials from Soult, hastened
up to Madrid and took office under the Rey IIItru80 I. Along
with the squadron 1,500 naval cannon, an immense quantity of
timber, cordage, and other stores, and ~O,OOO muskets newly
imported from England, fell into the hands of the French.
On the day after Ferrol was occupied, Soult received the last
communication from the Emperor which was to reach him for
many a day~. It was dated from Valladolid on January 17.
""Ve have already had occasion to refer to it more than once. while
dealing with the controversies of King J oseph and Marshal Victor.
This dispatch repeated the Emperor's former orders, with some
slight concession in the matter of dates. Instead of reaching
Oporto on February 1 the Marshal was to be granted four extra
days, and after taking Opotio on February 5, he was to reach
Lisbon on the sixteenth instead. of the tenth. Soult Wall also
told that he would not have to depend on his own resources
alone: Victor with the 1st Corps would be at Merida by the
time that the 2nd Corps was approaching the Portuguese
capital: he would be instructed to selld ucolumn in the direction
of Lisbon, to make a diversion in favour of the attack from the
north, and at the same time Lapisse from Salamanca should
move on Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. Bessieres was, so the
Emperor said. under strict orders to send Lapisse forward into
Portugal the moment that the news should reach him that the
I 'The Supreme Junta very properly condemned him and Alcedo, the
governor of Corunna, to the penalties of high lreason.
I Compare InstntCtiolU de fEmpereuT of Jan. 17, with Berthier to Soult
of Jan. 21.
176 pnELIMI~ARY OPERATIOKS IN GALICIA (JAN.2{l
2nd Corps had captured Oporto. This combination sinned
8.b"tlinst the rules of strutegy, as they had to be practised in
Spain. lne Emperor had yet to realize that in order to make
operations simultaneous, when troops starting from bases several
hundred miles apart are to co-opem.te, it is necessary that their
generals should be in [Tee communication with each othel" But
Soult, when he had advanced into Portugal, was as mueh out of
touch with the other French corps as if he .had been operating
in Poland or Naples. It WllS literally months before accurate
information as to his situation and his achievements reached
Salamanca, Merida, or Madrid. The movements of Victor and
Lapisse being strictly conditioned by the receipt of news con-
(:crning Soult's progrcss, and that I~ews being never recch'cd, or
1'C(.'Ci vcd too late, the combination ncvcr did and ncvcr conld
take place, Napoleon had forgotten to reckon with the ubiqui·
tOilS Spanish insurgent; here, as in so many cases, he wa.~
unconsciously nssuming that the bearer of dispatches could ride
freely through the country, as if he were in Sa.xonyor Lom-
bardy; and that Soult could make known his movements and
his desires as often as he pleased. French critics of the Em-
peror generally confine themseh'es to cen.~uring him for sending
the 2nd Corps to attempt unaided a tl\Sk too gl'eat for it 1; this
is not quite fair, for be Imd intended to support Soult by two
strong diversions. The real fault lay in ignoring the fact that
in Spain combined operations, which presuppose constant com-
munication between the participants, were practically impos-
sible. TIle liUlIIC errur was made in 1810, when Dronet was
told to co-operate in i\>!nssena's invasion of Portugal, and in 1811
when Soult was directed to lend a helping hand to that same
invasion. It is impossible to give effective aid to a colleague
whose condition and whose whereabouts are unknown.
On ,January 29 the DlIke of Dalmatia set to work to reor~
1 'n faut croire,' !l:'Ys St, ChanlllllS, 80ult's senior l.itlc-dlH;llmp, 'que·
Napoleon, au moment oll iI ortloulUl une p<.rcille overntiou, ctait ~dc
d'un esprit de vertige. Comment pouvait-il risqueI', au milieu d'ull
royaume illsur~, un si faible corps d'arm€e, sans C<lmmUllicatiOIl RVCC
ses autres troupes d'.Espague?' [Mlmoire8, p. 117]. <Tout et-lit en errew,'
says Le Noble, another 2nd Corps writer, 'dans le projet de aoumettrc
le Fortugal en 1809 avec une armee si faible et clepourvue de mOJ'ens.
L'Emperaur a montrc una oollfiauce aveugle' (p. 66).
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gallize his army for the great expedition that had been assigned
to him. It was impossible to march at once, t\S the Emperor
had commanded, because Ne)' had not yet arrived at the front,
and it was necessary to turn over the charge of COfunna and
FermI to him before departing fwihcr south. Morcovcl', there
were many other arrangements to be made: a base hospital had
to be organized at Corunna for the thollsands of sick and wounded
belOllging to the !2nd Corps. It<! transport had to be recon-
structed, for most of the animals had died during the forced
marches in pursuit of Moore 1. A Ilew stock of munitions had
to.be served out from the stores so fortunately captured at
Ferrol. The military chest of the corps had been left behind
at A,,{orga, and showed no signs of' appeal'jug; to provide for
the more urgent d~y.by.dayneeds of the army, the Marshal had
to !>queeze forced contributions out of the already exhausted
toWllS of Corunna, Ferrol, alld SAntiago, which had long ago
contributed all their surplus resources to the fitting out of
llIake's army of Galicia. These same unhappy places had to
submit to a heavy requisition of cloth and leather, for the
replacing of thc garmcnts und boots worn out in the late
marches. But even with the aid of 2,500 English greatcoats
discovered in store at Corunna, and other finds at FerroI, the
wants of the anny could not be properly supplied; it started on
the campaign in a very imperfectl)' equipped condition 2. The
most dangerous point in its outfit was the want of mules: most
of the valleys of inner Galicia and northern Portugal are desti-
tute of carriage roads. To bring up the food and the reserve
ammunition pack-animals were absolutely necessary, and Soult
could ollly collect a few hundreds. Even if his men should
suceeed in living on the country, and so solve the problem of
carrying provisions, they could not hope to pick up powder and
lead in the same way. ·When, therefore, the heav), baggage on
• The authors, English and French, who ell:press a humanitarian horror
at the shooting of 3,000 horses and mules before the embarkation of
Moore's army, forget what a godsend these would have been to Soult,
if the English had left them to faU intact into his l\amls. The slaughter
""all dreadful, but perfectly noclll'>Sllry and justifiable.
2 All these details come from Le Noble, who as Ordonllateur-en-OMf of
the 2ml Corps, had full experience of the difficulty of equipping it for the
Portuguese C):pedition.
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wheels had to be left behind, the ~nd Corps was only able to
carry a ~'ery insufficient stock of cartridges: twice, as we shall
see, it almost exhausted its ammunition and was nearly brought
to a standstill on the-way to Oporta.
It was not till February had already begun that Soult was
able to move forward the whole of his army, for he refused to
withdl'll.w Dclv.bordc's division from Corunna and Mermel's from
Ferrol, till Ney should have brought up troops of the 6th Corps
to relieve them. The Duke of Elchingen, though apprised of
the Emperor's orders, lingered long at Lugo, and it was not till he
came down in person to the coast, that Soult could call up his
rear divisions. Mennwhile a small e.'{change of troops between
the two corps was carried out: Ney, being short of cavalry,
recei\'ed a bri~e of Lorges' dmgoons to add to his own inade-
quate force of two regiments of light horse. In return he made
over to the 2nd Corps three battalions of the 17th lAger, which
had accompanied him hitherto. They were added to Delaborde's
division, which had been only eight battalions strong.
Even before the troops from l'errol and CorWlna were able to
move, Soult had put the rest of his army on the mareh for
Portugal. On January 30 Franceschi's light horsemen started
along the coa.st~road from Santiago to Vigo and 'I'uy, while
further inland Lahoussaye's division of drugoons,quiLting Mellid,
took the rough mountain path across the Monte Testeyro, by
Baren de Ledesma and Cardelle, which leads to Rivadavia and
Salvntierra Oil the lower ~1inho. 'Merle's and Heudelet's infantry
started several days later, and were many miles behind the
advanced ca,'alry.
Lahoussaye's division met with no opposition in the rugged
region which it had to cross, and occupied Salvatierra without
difficulty. Franceschi scattered a few peasants at the defile of
Redondela outside Vigo, and Ulen found himself at the gates
of that harbour-fortress. The governor, no less weak and Ull-
patriotic than those of Fermi and Corunna, surrendered without
firing a shot. His excuse was that he had only recruits, and
armed townsfolk, to man his walls and hand.lc his numerous
artillery. But his misconduct was even surpassed by that of
the Governor of Tuy. who capitulated to Franceschi's 1,200
horsemen three days later in the same style, though he was in
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command of 500 regular troops, and wns implored to hold out
by the local junta. Throughout Galicia, in this unhappy
month, the officials aJld military chiefs showed a most deplorable
spirit, which contrasted unfavoumbly with that of the lower
classes, both ill the towns and the country-side. .
The way to the frontier of Portugal had thus been opened,
with an case which seemed to justify Napoleon's idea that
tllc Spalliards would not hold out, when once their field armies
had been crushed. Franceschi and Lahoussaye reported to the
Duke of Dalmatia that they had swept the whole northern bank
of the l\linho, and that tllere.was nothing ill frout of them save
the swollen river and a few bands of Portuguese pea.santry, who
were observing them from Valenza, the dilapidated frontier
fortress of the neighbouring kingdom. •
Both the French and the Galieians of tlle eoast-line might
well have forgotten the fact that there was still a Spanish army
in existence within the borders of the prmoillce. It is long
since we have had occtlSion to mention the fugitive host of the
Marquis of La Romana. After being hunted out of Ponferrada
by Soult on January S, he had followed in the wake of
Craufurd's bl"igades on their eecenbic retreat down the valley
of the Sit. But while the British troops pushed on to Vigo
and embarked, the Spaniards halted at Orense. There the
Marquis endeavoured to rally his demorali7.ed and starving host,
with the aid of the very limited resources of the district. He
had only 6,000 men left with the eolours, out of tllC 22,000
who had been with him at Loon on December !5, 1808. But
there were several thousands more straggling after him, or
dispersed in the side valle)'s off the rood which he had followed.
Most of these men had lost their muskets, many were frost
bitten, or suffering from dysentery. The surviving nucleus
of' the army was composed almost entirely of the old regulars:
the Galician militia and new levies had not been able to resist
the temptation to dcsert, when the)' foulld themseh'es among
their native mountains. The Marquis hoped that, when the
spring came round, they would find their way back to the army:
in this expectation, as we shall see, he was not deceived. For
nearly a fortnight the wrecks of the army were undisturbed,
Ulld La Romunu. wus ,able to collect enough efficienls t'? constitute
.2
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two small corps of obsenation, oue of which he posted ill the
valley of the Sil, to watch for any signs of it movement of the
French from the direction of Ponferrada, while the other, in
the "alley of the Minho, kept a similar look out in the direction
of Lugo. The latter force was unmolested, but on January ]7
General Mendizaool, whowas watching the southern roo.d, reported
the approach of a heavy hostile column. TIlis was Marchand's
division of Ney's corps: the Marshal had divided his force at
l'onferrada; he himsclf with Mallrice Mathieu's division had
kcpt the main road to Lugo, while l\:£arehand had oc>en told off
to clear the lateral ,'alleys and seize Oreme. La Romana very
wi~eJy resolved that his unhappy anny was unfit to resist 8,000
l~rcnch troops. On January ]9 he evacuated Oreme, and fled
llCroSS the Sierrll Cabrera to Montel'CY on the Portuguese
frontier. Here at last he found rest, for Marchand did not
follow him into the mountains, but, after a short stay in Orensc,
marched to Santiago, where he was directed to relieve Soult's
!,"al'I'lSon.
The Marquis was completely lost to sight in his frontier
fllStnesses, and was able to do his best to reorganize his battered
host. Dy February ]$ he had 9,000 men under arms, nearly
all old soldiers, for the Galician le\'ies were still scattered in
their homes. Hls dispatches during tIlis period are "ery gloomy
reading: he complains bitterly of the apathy of the countr}'~
i"ide and the indiscipune of his officers. mat could be expected
of subalterns, he a~ks, when a general (Martincngo of' the 2nd
division) had absconded without asking leave or even report-
ing his departure? 'I know not where the patriotism, of which
c\'ery one boasted, is now to be found, since on the smallest
1'Cverse or misfortunc, they lose their heads, and think only of
saving themsell'es-sacriflcing their country and compromising
their commander.' Much harassed for want of food, La Romana
kept moving his head quarters; he was sometimes at Yerin and
llilonterey, sometimes at Chaves just inside the Portuguese
frontier, more frequcnUy ut Oimbm. He had only nine guns
left; there was no reserve of ammunition, and the soldiers had
but few cartridges remaining in their boxes. The strongest
battalion left in the army had only 250 bayonets-many had
but sc\"enly or eighty, and others (notably thc Galiciall local
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corps) hud completely disuppeared. He besought the Centrnl
Junta to obtain from the British money, muskets, clothing, and
above all ammWlition, or the army would never be fit to take
the field t. A similar request in the most pressing terms was
scnt to Sir John Cradock at Lisbon.
Soult could not but be aware that La Romana's arm,)', or
some shadow of it, was still in existence: but since it sedulously
avoided any contact with him, and had completely evacuated
the coast-land of Glllicia, he appears to havc treated it as
a 'ncgligible quantity' during his first operations. Its dis-
persion, if it required any further dispersing, would fall to the
lot of Ney and the 6th Corps, not to that of the army sent
ngll.inst Portugal.
l''ranceschi and Lahoussaye, as we ha\'e alrcauy seen, reached
the Minho and the Portuguese border on February 2. It was
only on the eighth that the Duke of Dalmatia set out from
Santiago to follow them, in company with the dhrision of Merle.
'l11OSC of Dclaborde and Mcrmet, released by the arrival of ~c)",
took the same route on the ninth and tenth resptttively. The
rear was brought up by the reserve and heavy artillery, and by
that brigade of Lorges' dragoons which had not been handed
over to the 6th Corps. The coast-road behlg very good. Soult
was able to conccntrate his whole urmy within the triungle TlIY,
Snlvatierra, Vigo by the thirteenth, in spite of the hilldrance..~
caused by a week of perpetual storm and rain.
It was the Marshal's inteution to enter Portugal by the great
coast-I'ood, which crosses the Minho at Tuy and proceeds to
Oporto by way of ValellZtl. and Bragu. But 1UI Valcnza WlUI a
fortress, and its cannon commanded the broad ferry at which the
usual passage was made, it was clearly necessary to choose some
I Most of tlwse details are from two interesting dispatches of La Romalla
in tl,e Foreign Office papers at the Rceord Office. TIlI~y IIro uated from
Clmvcs 011 .Tau. 28 aud }<'cb. 13. Thcy lIoro lUlpublishetl anu seem to 00
unkno\\-'fI eveu to General Arteche, wilo has made such 11 splendid collel..'tioll
of the ITUlterialll in the Spauish Rrchives which bear on this obscure corner
of the war. There was all .J<:nglish officer, Captain llrotherton, with the
anny of La llomana; hut his reports, whieh Kapier had evidently seCII,
are now no longer to be found. No doubt they werc bound lip ill the
Jauuary-March 1809 book of Portuguese dispatches, which since Napier's
day has disappeared from the Record Office,lea\·i.ug no trace behind.
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other point for crossing the frontier river. After n. careful survey
Soult fixed on a village named Campo Saucos, only two miles
from the mouth of the Minho, as offering the best starting-point.
He esta.blished a battery of heavy gUlls on his own side of the
river, Illld collcdt'<1 a number of fishing-boats 1, sufficient to
carry 800 men at a voyage. As he could not discover that the
POltngucse had nny regular force opposite him, he resolved to
attempt the passage with these modest resourees.
There would have been no great difficulty in the enterprise
during ordinary weather. But the incessant rains had so swelled
the i\1inho that it was now a wild, ungovernable torrent, which
1t was hard to face and still harder to stem. '¥hen the heavy
Atlantic surf met the furious current of the stream, during the
rising of the tide, the c..'onflict of the wu,t,ers made the pnssngc
absolutely impossible. It had to be attempted at the moment
between the flow and the ebb-though there was at that hour
another danger-that the boats might be carried past the
appointed landing-plaec and wrceked on the bar at the mouth
of the river. But this chance Soult resolved to risk: on
February 16, long before daybreak, his twenty or thirty /ishing-
boats, each with a d07.en men on board, launched out from the
northern shore, und struck diagonally across the stream, as the
current bore them. They were at once saluted by a heavy but
ill-directed fire from the Portuguese bank, where hundreds of
peasants were at watch even during the hours of darkness. The
soldiers rowed and steered hadly-Soult had only been able to
give them as guides a mere handful of men trained to the water 2.
The furious current swept them away: probably also their
nerve wns much tried by the fhsillade, which, though more noisy
1 These boots were hrought to Cllmpo Saucos overland, for a full mile
and more. They came from La Guardia and other fishing-villages on the
coast; but finding it impossible to get them over the bar of the Minho iu
such furious Il'eather, and against the swollen stream, Soult dragged them
from the beach north of the mouth to the crossing-point on rollers, much
as Mohammed 1I did with his galleys at the famous siege of Constantinople
in 14.53. But Soult's vessels were, of course, mudt smaller.
2 Soult Imu got together a few d07.(l1l seamen, French priSOlleN of war,
fOllnd lit Corunlla lIlId Ferrol, w"o lmu been captured lit sea by Spanish
cruisc\'S. The}' were not <mariues' as NlIpicr culls thelll (ii. 38), but
marin$ ~see Le Noble, p. 75, and lle"'3in I'. 78).
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than dangerous, yet occasionally picked off a rower or a helms~
man. The general result was that only three boats with thirty-
five or forty men got to the appointed landing-place, where
tlley were made prisoners by the Portuguese. The rest were
borne dOWlHtream, and came ashore at various points on the
same side from which they had started, barely avoiding shipwreck _
011 the bar. /
The attempt to pass the 1\finho, therefore, ended in a ridicu-
lollS fiasco: it showed the limitations of the French army, which
among its numerous merits did not possess that of good seaman-
ship. Soult was deeply chagrined, not becnuse of the insigni-
ficant loss of men, but because of th.e check to his prestige. He
resolved that he would not risk another such failure, aud at
once gave orders for the whole army to march up-stream to
Orense, the first point where there was a bridge over the
MinllO. This entailed a radical change in his general plan
of operations, fOr he was abandoning the good coast-road by
Tuy and Valenza fOr a very poor mountain-way from Orense
to Chaves along the vAlley of the Tamega. There was another
important result: from the alteration-the new route brought
the French army down upon Ll. ROlllalla's camp of refuge:
his cantonments ill and about Monterey lay right across its
path. But neither he nor Soult had yet realized the fact that
they were about once more to come into collision. The Marshal
did not know where the Marquis was; the MarfJuis did not
at first understand the lllCil.llillg of the MllIShal's sudden swoop
inland. Some of the ,Spanish officers, indeed, were sunguine
enough to imagine that the French, after their failure on the
lower Minho, would abandon Galicia altogether I!
The whole French army had now made a half-turn to the left,
alld was marching in a north-easterly direction. Luhoussaye's
dragoons, starting from Salvatierra, led the advance, Heudelet's
division marched at the head of the infantry; Delaborde,
Mennet, and Mel'Je, each at a convenient interyal from the
preceding division, stretched out the column to an interminable
length. The heavy artillery and wagon train brollght up the
rear. Nine hundred sick, victims of the detestable weather
l Letter of Captain Brotl1crton [now lost} quoted in Napier, H. 438, and
dated from Oimbrn 011 Feb. 21.
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of the first fortnight of February, were left behind at Tuy under
the guard of a half-battalion of infantr)'.
It was 011 the IlHu-ch from Tuy to Orcuse that Soult began to
realize the full difficulties of his task. He had already met with
small insurgent bands, hut they had been dispersed with ease,
and he had paid little attention to them. Now however, along
the steep and tiresome mountain road above the Minho, they
appeared in great force, and showed a spirit and an enterprise
which were wholly une.xpected by the French. The fact was
that in the manUl which had now elapsed siuce the battle of
Corunna, the peasantry and the local notables had found time
to take stock of the situatiQll. The first numbing effect of the
presence of a large hostile army in their midst had passed away.
Ruthless requisitions were sweeping 0/1' their cattlc, thc only
wealth of the countl·).. Although Soult had issued pacific
proclamations, and had tried to keep his men in hand, he could
not restrain the 11s11al plundering propensities of a French army
Oil the march. Enough atrocities had already been committed
to make the Galicians forget the misconduct of Moore's men.
La Romana, from his refuge at Monterey, had been dispersing
appeals to the patriotism of the province, and sending out
officers with local knowledge to rouse the country-side. These
probably had less effect 011 the Galicians-the Marquis was
a stranger and a defeated general-than the e.xhortations of
their own clergy. In the first rising of the peasantry most
of the leaders were ecclesiastics: in the region which Sou.lt was
now traversing the peasantry were raised by Mauricio Trollcoso,
Abbot of Couto, and a friar named GiraldC'~ who kept the
insurgents together until, some weeks later, they handed oyer
the command to military officers sent by La ltomana or by the
Central Junta. In the valley of the Sil, beyond Drense, it was
Quirogn, Abbot of Cnsoyo, who first called out the country-side1•
Every narrative of the Galician insurrection, whether French or
Spanish, bears witness to the fact that in almost every case the
I All the details of the Galieian insurrection may be fOUlld in the very
interesting Lw Gv.erriJkTQ8 Gal/eg06 de 1809, of Pardo de Andrade,
reprinted at Corunna in 1892. It is absolutely contemporary and mainly
composed of original documenl:8 written by men who sllared in the
risiug. Dut naturally it contains errors and exaggerations.
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clergy, regulnr llnd secular, were the earliest chiefs of the moun-
taineers. It WAA characteristic of the whole rising that muny of
the bands took the field with the church-banners of their
parishes as substitutes for the national flag.
This much is certain, that as soon us the violent February
mins showed signs of slackening, the whole of rural Galicia flew
to anns. From Corcubion on the surf-beaten headland of
Finisterre, to the remote headwaters of the Si} under the Sierra
de Penamnrella, there was not a. valley which failed to answer the
appeal which La Romana had made and which the clergy had
circulated. From the weak and sporadic mo\"ements of January
there sprang in February a general insurrection, which was all
the lllOrc formidable because it had no single focus, was based
011 no place of arms, and was dircdcd not by OIlC! chief but by
fifty local leaders, each intimately acquainted with the district
ill which he was about to operate.
The first result of this Widespread movement was to complete
the seVCTUIlCC of the communications between the various French
divisions in Galicia. From the earliest appearance of the
invaders, as we have already seen, there had been intermittent
attempts to cut the lines of I"Oad by which the 2nd and 6th
Corps kept touch with each other and with Madrid. Dut hitherto
a convoy, or escort of a couple of hundred men, (."Ould f:,reneru.lly
brush aside its assailants, and get through from post to post.
In February this power of movement ceased: the insurgents
becnme not only more numerous and more daring, but infinitely
more skilful in thcir tadics. Instead of cndeavouring to deliver
combats in the open, they broke the bridges, bm-ut the ferry-
boats, cut away the road in rocky places, and then hung per-
sistently Rbont any corps that was on the move, as soon as it
began to get among the o~st:Acles. They fired on it from
inaccessible side-hills, attacked and detained its reArguard so
fLS to delay its march, thus causing tl. gap to grow between it and
the main body, and only closed when the column was beginning
to get strung out into a series of isolated groups. The convoys
which were being sent up from Astorga to the 2nd Rnd 6th
Corps were especially vulnerable to snch tactics: the shooting
of a few horses in a defile would hopelessly block the progress
of everything that was coming on from behind. The massing of
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men to repair or rehorse disabled WIlb"OIlS only gave the lurking
insurgent a larger and an easier target. Hence the bringing up
to the front of the heavy transport of the French army became
such a slow and costly business, that the atrempt to move it ',I'M
after a time almost abandoned. Another point which the insur·
gents soon perceived was the helplessness of the French cavalry
among rocks and deliles. A horseman cannot get at an enemy
who lurks above his head in precipitous crags, refuses to come
down to the high-road, and takes careful shot'! from his eyrie into
the squadron below. If, worried beyond endurance, tlle French
officers dismounted some of their men to charge the hillside,
the lightly-equipped peasants fled away, and were out of sight
before the dragoons in their heavy boots could climb the fi!';>t
fiftJ yards of the nscellt. Thc copious anllals of the Gn.lician
guerrilla bands almost invariably begin with tales of the annihila-
tion of insufficiently guarded convoys, or of the defeat and
extermination of small bodies of cavalry canght in some defile.
A very little experience of sU,ch petty successes soon taught them
the right way to deal with the French. The invaders could not
be beaten en ma33e, but might be cut off in detail, harassed into
exhaustion, and so isolated one from the other that it would
require the sending out of 11 considerable cxpL>dition to cnrry
a message between two neighbouring garrisons, or to forward a
dispatch down the high-road to Madrid.
In a very short time intercommunication between the various
se<..iions of the French army in Galieia beC8.me so rare alld
ullcertaill, that each CQmmander of a garrison or chief of l~
column found himself in the condition of a man lost in a fog.
His ft:iends might be near or far, might be faring ill or prosper-
ously, but it was almost impossible to get news of them. Every
garrison was surrounded with a loose !lCl'€€n of insurgents, which
could only be pierced by a great effort. Each column on the
march moved on surrounded by a swann of acth'e enemies, who
closed around again in spite of all attempts to brush them ofl:
In March and April Ney, on whom the worst stress of the
insurrection fell, could only communicate with his' outlying
troops by taking circular tours at the head of a force of several
thollilalld men. Sometimes he found, instead of the post which
he had intended to visit, only a ruined village full of corpses.
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Ere the Galiciall rising was three months old, the bands had
becomc bold and skilful enough to cut ofl' a strollg detachmeut
or to captUl'~ a place held by a garrison severol hundreds strong.
In June they actually stopped the Marshal himself, with a whole
division at his back, in his attempt to march from Santiago
to recapture Vigo.
But these times were still far in the future: and when, on
February 17, Soult started on his march along the Minho from
Tu)' to Orense, the peasantry were far from being the formidable
opponents that they afterwards became. Nevertheless, the
progress of the ~lld Corps was toilsome and slow ill the extreme.
The troops had been divided between two paths, of which the
so-called high-road, a mile or two from the river, was only
a trifle less impracticable tha.n the rougher path along the
water's edge. Luhoussayc's dragoons had been put upon the
latter track; Heudelet's infantry division led the advance on
the upper road. All day long the march was harassed by the
insurgents, who descended fi'OIll the hills and hung 011 the left
flank of Heudclet's column, delivering partial attacks whenever
they thought that they saw an opportunity. The French
advanced with difficulty, much incommoded by the need of
dragging on their cannon, which could hardly be got forward
e\'en with the aid of the infantry. Lahoussaye, on th!! other
path, was assailed in a similar way, besides being molested by
the Portuguese, who movt,.>d purnllel to him on the south side
of the .Minho, taking long shots at his dragoons wherever the
path was close enough to the water's edge to be within range
of their own blmk. If the peasantry had confined themselves to
these tactics, they might have .harassed Soult at slll!\ll cost
to themselves. But they had not yet fully learnt the guerrilla's
trade. At Mourenlan on the path by the river, alld at
F'rancelos on the high-road, they had resolved to offer direct
resistance to the cnemy, and so put thcmsclves within reach
of the invader's claws. At each plfU.."e they had barricaded the
\'illage, had run a rough entrenchment across the road, and
stood to receive the frontal shock of the French attack. They
we~ of course, routed with great slaughter when they thus
exposed themselves ill close combat: several hundred perished,
among whom were many of their clerical leaders. Thus Soult
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was able to push on and occupy Rivadavia, which he found
evacuated by its inhabitants. His soldiery had sacked and
burnt all the villages on the way, and (al'cording to the Spanish
narratives) shot all adult males whom they could catch, whether
found with arms or not I.
On the eightecnth, having cut his way as far as Rivadavia,
the Duke of Dalmatia came to the conclusion that it was hope-
less to endeavour to carry on with him his heavy artillery and
his baggage. On such roads as he had been traversing, and
tlmid the continual attacks of the insurgents, they would be of
more harm than use. In all probability they would ere long
fall so far behind that, along with their escort, they would become
separated from the anny, and perhaps fall into the hands of the
Spaniards. Accordingly he sent ordcrs to the rear of the
column that Merle's division should conduct back to Tuy all
the heavy baggage and thirty-six gullS of large calibre. Only
twcnty piCi..'CS, mostly four-pounders, were to follow the expe-
dition. When the wagons had been turned back, there were
only pack-horses and mules sufficient to carry 3,000 rounds fOI"
the guns, and 500,000 cartridges for the infantry. 'l'his was
a dangerously small equipment for an army which had a whole
killgtlom to (,.'Ouquel·, and which was foreed to waste maIlY shot:s
every day on keeping off the irrepressible insurgents, But
Soult was determined that he should not be al:cused of shrinking
from thc task imposed 011 him, or allowing himself to be thwarted
by bunds of half-armed peasants,
The heavy guns and the train, therefore, were deposited ut
Tu)" along with the large body of sick and wounded who had
already been left thcre, General Lamartiniere, an officer in
whom Soult placed much confidence, was left in comllul.Ild. Hc
was warned that he would have to take care of himself, as his
commwlication with the army would be cut the moment that
I Long details of 011 this lighting mar be found in the narrative of tbe
Alcalde of Rivadavia, on pp. 130-44 ofvol. ii. of Lo8 Guerrilleroa GallegOil.
The details are probably exaggerated, but the reader can hardly refuse to
believe that tbere is a solid substratum of truth. The Alcalde notes that
the infantry were far better be1Ja\'ed than Lahous-"3)"e's dragoons, of
whom lie tells talcs of quite incredible ferocitr, even alleging that they
burnt the wounded,
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l\ferle's troops resumed their march to join the rear of the
Mvancing column. Nor did Soult err in this: when the 2nd
Corps had gone 011 its way, Tuy and the neighbouring post of
Vigo were immediately beset by a thick swarm of peasants, who
kept them completely block~ed,
Having thus freed himself from every possible incllmbranC1:l,
the Duke of Dalmatia pushed briskly on for Orcnsc and its all~
importunt bridge. l1u:l insurgents had not fallen back very far,
and on the nineteenth Heudelet's division had two smartengage~
ments with them, and drove them back to l\b,sside, in the hills
to the lcft. of thc rond. The valley was hcre wider and thc
route better than all the previous day, and much more satis~
factory progress was made. On the twcntieth, still pushing on,
Soult found that the ferry of Barbantes, ten miles below Orensc,
was passable. The Galicians had scuttled the feITy~boat in an
imperfect fashion: some voltigeurs crossed 011 a raft, repaired
the boat, and set it working again. Soult then pushed across
the river some of Mermet's battalions, intending to send them
to Orense by the south bank, if it should be found that the
hridge was broken. Meanwhile Heudelet continued to ndvllllC1:l
hy the road on the north side: his column arrived at its goal,
and found Orense undefended and its bridge intact. Thc
townsfolk made no attempt to resist: they had not left their
dwellings like the peasants, and their magistrates came out to
slIl'l'cnder the place in due form. The)" nppea.led to Soult's
clemency, by showing him that they had kept safe and properly
cared for 186 sick French soldiers, left behind by l\farchand
when he had marched tltrough the town in the preC1:lding
month.
'Where, meauwhile, it will be asked, was the army of La
Romana? The Marquis had now 9,000 men (.'Olk'Ctcd at
Oimbra and Montercy, and it might have been expected that
he would ha\'e moved. forward to defend the line of the Minho
and the bridge of Orense, as soon as he heard of the eastward
march of the 2nd Corps. He made no such advance: his
dispatches show that the sole precautions which he took were
to send some officers with fifty men to aid the peasants of
the lower MinIlO, and afterwards to order another party, 0111y
100 strong, to make sure that the fcrry-boats between TllY find
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Orense were all destroyed or removed-a task which (as we hal'e
already seen) they did not fully perform. If be had brought up
his whole force, instead of sending out these paltry detachmen~
he would have made the task of Soult infinitely more bloody
and dallgerous, though probably rye could not have prevented
the Marshal from cun}ing out his plan. His quiescence is not
to be explained as resulting from a reluctance to fight, though
he was fully conscious of the low morale of his army, and was at
his wits' end to complete its dilapidated equipment. It came
from another cause, and onc much less creditable to his military
capacity. Underrating Soult's force, which he placed at H!,OOO
instead of ~,OOO men, he was labouring under the idea that
the 2nd Corps was about to retire from Galicia altogether, in
face of the general insurrection and the want of food. The
march of the French to Orense appeared ill his eyes as the first
stage of a retreat up the valley of the Sil to Ponferrada and
Astorga, and he imagined. that the province would soon be lluit
of thcm. Hence he contented himself with stirring up the
peasantry, and left to them the task of harassing Soult's COIUlllllS.
being resoh'ed to make the proverbial 'bridge of gold' for
a flying enemy. From this vain dream he was soon to be
awakened.
From the 21st to the 24th of February the Duke of Dalmatia
was busily employed in bringing up the rear divisions of his army
to Orense. None of them reached that place wi thout fighting, for
the oonds which had been driven ofi' by Heudclet and Laholls~
saye returned to worry the troops of Delaborde, Mede. and
Mermet, when they traversed the route from Sal\'atierra to
Ol'ense. Jardon's brigw::le of the last~na.med division had a
sharp fight near Rivadavin, and. Merle had to clear his way at
Crecentc by cutting to pieces a body of insurgents which had
fortified itself in that village. When the whole army was con-
centrated between Rivadavia and Orense, the Marshal sent out
large detachments to sweep the valleys in the immediate neigh-
bourhood of those places. They fowld armed peasantry in
every direction. but in each case succeeded in thrusting them
back into their hills, and returned to Orense driving before
them large herds of cattle, and dragging behind them country
wagons with a considerable amount of grain. The longest and
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most importwlt of these expeditions was one made by Fran-
ceschi, who marched, with his own horsemen and one of Heude·
let'!:! brigades, alollg the road which the whole army wu:; dcstiJlcd
to take in its invasion of Portugal. They routed one band of
peasants at Allul'iz, and another at Ginzo, half way to Monterey
[l~ebl'Uary fl3]. Still there was no sign of La Romana's army,
which remained behind the mountains of the Sierra Cabrcra in
complete quiescence, though Franceschi's advanced posts were
only twenty miles away 1.
Sonlt kept his head quarters at Orense for nine days, during
which he was busied in collecting stores of food, repairing his
artillery, whose carri~s had bL'Cn budl}· shaken by the villain-
ous roads, and in endeavouring to pacify the country-side by
proclamations and circular letters to the notables and clergy. In
this last scheme he met with little success; from the bishop of
Orensc downwards almost every leading man had taken refuge
in the hills, and refused to return. Silence or defiant replies
answered the Marshal's epistolary efFods. His promises of pro-
tection and good government were sincere enough; but the
commentary on them was given by the excesses and atrocities
which his troops were committing in every outlying village, It
was not likely that the Galicill.ns would come down from their
fastnesses to surrender:!.
The general adwUlce of the army towards Portugal had been
fixed for March 4. It was not made under the most cheerful
conditions. Not only were the neighbouring peasantry still
defiant as ever, but bad news had come from the north. An
aide-de-camp of Marshal Ney, who had struggled through to
Orcnsc in despite of the insurgcnts, brought a letter fi:OlU his
chief, which reported that the rising had be(:olllc geneml
throughout the province, and apparently expressed strong
1 Le Noble says (p. 00) tbat at Ginzo the peasants had with them General
Mahy and La Romana'a vanguard division. But General Arteche gives
documentary evidence (p. 347) to prove that on that day Mahy and his
troops were at Ba.ltar, twenty miles away behind the mountains, 1£ there
were regulars present they were only detachments or stragglers.
1 .For the bishop of Orense's sarelllltic reply see Artcehc, ,'. 351. For
the general effect of thll proelnmatioll see St. Chllmans: of the atrocities
of the French,~ Guer-ril{ero8 GII!Jeg08 give ample and sometimes incredible
accounts.
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doubts as to the wisdom of invading Portugal before Galicia
was subdued. The Duke of Elchingen, as it would seem,
wished his collcngue to draw bnck, nnd to nid him in suppressing
the bands of the coast and the upper ::\:linho 1. He might well
doubt whether the 6th Corps would suffice for this task, if the
2nd Corps marched far away towards Oporto, and got complet.cly
out of touch. Soull:, however, hOO the Emperor's orders to
advance into Portugal in his pocket. He knew that if he
disobeyed them no excuse would propitiate his master. Prob-
ably he was not sorry to leave to Ney the unenviable task of
dcaliug with the ubiquitous and irrepressible Gaucinn insur·
gents. He sent back the message that he should march south-
ward on March 4, and continued his preparations. This resolve
was not to the liking of some of his subordinates: many of the
officers who had servL'tl with Junot in Portugal by no means
relished the idea of returning to that country. They did not
conceal their feelings., and made the most gloomy prophecies
nbout the fate of the expedition. It was apparcntly Loisoll
who formed the centre of this clique of malcontents: he found
lUany sympathir.ers among his subordinates. Their discontent
was the basis upon which, two months later, the strange and
obscure' Oporto Conspiracy' of Captain D'Argcllton was to be
based. At the present moment, however, they contented
themselves with denunciations of the madness of the Emperor
in planning the expedition, (l,nd of the blind obedience of the
Marshal in undertaking it. They told their comrudes that the
numbers, courage, and ferocit), of the Galicians were as nothing
compared with those of their southern neighbours, and that
during the oncoming operations those who found a sudden
death upon the battle-field would be lucky, for the Portugucse
not only murdered but tortured the prisoners, the wounded,
and the stragglers. It was fortunate for Soult that the majority
of his officers paid comparatively little attention to these fore-
bodings, which they rightly ascribed to the feelings of resent-
ment and humiliation with which the members of JUIlOt'S army
remembered the story of their former disasters 2, But it did
I See Le Noble (p. 90) for this dispatch and its effect on tblil morale of
tl16 army.
~ For tllemalconteuts and their \liews~LeNoble,pp. 98-9. 5t. Chamans,
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not make matters easier for the Marshal that even a small
section of his lieutenants disbelieved in the feasibility of his
undertaking, and expected disaster to ensue. Yet the opening
scenes of the invasion of Portugal were to be so brilliant and
fortunate, that for a time the murmurs of the prophets of evil
were hushed.
On March 4 the Marshal's head quarters were moved forward
from Orenseto AJariz, on the road to Mont.erey llnd the frontier.
The main body of the army accompanied him, but F('fLm.'(!$chi
and Hcudelct were already far ill front at GiIlW, only separated
from La Romana's outposts by the Sierra Cabrera. From that
point there are two difficult but practicable roads 1 into Portugal:
the one descends the valley of the Lima and leads to Oporto by
Viano. and the coast. It is easier tl'lan the s~ond or inland
route, which after crossing the Sierra Cuhrcra descends to Mon-
terey and Chaves, the frontier town of the Portuguese province
of Tras-os·Montes. But every military reason impelled Soult
to choose the second alternative. By marching on Viana he
would leave La. Romana, whose presence ]le had now discovered,
far in his rear. The Martjuis would be a bad general indeed if
he did not seize the opportunity of slipping back into Galicia,
reoccupying Orense, and setting the whole country-side aflame.
It was infinitely preferable to fall upon him from the front.
rout him, and fling him back among the Portuguese. Accord-
ingly Franceschi, leading the whole army, crossoo the mountains
ou the liftll. and came hurtling into lA Romaua's cantonments
long ere he was expected. Heudelet was just behind him,
Mermet and Delaborde a march further back: l\ferle brought up
the rear, guarding a convoy of 800 sick and wounded whom the
Marshal had resolved to bring 011 with him, rather than to leave
them at Orellsc to (all a prey to the insurgents. The drtl.cOOOOllS
of Lorges and Lahoussaye were kept ont on the right and left
on tllO oUler Imud (p. 110), 9llYs tlHl.t tllO IIrmy started ill good spirits IIl1d
with 11 gre...t contempt for nil insurgents, Spanish or Portuguese. As
Rtrusted ataff officer of tile Marsllal, he no doubt reprCl'euts the optimistic
vie", lit Illlad quarters.
I lltere "'liS also a tllird road, tlmt by Montnlcgrc IInd Ruivaens, by
wllicll Soult ultimately evacuated Portugal; but lIS it WIIS not available
for wlH~eled traffic, it could not be used by an army witll artillery.
0.11 ...1". II 0
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respecti\'ely, watching the one the valley of the Lim~ the other
the bead waters of the Tamega.
Down to the last moment the Marquis had been giving out
his intention of retiring into Portugal and co-operating with
General Silveira, the commandant of the '.rras~os.Montes,in the
defence of Chaves and the linc of thc Tall1cga. But he was on
very strained terms with his ally, who showed no great alacrity
to receive the Spaniards across the frontier: his troops had been
quarrelling with the Portuguese, and he was very reluctant to
expose his half-rallied battalions to the ordeal of a battle, which
Silveira openly courted.
On the very day on which Soult started from Orense, La
Romallll made up his mind that, instead of joining the Portuguesc,
he would escape eastwards by the single road, over and above
that of Chaves, which was open to him. Accordingly his army
suddenly started off, abandoning the meagre maga7.ill~ which
it had collected at Oimbra and Verin, and mude for Pucbla de
Senabria, on the borders of the province of Leon, by the road
which coasts along the north side of the Portuguese frontier,
through Osofio and La Gudilla. This sudden move bore the
appearance of a mean desertion of the Portugucse in their day
of peril: but it WllS in other respects wise and pntdent. It
discomfited all Soult's plans, since he failed to catch the army
of Galicial which escaped him and placed itself on his flank and
rear instead of on his front. It was small consolation to the
Marshal that Franceschi came on the rearguard of the Spaniards
at La Trepa nenr OS0l10 and routed it. Seven skeleton regiments,
only 1,~00 bayonets in all, under General Mahy, were caught
retirillgalong a hillside and completely ridden down b},the French
cavalry. Three standards and 400 prisoners were captured,
300 men more were killed, the rest dispersed. But La Romana's
main body, meanwhile, had got away in safety, and Soult had
failed to strike the blow which he intended I. He was soon to
1 Compare the narrative ofthe colonel of the Barcelona Light Infantry,
printed by Arleche in v. 359-01 of his Guerra de fa Illdepelldellcia, with tbo
highly-eoloured account in Le Noble, 10,1-5. The seven Spanisl1 Corps
eng:ageol were Segovia, Zalllora, Barcelon~, Majorca, Orellw, Bebuzos,
Aragon. None of them had more lhau 200 bayonets in line: the Galiciall
regiments far les9. 'Ibe three last-named corps lost a flag cnch. [Bctanzos
should be substituted for Tuy in the list in Le Noble, p. 106, line ]0.]
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hear of the Marquis again, in quarters where he little expected
and still less desired to find him 1.
Meanwhile the Portuguese were left alone to bear the brunt
of the attack of the 2nd Corps. It is time to relate and e.o,;:plain
their position} their resources, and their designs.
I Kapier (ii. 47) is wrong in saying that La Romaua escaped via Bra-
ganza; he did not enter l'ortugal, but kept OD hill own side of the frontier,
ou the :\Iontcrey-La Gudina-l'uebla de Scllt\bria road.
•
,2
SECTION XIII: CHAPTER II
PORTUGAL AT THE MQ;\IENT OF SOULT'S INVASION: THE
NATION, THE REGENCY, AND SIR JOHN CR.-mOCK
SoULT'S vilnguard crossed the Portuguese frontier between
Monterey and Cha\'cs on March 9, 1809: it was exactly fi\'e
months since the last of Junot's troops had evacu~ted the
realm on October 9, 1808. In the period which had elapsed
between those two dates much might have been done to develop
-or rather to create-a scheme of national defence and a compe·
tent anny. Unhappily for Portugal the Regency had not risen
to the opportunity, and when the second French imll.Sion rome
upon them the military organi:w.tion of the realm was still
in a state of chaos.
During the autumn months of 1808 the Portuguese Govern-
ment had been almost as snnguineand as careless as the Spanish
Supreme Junta. They had seen Junot beaten and expelled:
they still beheld a large British anny in their midst; and they
did not comprehend the full extent of the impending danger,
whcn the llCWS came that Bonaparte was nearing the Pyrenees,
and that the columns of the' GnUld Army' were debauching
into the Peninsula. It was not till Moore had departed that
they began to conceive certain doubts as to the situation: nor
was it till Madrid had fallen that they at last reali7.ed that the
invader was once more at their gate;;, and that they must prepare
to defend themselves.
There were still two months of respite granted to them.
llortugal-like Andalusia-was saved for a moment by Moore's
march to Sahagun. The great field anny which Napoleon had
collceted for the advance on Lisbon was turned off' northwards
to pursue the British, and on the New Year's day of 1809 the
only French force in proximity to the frontier of the realm
was the division of Lnpisse, which Bonaparte had dropped at
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Salamanca to form the connecting link between Soult and Ncy
in Galieial and the troops under Victor and King Joseph in the
vicinity of Madrid.
But the danger was only postponed, not averted, by Maore's
daring irruption into Old Castile. This the Portuguese Regency
understood; and during the first two months of 1809 they
displayed a considerable ftmoWlt of energy. though it was in
great part energy misdirected. Their chief blunder was that
instead of straining every nerve to complete their regular army,
on which the main stress of Ule invasion was bound to fall, they
diverted much of their zeal to the task of raising a vast lCl.'ee en
11IaBse of the whole able~bodied population of the realm. This
error had iw roots in old historical memories.' The deliverance
ofPortugal from the Spanish yoke in the long war of independence
in the seventeenth century, had been achieved mainly by the
OrdC1U1.lIZa, the old constitutionul force of the realm, which
resembled the English Fyrd of the Middle Ages. It had done
good service again in the wars of 1703-1~, and even in the
shorter struggle of 176~. Dut in the nineteenth century it was
no longer possible to reckon upon it as a serious line of defence,
especially when the enemy to be held back was not the disorderly
Spanish army but the legions of Donaparte. 'Vhen there were
not even arms enough in Portugal to supply the line-battalions
with a musket for every man, it was insane to summon together
huge masses of peasantry, and to mAAe over to them some of
the precious firearms which should have been reserved for the
regulars. The majority, however, of the Ordcnanza were not
even supplied with muskets, they were given pikes-weapons
with which their ancestors had done good service in 1650, but
which it was useless to serve out in 1809. The Regency had
procured some 17,000 I from the Dritish Government, and had
caused many thousands more to be manufactured. Both on the
northern .and the eastern frontier great hordes of country-
tolk, equipped with these useless and antiquated arms, were
gathered together. Destitute of discipline and of officers,
iusufficiently supplied with food, the prey of every rumour, true
or fahe, that ran along the border, thcy were a source of danger
I List of Arms sent to Portugal on p. 9 of Parlia'ITumtary Paper8 for
1809.
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rather than of strength to the realm. The cry of 'treachery','
which ille\·itably arises among armed mobs, was always being
raised in thcil' cnctunpments. Hence came tUlDulh and murders,
for the peasantry had a strong sllspicion of the loyalty of the
governing classes-the result of the subservience to the }rench
invader which had been displayed by many of the authorities,
both civil imd military, in 1808. Orders which they did not
understand, or into which a sinister meaning could be read by
a sllspicious mind, generally caused El. riot, and sometimes the
assassination of the wlforlunute commander whom thc Rcgenc>'
had placed over the horde. In Oporio the state of affairs was
particularly bad: the bishop, though a sincere patriot and
a man of energy, had drunk too deeply of the delighls of
power during Ius rule in thc summer months. After being
made a member of the Regency by Dalrymple, he should have
remained at Lisbon and worked with his colleagues. But
retm'ning to his own flock, he rcassumed the authority which
he had possessed during the early days of the insurrection, and
pursued a policy of his own, which often differed from that of
his Regency at large, and was sometimes in flagrant opposition
to it. His po:;ition, ill fact, was similar to that of Palafox at
Saragossa, and like the Aragonese general he often practised the
arts of demagogy in order to keep firm his influence over the
populace. He was 0.11 for the system of the levee en 11!Mse ;
and summont..'<1 together unml1nflenoeable bands which he wll.'i able
neither to equip nor to control. He praised their zeal, was
wilfully blind to their frequent excesses, and seldom tried to'
turn their energies into profitable channels. Indeed, he was so
ignorant of military matters himself, that he had no useful
order3 to gh·e. He ignored the advice of the Portuguese
/:,renerals in his district, and got little profit from that of two
foreign officers whom the British Government sent him-the
Halloverian General Von der Decken and the Prussian Baron
Eben. These gentlemen he seems to have conciliated, and to
have played off against the native military authorities. But if
they ga,'e him good counsel, there are no signs in his actions that
he turned it to account. All the British witnesses who passed
through Oporlo in January and February 1809, describe the
place as being in a state of patriotic frenzy, and under mob law
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rather than administered by any regular and lcgul b"Overnment '.
The only fruitful military effort Imide in this part of Portugal
was that of the gallant Sir Robert Wilson, who raised there
in ~o"ember and December his celebrated' Loyal Lusitanian
Legion.' This was intended to be the core of a subsidiary
POI"tuguesc division in British pay, distinct frolll the national
anny. '¥hen Wilson m·rived in Oporto the bishop welcomed
him, and forwarded in every way the formation of the corps.
In a few days the Legion had 3,000 recruits of excellent quality,
of whom vVilson could amI and clothe only some 1,800, for the
equipment which he had brought with him was limited. He
soon discovered, however, that the bishop's zeal in his behalf
was mainly due to the desire to have a solid force at hand which
should be independent of' the Portuguese generals. He wished
the Legion to be, as it were, his own body-guard. Sir Robert
was ill pleased, and being unwilling to mix himself in the
domestic feuds of the bishop and the Regency, or to become
the tool of a faction, quitted Oporio as soon as his men could
march. ''''ith one strong battalion, a couple of' squadrons of
cavalry, and an incomplete batterY-Illlder 1,500 men in 11.11-
he mOl'ed (irst to Villa Renl (Dec. 14), and thcn to the
frontier, where he posted himself ncar Almeida and took over
the task of obsen'ing Lapisse's division, which from its base at
Salamanca was threatening the Portuguese border. Of his
splendid services in this direction we shall have much to tell.
The unequipped portion of the Legion, left behind at Oporto,
was handed O\'er to Baron Eben, and became involved in the
tumultuous and lInhappy career of the bishop 2,
Meanwhile Lisbon was almost as disturbed as Oporto, and
might have lapsed into the same state of anarchy, if a British
garrison had not been on the spot. The mistaken policy of the
I The Portuguese \·olume for December 1800 and January-Fehruary 1609
in the Reeord Office being mysteriousl)' lost, Cradock's correspondence
and that of the other British officers in Portugal is no longer available,
But Napier took copious notes from it, while it was still forthcoming;
they will be found on pp. 42.5-31 of his voL ii, and bear wit.ness to a complete
state of anarchy in Oporto.
t The first battalion used to call the second' Baron Ebl:!n's runaways'
when they met again, as Mayoe assures us in his Hi8tQry of the u.yat
L«.titanian !egifm.
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Regency had led to the Connation of sixteen so-called' legions I'
in the capital and suburbs. These tumultuary levies hud 'few
officers and hardly any arms but pikes. They were under no
sort of discipline, and devoted themselves to the self-imposed
duty of hunting for spies and 'Afrmu:e8lldo8.' Led by demo..
goguC!> of the streets, they panulcd up and down Lisbon to bwt
of drum, arresting persons whom they considered suspicious,
'especially foreign residents of an nationalities. The Uegency
having issued n decree prohibiting this practice [January 291
the armed levies only assembled in greater numbers ne:!t night,
and engaged in a general chase after Wlpopular citizens, police-
men, and aliens of all kinds. Many filgitives were only saved
from death by taking refuge iu the guard-houses und the
barracks where the garrison was quartered. Isolated British
soldiers were assaulted, some were wounded, and parties of
'legionaries' actually stopped aides-dc-camp and orderlies carry-
ing dispatches, and stripped them of the dOCLlmcnts the)' were
bearing. The mob WlIS inclined, indeed, to be ill-disposed
towards their allies, from the suspicion that they were intending
to evacuate Lisbon and to retire from the PeninSllla. They had
seen the baggage and non-combatants left behind by :Moore
put on ship-board; early in February they beheld the troops
told off' for the occupation of Cadiz embark and disappear.
When they also noticed t~at the forts at the Tagtls mouth were
being dismantled 2 tile)· made up their minds that the British
were about to desert them, without making auy attempt to
defend Portugal. Hence came the malevolent spirit which they
displayed. It died down when their suspicions were proved
unfounded by the arrival of Deresford and other British officers,
at the begiuning of March, with resow·ces for the reorganization
of the Portuguese arnI)·, and still more whe.D a little later heavy
reinforcements from England began to pour into the city. But
in the last days of January and the first of February matters at
1 They were raised by a decree of Dec. 23, 1808.
1 This was a proper precaution, as the sea-forts could be of no use
for defending Lisbon from a land attack, while, if Lisbon got into l~neh
hands again, they would have been invaluable for resistiug an attack from
the side of the sea. But Cradock was far too precipitate in commenciug
an operation which betrayed SUdl want of confidetlce.
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Lisbon had been in a most dangerous and critical condition:
the Uegel1Cy, utterly unable to keep order, had hinted to Sir
John Cradock that he must take his own measures against the
mob, and for several days the Briti:;h general had kept the
garrison under arms, and planted artillery in the squares and
broader streets-exactly as Junot had done seven months before.
The 'legions' were cowed, and most fortunately no collision
occurred: if a single shot hud been fired in anger, there would
have been an end of the Anglo-Portuguese alliancc, and it i:;
more than likely that Cradock-a man of desponding tempera·
ment-would have abandoned the country.
His force at this moment was by no means large: when Moore
marched for Salamanca in October he had left behind in Portugal
six battalions of British and four of Germun infuutry I, three
squadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons (the regiment that had
been so much cut up at Vimiero), one of the 3rd Light Dragoons
of the King's German Legion, and five batteries, only one of
which was horsed. From Salamanca, when on the eve of start·
ing 011 the march to Sahagun, Sir John had sent back two
regiments to Portugal, in charge of his great com'oys of sick
and hoovy baggage z. To compensate for this deduction from his
army he had called up a brigade of the troops left in Portugal;
but only one battalion of it-the 82nd-reached him in time to
join in his Castilian campaign 3. The net result was that seven
British infantry regiments from Maore's a.rmy wcre left behind,
in addition to the four Gennun corps. Two lllore had arrived
from England in November 4., and a fresh regiment of dragoons
in December 6.
Thus when Sir John Cradock took over the command at
1 ThCEe were the 2/9tll, 29th, 1/4Otll, IJ45tll,82nd, 97th, and 1st, 2nd,
5t", nnd 7th line battalions of tl,e King's German Legion.
2 Tho 1/3rd Rud liJ60tb. 'I1Je hwt hllttnlioll WUOJ mainly cOlllll()Se(\ of
foreigncrs, and had received more tllal} 200 recruits from the destlmrs of
JUIlOt'S army. Moorc WOUltlllot trust it, 311d.6Cnt it back, It afterwards
did SIJIllndid service under Wellel;ley.
1 The battalions tlIRt did not get up in time were the 1/46tb allll 07th•
• These were tlle 3/27th and 2/3Ist, which h"d sailed with .Baii'd from
Portsmouth, but were illlnt on from Corull1lll W Lisbon when the rest
of .Baird's eX}Jedition landed in Galicin.
~ Thc Hth Light Dragoons.
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Lisbon on December 14·, 1808, he had at his disposal in all
thirteen battalions of infantry, seven squadrons of cavalry, and
five batteries, a force of about 12,000 men 1. But not more
than 10,000 were effective, for Sir John Maore had left behind
precisely those of his regiments which were most sickly, when he
marched for Spain. He had moreover discharged more than
~,OOO additional sick upon Portugal ere he began field. operations:
they were encumbering the hospitals of Almeida and Lnmego
when Cradock appeared. The 10,000 men fit for servit'e were
scattered all over Portugal: the two battalions, which had just
come back from Spain, and the two others which had been too
late to join Maore, were in tile north, at A}meida and Lamego 2.
One battalion was in garrison at Elvas 3• Six lay ill Lisbon,
as also did the whole of the cavalry and guns j,: two were on the
march from Abrant.es to Almeida~.
Such a dispersion of fOR'CS would have appalled the most
enterprising of generals, and this was a title to which Cradock
had certainly no claims. The two obvious courses between
which he had to choose, were either to concentrate his little army
011 the frontier and make as much display of it in the face of
the French as might be possible, or to abandon all idea of
protecting exterior IJortugal, and collect the scattered regiments
in or about Lisbon. Cradock chose the second alternativc. He
argued that he was too weak to be of allY effectual service 011
the frontier, and moreover found that there would be a vast
difficulty in moving forward. even the Lisbon ganison, for nearly
all the available transport had been requisitioned for the use of
Moore's army, and had been carried off into Spain. N~ither of
these pleas is convincing: with regard to the first, it is merely
necessary to point out that Sir lIobert Wilson, 'with 1,500 men
of the LlIsitnnillll Legion, 1I0t yet three months old, made his
I Kapier (ii. 6) much under-estimates when he calls the whole' 10,000
including sick.' Cradock's regiments add up to about 12,133 men including
those in hospital. In addition there were all l\foore'll sick, who, though
many had died in the interim, presented 011 Feh. 18 in })o'rtugal con-
valescents to the number of 2,000 mllll.
2 The 1/3rd, I/Mtb, 6/6Oth, and 97th.
I The 1/4Oth.
f The four German battalions, the 3/27th and 2/318t.
& The 2/9th and 29th.
1800] CRADOCK'S TDlID !'OLICY 208
presence felt on the frontier, checked Lapisse, and kept the whole
province of Salamanca in a state of unrest. Ten thousand British
bayonets and sabres could have done much more. As to the food
and supplics, Crooock WllS arguing in the old eighteenth-century
style, as if a British army was bound to mo\'e with all its
baggage and impedimenta, its women and children. If he had
chosen to • march light,' and to take the route through the
feltile and well-peopled EstremMnra, he could have reached
Abrantes or Almeida or any other goal that he chose.
The fact was that the reasons for refusing to adopt a 'forward
polic)" were moral and not physical. Cradock, in common with
Sir John Moore and many other British officers, believed that
Portugal could not be defended, and was thinking more of
securing himself a safe embarkation than of exercising any
influence on the main currellt of the war.
When Moore's anny had passed out of sight, and was known
to be retiring in the direction of Galicia, it seemed to Cr:adock
that his own position was hopeless. Even if granted time to
concentrate his scattered battalions, he would be forced to fly
to the sea aud take shipping the moment that any serious
French foree crossed the frontier. He had not sufficiently
accurate information to enable him to see that both Lapisse
at Salamanca, and the weak divisions of the 4th Corps which
lay in the valley of the Tagus, could not possibly move forward
against him. It would have been insane for either of these
fort'Cs to ha'ie attackC'd Portugal-the onc was at this moment
less than 10,000, the other about U,OOO strong-the), were
without communications, and separated by 100 miles of pathless
sierras. Moreover the troops in the vnlley of the Tagus were
full)' occupied ill observing the Spanish army of Estremaduril.
At' the opening of the New Year, therefore, Crtu:lock was in
absolutely no danger, and might have gone forward either
to Abrantes or to Almeida in perfect security. In the first
position he would have menaced the flank of the 4th Corps:
in the second he would have exercised a meful pressure on
Lnpisse. In either case be would haveenoournged the Portuguese
and lent moral support to the Spaniards.
But Cmdock was possessed by thEl.t miserable theory which
was so frequently expounded by the men of desponding mind
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during the early years of the Peninsular War, to the effect that
Portugal Will> indefensible, and would have to be e\'ll.CUatL>cl.
whenever a strong French force approached its frontier I, It was
fortunate for England and for Europe that Virellesley had other
views. The history of the next three years was to show that
a British general could fllld something better to do than to pack
up his baggage and prepare to embark, whenever the ellemy came
down in 8uperiol' strength to the Portuguese border.
No doubt Crndock would have had to take to his transports
if the French had possessed on January 1, 1809, an army of
40,000 men available for the invasion of Portugal, and ready
to advance. They did not happen to own any such force;
and till he was certain that such a force existed, Crooock wus
gravely to blame for ordering every British !!Oldier to fall back
on Lisbon, and for openly commencing to destroy the sea-forts
of the capital.. It is true that the dispatches which he received
from home gave him nltUly directions us to what he wus to do if
the enemy appeared in overpowering strength: he was to blow
up the shore batteries, destroy all military and naval stores, and
embark with the Dritish troops and as mMy Portuguese fiS
could be induced to follow. But this was only to take place
'upon the actual approach of the enemy towards Lisbon in such
strength as may render all further resistance ineffectual 2.' To
commence these preparations when the nearest troops of the
enemy were at Sala~anca and Almaraz was prematUl'e and
precipitate in the highest degree. Till the French began to
move, every endeavour should have been made to encourage
the Portuguese and to maintain ti. show---even if it were but
a vain show-of an intention to defend the frontier. If Lapissc
1 Sir John Moore himself ventilated this view in a letter to Lord
Castlereagh from Salamanca, Nov. 25, 1800. It is this fact that explains
Napier's very tender treatment of eradock, who quoted Moore as his
justifying authority. Moreover Cradoek bad been very obliging ill placing
all his papers at Napier's disposal, a fact which prepossessed the historian
in his favour.
, Castlercagh to Cradock, Dec. 24, 1808. Napier makes on this tile
curious remark that the ministry ga.ve contradictory orders when they
told Cradoek to make a show of preparation for resistance, ret to get
ready for embarkation if it should prove necessary.
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had heard that Cragock was at Almcida he would ha.\'c been
nailed down to Salamanca: if Victor had heard that he was at
Alcantara, or even at Abrantes, he would never have dared to
. pursue Cucsta into southern Estremadura.
Crndock, however, drew into Lisbon every available man:
Brigadier Cameron, with the troops from Almeida and Oporto,
started back on a weary march from the north, via Coimbra,
bringing not only his own four battalions, but ],500 COIl-
"nlesccnts and returned stragglers from ]\{oore's army. Richard
Stewart, with the two battalions that had been at Abrantes,
also came in to the capital, and all the British troops were
concentrated by the beginning of February, save the 40th
regiment, which still lay at Elv8s. Having thus got together
about 10,000 men, Cradock, with almost incredible timidity,
began to draw them back to Passo d'Arcos, a place behind
Lisbon near the mouth of the Tagus, from wbich embarkation
was easy. When Villiers, the British minister at Lisbon,
remonstrated with him on the deplomble political consequences
of assuming this ignoble position on the water's edge, CrBdock
replied, 1'1 mustob,ject to take up a 'false position,' say Alcantara,
or to occupy the heights in front of Lisbon, which would only
defend a certain position, and le8.'"e the remainder [of l'ortugal?]
to the power of the enem)', one which \Ve must leave upon
his approo.ch, and seek another, beating the appearance of
flight, and yet not securing our retreat. The whole havillg
annoullced the intention of defending Lisbon, but giving up
that idea upon the approach of the enemy, for positions liable
to be turned on every side cannot be persevered in by an inferior
force."
On the day [February 15] upon which Cradock wrote this
extraordinary piece ofEnglish prose composition, whose grammar
is as astounding as its argument, the nearest Frellch troops were
at Tuy ill Galieia, Salamanca ill Lean, and the bridge of Ar.ro-
bispo on the central Tagus, points respectively 230, 250, and
240 miles distant from Lisbon as the crow flies, and infinitely
more by road. Further comment is hardly necessary.
At this moment Cradock might have had at his disposal
2,000 more British troops, but he had chosen to fall in with
Sir George Smith's hasty and unauthorized scheme for the
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occupation of Cadiz \ and had scnt off to that port a whole
brigade 2, under General Mackenzie. He also dispatched orders
to Colonel Kemmis of the 40th to liuud over Elvas to the
Portuguese, llnd march to Seville. The battalion moved into
Andalusia., and placed itself at the disposition of Mr. Frere,
who found it as useless as the force which Smith had drawn off
to Cadiz. It was several months before the 40th rejoined the
army of Portugal.
Influenced by the remonstrances of Mr. Yilliers, and somewhat
comforted by the fact that the French armies had nowhere crossed
the Portuguese frontier, Crad.ock was at last persuaded to give
up his position at Passo cl'Areos; he fixed his head quarters at
Lumiar, left 2,000 men in garrison at Lisbon, and cantoned
the remainder of his anny at Saccavem and other places a few
miles in front of the city. TIllS was better than lcttving
them on the sea-shore; but the move was no more than
a miserable half measure. It was almost as indicative of an
intention to depart without fighting as the retreat to Vasso
d'Arcns had been. III short, from January to the end of April
the Brilish army exercised no influence wllatcvcr on the military
affairs of the Peninsula. Yet by March it was beginning to
grow formidable in numbers: early in that month all the troops
which had been drawn off to Cadiz were sent to Lisbon, and by the
addition of seven good. battalions to his corps 3 Cradock fOUIld
himself at the head of over 16,000 men. There were but 800
effective cavalry, and of the six batteries only two, incredible as
it may seem, were properly horsed, though three months had
passed by since the general had begun his first complaints on
this point ". But 16,000 British troops were a force not to be
despist.'<1, and if '¥ellesleyor some other competent officer had
been in command, we cannot doubt that they would have been
I See p. 27.
2 Tho 3j27tb, 2jmb, 29th, and some small details of artillery, &C.
S Not only .Mackenzie's brigade, but also Tilsoll'S brigade, the 2j87th
and lj88th, and the stronger battalions of H. Campbell, which had gone
Cadiz directly from England-the first battalions oftll\l 2nd (Olldstream)
and 3rd (Scots Fusilier) Guards.
• In a letter of March 20 to Mr. Villiers, Cradock makes the astounding
statemcnt that after scouring ,,11 Portugal for horses for three months,
lLe Wall still unable to proville tllem for four out of his six batteries.
1800] CRADOCK AT LmUAR ~07
turned to some profitable use. Under Cradock they remained
cantoned in the suburbs of Lisbon for the whole time during
which Smut was completing his conquest of Oporto and northern
POliugal, and Victor executing his invasion of Estremadw·a. It
was not till Soult's advanced guard was on the Vouga [April 6]
that Hill and Beresford t succeeded in inducing the general to
carr)' forward his heud quarters to Leiria and his outposts to
Thomar 2• Fortunatel.y his tenure of command was at last
drawing to an end. On April ~~ Sir Arthur Wellesleyarrived
in Lisbon and took overcharge of the troops in Portugal. How
startling were the consequcuces of this change of gencrals we
shall soon see: ere May was out the whole Peninsula realized
once more that there was a British Army within its limits-a fact
that might well have pussed unnoticed during the last four
months.
I Cradock's controversial letters to Lord Londonderry, priutOO ill tJu,
latter's historr (H. 286-7), do no more than bear out Londonderry's
accusations of torpidity against Sir John.
2 Cradock contended that before the arrival of Hill and Sherbrooke
and the return of Mackenzie from Cadiz, he had only 10,225 men, and,
deducting sick and garrisons for the Lisllon forts, could only have marched
out with 5,221. [Letter to Londonderry on p. 302, "01. ii. of the latter's
work.] lie had sent 3,500 lllen to Cadiz and Seville, on Sir Gcorgo Smith's
unlHlllpy inspiration, or his force would lmve been much larger. As to
tho resolution to marcll against Sou1t, wJlich he o.f1:erwards claimed to havo
made, it is sufficient to say that Wellcsley ou his arrival wroto to
Castlereagh that' Sir John Cradock does lJot appear to have entertained
an)" dedded intention of moving forward: on the contrary he appears
(by his letters to Mr. Villiers) to have intended to go no further till he
should hear of Victor's movements.' [1I"ell. Oorrup., Lisbon, April 24.]
SECTION XIII: CHAPTER III
THE PORTUGUESE ARMY: ITS HISTORY AND ITS
REORGANIZATION
"rRfr;F. the Regency was wasting much of its energy on the
nrming of the undisciplined masses of the Ordcnanza, and while
Cradock sat supine at Passo cl'Areos and at Saccavem, one
'useful piece of work at least was being taken in hand. This
was the reorganizution of the Portuguese regulnr army, a task
which the Regency determined, though only so late as Februnry,
1809, to hand over to a British general officer.
To explain the chaotic condition of the force at the moment
whell Soult was just about to enter Portugnl, a short nceoUllt of
its previous history is necessary. It had received its existing
shape from a foreign hand, that of the well-known 'Conde de La
J..ippe,' i. e. the German Marshal, Frederick Count of Lippe·
BUckcburg, who had been entrusted with its command during
the short war with Spain in 176~. He it was who first gave
Portugal an army of the modern type, modelled on the ordinary
system of the eighteenth century, and showing many traces
of adaptations from a Prussian original The Marshal was
a great organizer und a nmn of murk: his name is perhaps
best remembered in connexion with the citadel of Elms, which
he rebuilt, and christened La Lippe after himself: under that
designation we shall repeatedly have to mention it while
describing the early years of the Peninsular 'Var.
As he left it, the Portuguese army consisted of twenty-four
regiments of tllc linc, each forming a single battalion of seven
companies and 806 men. There were twelve regiments of
cavalry, each originally composed of no more thl\n 240 sabres,
and three regiments of artillery of eight batteries each, besides
a few garrison companies of that arm. After La Lippc's
departure the army had shared in the general decay of strength
and organization in the kingdom, which prevailed during the
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reign of the mad queen Maria., and her SOlI the feeble Prince·
Regent John. But the lack of mere numerical strength was
not nearly so fatal to its efficiency as the rustiness and rotten~
1lE.'SS of its internal machinery. Under an octogenarian com-
mander-in-chief, the Duke of Alafoens, every department of
the anny had been decaying in the latter years of the eighteenth
century. All the typical faults of an army of the alldel~ regime
after a long period of peace were developed to the highest possible
pitch. Commissions were sold, or gh-cn away by intrigue and
corruption, often to persons of unsuitable rank and education 1 :
promotion was slow iLlId perfectly arbitrary: the pay of the
officers was very low, while every incentive to petty jobbing
and embezzlement was afforded by the vicious system under
which the colonel contracted with the government for his
regiment, and the captain with the colonel for his company.
In the·Portuguese army, as in all others where this antiquated
practice prevailed, the temptation to fill the muster-rolls with
'dcad~hca.ds' and absentees, so thut the contractor might save
their food and pocket their pay, had been too strong for the
ordinary officer to resist. Hence came the empty ranks of
the battalions, the ludicrous disproportion of horses to men in
1 All authorities ngrco 89 to the inferior character and status of a great
part of the PortugueiC officers. DUillourle7; remarks [1766J that (their
pay does not enable them m \h'e better than the common soldiers, whwe
comrades I'nd relatil'es they often are. The subaltern ranks are filled
from the inferior classes, and their hatred of foreignen prevents their
association with, or rel;eiving any improvement {rom, them: hence it is
tllat they remain in such ignorance and wretchedness' (p. 17). IIalliday
remarks (p. 106) tllat (even captains had not the rauk of gentlemen.'
Compare with this Pattllrson's curious note ('101. i. p. 250), 'TIlll
familiarity that subsists between thll native officers aud their men renders
ineffective all the authority of the former, at the same time defeating
the objel;t to be attained by discipline. They eat, gamble, and drink
together. I have even seen them waltzing and figuring off in the rontra·
chm::a, captains with corporals, majors with drumbo}'S-all Jack-fellows
well met, and excellent boon companions. They will not of themselves
do anything, their good qualities must be elicited by strangers. I know
of nothing that stamps the character of Lord Bert'$ford as a man of energy
and perseverance, more tban the way in which he has organized them,
and from a miserable undiscipUned rabble produced, in course of time,
a fair body of fighting troops, who performed (encouraged by their English
officers) some spirited service during the war.'
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the cavalry, the depleted condition of the regimental store§ and
equipment.
The short Spanish war of 1801-!! had revealed the complete
disorganization of the army. Hasty measures were taken to
strengthen it: in the moment of panic every infantry regiment
was ordered to raise a secOlld battalion, and though the number
of companies per battalion was lowe'red from seven 'to five,
}-et as each of them was now to consist of 150 instead of 116
men, the total strength of each infantry corps was raised to
1,500 officers and mell. At tile same time the rovalry regiments
were supposed to have been increased to 470 sabres t, and a
fourth regiment of artillery was created. Nor was this all:
an 'Experimental Legion' fot light infantry service, eight
companies strong, with a couple of squadrons and a horse-
artillery battery attached to it, was soon afterwards raised by
the Marquis D'A!orna.
But after the peace of Badajoz had been signed the army
was allowed to sink back into its old sloth and inefficiency.
When Junot entered Portugal in December, 1807, it is doubtful
if there were as many as 20,000 troops really embodied, though
the nomillw toW of the DtJ,tionw army reached nearly 50,000
mens.
Portugal had a few keen soldiers (such as Gomez Freire de
Andmde, and the renegade D'Aloma), who had received abroad
a good. military education, and had cvcn written military books.
But the majority of the officers were slack, ignorant, and
incompetent; while the men were half-drilled, badly disciplined,
and ill-equipped. The only attempt which had been made to
introduce any of the modern military discoveries which had
been worked out in the wars of the French Revolution,
36,000
6,640
3,956
1,300
1,000
48,3!16Tow
I Of these, twelve squadrons were originally cuira88iers(Dumourie-", p. 18),
but their armament had been discarded before 1800, and oue regiment
only Wall ligllt horse.
S Twenty-four regiments of infantry of two battalions weh
twclvo regiments of cavalry at 470
foUl' regiments of artillery at 009
ten garrison companies of artillery (veterans)
'Experimental Legion,' engineers, &0.
HaJIiday gi\'CS an e\'en larger figure, 52,204.
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consisted in the creation of the a1ready-mentioned ' Experimental
Legion' which D'A)orna had been allowed to raise and to train
with anew light-infalltry drill, adapted by himself from French
models. The main body of the army looked with some
jealousy and suspicion on this corps, and had made no effort
to COP)' it.
The French invasion of Portugal had dashed to pieces the
old regular army. Junot, it will be remembered, had disbanded
the greater part of the men, and fonned with the remainder
a few battalions, which he had begun to seud off' to France ere
the insurrection of June, 1808, broke Qut. Some of them took.
an involuntary share in the first siege of Saragossa: others were
hurled into the red holocaust of·Wagram.
W'hen Portugal rose against th.e im'ader, the local juntas
endeavoured to call back to arms all the dispersed officers
and men, to serve as tl. nucleus for the insurrectionary hosts.
The system of recruiting which La Lippc hnd introduced made
this comparatively easy: he had instituted regimental districts
in a very complete form. Each corps was named after a'
particular town or region 1, drew its conscripts from that
locality, and was usuolly quartered ill it. When Junot dis~
banded the old army. the men naturally returned to their
homes. It resulted that when, for example, the Oporto Junta
summoned out to service the late members of the 6th and
18th regiments of the line, the two units belonging to the
Oporto district, it could be certain of finding the gt'Cater part
of the rank and file without much difficulty. To reconstitute
in a hurry the corps of officers WfUl a much harder matter:
a disproportionate number of the more competent holders of
commissions had been drafted into the contingent sent to
France: comparatively few resided in their proper regimental
districts, mml)' in Lisbon, which was still in J UDot's hands.
Hence the battalions which fought under Lcite at E,-ora, or
accompanied "rellesley to Vimiero, bore their old names
indeed, but were not merel)' m-equipped and low in numbers,
but lacked a due supply of officers. Considering the inefficiency
of the regiments even before they were destroyed by J unot,
I Except two Lisbon regiments, named Viern Te1lez and Freire, from
former colonels of distinction [Nos, 4 and 10].
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they might now be described as no more than 'the shadow
of II shade.'
VVhen the French had been driven out of Portugal, and the
Junta of Regency took in hand the reconstruction and enlarge.
ment of the army, the problem of organization seemed almost
insoluble. The government decreed that the regiments of
infantry of the line should be raised to their full establishment
of 1,500, a figure which they had never really !\tl;aincd in the
old days. It was also decided to create si.... new battalions of
riftemen (Cazadores), a class of infantry of which D'A!orna's
•Experimental Legion' had hitherto been the sole repre-
sentatives in Portugal. As to the cavalry and artillcr)·. it was
an obvious fact that the dearth of horses in the kingdom made
it impossible to enlarge the number of units. The twelve old
regiments of horse I, the thirty-two old batteries of artillery
were to be reconstructed, but no new oues were to be created.
Considering that the old corps of officers in Portugal was
notoriously incompetent, it was hard to ~ee how the expanded
army was to be drilled and disciplined. About 25,000 recruits
were suddenly shot into the old CadTe8; they eould be readily
procured, for not only were volunteers forthcoming in great
numbers, but if they ran shOlt a stringent conscription law was
in existence. Dut how were thc regiments to be olIicered? Jt
was true that a considerable amount of the raw material for
officers was obtainable, for patriotic enthusiasm was driving the
young men of the upper classes into the army, in a way that
had never before been seen-the service had not hitherto been
popular, owing to its poor pay and prospects. But onc <:anllot
officer raw recruits with equally raw ensigns, and call the result
a regular army. Moreover, arms and equipment were lamentably
deficient: Junot had confiscated aud destroyed almost all the
",tore of arms belonging to the old army: it is said that the
insurgents had not 10,000 serviceable muskets among them
when Wellesley landed. The British had distributed some
42,000 more between AUgWt and December 2 ; but what were
these among so many? There were to be over 50,000 regulars,
1 It was intended, howeve~, to give each cavalry regiment an atra
squad~on.
'I PI.lTfil.lmenlar!l PapeT8, 1809. Return No. 5, p. 9.
{!)In(:;,,u:,J,. !31Uj1(>f)'1l('/du; /~t(. !t('.((I//" ra/5f1" '''''1/,(
,-
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when the establishment was completed, and the Regenc~' hoped
to call out some 40,000 militia when the first line of defence hod
been equipped, and after that to arm the vast llltlSSes of the
Ordellan:::a-.
The natural results followed. In obedience to the decree
issued by the Regency, a considerable number of men were
collected at each regimental depot. Of these about one-third,
on an average, were old soldiers: but the proportion varied,
for some corps had suffered more than others fwm the drafts
of trained men which Junot had sent oft' to France. A good
many of the regiments succeeded, so far as numben; went,
in constituting their two battalions without much difficulty.
Others were less fortunate, and could only mise one: two were
so hopelessly incomplete that Beresford distributed the few
hundred men whom they could produce among other corps, and
temporarily disbanded them 1. It was the same with the cavalry,
of which two regiments were wholly "ithout horses, and several
were so absurdly short of mounts that they could not be used t.
:Even of the corps which were not dissolved, several were so weak
thut they had not recruited themselves up to half their nominal
strength even by September 3. This was more especially the
case in the Alemtejo, where the population displayed an apathy
that contrasted strongly with the turbulent enthusiasm prevalent
in Lisbon and in the North. ____
Two invaluable sets of Returns, in the Rcc::ord Offi<..'e, show us
that, as far as mere nwnbers went, the Regency bad not done
so much as it should, in the way of increasing the total of
men under arms, during the two months that followed the Cou-
"ention of Cilltra. On September 13, according to a report
from Baron Decken, who had gone round the insurrectionary
armies of }~reire, Leite, and the Monteiro Mor, there were under
arms 19,~7~ line infantry, 3,384 light infantry (Cazadores),
1,812 cavalry, and 19,000 militia: the force of artiller)' is not
I The 8th aud 22nd, both Alemtejo regiments, were entirely drafted otl',
and were raised again afresh with recruits in the autumn.
s The 2nd and 3rd, both Alemtejo regiments, were never honed during
the whole war, and did foot-ser\·ice in garrisons of the interior.
S In September the 3rd, 5th, 15th, 21st, and 24th had not raised tlleir
second battalions. Of these the 5th and 16th were Alemtejo regimenti.
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given. But of these 37,000 men only 13,600 had ser.'iceablc
weapons and equipment, and ,vere fit to take the field 1.
On November 26 these figures had risen to 922,361 infantry,
3,422 cavalry, 4,031 artillery, and JlO,880 militia. But, owing
to the importation of English muskets during the last two
months, Uiere were now 31,8313 men properly equipped, of whom
2,052 were mounted men. The remaining 19,000 had still
nothing more than pikes, or non-military firearms, such as
fowling-pieces and blunderbusses: 1,400 cavalry were still
without horses 2.
The figures are very moderate, but the worst part of the
situation was that a collection of 1,000 or 1,500 men does not
constitute a regiment., even if 300 or 400 of them chance to
have been old soldiers. There were not, it is' dear, muskets
enough to ann more than two-thirds of the rank and file: belts,
pouches, knapsacks, and other equipment were still more deficient.
Yet the really fatal point was that there was a wholly inadequate
number of officers, and that of those who were forthcoming the
elder men were mostly incompetent, and the YOWlger entirely
.untrained. In the official correspondence of the early months
of 1809 the most prominent fact that emerges is the difficulty
that was found in discoveling colonels and majors capable of
licking into shape the incoherent mass of men at the regimental
head quarters, and of teaching the newly.appointed junior
officers their duty. It lieemed that their long peace-service in
small garrison towns had taken all energy and initiative out of
the seniors of the army of the ancicl~ regime. They ga.zcd with
despair on the task before them, and seemed quite incapable of
coping with it. "''hen a British general took over the command
of the Portuguese army. he complained that' Long habits ot'
disregard to duty, and consequent laziness, make it not only
difficult but almost impossible to induce the senior officers of
this serdce to enter into any regular and continued attention to
the duties of their situations, and neither reward nor punish-
ment will induce them to bear up against the fatigue 8.' It was
only when a whole generation of colonels had been cleared away
I Report of Baron Decken, Sept. 13, 1808 (Re<:ord Office).
I Return of tlie Portuguese army, Nov. 26 (Record Office).
S Beresfonl to Wellesley, Wellington S/lppkJl/tJ1ltflry .Di8p<ltt:hea, vi. p. 774.
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that the army grew efficient, and the reorganized regiments
began to distinguish themseh'es in the field.
For the purpose of mobilization every regiment had been sent
in the autumn of 18Q8 to its proper head quarters, in the centre
of its recruiting district. There they still lay in the end of
February, when Soult was drawing near the frontier. There was
absolutely no Portuguese army in the field, only a number of
bR.ttalions, squadrons, and batteries, in a more or less imperfect
state of organiuttioll. scattered broadcast over the country.
They were, as we have already seen, still insufficiently supplied
\dth arms and equipment. Of transport and train, to enable
them to move, there WM hardly a trace. The only thing
approaching a concentration of force WWI that in Lisbon and its
immediate vicinity there were seven regiments of foot and three
of horse, which were there assembled simply because their head
quarters and their recruiting ground lay in this quartcl' 1. Of
the remainder of the infantry two regiments were in Algarve,
in the far south; fi\'e in the Alemtejo; four in Beira; two in
the Tras-os-Montes, four in Oporto and the ndjoining province
of Entre~Douro~e-Minho. It was with the last six alone that
Soult had to deal when he invaded northern Portugal z: not one
of the others was moved up to aid the northern regiments in
holding him back.
Impressed with the state of hopeless disarray in which their
army lay, and conscioulI that for stores and weapons to equip it,
and money to pay it, they could look only to Great Britain, the
Regency asked. in February for the appointment of a British
commander-in-chief. This was the best pledge that they could
give of their honest intention to pluce all their military resources
at the disposition of their allies. It had another ohvioW:l
advantage: Bernardino Freire, Leite, Silveira, the Monteiro
Mol', and the other Portuguese generals commanding military
t TIU!86 were the Jet, 4th, 7th, 10th, 13th, 16th, 10th of the line, and
the 1st, 4th, llnd 'lthcavalry. Of the foot the 1st, 4th, 10th, and 16th were
Lisbon regiments, the 7th was named frorn and belonged to SetubaI, the
13th to Peniche, the 19th to Cascaes.
~ These were the 6th, !!th, 12th, 10th, 21st,and 24th. The 6th and 18th
belonged to Oporto, the 9th to Viaua, the 12th to Chave3, the 21st to
Valama, the 24th to Braganza. .
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districts were at feud with each other. It would be very difficult
to place onc above the rest, and to sIXure fOf him loyal co-opera-
tion from his subordinates. It was probable that an Englishman,
a stranger to their quarrels and intrigues, would be better obeyed.
TIle Regency, it would seem, suggested that they would be
glad to see the post of commander-in-chief given to Sir Arthur
Vlelleslcyo But the victor of Vimiero refused to accept it,
probably because he had already secured from Lord Castlereagh
the promise that he should be sent out again to Portugal to
supersede Cradock. When he had declined the offer it was, to
tlte surprise of most men, passed on to General Beresford. This
officer hud the advantage of knowing Portuguese; he had com-
manded one of ::\loore's brigades during the Corunna retreat, and
had seen much service on both sides of the Atlantic. He
was a compamtively young man, being only in his forty-first
year, and was very junior in his rank, having only become
a major-general in 1807. Many officers who were his elders
had coveted the post, and some friction was caused by the fact
that witb his new Portuguese commission he outranked several
of his seniors in Cradock's army. Beresford was a good fighting-
man, and a hard worker; but he was neither a tactician nor
a strategist, and did not s]line when placed in independent
command-as witness Albuera. When Wellington had learnt
his limitations, he never gave him a task of any great difficulty,
and in the later years of the war either kept him under his own
eye or sent him on ermnds where it was not eASy to go wrong.
For really responsible work in 18U-14 he always used Hill, Hope,
or Graham. But in 1809 Beresford was, but for his undoubted
courage, more or less of an unknown quantity to his colleagues
and his subordinates. Fortunately hc turned Qut a good
organizer, if a mediocre gencral. For what he did in the way
of reforming, and almost recreating, the Portuguese army he
deserves considerable credit. Every one will remember the
quaint story of how he was received by his army af'tcr a short
absence, with the ingenuous cry of 'Long live Marshal Beres-
ford-who takes care of our stomachs l .' This in one way was
a high compliment-it was not every general, English, French,
1 The same story is told of General Robert Craufurd and his cazadores,
in Costello's Memoirlf.
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or Spanish, who succeeded in filling his soldiers' bellies during
the Peninsular War. The power to do so was not the least
among the qualities necessary for a commander-in-chief.
':Vhy the British cabinet chose Beresford, from among many
possible candidates, for the very responsible post now put in his
charge, it is hard to see. Castlereagh knew him, as being (like
himself) one of a powerful Anglo-hish family connexion, with
strong parliamentary influence. 'This may have told in his favour:
it was perhaps also remembered that he was a. personal friend of
'Velleslcy, whom Castlereogh was intending to send out to com-
mand the British army in Portugal, and moreover his junior.
This would facilitate matters when the two generalissimos had
to act together; Beresford would probably prove a more tracta-
ble colleague and subordinate to the self-confident, autocratic,
and frigid Wellesley, than any officer who was a stranger to him
or his senior in years and service. It is by no means impossible
that Cnstlcreagh nominated him at Sir Arthur's private sugges*
tion. But into the secrets of ministerial patronage it is useless
to pry.
Appointed to his new post in February, only a month after
he had returned from the Conmna expedition, Bcresforo at once
set sail for Lisboll, and took up the command ere three weeks
had expired since his appointment. He arrived at the very
moment at which Soult was about to pass the northern
frontier, and ",'as at once gA.2etted as a Portuguese field marshal.
Af'rer a short suryey of those part.~ of his command which lay in
and about Lisbon, he reported to the Regency that the dearth
of officers, and especially of competent superior officers, was so
great, that he could not hope to reorganize the anny unleSil he
were allowed to give commissions in the Portuguese service to
many foreigners. As a preliminary measure he asked for volun-
teers from Sir John Cradock's army, and obtained about enough
English officers to give three to each regiment. The main
inducement which attrJ\.Cted cnndidate> was Beresforo's pledge
that every onc accepted for the Portuguese servit-e should gain
a step-a lieutenant would become a captain, a captain a major.
The Marshal at once placed all the battalions with notoriously
inefficient commanders in charge of British officers, and drafted
into them a larger proportion of his volunteers than was given
\
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to those which were in better state. He also got leave from
the British cabinet to ofter Portuguese commissions to officers
serving in ,corps on the home station. This gave him by the
end of the year some scores of men of the sort required, and it
was by them that the new arlllY was mainly formed and
disciplined I. TIle Dritish drill Wl\S introchiced, and to tench it
Beresford was allowed to borrow many non-commissioned officers
from Cradock's regiments 2. As was but natural, there arose
considerable friction between the IIew COlUers and the native
Portuguese oflh:ers, over whose heads they were often placed.
This was inevitable, but led to less harm than might have been
expected, because the rank and file, quick to recognize soldierly
qualities, took kindly to their new <''Ollllnanders, and served them
loyally and well.
In the beginning Beresford's reorganization only extended
to the regiments in Lisbon and the south. Those stationed
beyond the Douro were already in the field, and actively engaged
with Soult. They had hardly received any assistance, either of
officers or of arms and equipment, before they became involved
in the campaign of March, 1809 3 • In fairness to them this
mllst be borne in mind, when their conduct in battle is compared
with that of the reorganized army in the following year. The
Portuguese Regenc}', in their report on the Oporto campaign
sent to their Prince on ).fay 31, 1809. pleaded ""ith truth' that
the armies formed in the northenl provinces were motley assem-
blies, whose numbers and good will bore witness to the zeal of
the people, and their determination not to accept the French
yoke, but which could not with any propriety be called regular
troops. They were composed of incomplete and fmctiolltll
regiments, and the larbreI' proportion of the rank and flIe con-
sisted of recruits, many of whom had not been a month under
I For notes 011 the difficultic<> IUlll friClion cnosed by olashing pretensions
of British and Portuguese seniority in rank, see WeJlillgtlm Dispatchu,
vol. iv. pp. 368-81, 39i-li, and several other letters to Castiereagh and
Beresford.
2 Largely from the 1/3rd foot. Sce Wellington Di.tpaUhu, ,.01. iv.
p. 46..1. Other regiments also contributed.
I A few Britisll officel'8 had arrived, such as Col. Patrick WllO C(lmnmndcd
.the 12th of the line in Sih'eira's army.
,
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arms. Some of the corps were short of mw~kets: those which
had them were armed with weapons of bad quality', and various
calibre. All were deficient in the most essential articles of
equipment. It was not fair to expect that such troops muld
oppose with any prospect of success a well-armed and well·
disciplined veteran arniy like that of France 2,'
The regular troops, and the totally undisciplined OrdenalliU/,
levies, did not fonn the whole military force of Portugal. There
also existed, mainly on paper, another line of defence for the
kingdom. This was the militia: 'according to the old military
system of the realm each regimental district had to supply not
only its line battalion, but also two (or sometimes one) battalions
of militia. There should have been forty-three such regiments
in existence in 1'808, and early in 1809 the Regency ordered
that they should be raised to forty-eight, and that each should
consist of two battalions of 500 men each 3. This force, however,
was purely a paper army; the militia had not been called out
sim;e the war of 1802; there were a "few oflk-crs bearing militia
commissions, but no rank and file. "When the Regency decreed
its mobilization, all that could be done was that the local
authorities should tell oft'such eligible young men as had not
been embodied in the regular fl.Ony, for militia recruits. But
as there were noither ollk'CI"S to drill them, nor muskets to ann
them, the conscription was but a farce. The men were not
even called out in many districts, since it was useless to do so
till arms could be procured for them. Dut in the two northern
provinces, when Soult crossed the frontier, the militia-men
took the field alongside with the Ordellallza, from whom they
were distinguished by name alone, for they were almost as
destitute of uniform, weapons, and officers as the levee en mastiC
itself, It would seem that most of the other border re~ments
I Some of the muskets sent by the Dritish were in the hands of tho
Oporto troops, but none had reached the Tras-os-Montes regiments of
Silveira's army.
~ All this is analysed frOIll tlle Portuguese historian Da Luz Soriano,
S :For the locaJ orgalli~.atiolt and llomenclature of tile militia regiments.
the reader is rcferroo.l to the table of the Portuguese army ill Appelldix 11.
It will he seen that there were theoretically sixtoon regimollts in the
I.rovinces invaded by Soult, beyond the Dou.ro.
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of militia were also mobilized in the spring of 1809, in the
neighbourhood of Almeida, Castello Branco, and Elvas. That
they were perfect],), useless was shown in Mayne's fight with
Victur at the bridge of Alcautara (Mu), 14), when their conduct
contrasted shamefully with the steady and obstinate fighting
of the Lusitanian Legion I. In June, Wellesley ordered that
all men for whom there were no anllS should be sent home
on furlough, and that the regiments should endeavour to drill
and exercise their men by relays of flOO at a time, each batch
being kept two months under arms. '!'his WBS ~pparently
because there were not arms, officers, or drill-sergeants enough
to provide for mote than a small proportion of the a,'ailable
numher of militia-men 2. In this way between 8,000 and 10,000
militia were to be out during the times of the p~ar when the
country-side could best spare them from the labour of the fields.
The rest were to be left at home, unless an actual invasion of
Portugal should occur. From the modec;t scope of this plan, it
may easily be guessed what the state of the militia had been
four months earlier, when Soult was in the Tras-os-l\Iontes, and
Beresford had barely begun his work of reorganization.
The militia~menwere supposed to provide their own uniforms,
the result of which was that few save the officcrs ever owned
uniforms at all. In 1810 'Vellesley had to make formal repre-
sentation to Massena that they were part of the armed force of
the Portuguese kingdom, and not banditti, as the Marshal
threatened to deny the rights of regular combatants to any
prisoners not wearing a military dress. The officers, however,
had a blue uniform similar to that of the line, save that they
had silver instead of gold lace on their collars and wrists. The
mil.;itia were not entitled to allY pay when mobilized within the
limits of 'their own province. When taken over its border
officers and men were supposed to draw half the pay of the
regulars of corresponding rank, but did not find it easy to
obtain the modest stipend to which they were entitled.
Throughout the war the Portuguese militia were only inter~
mittently in the field: the longest continuous piece of service
1 See Mayne, Hutory oftM Loyal LuBitanian Legi07J,p. 231, and Wellingtc/tl
.Di$p{11cha, vol. iv. p. 300.
~ Wellington Dispatches, yol. iv. pp. 389--90 and 478 [June, 1009].
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which they performed was that during Mnssena's invasion, when
they were all mobiliz(,!d for more than a year on cnd, fWIll
June 1810 to July 1811. At other times, the whole or parts of
various regiments were under arms for periods of varying length,
either to relieve the regulars from garrison duty, or to watch
the less-exposed frontier points in times when the French were
active in the neighlxmring district<; of Spain. They were very
seldom exposed to the ordeal of batHe, as their presence in
the liue would have beeD a 8(lul'(:e of danger mtller than a help.
But they were useful for secondary work, such as guarding
convoys, maintaining lines of communication, and (most of all)
restraining minor raids by small bodies of the enemy. During
Massena's invasion the greater part of them were not drawn
within the lines of Torres Vedras, like the Portuguese regulars,
but left.out in the country-side, to shift for themselves. Here
they did invaluable service in cutting the Marshal's line of
communication with Spain, and harassing all his detachments.
It was they who surprised and captured his wounded and his
depOt at Coimbra., who worried Drouet, and who turned back
Gardllnne, whcn he tried to push forwo.rd from Almeida ill OrdCI'
to join the main French army_
:But all this was in the far future when the spring campaign
of 1809 began. At that date, as we have already seen, the
militia were as undisciplined, as ill~armed, and as useless as the
mass of ordenanza l~vies, with which they were t'onfuscd.
A word must be added as to the theoretical organization of
tlJ.is last force. It dated back to the Middle Ages, and had been
regularly used during the days of the enfranchisement of
Portugal from the yoke of the Spanish Hapsburgs, in the seven-
teenth century. The 'ordinance' was a Royal decree summon-
ing to anus all males between sixteen and sixty with the excep-
tion of ecclesiastics_ In districts owning a feudal lord, that
IJffi'Son was ex-officio declared chief~captain (capitiW mor) of his
fief, and charged with the summoning of his vassals to tIle field.
'Vhere manorial customs had disappeared, the senior magistrate
of the town, village, or district had to take up the post of
capitiio mor, unless a substitute was !lamed by the <:t'Own.
It was the duty of this commander to eaU out all the able-bodied
men of his region, to divide them into companies of !t50 men,
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and to name a captain, ensign, sergeant, clerk (meirinho), and
ten <:orporals for each of these bodies. Persons able to provide
a horse were to serve apart, as cavalry, under separate corn·
manders; but no one ever saw or heard of mounted ordellallza
troops during the Peninsular "rar; all the horses of the country
did not suffice to provide chargers even for the twelve regiments
of the regular army. 'l'he whole levy was supposed to be called
out twice a year by the capitew mar, in order that it might he
seen that every man was properly enrolled in a company. But
as a matter of fact the ordenanza had not been summoned out,
save in 1762 and 1802, since the end of thE; 'War of the Spanish
Succession. NOl" had any care been taken to sce that every'
householder possessed a weapon of some sort, as the law directed.
When they mustered in 1809, the men with pikes outnumbered
those with fowling·picees or bhmdcrbusscs, and the men
furnished with no more than scythes on poles, or goads, or such-
like rustic weapons, were far more numerous than the pikemen.
The whole mass was perfectly useless; it was cruel to place it
in the field and scnd it against regular troops. Tumultuous,
undisciplined, unoffieered, it was doomed to massacre whenever it
allowed the enemy to approach. It would have been well to
refrain from calling it out altogether, and to turn over the few
serviceable arms which it possessed to the militia.
NOTE.-Dy rar the best account or the Portuguese army and military
system is to be round in Hallidny's Present l!I.a~ of Porlugal and the
POTtugU-t8e Army, aD iuvalulIlJle book of 1812. SometlIing can be glellllcd
rrom Dumouriez's E88ay on t/w military topography of PQ1'tugal (1766).
A little inrormation comes fl"(lm l-'oy, but many or his statements in hi.;
vol. H. are inaccurate. The Wellington and .Heresford dispatches in the
Record Office are, or course, fuU or inrormation, but would be very
unintelligible but for Halliday's explanatory memoir, as they presuppose
knowledge of the details or organization, but do not generally describe
tllem. For the Lusit....niall Legion, sec Ma)'uc's mOllogmph Oil that oorps,
Ilnd the dispatches or Sir &hert Wilgon. I have inserted in an appendix
a table or the reorganized army II.! it stood in the autumn of 1009. .
!{Itn-lw/liMe. fV'fuw;;y
{I #"t't·"R' c!d,.> .Y/.t'tNl Me~UI",n(a/U:6a "'0,"
,(Mr, ,(11""''''' ()'.'/"""'>I~."
~'" "'''"",w<-,.(>!19ty.

SEcTION XIII : CHAPTER IV
COMBAts ABOUT CHAV.ES AND BRAGA: CAPTURE OF
OI'ORTO (MARCH ]6-20, 18(9)
WJ.fF.N La. Romans. marched off to the east, and abandoned
bis Portuguese allies to their own resources, the duty of defend-
ing the frontier fell upon General Francisco Siheira, the military
governor of the Tras~os·:M:onte8. He had mobilized his forces
at Chaves the moment that 8oult's departure from Orense
became known, and hrtd there gathered the whole levy of his
province. The total amounted to two incomplete line regiments 1
four battalions of disorderly and ill-equipped militia 2, the
skeletons of two cavalry regiments. with hardly 200 horses
between them 3, and a mass of the locn.l ordellamra, lLrmed with
pikes, goads, scythes, and fowling-pieces. The whole mass may
have numbered some U,OOO men, of whom not 6,000 possessed
firearms of any kind 4. Against them the French marshal was
marching at the head of !i!Sl,OOO veterans, who had already gained
experience in the art of moulltaill~warfare from their recent
campaign in Galicia. The result WIlS not difficult to foresee. If
the Portuguese dared to offer battle they would be scattered to
the winds.
Silveira's levies were not the only force in arms on the
frontier. The populous province of the Entre-Douro*e-Minho~,
roused to tumultuous enthusiasm by the bishop of Oporto, had.
sent c\'ery available man, armed or unarmed, to the front. A
screen of militia and regulars under General Botilho was watching
the line of the lower Minho: a vast mass of orcknanza, backed
I The 12th and 24th regimenta-Cbaves and Draganza.
2 Militia ofCha\'es, Villa. Real, Miranda, and Bragaw.a.
5 The 6th and 9th cavalry.
• Brotbertoll to CasUereagh, March 13.
5 Entre-Douro-e-Minho had a population of500,ooo souls,Tras-os-l\Iontes
only 180,000.
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by a very small body of line troops lay in and about Braga,
under General Bernardino Freire; another multitude was still
thronging the streets of Oporta and listening to the windy
harangues of the bishop. But IlOIlC of these masses of armed
men were sent to the aid of Silveira. He was not ODC of the
• bishop's faction, nor was he on good tenns with his colleague
Freire. Neither of them showed any inclination to combine
with him, and their followers, in the true spirit of provincial
particularism, thought of nothing but defending their own
hearths and homes, and left the Tras·os~Montes to take care
of itself. Yet the)' had for the moment no enemy in front of
them but the small French garrison of Tuy, and could have
marched without any risk to join their compatriots.
Relying on the aid of La Romana, General Silvcira had token
post at Villarelho on the right bank of the Tamega, leaving the
defence of the left bank to the Spaniards, whom he supposed to
be still stationed about l\{onterey and Verin. On the very day
upon which the Army pf Galicia absconded, the Portuf,>'llese
general sent forward a detachment, consisting of a line regiment
and a mass of peasants, to menace the Rank of the French
advance. '1'his force, having crossed the Spanish frontier, got
into collision with the enemy near Villaza. Since Franccschi's
horsemel) and Heudelet's infantry had tllmed off to the east in
pursuit of La Romana, the Portuguese fell iu with the leading
column of Soult's main body-a brigade of Lahoussaye's
dragoons supported by Delabordc's division. This force they
\'clltured to attack, but were promptly beaten oft· by Foy, the
brigadier of the advanced guard, who routed them and captured
their sole piece of artillery. The shattered column fell baek on
the main body at Villarelho, and then Silveira, hearing of the
departure of the Spaniards, ~lved to retire and to look for
a defensive position which he might be able to hold by his own
unaided efforts. There was non~ such to be found in front of
Chaves, for the valley of the Tamega widens out between
MOlltcrey and the Portuguese frontier fortress, and offers
no ground suitable for defence. Accordingly Silveira very
prudently decided to withdraw his tumultuary army to the
heights of San Pedro, a league to the south of the town, where
the space betweeu the river and the mountains narrows down
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and offers a short and compact line of resistance. But he waited
to be driven in, and meanwhile left rear-guards in observation at
Feces de Abaxo on the left, and Outeiro on the right bank, of
the Tamcga.
Soult hnltl.-d three days at Montcrcy in order to allow his
rearguard and his convoy of sick to close up with the main
body. But on March 10 he resumed his advance, using the two
parallel roads on the two banks of the Tamega. Flnnceschi's
light horse and Heudclct'g division pushed down the eastern
side,Caulaincourt's brigade ofdragoons 1 and Delaborde's infantry
down the western side of the river. l\Ierle and .:\Iennet were
still near Verin. As the Tamega was unfordable in most places,
the army seemed dangerously divided, hut Soult knew well that
he was running little or no risk. Both at Feces and Outeiro
the Portuguese detachments, which covered Silveira.'s main body,
tried to offer serious resistance. They were of course routed,
'with the loss of a gun and many prisoners.
On hearing that his e.nemy was drawing ncar, Silvcim ordered
his whole army to retreat behind Chaves to the position of San
Pedro 2. This commalld nearly cost him his life; the ignorant
masses of militia and OrdelUlllZa could only see treason in the
proposed move, which abandoned the town to the French. The
local troops refused to march, and threatened to shoot their
general: he withdrew with such of his men as would still
obey orders, but a mixed multitude consisting of part of
the 12th regiment of the line (the Chaves regiment), and
a mass of Ordenallza and militia, remained behind to defend
the dilapidated town. Its walls had never been repaired
since the Spaniards had breached them in 1762; of the
fifty guns whidl armed them the greater purl were destitute of
carriages, and rusting away in extl"Cme old age; the supply of
powder and cannon-balls was wholly insufficient for even a short
siege. But encoura.:,<red by the advice of an incompetellt
engineer officer 3, who said that a few barricades would make
1 Of IAhoussaye's division.
S Brotherton to Cnulor:k, from POl"Oll de Aguillr, March 13.
3 He was called Magcllmcs Pil\ll.rro, hilt cannot be said to have shown
either the endurllllce of the Portuguese seamllll, or tIlC reckless courage of
the Spanish IWnqlJistador) whose historic names he Lore.
OllA1\'. u q
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the place impregnable, 8,000 men shut themselves up in it, and
aided by I,WO armed citizens, defied SouIt, and opened a furious
fire upon the vedettes which he pushed up tn the foot of the
walls. The Marshal sent in a fruitless summons to surrender,
and then im'€sted the place on the evening of the tenth; all
night the garrison kept up a haphazard cannonade, and shouted
defiance to the French. Next morning Smut resolved to
drive away Silveira from the neighbouring heights, convinced
that the spirits of the defenders of Chaves would fail the
moment thnt they saw the field anny acCented and forced to
abscond. The divisions ofDclaborde and Lahouf\SiLye soon com·
pelled Sil"eira to give ground: he displayed indeed a laudable
prudence in refusing to let himself be caught and surrounded,
and made off south-eaStward towards Villa Real with 6,000 or
7,000 men. 'l'he :Marshal then summoned Chaves to surrender
for the second time; the garrison seem to have tired them-
selves out with twelve hours of patriotic shouting, and to hltve
used up great part of their munitions in their silly nocturnal
fireworks. "Vhen they saw Silveira driven away, their spirits
sank, and they allowed their leader, Magelhaes Pizarro, to
capitulate, without remonstl·ance. In short, they displayed even
more cowardice on the eleventh than indiscipline upon the tenth
of March. On the twelfth the French entered the city in
triumph.
Soult was' much embarrassed by the multitude of captives
whom he had taken: he could not spare an escort strong
enough to guard 4,000 prisoners to a place of safety. Accord-
ingly he made a virtue of ne<.-essity, permitted the armed citizens
of Chaves to retire to their homes, and dismissed the mass
of 2,500 Ordenanza and militia-men, after extracting from them
an oath not to serve against France during the rest of the war.
The 500 regulars of the l£th regiment were not treated in the
same way. The Man:;hal offered them the choice between
cnptivity and enlisting in El. Franco-Portuguese legion, which
he proposed to raise. To their great discredit the majority,
both officers and men, took the latter alternative-though it
was with the sole idea of deserting as soon as possible. At the
same moment Soult made an identical offer to the Spanish
prisoners captured from Mah)"s division at the combats of
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Osoilo "and La Trepa on March 6: the)' beha\"ed no better than
the Portuguese: several hundred of them took the oath to King
Joseph, and consented to enter his service I.
The Duke of Dalmatia had resolved to make Chavcs his base
for further operations in Portugal. He brought up to it frolll
Montere)' all his sick and wounded, including those who had
been transported from Orense; the total now amounted to
1,g~5,of whom many were convalescents already fit for sedentary
duty. To guard them a single company of a French regiment,
and the inchoate' Portuguese Legion,' were detailed, while the
command was. placed in the hands of the duif de bataillon
M~"'er. The flour and ungroulld wheat found in the place
fed the amy for several days, and the small stock of powder
captured was utilized to replenish its depleted supply of
cartridges.
From Chaves Soult had the choice of two roads for marching
on Oporto. The more obvious route on the map is that which
descends the Tamega almost to its jUllction with the Douro,
and then shikcs across to Oporto by Amarante and Pcnnficl.
But here, as is so often tbe case in the Peninsula, the map
is the worst of guides. The road along the river, frequently
pinched in between the water and overhanging mountains,
presents a series of defHes and strong positions, is considerably
longc.t thnn the alternative route, Ilnd passes through difficult
country welluigh from start to finish.
The second path from Chaves to Oporto is that which strikes
westward, crosses the Serra da Cabrem, and descends into the
valley of the Cavado by Ruivaens and Salamonde. From thence
it leads to Brags, on the great coast-road from Valenza to
Oporto. The first two or three stages of this route are rough and
difficult, and pass through grOl.md even more defensible than
that on the way to Amarante and Penafiel. But when the
nlgged defiles of the watershed between the Tamcga and the
Cavado have been passed, and the invader has reached Braga.
the cQuntry bceomes flat and open, and the coast plain, crossed
by two excellent roads, leads him easily to his goal. It has also
to be reme'inbered that, by adopting this alternative, Soult
1 See Naylies, p. 81; St. Chamans, p. 120; Le Koble, p. 120; and Des
Odoards, p. 213.
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took in the l'Cm the Portuguese fortresses of the lower :31inho,
and made it easy to reopen communications with Tuy and the
French forces still remaining ill Galicia.
[f allY other persuasion were needed to induce \hc Marshal
to take the western, and not the eastem, road to Oporto, it was
the knowledge of the position of the enemy which he had
attained by diligent cavalry recOlmaissances. It was ascertained
that Silveira with the Tcmains of his division had fallen back
to Villa POUC8., more than thirty miles away, in the direction of
Villa Ileal. He could not be caught, and qanld retreat whither-
soevcr he pleased. Frcil'C, 011 the other haud, was lying at
Braga with his unwieldy masses, and had made no attempt
to march forward and fortify the pas.<;es of the Serrs. da Cabrera.
By all accounts that the horsemen of Fl'anceschi could gather,
the defiles were blocked only by the 01'delWIIZa of the mountain
villages.
This 'ftStounding news was absolutely correct. Freire's obvious
course was to defend the rugged watershed, where positiollS
abounded. But he contented himself'with placing mere observa-
tion posts-bodies of thirt)' or 100 men-in the passes, while
keeping his main army concentrated. The truth was that he
was in a state of deep depression of mind, and prcpared for
a disaster. Judging from the line which he ndopted in the
previous year, while co-operating with Wellesley in the campaign
against Junot, we may set him down as a timid rather than
a cautious gcnernl. He had no confidence in himself or in his
troops: the indiscipline and mutinous spirit of the motley levies
which he commanded had reduced. him to despair, and he
received no support from the Bishop of Opotto and his fadion,
who were omnipotent in the province. Repeated demands for
reinforcements of regular troops had brought him nothing but
the 2nd battalion of the Lusitanian ugion, under Baron Ebell.
The Bishop kept back the greater part of the resources of which
he could dispose, for' the defence of his own city. in front of
which he was erecthlg a great entrenched. camp. Freil'C had
also called on the Regency for aid, but they had done no marc
than order two line battalions under General Vittoria to join
him, and these troops had not yet crossed the Donto. 'Vhen
he heard that the French were on the march, and that he
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himself would be the next to receive their visit, he so far lost
heart that he contemplated retiring on Oporto without attempt-
ing to fight. 1I'1stead of defending the defiles of Ruivaens and
Salamonde,. he began to send to the rear his heavy stores, his
military chest, and his artillery of position. This timid resolve
was to be his ruin, for the c.xcitable and suspicious multitude
which surrounded him had c\'ery intention of defending their
homes, and could only see treason and cowardice in the prepara·
tions for retreat. In fL few days their fury was to burst forth
into open mutiny, to the destruction of their general and their
own ultimate ruin.
Soult meanwhile had set out from Chaves on March 14, with
Franceschi and Delaborde at the head of his column, as they had
been in all the operations since their departure from Orense.
1\1ermct and Lahoussaye's drl\,O"Qolls followed on the fifteenth:
Heudelet, with whom were the hend quarters' staff and the
baggage, marched on the sixteenth: l\:1erle, covering the refir
of the army, came in from Monterey on that day, and started
from Chaves on the s~,"enteenth. Only ViaJannes' brigade of
dragoons 1 was detached: these two regiments wel'C dirceted
to make a feint upon Villa Real, with the ohject of frightening
and distracting Si!veira, lest he should return to his old post
when he heard that the French army had departed, and fall
upon the rear of the marching columns. They beat up his
outposts at Villa Poucn., announced everywhere the Marshal's
approach with his main body, and retired under cover of the
night, after having deceived the Tras-os~j\1ontes troops for
a couple of days.
The divisions of Delaborde and Franceschi, while clearing the
passes above Chaves, met with a desperate but futile resistance
from the OrdenrJ.,nza of the upper Cavado valley. Practically
nnaided by Freire, who had only sent to the defile of Salamonde
300 regular troops-a misemble mockery of assistance-the
gulJant peasantry did their best. 'Even the smalle.1: villages,'
wrote an aide-de-camp of Soult, 'tried to defend themselves.
It was not rare to see a peasant barricade himself all alone in his
house, and tire from the windows on our men, till his door was
, Lorges' other brignde, tlmt of Foumier, had been (as it will be remem~
bered) left. behilld in Gnlicia "ith n.Jnrshal Ney.
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battered in, and he met his death on our bayonets. The
Portuguese defended themsehes with desperation, and never
asked for quarter: if only these brave llnd devoted fellows boo
possessed competent leaders, we should have been forced to gh-e
up the expedition, or else we should never have got out of the
countr:r. But their resistance was individual: eiLCh man died
defending his hamlet or his home, and a single battalion of our
advanced guard easily cleared the way for us. I saw during
these days young girls in the fighting-line, firing on us, and
meeting their death without recoiling a step. The priests hud
told them that they were martyrs, and that all who died defending
their country went straight to paradise. In these petty combats,
which lasted day after day, wc frequently found, among the
enemy's' dead, monks in their- robes, their- crncifL"es still clasped
in their- hands. Indeed, while advancing we could see from afar
these ecclesiastics p£\.Ssing about among the peasants, and ani*
mating them to the combat 1•••• "Vhilc the columns were on
the march isolated peasants kept up a continual dropping fire
on us fmm iJlaccessible crags above the road: at night they
attacked our sentries, or crept down close to our bivouacs to
shoot at the men who sat round the blaze. This sort of war
was not very deadly, but infinitely fatiguing: there was not
a moment of the day or night when we had not to be upon the
qui vive. MOIW\'er, every' man who strayed from the ranks,
whether he was sick, drunk, tire<:l, or merely a marauder, was
cut off' and massacred. The peasants not only murdered them,
but tortured them in the most horrid fashion before putting
them to death to'
Among scenes of this description Fro.llccschi and Dclabol'de
forced their way down the valley of the Cavado, till they arrived
at tile village of Car\'alho d'Este, six miles from Braga, where
1 Every French diarist of &uJt's anny has tales of the stoic courage
displayed by the Portuguese clergy, A story from Naylies of Lahoussare's
dragoons may serl'e as an example. Kear Dmga he came on a cart escorted
by a single priest with a gun 011 his shoulder. He was the chaplain of
8 collvcnt, who \\'W! taking out of llarnl's \I'ay 11 party of nUlIs. \Vllell ha
saw himself ol'ertaken, lw quietly waited in the middle of the rou.d, shot
the first dragoon dead, and was killed by the secolld lIS he was tr}'iug
to reload his musket.
t St. Chamans, Mimoires, pp. 119-21.
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they found a. range of hills on both sides of the road, occupied
by the whole horde of ~5,OOO men who had been collected by
Freire. The division which followed the French advanced guard
had also to sustain several petty combats, for the survivors of
the OrdellallZa whom Deluborde had swept out of the WI\Y, closed
in again to molest each column, as it passed by the defiles of
Venda~NoYa, RuivaenSt and Salamonde. Mermet's division,
which brought up the rear, had to beat off' a serious attack
from Silveira's army 1, For that general, ilS soon as he dis-
covered t1lut he ha.d been fooled by Lorges' dcmonstrutioll, sent
across the Tamega a detachment of 3,000 men, who fell upon
Soult's rear. But a single regiment dro\'e them off without much
difficulty: they drew back to their own side of the mountains,
and did not quit the valley of the Tamega.
It was on March 17 that F'ranceschi and Delaborde pushed
forward to the foot of the Portuguese position, which swept
round in a semicircle on each side of the high-road. Its western
half was composed of the plateau of Monte Adaufe, whose left
ovcrhanbJ'$ the river Cavado, while its right slopes upward to join
the wooded Monte Vallongo. This latter hill is considerably
more lofty than the Monte adaufe and less easy of access.
In front of the position, and bisected by the high-road, is the
village of Carvalho d'Este: at the foot of the Monte Vallongo
is another Yillage, Lanhozo, whose name the French have chosen
to bestow on the combat which followed. To the left-renr of
the Monte Adauf6, pressed in between its slopes and the river,
is a third village, Ponte do Prado, with a bridge across the
Cavado, which is the only one by which the position can be
turned. The town of Braga lies three miles further to the rear.
The invaders halted 011 seeing the whole range of hills, some six
miles long, CrOWnL.fl. with masses of men in position. Frttll(.'Cschi
would not take it upon himself to attack such a multitude, even
though they were but peasantry and militia, of the same quality
as the horde that had been defeated near Chaves It few days
before. He sent back word to the Marshal, and drew up in
front of the position to await the arrival of the main body.
1 For c<Imbats waged b)' Lahonssare's dragoons, who were in the middle
of the long column, see the journal of Naylies (pp. 63--4). For attach on
Mermet, in the rear column, see }'antin des Odoards (p. 214).
BRAGA Ac'lD OPORTO [l\fARCIl 18
But noting that a long rocky spur of the Monte Adaufe pro-
jected from the main block of high ground which the enem~'was
holding, he caused it to be attacked by Foy's brigade of info.ntry,
and drove back without much difficulty the advanced guard of
the Portuguese. The possession of this hill gave the French
l~ foothold OIl the heights, and an advantageous emplacement
for artillery such as could not be found in the plain below.
It was three days before the rest of Soult's army joined the
leading division-not until the twentieth was his entire force,
with the exception of Mcrle's infantry, concentrated at the foot
of the enemy's position, and ready to attack. This long period of
waiting, wbell every mind was screwed up to the highest pitch
of excitement, had completely broken down the nerve of the
Portuguese, who spent the hours of respite in hysterical tumult
and rioting. Freire, as we have already seen, had been planning
a retreat on Oporto, but he found the spirit of his army so
e.'mlted that he thought it better to conceal his project. He
pretended to have abandoned the idea of retiring, and gave
orders for the construction of entrenchments and batteries Oil
the Monte Adaufe, to enfilade the main approach by the high·
road. But he eould not disguise his down-heartedncss, nor
persuade his followers to trust him. Presently the wrecks of the
Ordenanza levies, who had fought at Salamonde, fell baek upon
Brnga, loudly accusing him of cowardice, for not supporting
them in their advanced position. The whole camp was full
of shouting, objectless firing in the air, confused cries of treason,
and mutinous assemblies. On the day when the French appeared
in front of the position Freire grew so alarmed at the threats
against his life, which resounded on every side, that he secretly
quitted Braga to fly to Oporto. But he was recognized and
seized by the Ordenallza of Tobossa, a few miles to the rear.
They brought him baek to the camp as a prisoner, and handed
him over to Baron Eben, the cololld of the ~nd battalion of
the Lusitauian Legion, who had been acting as Freire's sccoud-
in-command. This officer, an ambitious and presumptuous man,
and a great ally of the Bishop of Oporto, played the demagogue,
hanmgued the assembled multitude, and readily took over the
charge of the army. He consigned his unfortunate predecessor
to the gaol of Braga, and led QIl the mutineers to reinforce the
16001 MURDER OF FREIRE
alTa)" on Monte Adnufe. W'hcn Ebcn had departed, n. party of
Ordellam:a returned to the city, dragged out the wretched Freire,
and killed him in the street with their pikes. The same after-
noon they murdered Major Villasboas, the chief of Freire's
engilll..'Crs, and onc or lllorc of his aides-de-camp. 'l'hc)' also
seized and threw into prison the corregidor of Braga, and several
other persons accused of sympathy with the :French.Eben
appem'S to have winked at these ntrocities-lllllCh as his friend
the Bishop of Oporto ignored the murders which were taking
place in that city. By assuming command in the irregular
fashion that we have seen, he had made himself the slave of
the hysterical horde that surrounded him. and had to let
them do what they pleased, lest he should fall under suspicion
himselfl.
It would seem, however, that Eben did the little that was
possible with such material in preparing to oppose Soult. He
threw up more entrenchments on the Monte Adaufe, mounted
the few guns that he possessed in commanding situations, and
did his best to add to the lamentably depleted store of muni-
tions on hand. E,'en the church roofs were stripped for lead,
when it was found that there was absolutely no resen'e of cart-
ridges. and that the Ordenanza had wasted half of their stock
in demonstrations and profitless firing at the French vedettes.
On the morning of the nineteenth he extended llis right wing
to some hills below the Monte Vallongo. beyond the village of
Lanhozo. a movement which threateried to outflank and sur·
round that part of the French anny which was in front of him,
and to cut it off from the divisions still in the rear. This couJd
not be tolerated, and Mermet's infantry were dispatched to
l I agree witll General Arteclle in thinking tliat Eben's dispatcll to
Cradock, from which tllis narrative is mainly drawn, does him no credit.
Indeed, it is eaay to adopt the sinister view that Eben wa.s aiming at
getting the oommand, did nothing to diISCourage the mob. and wa.s
indirectly responsible for Freire's murder. As Artoolle remarks' with
llo little more resolution and a little less personal amhition. the Baron
could probably have prevented tl16 catastrophe' (vo1. v. p. 393). Dut
Freiro's conduct had been so cowardly and incapable tllat the peasants
were reasonably incensed with him. Why llad he not defended the rugged
defiles of Vellda No"a and Salamonde, and what could e~cuse his abscor0ing
and abandoninK his army?
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dislodge the ~,OOO men who had taken up this advanced
position. They were easily beaten out of the village and off'
the hill, and retired to their former station on the Monte
VaUongo. The :French here captured two guns and some
prisoners. Soult gave these men l'opies of a proclamation
which he had printed at Cha.ves, offering pardon to all Portu-
guese who should lay down their arms, and sent them back into
Eben's lines under a flag of truce. "''ben the O,"dcllanua dis-
covered what the papers were, they promptly put to death the
twenty unfortunate men as traitors, without listening to their
attempts to explain the situation.
On the morning ofl\1arch 201 Soult had been joined by Lorges'
drRefJ'Oons and his other belated detachments, and prepared to
attack the enemy's position. To defend it Eben had now,
beside 700 of bis own Legion \ one incomplete line regiment
(Viana, no. 9), the militia of Bragn and the neighbouring places,
and some 23,000 Ordenanza le\"ies, of whom 5,000 had firearms.
11,000 pikes, and the remaining 7,000 nothing better than
scythes, goads, and instruments of husbandry. There were about
fifteen or twenty pieces of artillery distributed along the front
of the six·mile position, the majority of them in the entrench·
ments on the Monte Adaufe, placed so as to command the
high-road.
Knowing the sort of rabble that was in front of him, Soult
made no attempt to turn or outflank the Portuguese, but resolved
to deliver a frontal attack all along the line. in the full belief
that the enelllY would give way the moment that the charge
was pwheu home. He had now about 3,000 camlry and 13.000
infantry with him-Merle being still absent. He told off'
Delaborde's division with Lahoussaye's dragoons to assail the
enemy's centre, on both sides of the high-road, where it (:fOsses
the Monte Adaufe. l\:{el'met's infantry and Franceschi's light
horse attacked, on the left, the wooded slopes of the :\lonte
Vallongo. Heudelet's division, on the right, sent one brigade to
storm the heights above the river, and left the other brigade us
a general reserve for the arm)'. Lorges'dragoons were also held
back in support.
• Eben's diSPAtch is in the Record Office, in the mis<:ellaueous volume at
tile end of tlle Portugal 1809 series.
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As might have been expected, Soult's dispositions were
completely successful. When the columns of Delahorde and
Heudelet reached the foot of the enemy's position, the motley
horde which occupied it broke out into wild cheers and curses,
and opened a heavy but ineffective fire. They stood us long as
the French were climbing up the slopes, but when the infantry
debauched on to the plateau of Monte Adaufe they began to
w/wer lllId disperse 1. Then Soult let loose the cavalry of
Lahoussuye, which h8.(l trotted up the high-road close in the
rear ofDelaborde's battalions, the 17th Dragoons leading. There
was no time for the reeling mass of peasants to escape. • 'Ve
dashed into them,' wrote one officer who took pari in the charge2;
• we made a great butchery of them; we drove on among them
pell-mell right into the streets of Bmgu, and wc pushed them
two leagues fwther, so that we covered in all foux leagues at
full gallop without giving them a moment to rally. Their
guns, their baggage, their military chest, many stroldards fell
into our power3.'
Such was the fate of the Portuguese centre, on each side of
the high-road. Further to the right, abo\'e the Cavado,
Hcudclct was equally successful in forcing his wuy up the
northem slopes of the Monte Adaufe; the enemy broke v.:hen
he reached the plateau, but as he had no hea\')' force of cavalry
with him, their flight was not so disastrous or their loss so heavy
as in the centre. Indeed, when they had been swept down into
the valley behind the ridge, some of the Portuguese turned to
bay at the Ponte do Prado, and inflicted it sharp check on the
Hanoverian legioll, the lending batl:alion in Heudelct's advance.
It was ·not till the 26th of the line came up to aid the Germans
that the rallied peasantry again broke and fled. They only lost
300 men in this part of the field.
, Eben, in his report, says that at the moment of the French assault one
of his guns in the battery commanding tlu:~ high-road burst, and killed
many of tllOse standing about, and that tlle rout commenced with the
stampede caused by this explosion.
~ Naylies [of the 19th Dragoons], p. 87.
~ Even while Bying through the streeu of Braga, some of the routed
horde found time to pay a visit to the town gaol, and to murder the
corngidor and the other prisoners who had been placed there on the
eighteenth.
~86 DRAGA AND OPORTO [MAru:J11 ~3
Far to the left, in the woods on the slope of the Monte
Vullongo, Mennet and France.~hi had found it much harder to
. win their way to the edge of the plateau than had the troops in
the centre. But it was only the physical obstacles that detained
them: the resistance of the eDemy was c\'en feebler than in the
centre. By the time that the infantry of Mermet emerged on
the crest of the hill, the battle had already been won elsewhere.
The Portuguese right wing crumpled up the moment that it
was attacked, and, fled devious over the hillsides, followed by
Frauccschi's Cllvalry, who made Cl dreadful slaughter among the
fugitives. Five miles behind their original position a body of
militia with four guns rallied under the cliffs on which stands
the village of FalpeITll. The cavalry held them in check till
l\fcrmct's leading regiment, the 31st Uge!", came up, and then,
attacked by both anns at once, the whole body was ridden
down and almost e.xterminated. 'The commencement was
a fight, the end a butchery,' wrote an officer of the 31st; 'if our
enemies had been better armed and less ignorant of the art of
war, they might have made us pay dearl), for our victory. But
for lack of muskets they were half of them armed with pikes
only: they could not manreuvre in the least. How was such
a mob to resist us? they could only have held their ground jf
they had been behind stone walls 1.'
The rout and pursuit died away in the southern valleys
beyond Bragn, and Soult could take stock of his \·ictory. He
had captured seventeen guns, five flags, and the whole uf the
stores of Eben's army: he had killed, according to his own
estimate, some 4,000 men 2, and taken only 400 prisoners. 'Ibis
shocking disproportion between the dead and the captives was
caused by the fuet that the French in most part<; of the field
had given no quarter. Some of their historians explain that
their cruelty resulted from the discovery that the Portuguese
had been murdering and mutilating the stragglers who fell
into their hauds 3. But it was rcnll)' due to the exasperation of
I Fantin des Odoards, p. 216.
~ EOOn, in his report to Cradock at the Record Office, says 1,000 only,
of whom more than 200 belonged to the Lusitanian Legion.
~ Le Noble, p. 142: St. Charoalls, p. 121. Naylies and Fautin des
Odoanls, though botll mentioning the slaughter ill which the)' took Imrt,
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spirit that always accompanies guerrilla warfare. Constantly
worried by petty ambushes, 'sniped' in their bivouacs, never
allowed a moment of rest., the soldiers were in a state of nervous
irritntion which found vent in needless alld unjustifiable cruelty.
In the fight they had lost only forty killed and 160 wounded,
figures which afford no excuse for the wholesale slaughter in the
pursuit to which they gave themselves up.
In the first flush of victory the French supposed that they
had mude an end of the Ordcnanza, and thut northern Portugal
was at their feet. 'Cctte journee a etC fatale A l'illsurrection
portugaise,' wrote one of the victors in his diary!. But no
greater mistake could have been made: though many of the
l'Outed horde dispersed to their homes, the majority rallied again
behind the Av6, only ten or twelve miles fmm the bntUe·field.
Nor did the battle of Braga even open the way to Galicia:
General Botilho, with the levies of the Valenza and Vianadistrict,
closed in behind Soult and blocked the way to Tuy, the nearest
French gllM'ison. Tbe Marshal had only conquered the ground
on which he stood, and already his communication with Chavcs,
llis last base, had been intcrceptl..'{]. by detachments sent into the
passes by Silveira.
Soult halted three days at Brags., a time which he utilized for
the repair of his artillery, and the replenishing of the cartridge
boxes of his infantry from the not too copious supply of munitions
captured from the Portuguese. His eavalry scoured the country
down the Cavado as far as Barcellos, and southward to tile line
of the Ave, only to find insurgents everywhere, the bridges
broken, and the fords dredged up and staked.
The Marshal, however, undaunted by the gloomy outlook,
resolved to march straight for his destined goal, without paying
any attention to his communications- He now made Draga
a temporary base, left there Heudelet's division in charge of 600
sick and woundl..'<1, and moved 011 Oporto at the head of his threc
rcmaining infantry divisions and all his c£n·alry.
Two good c!ullVJ8feS, and one additional mountain road of
inferior character, lead from Brags. to Oporto, crossing the Ave,
do not give this justification for it. TIle mtter sa}"ll that the French gave
no quarter &aye to men in uniform.
1 Falltiu des Odoards, p. 216.
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the one four, the next six, the third twenty-four miles from the
sea. The first and most westerly passes it at Ponle de Av€, the
second at Bllrca de Trofa, where there is bOUl a bridge and
a ~'ide ford, the third and least obvious at Guimaraens not far
from its source in the Serm de Santa Catalina. 80u1t resoh'ed
to use all three for his adn\.!u:e, wisely taking the difficult road
by Guimaraens into his scheme, siJlce he guessed that it would
probably be ullwatched by the Portuguese, precisely because it
was far less eligible than the other two. He was perfec;tly right:
the Bishop of Oparta, the moment that he heard of the full of
Braga, pushed up some artillery and militia to aid the Ordenallzu
in defending both the Panle de AYt~ and the Darca de 'frora
bridges. Each was cut: batteries were hastil)' thrown up com-
manding their approaches, and entrenchments were constructed
in their rear. At DaTC8. de 1'rofa the ford was dredged up and
completely blocked with chevaux de frise. But the remote and
secondary passage at Guimaraens was comparatively neglected,
and lcft in charge of such of the local OrdCllanza as hnd retul'lloo
home after the rout of Braga.
Soult directed Lorges'dragoons against the western road; he
himself with Delaborde's and l\{crlc's infantry and Lahoussayc's
cavalry took the central clU1UfJsee by Barca de Trofa. On the
difficult flanking path by Guimaraens he sent FrMceschi's light
horsc and 1.fcClnet's infantry. On both the main ronds the
Portuguese positions were so strong that the a(h'ancing columns
were held back: Soult would not waste men-he was beginning
to find that he lmd nonc to spare-in attempting to force the
entrenched positions 9pposite him. After feeling them with
caution, he pushed a column up-stream to a small bridge at
San .Justo, which had been barricaded but not broken. Here
he established by night a heavy battery commandiug the
opposite bank. On the morning of the twenty-sixth he opened
flre on the Portuguese positions across the water, and, when the
enemy had been well battered, hurled the brigade of General
Foy at the fortified bridge. It was carried, and Delaborde's
division was beginning to pass, wben it met another French
force debauching on the same point. This was composed of
Mermet and Franceschi's men: they hud beaten the local
Ordenanza at Guimaraens, erossed the Ave high up, and were
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now pushing along the soulhem bank to take the Barca de
Trofa position in the flank. Thus Soult found that, even if his
frontal assault at San Justo' had failed, his left-hand column
would have cleared the way for him a few hours later, being
nh'CUdy u.cross the river and in the enemy's rear. Indeed his
lateral detachment hud done ull that he had expected from it,
and at no great cost. For though the Ordelwnza had opposed
it bravely enough, they had never been able to hold it back.
The only notable loss that had been sustained was that of
General Jardon, oue of Mennet's brigadiers, who had met his
death by his own rt.'Cklessness. Finding his men checked for
a moment, he had seized a musket and charged on foot at the
head of his skirmishing line. This was not the place for
a brigadier-geneml, and Jardon died unnecessarily. doing the
work of a sub-lieutenant.
Finding the French across the river at San Justo, the Portu-
guese, who were defending the lower bridges. had to gi,'e way, or
they would have been surrounded and cut ofE They yielded
unwillingly, and at Ponte de Ave actually bent ofi' the first
attempt to eviet them. But in the cnd they had to fiy, abandon-
ing the artillery in the redoubts that covered the two bridges 1.
On the twenty-seventh, therefore, Soult was able to press close
in to Oporto, for the line of the Ave is but fifteen miles north of
the city, On approaching the heights which overhang the Douro
the Fl"cnch found them covered with entrenchments and batteries
nlllgcd Oil [l long front of six or sevcn miles, from San .Toao de
Foz on the sea-shore to the chapel of BoUl Fin o\'crlooking the
river above the town, Ever since the departure of the French
from Orense and their crossing of the frontier had become
known, the whole of the populace had been at work. on the
fortifications, under the direction of Portuguese and British
engineer officers, In three weeks an cnormous amount of work
had been done. The rounded summits of the line of hills, which
1 Le Noble (pp. 167-8), aud Napier following him, Ba}' that the
Portuguese murdered their commander, Brigadiel'-General Val10Jlgo,
when tlle 11ridgw were forced, toro him in pieccs, and buried his sc....ttered
members ill a dungllill. It i8 l\ relief to know from Da Lu7. Sorial1oJ
tile Portuguese historian, that nothing of the kind occurred, and that
there WIlS no officer of the name of Vallongo i~ the Portuguese army,
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rise immediately north of the city, and only half R. mile in advance
of its outermost houses, hurl been crowned with twelve redoubt!!,
armed with artillery of position. The depressions between the
redoubts had been closed by palisades and abattis. Further
west, below the city. where the line of hills is less marked, the
front was continued by a deep ditch, fortified buildings, and four
strollg redoubts placed in the more exposed positions. It ended
at the walls of San JOM do. Faz, the old citadel which commands
the mouth of the Douro, and had in this direction an Qutwork
in another ancient fort, the castle of Quejo, on the sea~shore
a mile not-th of the estuary. There were no less tha.n 197 guns
of various calibres distributed along the front of the lines. Nor
was this all: the main streets of the place had been barricaded
to serve as t1 second line of dcfence, and even south of the river
a battery had been constructed 011 the height crowned by the
Seaa Convent, which overlooks the bridge and the whole city.
To hold this enormous fortified camp the Bishop of Oporto
had collected an army formidable in numbers if not in quality.
There was a strong nucleus of troops of the regular army: it
included the two local Oporto regiments (6th and 18th of the
line), two more battalions brought in by Brigadier-General
ViUoria, who had been too lute to join in the defeuce of Braga,
a battalion of the regiment of Valenza (no. 21). a fraction of
that of' Viana (no. 9), with the wrecks of the 2nd battalion of
the Lusitanian Legion, which had escaped from Ebcu's rout of
the twentieth, and the skeleton of an incomplete cavalry
regiment (no. 12, Mimnda). In all there cannot have been
less than 5,000 regular troops ill the town, though many of the
men were recruits with only a few weeks of service. To these
may be added three or four militia regiments in the same con-
dition as were the rest of' the corps of that force, i. e, half-armed
and less than half-disciplined 1. But the large majority of the
garrison was composed of the same sort of levies that had
already fought with such small success at Chaves and Braga-
there were 9,000 armed citi7.ens of Gporto and a somewhat
greater number of the Ordena1lza of the open country, who had
retired into the city before Soull's advancing columns. The
1 Apparentlr the regiments of Oporto, Daltar, Feira, and Villa de
Conde.
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whole mass-regulars and irregulars-may have made up a force
of80,000 men-nothing like the 40,000 or 60,000 of the .French
reports 1. Under the Bishop the military commanders were
three native brigadier-generals, Lillla-Barreto, Parreiras, ana
Vittoria. Eben had been offered the charge of a section of the
defences, but-depressed with the results of his experiment in
genemlship at Braga-he refused any other responsibility than
that of leading his battalion of the Lusitanian ugion. TIle
Bishop had allotted to Parreitall the redoubts and entrench-
ments on the north of the town, to Vittoria those on the north-
east and east, to Lima-Barreto those below the town as far as
St. Jo1i.o da Foz. The regulars had been divided up, so as to
give two or three battalions to each general; thcy were to form
the reserve, while the defences were lllanned by the militia and
Orde"anza. There was a lamentable wailt of trained guntlers-
less than 1,000 artillerymen were available for the 200 pieces in
the lines and on the beights be)'ond the river. To make up the
deficiency many hWldrcds of raw militia-men had been turned
Ovcr to the commundcrs of the batteries. The natural result
. was s(."en in the inferior gunnery displayed all along the line
upon the fatal twenty-ninth of March.
To complete the picture of the defenders of Oporto it must
be added that the anarchy tempered by assassination, which had
been prevailing in the city ever since the Bishop assumed
charge of the government, had grown to a head during the last
few days. On the receipt of the Ilews of the disaster at Braga
it had culminated in a riot, during which the populace con-
l:Itituted a sort of Revolutionary Tribunal at the Porto do Olival.
I I draw these deductions from Beresford's and Eben's reports in the
Record Office. Beresford (writing to Castlereagh on March 29, the day of
the storm) complains that he can get no proper <morning states' out of
the officenl at Oporto, but says that the Bishop has there nos, 6 and
10 of the line, Vittoria's two battalions and the wrecks of the 2nd
Lusitanian Legion. He speaks of two or three militia regiments, 9,000
armed citi:.l:ens, and an indefinite number of Ordenanza. Eben gives some
details concerning his own doings. Da Luz Soriano mentions Champlemond
alld his battalion of the 21st of the line, As to the OrdenalIzu, 9,000
flElems a high estimate for the local Oporto horde, for that toWII with
70,000 souls had already supplied two regiments of the line, two batta-
lions of the Lusitanian Legion, and a militia regiment, 6,600 men in all.
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They haled out of the prisons all persons who had been con-
signed to them on a charge of sympathil.ing with the French,
hung fourteen of these unfortunates, including the brigadier-
general Luiz da Oliveim, massacred many more in the streets,
and dragged the bodies round the town on hurdles. The
Dishop, though he hOO 5,000 regular troops at hand, made no
attempt to intervene-' he could not stand in the way of the
righteous vengeance of the people upon traitors: On the night
of tha twenty-eighth he retired to a place of safety, the Serra
Convent across the river, UnCI' bestowing his solemn bcnedict,ion
upon the garrison, and handing oyer the further conduct of the
defence to the three generals whose names we have already
cited. .
The town of Oporto was hidden from Soult's eyes by the
range of heights, crowned by fortifications, which lay before him.
For the place was built entirely upon the dowllslope of the hill
towards the Douro, and was invisible till those approaching it
were within half a mile of its outer buildings.. It is a town of
steep streets running down to the water, and meeting at the
foot of the great pontoon-bridge, more than 200 yarr,1g long,
which links it to the transpontine suburb of Villa Nova, and
the adjacent height of the SeITS. do Pilar. The river front
forms a brood quay, along which were lying at the time nearly
thirty merchant ships, mostly English vessels laden with port
wine, which were wind-bound by ~ persistent ~orth-·Wester, and
could not cross the bar and get out to sea.
Although his previous attempts to negotiate with the
Portuguese hud nut been very fortunate, the Marshal thought
it worth while to send proposals for an accommodation to the
Bishop. He warned him not to expose his city to the horrors
of a sack, pointed out that the raw levies of the garrison must
inevitably be beaten, and assured him that 'the French CAme
not as enemies, hut as the deliverers of Portugal from the yoke
of the English. It was for the benefit of these aliens alone that
the Bishop would expose Oporto to the incalculable calamities
attending a storm I.' The bearer of the Marshal's letter W!lS
a Portuguese major taken prisoner at Braga, who would have
been massacred at the outposts if !;le had not taken the precaution
1 Le Noble, p. 161.
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of explaining to his countrymen that Soult had sent him in to
propose the surrender of the French army. which was appalled
at the formidable series of defences to which it found itself
opposed! The reply sent by the Bishop and his council of
war was, of course, defiant, and bickering along the front of
the lines immediately began. While the white Bag was still
flying General Foy, the most distinguished of Soult's brigadiers,
trespassed by some misconception within the Portuguese picquets
and was made prisoner. 'Vhile being conducted into the town
he was nearly murdered, being mistaken for Loison, for whom
the inhabitants of Oporta nourished a deep hatred I.
On finding that the Portuguese were determined to fight,
Smut !?egnn his preparations for n general assault upon the
following day. He drove in the enemy's outposts outside the
town, and captured one or two small redoubts in front of
the main line. l-Iaving reconnoitred the whole position, he told
off Delaborde and Franceschi to attack the nort.h-eastern front,
Mermet and one brigade of Lahoussaye's dragoons to storm the
central parts of the lines, due north of the city, where the
fortifications were most formidable, 'Merle and the other brigade
of Lnhoussaye to press in upon the western entrenchments below
the city. There was no general reserve save Lorges' two
regiments of cavalry, and these had the additional task imposed
upon them of fending oft' any attack on the rear of the army
which might be made by scattered bodies of Ordenan;w, who
1 Some of the Freucll Ivriters say that foy WIl!l taken prisoner while
carrying a flag of truce and a second letter for the Bishop's eye. But
what really seems to have happened was that he conceived a notion that
one of the Portuguese outposts wished to surrender, rode ill amongst
tllcm, and began to llrge them to lay down their arms. But tllcy seized
llim alld $(lut him to the rear; his companion, the chefde bttf41itifm Roger,
drew Ilis sword and tried to cut his war bock to his men, whereupon
he was oo)'ollettcd. Onc callnot blame the PortuguClle, for officel'9, in
time of truce, IIlLVC no right to come witbin the enemY'B IiIlOS, still less to
urge hiB troops to desertion. Foy proved that he was not Loison by
holding up Ilis two hands. Loison being ono-handcl1 (as his nickname
Mallela SlIOWS)J the populacc at once saw that they Ilad made a mistake.
I follow the narrative in Girod. de l'Aill'B new life of Foy (p. 78), corro-
borated by Le Noble (p. 162). Nupicr (H. p. 57), of course,gives a version
uufavourable to the PortUgllCSC.
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were creeping out into the woods along the sea.coast, and
threatening to turn the Marshal's right flank.
Soult had but 16,000 men avnilable,-of whom 3,000 were
cavalry, and therefore could not be employed till the infantry
should have broken through the line of fortifications which
completely covered the Portuguese front. Nevertheless he boo
no doubts of the result, though he hnd to storm works dcfend...>d
by 30,000 men and lined with 197 cannon. He now knc\I' the
exact fighting value of the Portuguese levies, and looked upon
Oporto as his own.
The Marshal's plan was not to repeat the simple and simul~
t8neous frontal attack all along the line by which he had
carried the day at DI·aga. There was a good deal of strategy in
his design: the two flank divisions were ordered to attack,
while the centre was for a time held back. Merle, in especial,
was directed to do all that he could against the weakest point
of the Portuguese line, in thc comparatively level ground to the
west of the city. Soult hoped that a heavy attack in this
direction would lead the enemy to reinforce his left from the
reserves of his centre, nnd gradually to disgarnish the formidable
positions north of the city, when no attack was made Oil
them. If they committed this fault, he intended to hurl
Mermet's division, which he carefully placed under cover till the
critical moment, at the central redoubts. A successful assault
at this point would finish the l:,rame, as it would cut the Portuguese
line in two, and allow the troops to enter the upper quarters of
the city in their first rush.
The French were under arms long ere dawn, waiting for the
signal to attack. 'The Portuguese also were awake and stirring
in the darkness, when at three o'clock a thunderstorm, accom-
panied by a terrific hurricane from the north-west, swept over the
city. In the midst of the elemental din some of the Portuguese
sentinels thought that they had seen the :French columns
advancing to the assault; they fired, the nrtiller)' followoo their
example, Rnd for half Rn hour the noise of the thWlderstorm
was rivalled by that of ~OO guns of position firing at nothing.
Just as the gunners had discovered their mistake, the tempest
passed away, and soon after the .day broke. So drenched and
weary were the French, who had been lying down under the
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torrential rain, that Soult put off the assault for an hour, in order
to allow them to dry themselves and take some refreshment;
the pause also allowed the sodden ground to harden.
At seren all' was ll{.>"Iliu ready, and Merle's and Delaborde's
regiments hurled themselves at the entrenchments above and
below the city. Both made good progress, especially the former,
who lodged themselves in the houses und gardens immediately
under the main line of the Portuguese left wing, and captured
se\"eral of its outlying defences. Seeing the position almost
forced, ])arreiras, the commander of the central part of the
lines, acted just us Soult had hoped, lUld sent most of his resen'c
to reinforce the left. The Marshal then bade Merle hult for
a moment, but ordered Delaborde, on his eastern flank, to push
on as hard Il.S he could. The general obeyed, and charged right
into the Portuguese entrenchments, capturing severnl redoubts
and actuall)· breaking the line and getting a lodgement in the
north-east corner of the city. I'arreir~ to aid his colleague in
this quarter, drew off many of his remaining troops, and sent
them away to the right, thereby leaving his own section of the line
only half manned. Thereupon Soult launched against the central
redoubts his main assaulting column, l\1ermet's division and the
two regiment." ofdragoons. The central battalion went straight
for the main position above the high4road, where the great
Portuguese flag was flying on the strongest redoubt. The
others attacked on each side. This assault was decisive: the
Portuguese gulmers had only time to deliver two ineffective
salvos when the FrClich were upon them. They charged into
the redoubts through the embrasures, pulleddown the connecting
abattis, and swept away the depleted garrison in their first
rush. The line of the defenders was hopelessly broken, and
Mermet's division hunted them down the streets leading to the
river at full speed.
Thc centre being thus driven in, the Portuguese wings saw
that all was lost, and gave way in disorder, looking only for
a line of retreat. Vittona, with the right wing, abandoned
his section of the city and retreated cnst along the Vallongo
road, towards the interior: he got away without much loss, and
even turned to bay and skirmished with the pursuing battalions
of Delaborde when once he was clear of the suburbs. Far other
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was the lot of the Portuguese lcfl; wing, which had the sea' behind
it instead of the open country. General Lima·Barreto, its com-
mander, was killed by his own men: he had given orders to spike
the guns and double to the renr the moment that ne saw the
central redoubts carried. Unfortunately for himself, he was
among a mass of men who '\\;shed to hold on to their entrench-
ments in spite of the disaster on their right. When he reitemted
his order to retl'ea~he was shot down for a traitor. But MerIe's
division soon evicted his slayers, and sent them flying towards
St, Joao dn Foz and the sea.. There was a dreadful slaughter of
the Portuguese in this direction: SOllle escaped across the river
in boats, a large hod)' slipped round Mede's flank and got away
to the north along the coast (though Lorges' dragoons pursued
them among the woods above the water and sabred many):
others threw themselves into the citadel of St. Joan and capitu~
lated on terms. But several thousands, pressed into the angle
between the Douro and the ocean, were slaughtered almost
without resistance, or rolled en massc into the water.
The fate of the POltuguese centre was no less ho~ible. Their
commander, Parreiras, fled early, and got over the bridge to
report to the Dishop the ruin of his army. The main horde
followed him, though many lingered behind, endeavoUl'ing to
defend the barricades in the streets. Wben several thousands
had passed the river, some unknovm officer directed the draw-
bridge between the centcul pontoons to be raised, in order to
prevent the French from following. This was done while the
larger part of the armed multitude was still on the further bank,
hurrying down towards the sole way of escape. Nor was it
only the fighting~menwhose retreat was cut off: when the news
ran round the city that the lines were forced, the civil population
had rushed down to the quays to escape before the sw.:k began.
It was fortunate that half the people had left Oporto dUl'ing the
last two days and taken refuge in Beira. But tens of thousands
had lingered behind, full of confidence in their entrenchments
and their army of defenders. A terrified mass of men, women,
and children now came pow'ing down to the bridge, and mingled
with the remnants of the routed garrison. The pontoons were
still swinging safely on their cables, and no one, save those in
the front of the nlsh, discovered that there was a fatal gap
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in the middle of the passage, where the drawbridge had been
raised. There was no turning back for those already embarked
on the bridge, for the crowds behind continued to push them on,
and it was impossible to make them understand what had
happened. The French had now begun to appear on the quays,
and to attack the rear of the unhappy multitude: their musketry
drowned the cries of those who tried to turn back. At the same
time the battery on the Serra hil~ beyond the river, opened
upon the French, and the noise of its twenty heavy guns made
it still more impossible to convey the news to the back of the
crowd. For more than half an hour, it is said, the rush of fugitives
kept thrusting its own front ranks into the death~trap. forty
feet broad, in the midst of the bridge. If anything more was
needed to add to the horror of the scene, it was supplied by the
sudden rush of a squadron of Portuguese cavalry, which-cut off
from retreat to the east-galloped dmVD from a side street and
ploughed its way into the thickest of the crowd at the bridge-
head, trampling down hundreds of victims, till it was brought to
a standstill by the mere density of the mass into which it had
penetrated. So many persons, at last, were thrust into the
water that not only was the whole surface of the Doum covered
with drowning wretches, but the gap in the bridge was filled up
by a solid mass of the living and thc dead. Ovcr this horrid
gangway, as it is said, some few of the fugitives scrambled to
the opposite bank 1.
At first the French, who had fought their way down to the
qua)', had begun to 6re upon the rear of the multitude which
was struggling to escape. But they soon found that 110 resist-
ance was being offered, and saw that the greater part of the
flying crowd was composed of women, children, and non-com-
batants. The sight was so sickening that their musketry died
1 Le Noble, and Napier following him, state that the breacb in the briflge
W!IS caused merely by some of the central pontoons sinking under the
weight of the passing multitude. Hennegan, who was present in Oporto
that dar, says the same. But it seems safer to follow Da LIl1i &lriano and
other Portuguese witnesses, who state that no suc"b accident occurred, but
that the early fugitives pulled up the drawbridge in order to stay the
pursuit, reckless as to the fate of those who were behiud them. Historians
telling a story to the discredit of their own party may generally be
trusted.
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down, and when they saw the unfortunate Portuguese thrust by
thousands into the water, numbers of them turned to the
charitable work of helping the strugglers ashore, and ga,'ed
many lives. The others cleared the bridge-head by forcing
the fugitives back with the butt ends of their muskets, and
edging them along the quays and into the side streets, till the
way was open. In the late afternoon some of Merruet's troops
mended the gap in the bridge 'with planks and raflers. and
crossed it, despite of the irregular fire of the Portuguese battery
on the heights above. They thcn pushed into thc transpon.
tine suburb, expelled its defenders, and finally climbed the Serra
hill and captured the guns which had striven to prevent their
passage.
Meanwhile the parts of Dporto remote from the pontoon-
bridge had been the scene of a certain amount of desultory
fighting. Many small bodies of the garrison had barricaded
themselves in houses, lLnd made a desperate but ineffectual
attempt to defend them. In the Bishop's palace at the south
end of the town 400 militia held out for some hours, and were
all bayonetted when the gates were at last burst open. Street-
fighting always end.. in mpine, rape and arson, and as the
resistance died down the victors turned their hands to the usual
atrocities that follow a storm. It was only a small proportion
of them who had been sobered and sickened by witnessing the
catastrophe on the bridge. The rest dealt with the houses and
with the inhabitants o.ftcr the fushion usual in the sieges of that
day, and Oporto was thoroughly sacked. It is to the credit of
Soult that he used every exertion to beat the soldiers oft' from
their prey, and restored order long ere the following morning.
It is to be wished that \Vellington had been so lucky at Badajoz
and San Sebastian.
The French army had lost, so the Marshal reported, no more
than eighty killed and 350 wounded, an extraordinary testimony
to the badness of the Portuguese gunnery. How many of the
garrison and the populace perished it will never be possible to
ascertain-the 6gures given by variousoontemporary autholities
run up from 4,000 to ~O,OOO. The smaller number is probably
nearer the truth, but no satisfactory' estimate can be made. It
is certain that some of the regiments which took part in the
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defence were almost annihilated 1, and that thousands of the
inhabitants were drowned in the river. Yet the town was not
depopulated, llnd of its defendeI'il the greater proportion turned
up sooner or later in the ranks of Silveira, Botilho, and Trant,
The slain and the drowned together may perhaps be roughly
estimnted at 7,000 or 8,000, about equally divided betw~n
combatants and non-combatants,
50ult meanwhile could report to his master that the first half
of his orders had been duly carried out. He had captured
~oo cannon, a great store of English ammunition and military
equipmcnt, Rnd more than thirty merchant vessels, laden with
wine. He had delivered Foy and some dozens of other French
captives-for it would be doing the Portuguese injustice to let
it be'snpposed that they had killed or tortured all their
prisoners. In short, the victory und the trophies were splendid:
yet the Marshal was in reality almost as far from having com-
pleted the conquest of northern Portugal as on the day when
he first crossed its frontier. He had only secured for himself
a new base of operation, to supersede Chnves and Braga. For
thc next month he could do no more than endeavour ineffectually
to complete the subjugation of one single province. The main
task which his master had set before him, the capture of Lisbon,
he was never able to contemplate, much less to take in hand.
Like so many other French generals in the Peninsula, he was
soon to find that victory is not the same thing as eonquest.
I }':.g. the 21st of the line l13d even in September, nearly six monUls
after the storm, only 193 men under arms,
N.B.-The sources for tlLis part of the Portuguese campaign are very
full. On the Frellch side we 1111.\'6, besides the Marshal's dispatches, tl.e
following eyu-witnesses: Le Noble, Soult's official chronicler; SL Chamans
(one of the MarBhal's aides-de-cllmp); General BigllrrcJ King Joseph's
representative at the head quarters of the 2nd Corps; Naylies of Lahous-
saye's dragoons; and Fantin des Odoards of the 31st Uger. On the
Portuguese side wc have the lengthy dispatches of EOOn, the narrative
of Hennegan (who had brought the British ammunition to Opqrto), some
letters from Brotherton, who was first with La Romana Rllll tileD with
Silveira, and a quantity of official C<lrrespoudence in the Record Office,
between Beresford and the Portuguese.
SECTION XIII: CHAPTER V
SQULT'S HALT AT QPQRTD: OPERATIONS OF WILSON ON
THE PORTUGUESE FRONTIER: SILVElRA'S DEFENCE
m' AMARAKTE
OPORTO had been conquered: the unhappy levies of the
Bishop had been scattered to the winds: by the captures which
it had made the French army was now, for the first time since
its departure from Orease, in possession of a considerable store
of provisions and an adequate supply of ammunition. Soult
was no longer driven forward by the imperative necessity for
finding new resources to feed his troops, nor forced to hurry all
the fighting by the fear that if he delayed his cartridges would
run short. He had at last leisure to halt and take stock of his
position. The most striking point in the situation was that he
was absolutely ignorant of the general course of the war in the
other regions of the Peninsula. 'When he had been directed to
march on Oporto, he had been assured that he might count on
the co-operation of Lapisse, who was to advance from Salamanca
with his 9,000 men, and of Victor, who was to stretch out to
him a belping hand n:om tbe valley of the Tagus. It was all~
important to know how far the promised aid was being given:
}'et the Marshal could learn nothing. :More than two months
had nov( elapsed since he had received any dispatches from the
Emperor. It was a month since he had obtained his last ne\\'s
of the doings of his nearest colleague, Ne)', which had been
brought to him, as it will be remembered, just as he was about
to leave Orense. At that moment the Duke of Elchingen had
been able to tell him nothing save that the communications
between Galicia and Leon had been brokell, and that the insur·
reclion was daily growing more formidable. After this his only
glimpse of the outer world had been aWorded by Portuguese
letters, seized in the post-offices of Braga and 0POlto, from which
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he had learnt that his garrisons left behind at Viga and 'l'uy
were being beleaguered by a vast horde of Galiciun irregular
levies. 'The march of the 2nd Corp5,~ wrote one of Soult's
officers, 'may be compared to the progress of a ship on the
high seas: she cleaves the wayes, but tlley close behind her, and
in a few moments all trace of her passage has disappeared 1.'
To make the simile complete, Fantin des Odoaros should have
compared Soult to the captain of a vessel in a dense fog,
forging ahcnd through shouls and sandbanks without any possi·
bility of obtaining a general view of the coast till the mists may
lift. To all intents and purposes, we may add, the fog never
dispersed till May had arrived, and Wellesley hurtled down in
a dreadful collision 011 the groping cOlllmander, ere he bad fully
ascertained his own whereabouts.
'When the whole cOllntry.side is up in arms, as it was in
Galicia lLnd northern Portugal in the spring of 1809, it is
useless to dispatch small bodies of men ill search of news. They
are annihilated ill a few hours: but to make large detachments
and send them out on long expeditions, so weakens the main
army that it loses its power of further advance. This was the
fate of the ~nd Corps after the fall of 01'01'00. Soult, compelled
to seek for information at all costs, had to send one of his four
infantry divisions back towards Galicia, to succour Tuy and
Vigo and obtain news of Ney, while another marched eastward
to the 'l'ras-os-Montes, to look for signs of the ad\'lLllce of
La1'issc from Salamanca. 'When these detachments had been
made, the remainder of the army was too weak to resume the
march on Lisbon which the Emperor had ("'Olllmandcd, and was
forced to remain callOOned in the neighbourhood of Oporto.
The details of Soult's disposition of his troops afteJ;: the fa.\l
of Oporto were as follows: Franceschi's cavalry, supported by
Mcrmet's division of infantry, were pushed forward across the
Douro on the road to Coimbra, to watch the movements
of the wrecks of the Bishop's army, which had retired to the
line of the Vouga. Merle's division and half Delaborde's
remained in garrison at Oporto, while Lorges' and one brigade
of Lahoussaye's dragoons were kept not far from them, in the
open country north of the city, about Villa de Conde and
I .Fantin des Odoards j JQurllalj April 2-8, p. 226.
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Vallongo. The other brigade of LllhousSElJe's division, sup-
ported by Foy's infantry, was sent out on an expedition towards
the Tras-os·l\fontes, with orders to bru~h away Silveira and
seek for news of the expected approach of Lapisse. Loison
was placed in command of this detachment. Finally, Heudelet's
division, which had been guarding the sick and the stores of the
army at Bmga, was ordered to send on all the impedimeula
to Oporto, and then to prepare to march northward in order
to relieve Thy and Vigo, and to get into touch with Neyand
the 6th Co,!,,_
It was ic1ear that the further movements of the Duke of
Dalmatia would depend on the intelligence which Loison and
Heudelet might obtain. If Ney should have crushed the Galician
insurgents, if Lapisse should be met with somewhere. on the
borders of Spain, matters would look well for the resumption of
the advance on Lisbon. It was also to be hoped that Lapisse
would be able to give some information as to the doings of
Victor llud the 1st Corps. For it was necessary to find out how
the Duke of BeIlwlO had been faring in Estremadura, and to
know whether he was prepared to co-operate in that general
movement 8gainst the Portuguese capital which the Emperor
had prescribed in his parting instructions from Valludolid.
As a matter of fact, Victor, having beaten Cuesta at l\Iedellill
on the day before Soult captured Oporio (March~), had
reached the end of his initiative, and was now lying at Merida,
incapable, accordiug to his own conception, of any further
offensive movement till he should have received heavy reinforce·
ments. Ney in Galicia was fighting hard against the insurge:nts,
and beginning to discover 'that though he might rout them a
dozen times he could not make an end of them. He had not
a man to spare for Soult's assistance.
There remained Lupisse, who in his central position at OOla·
mnDca should have been, according to Napoleon's design, the
link between Ney, Victor, and Soult. He had been directed, as
it will be remembered I, to move on Ciudad Rodrigo and
Almeida, to capture both these fortresses, and then to advau{.'c
into Portugal and to strike at Abrantes: when he arrived there
it was hoped that he would find Soult on his right and Victor
1 See p. 176.
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on his left, nud would join them in the genernl nssault on
Lisbon. There can be no doubt that Napoleon was giving too
heavy a task to Lapisse: he had but a single division of infantry
-though it was a strong olle of twelve battalions-and one
provisional brigade of cavalry I, in all about 9,000 men. This
was ample for the holding down of the southern parts of the
kingdom of Lean, or even for the attack on Almeida. and
Rodrigo: but it was a small force with which to advance into
the mountains of central Portugnl or to 6Ci7,e Abmntes. If he
had carried out his instrudions, Lu.pisse would have had to
march for nearly ~OO miles through difficult mountain CQllntr)',
beset every day by the Ordenallza, as Soult had been in his
shorter route from Orense to Oporto. And if he had ever cut
his way to Abrant..es, he ought to have found himself faced by
Cradock's 9,000 British troops and by the reorganized Por-
tuguese regular army, which lay in and about Lisbon, with a
strength which even in February was not less than l~,OOO men,
Napoleon had given Lapisse too much to do: but on the
other hand that general performed far too little. Though he
could never have reached Abrantes, he ought to have reached
Almeida, where his presence would have been of material assist-
ance to Soult, more especially if he had from thence pushed
exploring columns towards Lamego and Vizeu, before plunging
into the mountains on the road to the south. As a matter of
fact, Lapis5c in February aud 'March nevcr advanced so much
as fifty miles from Salamanca, and allowl.-u himself to be 'con~
tained' and baffled, for two whole months, by an insignificant
opposing force, commanded by a general possessing that enter-
prisc and initiative which he himself entirely lacked.
The officer who wrecked this part of Napoleon's plan for the
invasion of Portugal was Sir Robert 'Wilson, one of the most
active and capable men iu the English army, and one who might
have made a great name for himself, had fortune been pro~
pitious, But though he served with distinction throughout the
Napoleonic war, and won golden opinions in Belgium and
Egypt, iu Prussia and Poland, no less than in Spain, he never
obtained that command on ll. large scale which would hllve
I On Feb. 1 the foree was, priWlt, 'OlU In ":/"me', 7,692 infantry, about
1,000 cavalrr, and 200 gunners.
•
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enabled him to show his full powers. It may seem singular
that a man who won love and oomiratiOll wherever he went,
who was decorated by two emperors for brilliant feats of arms
done under their eyes, who was equally popular in the Russian,
the Austrian, or the Portuguese camp, who had displayed on
a hundred fields his chivalrolls daring, his ready ingenuity, and
his keen military insight, should fail to achieve greatness. But
Wilson, unhappily for himself, had the defects of his qualities.
'When acting as e. subordinate his independent and self.reliant
character was always ~ttillg him into trouble with his ll.ier-
archical superiors. He was not the man to obey orders which
he believed to be dangerous or mistaken: . he so frequently
'thought for himself' and carried out plans quite different from
those which had been imposed upon him, that no commander:-
in-chief could tolerate him for long. His moves were always
clever and generally fortunate, but mere suceess did not alone
for his disobedience in the eyes of his various chiefs, and he
never remained for long in the same post. All generals, good
and bad, agree in disliking lieutenants who disregard their
orders and carry out other schemes--even if they be ingenious
and successful ones I. It must be added that Wilson dabbled
in politics on the Whig side, and was not a favourite with
Lord Castlereagh, a drawback when preferments were being
distributed.
Dut when trusted 'with any independent command, and
allowed a free hand, 'Wilson always .did well. Not only had he
all the talents of an excellent partisan chief, but hc was onc of
those genial leaders who have the power to inspire conllden<:e
and enthusiasm in their followers, and are able to get out of
them double the work that an ordinary commander can extort.
He WllS in short onc of those mcn who if left to themselves
achie\'c great things, but who whcn placed in a subordinate
position quarrel with their superiors and get sent home in
disgrlce. From the moment when Beresford assumed command
ot' the Portugnese army his relations with Wilsoll were one
long story of friction and controversy, and 'Wcllcslcy (though
I Wellington, e.g., wriWi to him on August 6, 1809, <It is difficult for
.me to instruct you, when every letter that 1 I'(,'(:eive from you imormll me
that you have gone further off, and are executing some plan of your own.'
•
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acknowledging his brilliant services) lTIaOe no attempt to keep
him in the Peninsula. He wanted officers who wou Id obey
orders, even when they did not understand or approve them,
• and would not tolerate lieutenants who wished to argue with
him 1.
It WM Yvilson who first showed that the new levies of Portu-
gal could do good service in the field. While Silveira and Eben
were meeting with nothing but disaster in the Tras-os-Montes
and the Entre-Douro-e-Minho, he was conducting a thoroughly
successful campaign on the borders of Leon. From January to
April, 1809, he, and he alone, protected the eastern frontier of
Portugal, nnd with a mere handful of lllen kept the cnctIl)' at
a distance, and finally induced him to draw ofi' and leave
Sa1aman~ just at the moment when Soult's operations on the
Douro were becoming most dangerous.
The force at his disposal in January, 1809, consisted ofnothing
more than his own celebrated' Loyal Lusitanian Legion.' Wc
haye already had occasion to mention this corps while speaking
of the reorganization of the Portuguese army (see page 199).
On December 14, as we haye seen, he had led out his little
brigade of Green-coats towards the frontier 2.
'Vilson's reasons for moying forward were partly political,
partly military: on the one hand he wished to get away from
the neighbourhood of the Bishop of Oporto, whose intrigues
disgusted him; on the other he saw that it was necessary to
'f It is most unfortunate that while Wilson wrote and published admirable
narratives of bis doings in Prussia and Poland in 1806-7, and of bis
Rusaian and German campaign of 1612--3, he has left nothing on record
coucerning Portugal in 1808-9. Moreover the life, by his son-in-law,
breaks off in 1607, and was never finislum. IHy narrative is constructed
from Ilia dispatches in the Record Office, the corresp.mdence of Wcllesley
and Beresford, and Mayne nnd Lillie's Loyal Lurilallian. Legion.
t It will 116 remembered that it was only tho first division of the Legion
that marched. The lJOOond, ~bich could not go forw11rd for want of
unifornls and arms, WlIB left behind in charge of &ron Eoon. That
officer hOO strict orders to move out to Almeida the moment that JIU
should re<;:eive the muskets, &C. that were on their way from England.
Eben, however, disregnnled his instructions, became oue of the Bishop's
clique, and involved his men in the campaign agaiust Soull, thereby
marring Wilson's plaDs aud depriving him of half his proper fo~e.
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bring up a force to cover the frontier of Portugal. when Maore
marched forward into Spain. As long as Moore had remained at
SalamanCEL, there was n strong barrier in front of Portugal: but
when he departed it was clear that the kingdom must defend
itself. 'Vilson therefore advanced to Pinhel, near Almeida,
and there established his little force in cantonments.
He was at this place when the startling developments of the
campaign in the last ten days of December, 1808, took place.
Maore retired on Galicia, Napoleon's army swept on into Loon,
alld Wilson found himself left alone with the whole defence of
the north-eastern frontier of Portugal thrown on his hands.
He soon heard of the storming of Zamora and Toro. and learnt
that Lapisse's division had arrived at Salamanca. Three
,marches might bring that geneml to the border.
A few days later Wilson received from Sir John Cradoek the
news that he had ordered the British garrison to evacuate
Almeidll.\ and to retire on Lisbon, as the whole remaining force
in Portugal would probably have to embark in a few days. The
new commander-ill-chief added that he should advise 'Wilson to
bring off his British officers and depart with the rest, as the
Portuguese would be unable to make any head against Bonaparte,
and it would be a u.scless sacrifice to linger in their company
and be overwhelmed. This pusillanimous counsel shocked and
disgusted Wiloon: he ClllJed together his subordinates, and
found that they agreed with him in considering Cradock's
advice disgraceful. They resolved that they could not desert
their Portuguese comrades, and were in honour bound to see
the campaign to an end, however black the present outlook
might appear 2.
When therefore the British garrison of Almcida was with-
drawll, ,Vilson entered that fortress with the Legion and took
charge of it. Hc obtained from the Regency leave to appoint
his lieutenant-colonel, William Mayne, as the governor, and
also received permission to assume command of the local levies
1 It consisted of the 45th and 97th regiments.
I Napier, who is very friendly to Cradock, makes no mention of this
extraordinary (lispatcll. But it is fully i1ubstnlltiated by :Mayne and
LiIlie, who were both present at 'Wilson'i1 council of war, and heard
the matter discuilSed. See their HUit(Jry (Jfthc LmitallWll LegiQIl, 11. 43.
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in the neighbourhood. These consisted of the skeletons of two
line regiments (nos. 11 and ~3) whose reorganization had but
just begun. There were also two militia regiment.. (Guarda.
and Trancoso) to be raised ill the district, but at this moment
they existed only in name, and possessed neither officers nor
arms. For immediate action Wilson could count upon nothing
but the 1,300 men of the Lnsitallian Legion.
Nc\'crthelcss he resolved to advance at once, and to endeavour
to impose on Lapissc by a show of activity. Leaving the
Portuguese regulars and 700 men of the Legion to garrison
Almeida, he crossed the frontier with his handful of cavalry
(not 200 sabres), two guns, and SOO men of his light companies.
Pussing the Spanish fortrcss of Ciudad Rodrigo he ad\'anccd
some distance on the Salamanca road, and took up his position
behind the Yeltes river, with his right resting on the inaccessi-
ble Sierra de I"rancia, and his left at San :Felices, halfway to the
Douro. His whole force constituted no more than a thin line of
pickets, hut he acted with such confidence and decision, beating
up the French outposts with his dragoons, raiding well forwllrd
in the direction of Ledesma and Talllames, and stirring up the
peasants of the mountain country to insuITeetion, that Lapisse
gave him credit for having a considerable force at his back.
The French general had expected to meet with no opposition
on his way to Almeida, believing that Cradock was about to
emoork, mId that the Portuguese would !lot fight. He was
accordingly much surprised to find 11 long line in his front,
occupied by troops dressed like British riflemen, and commanded
by British officers-whose strength he was unable to ascertain.
He halted, in order to take stock of his opponent, when a hold
push would have shown him that only a skeleton army was
before him. In an intercepted dispatch of February 1 he reported
that the peasantry informed him that "VHsoll had l~,OOOmen,
and that as many more were in garrison at Ciudad Rodrigo and
Almeida.
As the weeks wore on, ~Uld the whIter drew to an end, \Vilson
obtained some slight reinforcements. When he nrst advanced
the Spaniards could give him no help. for the garrison ofCiudad
Rodrigo itself consisted of nothing but its six companies of
I See the Luritanian LegiQII, p. 47.
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urban militia, and a lIew battnlion of 500 men, which had been
on the point of setting out to join La Romana when its way to
Lean was intercepted by the French. There were 1,400 men to
man a fortress which required a gill'risoll of 4,0001! But
before.January was out, Pigllatelli, the captain-general of Castile,
had sent into the place a regiment which he had raised in the
mountains of A\"iln, and Carlos d'Espnila 2 had begun to fann
some new battalions from the peasantry of the Cilldad Rodrigo
district, stiffened by stragglers from La Rornana's army 8. In
February the Central .Junta. gayc 'Vilson a provisional com-
mand over the Spanish fOl-re8 in Lean, and he used his nllthority
to draw upon the garrison of Rodrigo for detachments to
strengthen his outposts. He-also requisitioned. men fromAlmeida,
when the ])ortuguese regiments there placed had begun to fill
up their ranks to [I. respectable strength. A few cavalry of the
re-formed 11th of the line were especially useful to him for
scouting work.
With this small assistancc, 'Vilson, whose toW force never
exceeded 400 horse and 3,000 illfanb')', kept LJ.pisse employed
throughout February llnd March. He beat up the French
quarters on several occasions, and twice captured large convoys
of provisions which were being directed on Salamanca; to fall
upon one of these, a great requisition of foodstuffs from Ledesma,
he dashed far within Lapisse's lines, but brought out all the
wagons in safety and delivered them to the governor of Ciudad
Rodrigo. At lnst, emboldened by his adversary's timidity, he
extended his right beyond the Sierra de Pruncia, and established
part of the Legion under Colonel Mayne in the Puerto de
Baiios, the main pass between Salamanca and Estremadura.
Thus Lapisse was completely cut off' from all commnnication
1 This fnet comcs from 11 letter of RmnOIl BInneo, governor of Ciudad
llodrigo, dated Jan. 13, which f'rere sent home to CasUereagh, and which
is therefore now in the Record Office. Blanco complains that he is
absolutely without trained artillel)'men of any sort.
'I CarIos d'Espaila. whose name we shall so frequently meet during
tlle succeediug years, Wali DO Spalliard, but a French emigre officer of the
!lame of .D'Espagne. Englisllmen,oll account of his namo,l10111etimes took
him for 11 princc of the SplLDish Toyal family.
, Sir Itobert Wilsoll to lo'rcre, dated Jan. 2!), in the Reeord Office.
The regiment sent by Pignatelli was called' Volunteers of Avila.'
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with Victor and the French army on the Tagus, snve by the
circuitous route through Madrid.
Jourdan, writing in the Ilame of King Joseph, had duly
transmitted to Lapisse the Emperor's orders to march on
Abrantes, the moment that it should be known t1mt Soult had
arrived at Oporto. He had even reiterated these directiuus
in February, though both he and the King doubted their
wisdom. Victor had written to Madrid to sugge.~t that
Alcnntnra would be a much better and safer objective for
the division to aim at than Abnmtcs 1, He wished to draw
Lapisse's troops (which properly belonged to the Ist Corps)
into his own sphere of operations, and repeatedly declared that
without them he had no hope of bringing his Estremaduran
campaign to a happy cnd, much less of executing any effecth'c
diversion against Portugal. Jourdan agreed with him, opining
that Lapisse would miscarry, if he invaded central Portugal
on an independent line of operati?ns. Dut no one was so
convinced at' this a.~ L'\pisse himself, who, with his exaggerated
ideas of the strength of Wi]SOll, was most reluctant to move
forward. As lnte as the cnd of March the Emperor's orders
were still ostensibly in vigour 2, and the general only excused
himself for not marching, by pretending that he could not
venture to advance till he had certain news of 5oult'8 move-
ments. This the Galician insurgents were obliging enough to
keep (l'OIll him.
At last, however, Jourdan yielded to Victor's wishes, and
authorized Lapisse to drop down on to Alcantara, keeping
outside the limits of Portugal, instead of making the attack
on Rodrigo and the subsequent dash at Abrnntes which the
Emperor had prescribed 3. OVCljoycd at escaping from the
re;pollsibility which he dreaded, Lapissc first prepared to march
1 Victor to King Joseph, from Toledo, Feb, 3, 180'.),
, This is sbown by a letter of March 23 from Solignac, one of Lapisse's
brigadiers, which was intereepted by guerrillns. '11le general writes to
his friend ltnguerie thnt the march on Abrantes is certain, and that letters
for llim had better be readdressed to Lisbon [Record Officel,
a Jourdan's MI!mQirelt, p. 189, show that he and Joscph authorized the
move, at Victor', instance, and pro\'e that it was not made on Lapisse's
own responsibility, asNlI.pier supposes [H. 12], but in obedience to superior
ordors.
.2
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southward by the Puerto de Banos. But when he found it held
by :Mayne and the troops of Wilson's right willg, he made no
attempt to force the passage; hut resolved to carry out his
design by stratagem, Massing his division, he marched on
Ciudad Rodrigo upon April 6. He pierced with ease the
feeble screen of Wilson's outposts and appeared in front of
the Spanish fortresSt which he duly summoned to surrender.
But though the place might easily have been carried by a coup
de main in January, it was now safe against anything but
t\ formal siege, and Lapissc had neither a battering-train Ilor
any real intention of attacking. 'Vhen the governor returned
a. defiant answer, the French division made a show of sitting
down in front of the walls. This was done in order to draw
Wilson to the aid of the place, and the move was successful.
Calling in all his outlying detachments from the nearer passes
and collecting some of CaI'los d'Espaiia's levies, Sir Robert took
post close to the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a battalion of
the Legion under Colonel Grant. some other Portuguese troops
and four guns 1,
Having thus lured Wilson away from the passes, the French
general suddenly broke up by night, and made a forced march
for the Puerto de Perales, the nearest mountain ~ road to
Alcantnra. He thus obtained a full day's start, and got oft'
unmolested. Sir Robert and Carlos d'Espal1a followed on his
track as soon as they discovered his departure, and Mayne also
pursued, from the Puerto de Dai'ios, but none of them could do
more thall harass his rearguard, with wllich they skirmished
for three days in the passes. It would not have been wise of
them to attempt more, even if they could have got into touch
with the main body, for the French division was douhle their
strength. Meanwhile the peasantry of the Sierra de Gata.
endeavoured to stop Lapisse's progress, by blocking the dcJilcs;
but lIe swept them away with case, and they never succeeded
in delaying him for more than a few hours. 'I'heir incessant
•sniping' and night attacks exasperated the French, who dealt
most ruthlessly with the countr)'-side 9.S they passed. When
I This nanoative is from ~Iayne and Lillie, supplemented by .Tourdan
and other French sources. Wilson thought that he had foiled a. real
attack 00 Uodrigo, but lya.$ mistaken: Lapisi6 was only feioting.
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they arrived at Alcantara, and found the little town barricaded.
they Ilot only refused all quarter to the fighting.men when they
stormed the place, but committed dreadful atrocities on the
non-combatants. Not only murder and rape but mutilation
and torture are reported by credible witnesses 1. After the
houses had been sacked, the very tombs in the churches were
broken open in search of plunder. Leaving AJcantara. full of
corpses and ruins [April 121 the division marched on by Caceres
and joined Victor in his camp near Merida 2 [April 19].
Since Lapisse, then, had moved off far to the south, and
thrown in his lot with his 'old comrades of the 1st Corps, it was
in vain that Soult sought for news of him on the Douro after
the fall of Opotto. When Loison set out to cross the Tamega
and to enter thc Tras-os·Montes, in order that he might obtain
information of the movements of the division at Salamanca,
that division was making ready for its march to Alcantara;
a fortnight later it had disappeared from the northern theatre
of operations altogether, and Soult's last cllancc of obtaining
e.·dernal help for his invasion of Portugal was gone. This
sectioll, in short, of Napoleon's great plan for the march on
Lisbon had been foiled, and foiled almost entirely by Sir Robert
Wilson's happy audacity and resourceful generalship. But for
1 It is impossible to make out why Alcautara was treated so much worse
than other places taken by storm, but the facts are well vouched for. The
report of the local authorities to Cuesta says that not only all pea.oants
taken with arms in their hands, but more than forty non-combatants were
butchered, and that not a woman who had remained in the place escaped
rape. Lillie, the historian of the Lusitanian Legion, who was with the
force that punued Lapisse fro'm Uodrigo, says that he saw the traces of
• acts of barbarity tllat would disgrace tlle most savage and ullcil'ilized
of maukind '-OOTl'ses deliberately mutilated ll.1ll1laid out to roast 011 piles
of burniug fumiture, with the bodies of demestic animals, such 118 lligs
allll dogs, placed on tILe top of the llile as if in jeat [J..mitanian. UgiQll,
PI', 6G-7J. The Genmm llistorian Scll!ll'eler giVCll very similar details,
adding the 110te about the dragging up of bonCll and coffins from thc
ehurchea.
• t All Napillr's criticism (ii. 86-6) on l.'lpiSile's movemcut to Alcantarn is
vitiateo.l by his ignorancc of the filet tll11t JOUrdllll aud the King, at Victor'e
illstaulle, had sent him urdel'll to go tllcre. But nothing can excuse his
previous inactiou in February and i\1"rc1l. He ought to have attacked
Uudrigo before tilC clld of January, WhCll it was still almost without a
garrison, nlld ill a state of great disrepair.
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him, the timidity of Cl'udock, the impotence of the Spaniards,
and the disorganization of the Portuguese arm}' might have
brought about the fall of Ciudad llodrigo and Almeida, at the
same moment that Soult was entering Portugal 011 its northern
frontier. His services have never received their proper meed of
praise, either from the government which he 5crved so well, or
from the historians who have told the annals of the Peninsular
War.
'We must now return to the details of the Duke of Dalmatia's
operations. His movements were clearly dependent all the
results of the two expeditions under Heudelet and Loisoll, which
he had sent out to the north and the east after his victory of
March 29.
Heudelct, a.ftcr discharging on to Gporto the sick and wOlmded
and the stores which he had been guarding at Braga, started
out northward on April 6, with the 4,000 infantry of his own
division and Lorges' dragoons, whom the Marshal had ordered
up to his aid from Vill,t de Conde. Heudc1et was ordered to
disperse the insurgents in the valleys of the Lima and :Minho,
and to relieve Tuy and Vigo, where the French garrisons were
known to be in a state of siege. To reach them it was necessary
to pierce through the screen of militia and Ordenanza under
General Botilho, which had cut off all communication between
Galicia and the army of Portugal since the month of February.
On April 7 the French general neared the line of the Lima,
only to find the bridges barricaded and Botilho's horde en-
trenched behind them. After some preliminary skirmishing,
fords were discovered, which Heudelet's infantry passed upon
the following moming, sending the llnfortLmate Portuguese
flying in evcry direction and capturing the UU"CC gUllS which
fornll.'d thcir sole artillery. On the tenth the frontier fortress
of ValenZl\. was reached: it was found to be in a dilapidated
condition, and garrisoned by only ~oo men, who surrendered at
the first summons. Tuy, where General Lamartiniere had been
shut up for the last scven weeks, faces Valenza across the broad
estuary of the l\Iinho. so that Heude1et was now in full commu-
nication with it.
Lamartiniere, as it will be remembered 1, had been left behind,
1 See p. 188.
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with Sault's heavy artillery, wheeled transport, and sick, when
the 2nd Corps marched for Orense on February 16. He had
gathered in several belutoo detachments which had started from
Santiago in the hope of joining the rear of the marching
{;oluum, so that he had the respectable force of 3,300 men,
though l,JWO of them were invalids or convalescents. The
walls of 1.uy were in a bad state of repair, but the governor
had found no great difficulty ill maintaining himself agninst the
Galician insurgents on his own side of the Minho, and the
Portuguese levies from the other bank which Botilho sent to
the aid of the Spaniards. But he had been completely shut in
since Sault's departure, and could give no information conccr:n4
iug Ney's operations in northern Galicia, or the general progl"Css
of the war in the other parts of Spain. The only news which
he could supply was that Vigo, the next French garrison, had
faUen into the hands of the enemy. On his way to Portugal
Soult had dropped a force of 700 men at that fortress, lest its
c-xccllcut harbow' should be utilized by the British for throwing
iu supplies to the Galician insurgents. The paymaster-general
of the 2nd Corps, with his treasure and its escort, had lagged
behind during the Marshal's advance, and, being beset by the
peasantry, had entered Vigo instead of pushing on to Tuy.
'Vhen Sonlt had passed out of sight on the way to Orense,
the Galicians of the coast-land, headed by PubIo Morillo, a
lieutenant of the regular army whom La Romana had sent
down from tM interior, and by Mantlel Garcia Del Barrio 1,
a colonel dispatched by the Central Junta from Seville, had
taken arms in great numbers, and blockaded Vigo. The }rench
commander, Colonel ChaIot, found himself unable to defend the
whole extent of the fortifications for sheer want of men, and
could not prevent the insurgents from establishing themselvcs
close under the walls and keeping up a continual fire upon the
garrison. He believed that a serious assault would infallibly
succeed, and only refused to surrender because he was ashamed
to yield to peasants. On March !lS two English frigates, the
Lively and Venus, appeared off' the harbour mouth, and began
to supply the insurgents with ammunition, and to land heavy
1 Napicr'lI 'Colonel Barroill.'
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naval guns for their \lse. On the tweIlty-seventh onc of the
gates was battered in, and the Galicians were preparing to
.storm the place, when ChaIol surrendered at discretion, only
stipulating that he and his men should be handed over to the
British, and not to the Spaniards. This request WllS granted,
and Captain Mackinley receiyed twenty~three officers and nearly
800 men as prisoners, besides a nUlllber of sick and several
hundred non-combatants belonging to the train, and romp-
followers. The plunder taken consisted of sixty wagons, 339
horses, and more than £6,000 in hard cash, composing the
military chest of the 2nd Corps [March is].
The Galicians had somewhat relaxed the blockade of Tuy in
order to press that of Vigo, and on the very day when ChaIot
surrendered, General Lamartiniere had sent out a flying column
to endcavour to communicate with llis colleague. It returned
pursued by the Spaniards, to report to the governor that Vigo
had fallen I. On. its way back to 'l\lY it suffered a loss of
scnmty prisoocrs nnd ncndy ~OO killed and wounded.
Heudelet and Lamo.rtiniere had now some 7,000 men collected
at Tuy, a force with which they could easily have routed the
whole of the insurgents of the l\Hnho, and forced them to retire
into the monntains. Dut Soult's orders to his lieutenants were
to avoid operations in Galicia, and to concentrate towards
Portugal. Tuy was evacuated, and its garrison transferred
across the frontier-river to the Portuguese fortress of Valenza.
Before the t1'unsferellcc was completed, the French gencrals
received an unexpected visit from some troops of the 6th Corps.
Ney, disquieted as to the condition of Tuy and Vigo, had sent
a brigade under Maucune to seek for news of their garrisons.
This force, cutting its way through the insurgents, came into
1 ;\£oot of these details as to tile fall of Vigo come from a contemporary
account ill Audmdc'll colledioll, printed ill LOiJ Gue1'riIIer08 GalleglJ8,
pp. .129-37. Le Koble lLsserts that ouly 794 men were captured, but
Captain l\Jackinley says that he r~eived nearly 1,300 prisoners, including
300 sick and many nonoCombatants. He had the best opportunitie~ of
kllo"'ing, and must be followed. Le Noble aod the Spaniards do not gh'c
the French cormnallder's name, but I find t1Lat ofChalot as the senior officer
amOllg the prisolleI1l in the list in the Record Office. Next to him is the
pn)'ITlnstcr-gcneral Conscience. Torcno and SclLcpcler agree with Captain
Mackinlcy in giving the llumber ofthc pri90lleI1l at over 1,200.
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Tuy on April U. Thus Heudelet was at last able to get news
of the operations of Ney. The information received was not
encouraging: the Duke of Elchingen was beset by the Galicians
on e,'cry side: La Romana had cut off onc of his outlying
garrisons, that of Villafranca, and his communications with Leon
were so completely cut off that he had no reports to give as
to the progress of affairs in the rest of Spain. Finding that
Vigo was lost, and the garrison of 'fuy relicyed, Maucune
retraced his steps and returned to Santiago, harassed for the
whole of his march by the insurgents of the coast-land.
Meanwhile Heudclet's communication with Oporto had been
interrupted, for the Portuguese, routed 011 the Lima a week
before, had come back to their old haunts, seized Braga, and
blocked the high~road and the bridges. Soult only got into
touch with his e>..-peditionary fOI'(e by sending ant Lahoussaye
with 3,000 men to reopen the road to the North. 'Vhen this was
done, he bade Heudelet evacuate Valeuza (whose fortifications
tuOled out to be in too bad order to be repaired in any reason-
able space of time), and to disperse his division in galTisons for
Braga, Viana, and Barcelos. The whole of the com'by and the
sick from '1\IY were senl up to Oporto.
The net result of Heudelet's operations was that the Marshal,
at the cost of immobilizing one of his four infantry divisions,
obtained a somewhat precarious hold upon the flat country of
Entre-Douro-e-Minho. The towns were in his hands, but the
Ordeuanza had only retired to the hills, and perpetually
descended to worry Heudelet's detachments, and to murder
couriers and foraging parties. Mem~while 4,000 men were wnsted
for all purposes of offensive action. Vigo, Tuy, and Valenza
had all been abandoned, and touch with the army of Galicia
had been completely lost.
Even this modest amount of success had been denim to
Soult's second expedition, that which he had sent under Llison
townrds the Tras-os-Montes. The enemy with whom the
French had to deal in this region was Silvcil'tl., the snme officer
who had. been defeated between l\fonterey and Chavc.s in the
early days of March, when the 2nd Corps crossed the Portuguese
frontier. He had fled with the wrecks of his force towards
Villa RellI, at the mOl1).ent when Soult marched on Bruga, and
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the Marshal had fondly hoped that he WllS now ll. negligible
quantity in the campaign. This was far from being the case:
the moment that Silveira heard that the French had crossed
the mountains and marched on llraga, he had rallied his two
regular regiments and his masses of OrJcnalV'.ll) and pounced
down 011 the detachment under Commandant Mess!\l:,rer, which
Soult had left in garrison at Chaves. 'l'his, it will be remem-
bered, consisted of no more than a company of hlfnutry, a
quantity of cOllvalescents and stragglers, and the untrustworthy
Spanish-Portuguese' legion,' which had been formed out of the
prisoners captured on March 6 and 12 1, On the very day
upon which Soult was TOuting Eben in front of Braga, Silveira
appeared before the walls of Chavcs with 6,000 men. Messugcr
retired into the citadel, abandoning on the outer walls of the
town a few guns, which the Portuguese were thus enabled to
turn against the inner defences. After a siege of 6\'c days and
much ineffective cannonading, the governor slUTeudered, mainly
because the native 'legion' was preparing to open the gates to
Silveira. Twelve hundred men were captured, of whom only
one-third were Frcnchmen ropnble of bearing arms, the rest
being sick or ·legionaries.'
Having made this successful stroke, Silveira marched down
the Tamega to Amarante, making a movement paraUel to
Soult's advancc on Oporto. His recapture of Chans brought
several thousands more of Ordcnanza to his standard, and at
Amarante he was joined on the thirtieth by many of the
fugiti\'es who hOO escaped from the sack of Oporto on the
previous day. He spread his army, 110W amounting to 9,000
or 10,000 men, along the left bank of ilic Tamcgn., whose
bridges and fords he protected with entrenchments. Advanced
1 Le Noble, though he mention8 tbe formation of the legion Cr. 120),
omitl;; to slate that it was left at Chave8, Rut St. Cllllmalls est.'lblislws
this fltet (p. 120) j he calls tlle corlls (les FApagnols et Portugaill qui se
disaicnt 110 notre parti.' Des Odoll.rds (po 212) also speaks of the 'legion,'
as does Naylies (p. 81). Its existence explains both the feebleness of
Messager's defence, and the large !lumber of prisoners whom Siheira
captured. The figllting force of the garrisou was only the one compan)",
plus some hundreds of convalescents, who in the fortnight since Soult"s
departure had been ahle to resume their arms.
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guards were pushed out on the further side of the river on the
three roods which lead to Oporta.
'\TheD, therefore, the troops under Loison, which Soult had
sent out towards the Tras-os-l\fontcs, drew nell!" the Tnmcgn, they
found the Portuguese in force. The cavalry could get no further
forward than Penanel; when Foy's infantry came up (April '7)
Loison tried to force the enemy back, both 011 the Amarante and
011 the Canavc7.cs road. He faii~ at each point, and sent
back to the Marshal to ask for reinforcements. Seeing him halt,
Silvcira, whose fault was not n wnnt of initiative, actually
crossed the river with his wbole army, and fell upon the two
French brigades. He was checked, but not badly beaten, and
Loison remained on the defensive (April 1~).
At this moment Soull heard of the fall of Chaves, full seven-
Wen days after it had happened. Realizing that Silvcim was 1I0W
growillg formidable, he sent to Loison's aid General Delaborde
with the second of his infantry brigades, and Lorges' dragoons.
These reinforcements brought the hoops facing Silveira up to a
total of some 6,500 men-nearly a third of Soult's whole dis.
posuble force. As I-Ieudelet was still absent on the Minho with
4,000 men more, the Marshal hOO less than 10,000 left in amI
about Oporto. It was clear that the grand march on Lisbon
was not likely to begin for many a long day. ---
On April 18 Loison advanced against Sih'eira, who boldly
but unwisely offered him battle on the heights of Villamea in
front of Amarante. Considering that he had but 2,000 regulars
and 7,000 or 8,000 half-armed militia and Ordellam:a, his
conduct can only be described as rash in the extreme. He was,
of course, beaten with great loss, and hustled back into the
town of Amaranle. He would have lost both it and its bridge,
but for the gallantry of Colonel Patrick, an English officer
commanding a battalion of the l~th of' the line, who rallied his
regiment in the streets, seized a group of houses and a COIlvent
at. the bridge-head and beat oil' the pursuers 1. Patrick was
mortally wounded, but tIle passage of the river was prevented.
Tills saved the situation: Silveira got his men together, planted
I Silvcira W Beresford (Record Office). Cf. Foy'a dispatch to Loi~oll
(April 19), in which he OWlIS tllat lie fniled la hold tIle convent, aud
retired with a loss of ninety-QlIc mcn (If the 17th regimcnt.
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his artillery so as to command the bridge, and took post in
entrenchments already constructed on the commanding height.~
all the l~ft bank. Next day Loison stormed the buildings at
the bridge-head, but found that be <-'QuId get no further
forward. The town was his, but he could not debouch from
it, a.~ the bridge }\'SS palisaded, built up with a barricade of
masonry and raked by the Portugucsc artillery. Soult now
sent up to aid LoisOll still further reinforcements, Sarrut's
brigade of infantry from Merle's dh'isioll and the second
brigade of Lahoussaye's dragoons. Thus no less than 9,000
French troops, nearly half the 'army of Portugal, were con-
centrated at Amarante.
The fact that twelve whole days elapsed between the arrival
of these last succours and the forcing of the passage of the
Tam~rra had no small influence on the fate of Soult's campaign.
Hithelto the initiative had lain with him, and he had faced
adversaries who could only take the defensive. This period
was nearly at an cnd, for on April 22 Wclleslcy had landed
at Lisbon, the English reinforcements had begun to arrive,
and an army, differing in every quality from the hordes which
the MlU'Shal had encountered north of the Douro, was about
to assume the offensive against him. By the time that Loison
at last forced the bridge of Arnarante, the British were already
on the mnrch for Cohnbra and Oporto.
Silveira and his motley host, therefore, were doing admirable.
service to the cause of their country when they occupied 9,000
out of Soult's 2],000 men from April 20 to May 2 on the banks
of the Tmllega. The grollnd was in their favour, but ffir
stronger positions had been forced ere now, and it was fortunate
that this one Wa';l maintained for so many da)'s. The town of
Amarante, it must be remembered, lies on comparatively low
ground: its bridge is completely commanded by the height.~
Oil whid. Silveira had planted his camp Md his batteries. The
river flows in a deep-sunk ravine, and was at this moment swollen
into an impassable torrent by the melting of the mOllntain
snows. Loison more than once sent swimmers by night, in
search of places. where the strength of the current might be
sufficiently moderate to aUow of an attempt to pass on· rafts
or boats. Not one of these explorers could get near the further
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bank: they were swept off by the rushing water and enst ashore
far down stream, 011 the same side from which they had started.
There had been bridges above Amarante at Mondin and Araza,
and below it at Canavezes, but reconnaissances showea that
the>' had all three been blown up, alld that Portuguese detach.
ments were watching their ruins, to prevent any attempt to
re<:onstruct them. Loison found, therefol"et that he could not
turn Silveira's position b)' a flanking movement: there was
llothing to do save to wait till the river should fall, or to attempt
to force the bridge of Amarante at all costs. Continual mills
made it hOpelL'SS to expect the subsidem:e of the Tamega. for
many days, wherefore Loison devoted all his energies to the
task of capturing the bridge. Even here there was one difficulty
to be faced which might prove fatal: the !;rench engineers had
discovered that the structure was mined. It was necessary,
therefore, not only to drive back the Portuguese, but to prevent
them from blowing up the bridge at the moment of their retreat.
Loison had entrusted the details of the attack on the bridge
to Delaborde, whose infantry held the advanced posts. That
officer first tried to approach the head of the bridge by means
of a flying sap; but when it had advanced a certain distance
the fire of the Portuguese from across the river became so
deadly, that after many men bad bccn killed in the endeavour
to work up to the palisades on the bridge, the attempt had to .
be abandoned. 'TIle next dcvice recommcnded by the engineers
was that an attempt should be made to lay a trestle bridge at
a spot some way below the town, where a mill-dam contracted
tlt width of the angry river. This was found to be impossible,
the stream proving to be far deeper than had been supposed,
while the Portuguese from tlle left bank picked off many of the
workmen [April ~5].
Smut was now growing vexed at the delay, and sent two guns
of position from Oporto to Loison, to enable him to subdue
the fire of the enemy's batteries. He also offered to call up
Heudelet's division from Braga, even at the cost of abandoning
his hold on the northern part of the province of Entre-Douro-
e-Minho. But a mere increase of his already considerable force
would have been of no service to Loioon; it was a device for
passing the Tamega that he needed.
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Such a scheme wus at last laid before him by Captain
Bouchard, one of his engineers 1. 'fhe French officers had
discovered, by a careful use of their glasses, that the Portuguese
mine, which was to destroy the bridge, was situated in its lcft~
hand arch, and that the mechanism by which it was to be
worked was not a 'sall.Sao~ , or a train of powder 2, but a loaded
musket, whose muzzle was plu.ced in the mine, while to it.'!
trigger was attached a cord which run to the nearest trenches
beyond the l'iver. The musket was concealed in a box, but its
cord was visible to those provided with a good telescope.
Bouchnrd argued that if the cord COILld be cut or broken, the
enemy would not be able to touch off the mine, and he had
thought out a plan for securing his end. He maintained that
tu} explosion at the French side of the bridge would probably
sever the cord without fiting the mine, and that a sudden
assault, made immediately after the explosion, and before the
Portuguese could recover themselves, might carry the ham.
cades. In spite of the strongly-expressed doubts of Fo)' and
several other generals, Douchard was finally permitted to carry
out his scheme.
He executed it on the night of :May fl, when a dense fog
chanced to favour his daring and hazardous proceedings. Having
first told ofi' some tirailleurs to keep up a smart fire on the
enemy's trenches and distract his attention, he sent four sappers,
Cilch provided with a small powder-barrel, on to the 'bridge.
The men, dressed in their grey capole.'J, crawled on hands nud
knees, each rolling his barrel (which was wrapped in cloth to
deaden the sound) before him. They kept in the shadow, a~d
getting close under the parapet of the bridge crept on till they
reached the outermost Portuguese palisade. One after another,
at long intervals, ctU:h got forward ullobserved, left his barrel
behind, and crawled back. The fourth sapper, starting to his
feet on his return journey, was observed by the Portuguese and
shot down, but Silveira's men did not realize what he had been
doing, and merely took him for some daring explorer who WI\S
1 Napier, H. pp. 80-1, cOllsistelltly mi.lH.\.l11s him Broclw.rd.
~ Either of thl;l!le might easily have been fired hy a casual shot, during
the long cannonading which had been in progress. The Portuguese, there-
fort', avoided them.
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endeavouring to spy out the state of the defences. After
waiting for nn hour, Bouchurd sent out t\ fifth supper, who
dragged behind him 8. 'sausage' of powder thirty yards long,
which he successfully connected with the four barrels. All was
now ready, and a battalion of picked grenadiers from Delaborde's
division, filed silentJy down into the street near the bridge-head;
a whole brigade callle behind them.
At two o'clock Bouchard firt~d his sausage, and the explosion
followed. There were two chances of failure-one that the
apparatus for firing the mine might not be disturbed by the
concussion, the other that the shock might prove too strong,
reach the mine, and destroy the bridge. Neither of th"se fatali-
ties took place; the explosion duly broke the (.'Ord, shattered
the nearest palisades, but did not affect the mine. Before the
smoke had cleared away Delaborde's grenadiers had dashed
out Oil to the bridge, scrambled O\'er the barricades, find
driven off the guard on the further side. Regiment after
regiment followed them, and charged up the mountain~side
towards Silveira's batteries and entrenchments. None of the
Portuguese were under anns, save the few companies guarding
the debauches from the bridge. These were swept away, and
t.he French columns came storming into the bi~'ouacg of the
enemy before be was well awake. Hardly half a oozen cannon
shots were :fired on them from the batteries, and the greater
part of the army of the Tras-os-Montes fled without firing
El shot. Silveira escaped almost naked by the back window of
the house above the bridge in which he had been sleeping.
All the ten guns in the Portuguese batteries, five standards,
and several hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the
victorious French, who lost (it is gRid) no more than two killed
alld seven wounded. Their good fortune had been extra-
ordinary: without the opportune fog which hid their advllncc,
their preliminary operations would probably have been dis-
covered. If their explosion had done a little more or a little
less than was hoped, the bridge might have been totally
destroyed, or its barricades left practically uninjured-either of
which chances would h9.\'e foiled llouchard',. plan. But the
luck of the army of Portugal was still in the ascendant, and all
went exactly as had been intended.
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Thus the Tamega was passed, and Silveim decisively beaten:
his levies had lied in all directions, and Soult opined that it
would take a long time to rally them. The day after the fight
Loison was joined at Amarante by Heudclet's dh'ision from
Braga, which, in obedience to the Marshal's orders, had marched
to join the e.xpeditionary force, leaving only a single battalion
behind to hold Viann. This was an unfortunate move, as on
Heudelet's departure the Orde"anza came down from the Serra
de Santa. Catalina, and overran the district which had been
evacuated, in spite of Lorges' dragoons, who had been directed
to keep the roads clear after the infantry had been withdrawn.
Meanwhile there were far more troops at Amarnnte than
were needed for the pursuit of Silveira, so Soult called back to
Oporto the division of Delaborde, leaving to Loison the
infantry of Heuuelet and Sarl'ut, with Lnhoussuye's two
brigades of dragoons, a force of about 7,000 men. He ordered
his lieutenant to scour the country as far as Villa Real, and to
send reconnaissances on the roads toward Chaves and Braganm,
with the object of frightening the insurgents to retreat as far
as possible. But Loison was not to advance for more than two
days' march into the Tras-os-:\fontes, for rumours were beginning
to arrive conceming the appearance of Ddtish troops in the
direction of Coimbru, and the Marshal wished to keep his various
divisions close enough to each other to enable them to concen-
trate with ease. If there were any truth ill the news from the
south, it would be dangerous to allow a. force which fonned
a. third of the whole army of Portugal to go astray in the hea.rt
of the mountains beyond the Tamega. Loison accordingly
marched off on May 8 towards Villa Real, which he occupied
without meeting with resistance. He leamt that Sil"eira and
his regulars had crossed the Douro, and gone oft' in the direction
of Lamcgo; but Botilho had fled up the Tamega towtU'ds
Chavel, and the Ordenanza were lurking in the hills, He then
retumed to Amarante, where we may leave him, at the end of
his tether, while we describe the state of afl-airs in Oporto.
SECTION XIII: CHAPTER VI
IN'TRlGUES AT· QPQRTO: THE CONSPIRACY OF
ARGEt\'TON
IT will have occurred to every student of the operations of
the army of Portugal during the month of April, that it wa.~
strange that Murshol Soult should have remained quicsc.'Cllt at
Oporto, while the fate of his entire campaign was at stake
during the fighting on the Tamega. His head quarters were
only thirty miles fmm Amarante-but one day's ride for himself
and his stafr-yet he never paid a single flying visit to the ~ne
of operations, even after he had come to the conclusion that
Loison was mismanaging the whole business. He sent his
lieutenant many letters of reproach, forwarded to him guns of
position, and ample reinforcements, but never came himself to
the spot to urge on the advance, even when ten and twelve days
had elapsed since the first unsuccessful attempts to force the
passahte of the Tamega.
The explanation of this persistent refusal of the Marshal to
quit Oporto is to be found in the political not the military state
of affairs. At Chaves he had proclaimed himself Viceroy of
Portugal: his viceroynltyat that moment embraced only just
so much soil as was covered by the encampments of his battalions.
Bllt after the capture of Oporto and the occupation of the
neighbouring towns of the Entre-Douro-e·Minho, his position
assumed all ail' of reality, and he himself allowed the dutics of
the viceroy to trespass on those of the commander of the
Second Corps d'Armee. Nay more, there is good reason to
believe that hc WiUl not merely dreaming of setting up a stable
govcrnmcnt in northern Portugal, but of something clse. The
evidence as to his intcntions is hard to weigh, for most of
it comes from the letters and diaries of men who disliked him,
but there are certain facts which cannot be disguised, and the
inference from them is irresistible.
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With the example of Mural's exaltation before them, the
more ambitious and capable of Napoleon's marshals could not
refrain from dreaming of crowns and sceptres. Nothing seemed
impossible in those astounding days, whcn the Emperor was
creating sovereigns and realms by a stroke of thc pen, whenever
the notion seized him. The line between an appanaged duke
and a vassal prince was a very thin one-as the case of Berthier
shows. Junot had dreamed of royalty at Lisbon iu 1808, and
there seems little doubt that the same mirage of a crown floated
before Soult's eyes at Oporto in 1809. The cit), itself suggested
the idea: in the Treaty of Fontainebleuu Napoleon had put on
paper the project for creating a I king of Northern Lusitania,'
with Oporto as his capital and the Entre-Douro-e-Minho as his
realm. Soult was cautious and wary, but he was also greedy
H.ud ambitious. If, on the onc hand, he had a wholesome fear of
his master, he had on the other good reasons for believing that
it might be possible to force his hand by presenting him with
aJait aa:ompli.
niere was in the city the nucleus of a party which 'Xas not
wholly indisposl'<1 to submit to the Frem;:h domination. It was
mainly composed of those enemies of the Bishop of Opono who
had been suffering from his anarchical rule of the last two months.
They were the friends and relatives of those who had perished
by the dagger or the rope, during the mob-law which had
prevailed ever since Dom Antonio retuMled from Lisbon. To
these may be added some men of purely material interests, who
saw that the insurrection was ruining them, and a remnant of
the old corrupt bureaucracy which had submitted once before to
Junot-whose only thought was to keep or gain profitable posts
under the government of the day, whatever that government
might be. The whole body of dissidents from the cause of
patriotism and independence was so small and weak, that it is
impossible to belie\'e that they would have taken any overt
action if they had not received encouragement from Soult.
This much is C(lrtain-that when the disorders which llCcom~
panied the capture of Oporto were ended, Soult showed himself
most anxious to conciliate the Portuguese, not only by introducing
a regular and orderly government, but by going out of his way
to soothe and flatter any notable who lingered ill the city. In
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his anxiety to win over the clergy he caused new silver vessels
and candelabra to be made to replace those which had been
stolen from the churclles ill the sack I. Hc filled up all civil
appointments, whose holders had fled, from the sumll number
of persons who were ready to adhere to the French, He again,
as already at Chaves, endeavoured to enlist a native military
force, by putting temptillg offers before tl;Jose officers of the
regular army who had been made prisoners. All this might
have had no other cause than the wish to build up a party of
Afrancesados, such as already existed in Spain, and Soult openly
declared that such was his object 2. This was the only purpose
that he avowed in his dispatches to the Emperor, and in his
communication:; with his colleagues.
But if the Marshal had no ulterior object in view, it is singular
that all his native partisans concurred in setting on foot a
movement for getting him saluted as king of northern Portugal.
The new municipal authorities, whom he had established in the
half-deserted towns occupied by his troops, sent in petitions
begging him to assume the position of sovereign, Documents
of this kind came in from Braga, Barcellos, Guimaraens, Feira,
Oli\'eira and Villa de Conde. In Oporto proclamations were
posted on the walls declaring that 'the Prince Regent by
his departure to Bmzil had formally resigned his CroWll, and
that the only salvation for Portugal would be that the Duke of
Dalmatia, the most distinguished of the pupils of the great
Napoleon, should ascend the vacant throne 3: A priest named
Veloso and other persons went about in the street delivering
harangues in favour of the creation of the 'kingdom of Northem
Lusitania.' A register was opened in the municipal buildings
1 Sw Le Noble (SouIt's partisan and official viudicator), p. 207, and
Fnlltin des Odoards, p. 227.
I Sce his ool)versation with his aide-de-camp, St. C1mmans, in the latter's
MCIIIQi-ru, p. 139. The Marsbal snid that he Wllll in a hazardous military
position nud that <je ue puis m'en tirer qU'Cll dh'i9llnt IllS Portugnis entre
eux, et j'emploie pour ccla le meilleur rooyen politiqne qui soit en mon
pouvoir.' Comp."re Fantin des Odoards, p. 227.
• .Fautin des Odourds, writil1g at Oporto under the date May S, !lays
that he bad just read tllis proclamation on the walls, ami Wal> astounded at
it, for the great bulk of the population WllS BO hostile that the project
seclIloo absolutely iusnne.
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to be signed by all persons who wished to join in the petition
to the Marshal to assume the ~rral title, and a certain number
of signatures were collected. A newspaper, called the Diarw do
Porto, Wl'lS started, to support the movement, and ran for abollt
a month. It is said that Soult's partisans even succeeded ill
gathering small crowds together, before the mansion where his
head quarters were established, to shout Viva 0 Rei NicOlM/
and that the ncclamlltiom; were acknowledged by showers of
copper coins thrown from the windows 1. The latter part
of this story is no doubt an invention of Soult's euemies, but
it was believed at the time by the majority of the French
officc~ and 'Le RQi Nico!a.s' was for the future his nickname
ill the army of Portugal a. On April 19 the Marshal ordered
his chief of the staff; General Ricard, to issue a circular letter to
the generals of divisions and brigades 3, inviting their co·opera·
tion in the movement, and assuring them that no disloyalty to
the Emperor would be ill\'olved e\'en if the Marshal assumed
regal powers 4• This document is the most convinci.ng piece
of evidence that exists as to Smut's intentions. In it there
is no attempt made to conceal the movement that had been set
on foot: the writer's anI)' preoccupation is to show that it W8.~
not dirccted against Napoleon. 'Wllcn, five months later,
Ricard's circular came under the Emperor's eye, it roused
his wrath to such a pitch that he wrote in the most stinging
and sarcnstic terms to Soult. 'He is astounded,' he says, 'to find
the chief of the staff suggesting to the generals that the Marshal
should be requested to take up the reins of government, Ilnd
assume the attributes of supreme authority. If he had assumed
1 St. Chamans, aide-de-camp to Soult, speaks or the crowds assembled
by Veloso and othen (p. 134): Bigarrt'! sa)'s that General Ricard threw
money to the crowd {or seven days ruuuiug from the l\Ianhal's balcony,
and then stopped because the harvest of llivaa was not large enough (p. 24.5).
~ See Fantin des Odoards, p. 229, and Jourdan, p. 218.
, This strange document will be found printed in t]le Appendix.
t Soo Chamans, pp. 134 llnd 140. Ho ends with observing that Soult
'aurait vouIu se fairo dcmander pour roi de l'ortugal pnr lcs babitauts,
qu'alors, le premier pas fait, il aurait sollicitt'! les suffrages de l'armee, ils
auraient ett'! consignes sur des registres pour ehaque corps, et it aurait mis
toutes cas pieces sous les yeux de l'Empereur, en lui demandant SOli
approbation. '
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sovereign power on his own responsibility, it would have been
a crime, clear !ese-rflnjeste, an fLttack on the imperial authol"ity.
How could a man of sensc, like Soult, suppose that his mllster
would permit him to exercise auy power that had not been
delegated to him? No wonder that the army grew discontented,
and that rwnours got about that the )1arshal was working for
himself, not for the Emperor 01" France. After receiving this
circular, it is doubtful whether any French offiecr would not
have been fully justified in refusing to obey any further orders
issued from Oporto 1,'
This wa.'\ written from Vienna, before the Emperor had
received any full and exact account of the details of Soult's
intrigues. Had he but known them flU, it is doubtful if he would
have granted his lieutenant the complete pardon and restoration
to favour with which his dispatch concludes 2.
There can be no doubt that the Duke of Dalmatia might have
put a stop to all the activity of his Portuguese friends by merely
raising his hand. It would have sufficed for him to assure the
deputations which visited him that his duty as the lieutenant
of the Emperor forbade him to listen to their proposals. He
1 Napoleon to Soult from SchOnbruJ)Jl, Sept. 2G, Nap. Corre8p.,
15,a'71.
2 Napier's conclusions as to Soult's conduct arc WllOll)" warped by llis
litrong predilection for the Marshal-whicll dated hack to tllC time w1lell
the latter dealt kiudly witl1 his wounded orother on tIle day after Corulma.
Ho Ulldersttltes Soull's encouragement of the movement, and will 11In"c us
believe thst it was purel)" the Ivork of the Portuguese. Ho omiti.l all
mention of Ricard's circular, and finally suppresses all melltion of
Napoleon's angry npbraidings ~cept the following (ii. p. 75): "1110
Emperor wrote to Soult that the rumour had reached him, adding, with
a delicate allUEion to the Marshal's prel'ious Eer\'ices, "I remember
nothing but Austerlib.'" Now it was 110t a rml«>U" wbicll llad re:tClll~d
Schonbrunll, but a CUllY of Ricar<l'8 circular, whicll t1ltJ Emlmror quotes
.'C"batim. TIlerefure N"puloon was writing with tangible evidence, not
with c~mll' reports, to guide him. How far Nllpier's sentence "buvc givC!:!
" filir imprllS.'lion of the tone of the dispatch which I hlll'6 rcproducell,
I Ien.ve tlte reader to judge. It \I1l9 a surprise to myselfwben I put tllo
two together. Once and for all, it must be remembered that Napior CUll
n6nlr be trusted. when Soult is in question-the Marshal's intrigues,
his greed, his shameful plundering of Andalusian churches, are all con-
cealed.
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could have caused the proclamations to be tom down, and have
silenced the street orators. 'They could not have made him
king against his own will,' as one of his officers remarked I. But
no action of the kind wus tuken; and the movement was openly
encouraged. The Marshal's explanation, that he was only taking
the best means in his power to build up a French part)' in
Oporto, will not stand examination. 'Vh)' should the scheme
involve his own promotion to the throne, if his views were
disinterested, and his actions merely intended to serve his
master's ends? Is it conceivable that the )lorluguese should,
of tlldr own accord, and without any suggestion from without,
have hit upon the idea of crowning a conqueror whose very
name was strange to them three weeks before, and whose hands
were red with the blood of thousands of their fellow country-
men? Clever and cautious though the Marshal was, it is
impossible to avoid the conclusion that he had for once
allowed his ambition to take the bit between its teeth, and to
whirl him off into an enterprise that was worthy of the most
hair-brained of adventurers.
Mcnnwhile the consequences of his intrigue were strange
and various. The army received the news of what was going
on at Oporto with puzzled surprise. Of those who were not
present at the centre of affairs, some refused lo believe the
stories that reached them, and merely observed that the Marshal
was not such a. fool as to take in hand a. plan that was both
treasonable to his master and preposterous in itself2. Others,
particularly his personal enemies, not only credited the informa-
tion but began to concert measure!! for resisting him if he
should try to carry out his scheme. TIus party was very
strong among the officers of Junot's old army of Portugal,
who had been transferred in large numbers to the ~nd Col'ps.
The)' disliked the expedition, had been prophesying disaster
from the ~rst, and had criticized e\·cry move of the Marshal.
Now thcy found in thc news of his intrigue another excuse
1 Fantin des Odoards, p. 220.
2 So writes Naylies, of Lahoussaye's dragoons, who, being absent at
Amarallte and elsewhere, never saw the doings in Oporto: (n a'est
repandu dans l'annee qu'll aspirait a. la souveraioeti du pays: all ell
con~ut d'abord quelques inquietudes, qui fureat bientot dissipeee' (p. 119).
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for running counter to his orders. There is good reason for
believing that Loison and Delaborde had actually conferred
on the necessity for seizing and imprisoning the Marshal if he
should take the final step and allow himself to be proclaimed
king. Both these generals were faithful adherents of Napoleon,
and had no thought save that of serving their master. Dut
there were other offi(.ocrs who watched the progress of affairs
with very different eyes.
There had existed in the French army from the day when
the empire was 6rst proclaimed, a party of malcontents who
still regarded Bonaparte as a usw'per, and were only biding
their time till it might be safe to deal a blolV at him. Hitherto
his career had been so uniformly successful that no opportunity
had arisen. But secret societies, of which the Phikuklphes was
the best known, were at work all through the years of the
Emperor's reign: their one object was to be ready for a coup
(Ntat when the favourable moment should arrive. The history
of' these associations is so obscure that it is impossible to estimate
Uleir stl"Cnglh at any given time-no trustworthy historian ever
nrose from their ranks to tell the story of their schemes, when
lips were unsealed by the fall of Napoleon 1. It js only by
the sudden appearance of phenomena like Malet's conspiracy
of 1812, and the plot which we are now about to describe, that
the reality of the existence of these secret societies is proved.
In the army of Portugal there was a group of officers who
belonged to the band of the discontented, and were perfectly
prepared to execute 8 pronuncuwwnto against the empire if
thc times and circumstances proved propitious. We know
ilie names of four t: Donadieu, colonel of the 47ili of the line;
Lafitte, colonel of the 18th Dragoons; his brother, a captain in
the same regiment., who was serving on Soult's staff; and Argen-
ton, another captain, who was adjutant of Lafitte's regiment; two
other plotters are hidden under the assumed names of 'Dupont'
and 'Gari.s,' by which they were introduced to VVellesley.
I Charles Nodicr's HisWire du C0718pirotil)1I1 militairu l(J1l8 r Empire is
nnfortunately quite untrustworthy. He was never among the Plliladelphu,
and writes !IS a credulous and ill-informed outsider. Neverthel68ll there is
a basis of fact underlying his work.
9 The names of Argenton, Lafitte, and Dona.dieu are public property.
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'!1ICrc were certainly other officers implicated, for it is inconcei"4
able that six men could havc planned an insurrection tulless they
were sure of a certain measure of support. At this moment
they were carrying on an active propllc,<>anda of discontent,
especially among the officers of Delaborde's division and of
Lahoussaye's dragoons. There were llluny men who SliW the
full iniquity of the Spanish War, and were disgusted at finding
themselves involved in it 1, Others loathed the hanging and
burning, the shooting of priests and women, the riding down
of half-armed peasants, which had been their lot for the last
two months. Still more were simply discontented at being
lost in a remote corner of Europe, where glory and profit were
both absent, and where ignominious death at the hands of the
lurking 'sniper' or the midnight assassin came all too frequently
-sometimes death 8.C(ompanied by torture. It was three
months since the army had received a mail from ]<rance; they
might as well have been in Egypt or America, and they felt
themselves forgotten by their master, In many a mind the
question arose whether the game was worth playing: must they
for ever' persist in this wretched interminable campaign. in
order that the Duke of Dalmatia might become a king, or
even ,in order that the Emperor might be able to apply the
Continental System in its full rigour to this land of brutish
peasants and fanatical monks? A speedy retuMl to France
seemed the one thing desirable,
It is easy to wldcrstand that the conspirators found many
sympathizers, so long as they L"(.mfined. thelllllClves to setting
forth the miseries of the campaign, and to criticizing the
'l\larshal and the Emperor. But the)' erred when they took
a general readiness to grumble for a sign that the army was
ripe for revolt. However discontented the officers might bc,
there were very few of them who were prepared to engage in
the game of high treason. The vast majority were still unable
to dissociate the idea of the Emperor from the idea at' France.
Kapier gives them, as doe<; Bigarre, The names of' Dupont' and' Garill'
are in BllpprcsscII paragraphs of the Welfillgt(J/lDittpaw~whic]1 Gllrwood
chose to omit, and are also foulld ill the miuutes uf Argentoll's trilll ut
Paris,
1 The reader may trace this feeling in Fo}"s diaries, and Naylies (p. Gi).
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It was only a few who could rise (or sink) to the conception of
tmning their !U'ms against Bonaparte in order to free France
from autocracy. This bore too close a resembhmcc to treachery
to be palatable to men of honour. None save eXalted Jacobins.
or men of overweening ambition and few scruples, could con-
template the idea with patience. 'When we find that the plans
of the conspirators included not merely a prununciamento, but
the conclusion of a secret pact with the enemies in arms against
them, we are driven to conclude that they belonged to the last-
named of these classes-that their heads were turned with the
gmlldiosc notion of getting uu arm)' into their power and
changing the fate of Europe.
The conspirators, observing the course of affairs at Oporta,
were full~' convinced that Soull would within a few days declare
himself' King of Northern Lusih:mia.' This act would produce
an outburst of wrath in the army, and they hoped to turn the
inevitable mutiny to their own profit, They intended to seize
the Marshal, and then to make an appeal to the soldiery, not in
the name of Napolc(;m but in that of Frnnce. They were also
prepared to lay hands 011 any general who might attempt to
assume command of the troops in the Emperor's interest I.
Donadieu and Lafitte had se<:ured some of the officers of their
own regiments, and believed that the men would follow them.
The other corps, as they hoped, would be drawn away after
them, and the cry of liberty and the promise of an inst.u.nt
return to France would lure the whole army into rebellion. So
far the plot, though rash and hazardous, might conceivably
have beeu carried out. Hut their next step was to be the issue
of un appeal to Ncy's divisions I.Uld the other French troops in
Ilorthem Spain to join them, and march upon the Pyrenees.
Even though there were members of the secret societies scattered
all through the army, it seems absolutely impossible to believe
I Napicr and Le Noble both hint that LoisOll was in the plot, and
perhaps Delaborde, though they do \lot actually name these officers.
But J think that their innocence is pro\'ed by Argenton's declaration to
\Vellesley (Wellesley to Castlereagh, May 7, Re<:ord Office), that LoisoD
was attached to Bonaparte, and would certainly seize Soult if he pro-
claimed himself king for' ambitious abuse of his authorit}' and disobedience
to his master.'
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that they could have carried away with them into open revolt the
whole of their eompnnions. The mO\'CllU.mt of protest against
Napoleon would have begun and ended with the 2nd Corps, if
even it got so far as the initial pmmmciamento 1• To be effective
it would have required 11. ~trong backing in France, BlId the list
of the lenders in that country, on whom the conspirators said
that they relied for aid, does not give us a high opinion of the
strength and organi7.ation of the plot. The persons named
were the old Jacobin general Lecoul'be, Alacdollald who-
though they did not know it-had just been taken back into
favour by the Emperor, and Dupont, who was in prison and
incapable for the moment of helping himself or anyone else 2.
11ley also spoke of sending for Moreau from America, and
placing him at the head of the whole movement. But it is
clear that they were not in actual communication with the
generals in France, much less with the exiled victor of Hohen-
linden. The whole plan was ill-considered; it was the result of
the intense irritation against Soult and Bonaparte felt by the
officers of the army of Portugal, acting upon the disordered
ambition of a knot of intriguers. Anbrer and vain self-confi-
dcnt-c blinded them to the imtdequacy of their resources.
It was a main condition of the projected outbreak that Soult's
position shouJd be made impossible; the most faxourable course
of events, so the conspirators held, would be that he should
persist in his monm'chical ambitions and proclaim himself king.
When he did so, the part)' loyal to Bonaparte among his officers
would make an attempt-successful or unsuccessful-to seize
hig person. Chaos and civil strife within the army would
re'Sl!lt, and it was then that the cOllspi~tors intended to show
their hand. It would seem that their Machiavellian foresight
1 This, at the time, was \Vdlestey's eminently sensillle conclusion. He
wrote to Castlercagb on April 27,' 1 doubt whether it will be IJuite so
Co'lSy as their emissary tllinks to rorr)' Uleir illteutious into execution;
I also uoubt wJlether it follows that tile successful re\·olt of this one corps
would be followed by tllllt of otllcrs, and I am collvillced that the mcthod
proposed. by 1\1. D'Argentoll would not answer that purpose.' WeHi1lg/on
Di$pflrew, iv. 276.
~ These are the names omitted in the printed version of the Welli1lgton
Dilpatcka; that of Moreau does 1l0t occur there, hut is to be found in the
cOllfesi;ion which Argeuton made to 8ou~t; see Le Noble, p. 236.
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went so far that they proposed to wait till the Marshal should
be imprisoned, or should find himself ill\'olvoo in hostilities with
the Bonapartists, and then offer him the aid of their regiments,
on condition that he should put himself at the head of the
anti-imperialist movement. All this wa.<; too ingenious for
practical work. But the next development of the plot was
c\"en more astonishing in its futile cunning.
The conspirators wished to draw the English commander
at Lisbon into their scheme-it was Cradock whom they had
in view, for ·Wellesley was in England when the plot begun,
and when it dcycloped he had landed indeed, but his arri,'al
was not known. The part which they had allotted to Cradock
was twofold-he was to be asked to send secret adyice to the
Portuguese notables of the north, ordering them to feign nn
enthusiastic approval of Soult's designs on the crOWll, and
to join with all possible clamour in the demonstrations at
Oporto. 'When this unexpected outburst of devotion to his
person sll(~uld be forthcoming, they supposed that the Marshal
would not hesitate any longer to assume the crown. Then
would follow civil strife and the desired opportunity for inter-
vention by the conspirators. The second request whieh they
intended to make was that Cradock should bring up the British
army to the front, and place it so as to make it dangerous
01" impossible for Soult to force his way out of Portugal in the
dircetioll of the middle Donro and Salamanca. They suggested
Villa ReB:1 in the Tras~os~Montcsas a suitable position for him.
Their idea in making this proposal was that the army would
be filled with despair at seeing its best line of retreat cut oft'
(that by Galieia was growing to be considered impo~sible), ancl
would therefore be more inccnsed against Soult, and at the
same time more inclined to secure safety by coming to a pact
and agreement with the enemy I.
I It must be remembered tlmt the whole plot was far advanced, and
that A.rgcnwn had placed llimself in treasonable communication with
the British, before Wellesley landed. Sir Arthur came ashore on the
night of April 22. On the morning of the twenty-fifth, he received
a visit from Deresford, who came down from Coimbra to tell him that a
Frendl officer, bearing the message of the coIISpirators, had come within
the Portnguese lines on the Vouga on the twenty-first. Argt'IIktII arrived
at Lisbon the same night, and had his first interview with the new
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The officer who volunteered for the dangerous task of going
within the English lines was Captain Argenton, the adjutant
of Lafitte'g regiment of dragoons. He was a vain, ready,
plausjble man, full of resources but destitute of firmness: his
character is sufficiently shown by the fact that he ultimately
wrecked the plot by his indiscretion in tampering with loyal
Bonapartists, who delated him, and that when seized he
betrayed the whole scheme to Soult in the hope of saving
his life. Clearly he was deficient both in the caution and in
the stoic courage required for a conspirator-successful or
ullsuccessful.
~re must note that he start.cd from the camp of Lahotlssaye's
drogoolls, nem' fumu·ante. on April 19, tlmt he rcuched the
French outposts on the Vouga and got into communication
with Major Douglas, one of Beresford's officers in the Portuguese
service) on the twenty-first, finally) that at the imritation of
Douglas and Bcresford he ClUIlC into Lisbon und reached thut
city on the b'enty~6.fth) just in time to meet the newly-landed
"Vellesley. The plot meanwhile stood still in his absence) for
the Duke of Dalmatia did not take the overt step which would
have given the plotters their opportunity-he refrained from
accepting' the crown which his Portuguese partisans were so
continually pressing him to assume. Nothing decisive had
occurred, when the situation was suddenly changed by the
appearance of the British army upon the oUensive on May 7 1•
commauder.in-ehief, whom he found in charge of the British army, and
not (as he had expected) Sir Johu Cradock. The three requests made
were (1) that \\'ellesley would' press upon Soult's Corpsl-the seizure
of Villa Real being suggested, (2) that he would give passports to
Argenton and two others to go to }'rance, (3) that he would stir up
the Portuguese to flatter and deceive Soult into taking overt steps of
treason. Cf. lVeUingtM Di4pat<:hu, iv. 274 [Lisbon, April 271 and 300
[Coimbra, )Iay 7].
I It is to these days, and probably to some date about May 4-7, tllat
belongs General Digarre's curious story about the conspirators (see Ilia
Mblwi7WI, p. 235, ,'l.110 l.e Noble, I'. 238; the latter printed the story ill
]821 witbout nalUC8, the former's version WlI8 only gi\'en to the light a few
years ago; they agree in every point). The story is too good to be
omitted. BigarrE! says that, walking the quay of Oporto 011 a moonlight
night, he came on Lafitte and Douadieu, muffled in their cloaks and
vehemently discW!sing something ill a dark corner. He stole up to them
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wlUoticcd, slapped his friend DOlllulicu 011 the back, amI suddenly shouted
in their ean; '.AA/ jt t'Otl¥!I prendf, Meuieun Ju C(JTl.Opirote~r,. Lafitte
.....hipped out a pistol, and had nearly shot the practical joker, before
Donadieu could reassure him that this was only a boisterous piooe of fUll
and that Bigarre kuew nothing. It was not tiU much later that the latter
found out what had been brewing.
N.B.-For some documents bearing on Argellton's eonspirac}' see
Appendix at the end of thii volume.
SECTION XIV
WELLESLEY'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN
PORTUGAL '
CHAPTER I
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY
o~ Nov. ~5, 1808, Sir John Maore, in answer to EL question
from Lord Castlereagh, wrote the following conclusions as to
the practicability of defending Portugal 1 :
'I can say generally that the frontier of Portugal is not
defensible against EL superior force. It is an open frontier, all
equally rugged, hut all equally to be penetrated. If the French
succeed in Spain it ",;11 be vain to attempt to resi:;t them in
Portugal. The Portuguese ore without a military force ... no
dependence can be placed on any aid that they can give. The
British must in that even4 I conceive, immediately take steps
to evacuate the country. Lisbon is the only port, and therefore
the only place from whence the army. with its stores, can
embark..•• 'Vc might check the progress of the enemy while
the stores arc embarking, aud nrrnngements are being made for
taking off the ann)·. Beyond this the defence of Lisbon or of
Portugal should not be thought of:
Four months later, on :March 7', 1809, Sir Arthur Wellesley
answered the same question, put to him by the same minister,
in yery different terms.
I In common fairness to Moore, it is necessary to I]llOtc \lrellcsley's
own words on their fUlIlIamenl.al difference of 0l,inioll O!:I to the possibility
of defending Portugal. 'I llave as mucll respeet as auy man eau have for
the opinion and judgement of Sir J. Moore, and 1 should mistrust my own
(if opposed to his) in a case where he had an opportunity of knowing and
considering. But he positively kne"· nothing of l'ortugal, and Wldd
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'[ ha\'c always been of opinion that Portugal might be
defended, whatever might be the result of the contest in Spain)
and that in the meantime measures adopted for the defence
of Portugal would be highly useful to the Spaniards in their
contest with the French. My notion was that the Portuguese
military establishment ought to be I"Cvived, and that ill addition
to those troops His Majesty ought to employ about ftO,OOO
British troops, including about 4,000 cavalry. My opinion
was that," even if Spain should ha'oc been conquered, the French
would not be able to overrun Portugal with a smaller force
than 100,000 men. As long as the contest may continue in
Spain, this force [the ~O,OOO British troops1 if it could be
placed in a state of activity, would be highly useful to the
Spaniards, and might eventually decide the contest.'
Between these two divergent views as to the practicnbility
of defending Portugal, Lord Castlereagh had to make his
decision. On it-though be could ,not be aware of the fact-
depended the future of Britain and of Bonaparte. He carefully
considered the situation; after the disasters of the Conmna
retreat it required some mornl COUfRg(! for n minister to advise
the sending of another British army to the Peninsula. Moore's
gloomy prognostications were echoed by many lllilitary experts,
and there werf leading men-soldiers and politicians--who
declared that the only thing that now remained to be done
was to withdraw Crndock's 10,000 sabres and bayonets from
Lisbon, before the French came near enough to that city to
make their embarkation difficult.
Castlereagh resolved to stake his faith on the correctness of
\Velleslcy's conclusions; all through these years of contest he
had made him his most trusted oo"jser on thinb"S military,
and now he did not swerve from his confidence. He announced
to him, privately in the end of March,and officially on April !el,
that the experiment of a second expedition to Portugal should
know nothing of its existing state.' Yet he says that 'lb6 greatest
disadVAntage uuder which I labour is that Sir John Moore gave an opinion
that the country could not be defended by the army under his command.'
Wellington to Lord Liverpool, from Vi~eu, April 2, 1810.
I The official notice is daWJ April 2 (lVe/{ingtQn Supplementary DiI;patchu,
\'j. p. 210), but several letters dllWJ late in March show tlwt the matter
had,been &iready settled.
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be tried, and that he himself should have the conduct of it.
Reinforcemcnts should at once bc sent out to bring the British
army at Lisbon up to a total of 30,000 men-the number to
which Wellesley, on consideration, raised the original 20,000
of which he had Sl)oken. Beresford had already sailed, with
orders to do all that he could for the reorganization of the
disorderly native forces of Portugal. The few regiment'!
in England that were ready for instant embarkation were
sent off ere March elided, and began to arrive at Lisbon early
in April l . Others were rapidly prepared for foreign sen-ice;
but it was a misfortune that the Corunna battalions were still
too sickly and depleted to be able to sail, so that troops who
had seen nothing of the first campaign hud to be sent out. The
majority of them were 'second battalions' from the home
establishment 2, many of them very weak in numbers and full
of young soldiers, as they had been drained in the previous
year to fill their first battalions up to full strength. Finally,
just behind the first convoys of reinforcements, Wellesley himself
set sail from Port.'!mouth, after resigning his position as Undel'
Secretary for Ireland, which, by a curious anomaly, he had
continued to hold all through the campaign of Vimiero, and
the proceedings of inquiry concerning the Convention of Cintra.
He sailed upon April 14, in the SurveillanJe frigate, had the
narrowest of escape=J from shipwreck on the Isle of Wight during
the first night of his voyage, but soon obtained favourable winds
and reached Lisbon on the twenty-second, aner a rapid passage
oflcss than eight da)'s.•Just before he started there had been
received from Portugal not only the correct intelligence that
Soult had stormed Oporto upon March 29, but tl false rumour
that Victor had been joined by the corps of Seba.'ltiani 3 and
1 The troops from the abortive clI"pedition to Cadiz, under Mackem:ie,
Sherhrooke aud Tilson, turned up about the middle of March at .l..i3boll.
Eut Hill, with the first hod}' of the !ICCOnd batch of reinforcements, onlr
appeared upon April ~.
~ Of the first ten battalions to appear, seven \verc 2nd battalions-those
of the 7tll, 30th, 48th, S3rd, 66th, 83rd, 87th regiments. Some were vcr}'
weak, with lCiSB thau 700 bayonets, e. g. the 7tli (028 men), 30th (098 men),
Gilth (740 men).
~ This cnme from Beresford at Lisbon (see Wellingtoll Supplemetliary
Diapuicheft, vi. p. 219).
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had after hig victory at Medellin laid siege to Badajoz 1. If
this had been true, the Duke of Belluno would have been
strong enough to move against Portugal with 25,000 merh
af'tcr deUtching a competent force to watch the wrecks of
Cuesta's army. Fortunately the whole story was an invention:
but it kept Wellesley in a state of feverish anxiety till he
reached Lisbon. His fears are shown by the fact that he drew
lip it memorandum for Lord Costlereagh, setting forth the
supposed situation, and asking what he was to do Oil arriving,
if he should find that Cradock had already embarked his
troops and quitted Portuga1 2, The Secretary of State, equally
harrn.ssed by the false intelligence, replied that he was to make
an effort to indm.'C the Spaniards to let him land the anny
at Cadiz, and, if they should refuse, might reinforce the garrison
of Gibraltar to 8,000 men, and bring the rest of the expedi.
tionary force back to England 3.
It was therefore an immense relief to Wclles1ey to find, when
he hmded, that the news from Estremadw'a was false, that
Vidor had not been reinforced, and that the Ist Corp~ was
l)·jng quiescent at 1\Ierida. Soult was still at Oporto, Cradock
had not been molested, and the :French invasion was at a
&tandstill.
It is comparatively seldom that the historian is able to
compare in detail a general's original conception of a plan
of Cllmpaign with the w::tual scheme which he carried out.
Still less common is it to find that the commander has placed
Oil record his ideas as to the geneml policy to be pursued
during a war, before he ha.s a&lumcd charge of his arUlY or
issued his first orders. It is therefore most fortunate that
we have three documents from Wellesley's hand, written early
in 1809, which enable us to understand the principles on which
J Wellesler to the Duke of llichmond, April 14 (Supplementary
Di$p(1tche8, vi. 227).
2 Wellingtl'.m Supplementary Di8parehu, "i. 221-2. It is very creditable
to Sir Arthur tllat,adverting to another po~sibility, viz. that Cradock may
have plucked up courage to go out against the French, and have success-
fully beaten them off, he declares that' he could not rewncile it with llis
feelings' to supersede a successful general. He remembered his own
state of mind when supplanted br Bnrrard OD the day of Vimiero•
• Castlereagh to WellesleYt Supplemmtary DiSpatche8, vi. 222 and 22K
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he believed that the Peninsular Wat should be fought out.
These are his ~l[emorandum on the Difence of Portugal, which
we have already had occasion to quote, and the two dispatches
to Lord Castlereagh and to Ml'. Frere which he wrote im-
mediately after his arriml in Lisbon. The first gives us his
general view of the war. He believed that an English army
of ~O,OOO or 30,000 men, backed by the levies of Portugal,
would be able to maintain itself 011 the Hank of the French
army in Spain. Its presem:e there would paral,yse all the
offensive actions of the enemy, and enable the Spaniards to
make hCtld against the invaders as long as Portugal remained
unsubdued. The news that a British army had once more
taken the field would, he considered, induce the :French to turn
their main efforts against Portugal \ but he believed that con-
sidedng the geography of tlIe country, the character of its
people, and the quality of the British troops, they would
fail in their attempt to overrun it. The}' could not succeed,
as he supposed, wlless they could set aside 100,000 men for
the task, and he did not see how they would e"er be able to
spare such a large detachment out of the total force which they
then possessed in the Peninsula--a force whose Ilumerical
strength (in common with all British statesmen and soldiers
of the day) he somewhat underrated. Being in the secrets
of the Ministry, he was already aware in March that a new war
in Germany was about to break out within the ncxt few months.
When Austria took the field, Napoleon would not be able to
spare a single battalion of reinforcements for Spain. If the
Spaniards pursued a reasonable military policy, and occupied
the attention of the ma'in armies of the French, the enemy
would ncvcr be able to detach a forl,,'C of 100,000 for thc
invasion of Portugal. He would underrate the numbers
required, make his attempt with insufficient resources, and
be beaten. ''Vhen Wellesley landed at Lisbon, and found that
Boult had halted at 0!X'rlo, that Victor lay quiescent at
Merida, and that Lapisse with the troops from Salamanca
I Memorandum of March 7, t As soon as the newspapers shall have
announced the departure of officers for Portugal, the French armies in
Spain will recei\'e orders to make their movements towards Portugal, so
as to anticipate our measures for its defence,' &0,
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ha.d gone southward to join the 1st Corps, and so severed
the only link which bound together the army in Northern
Portugal and the army ill Estrcmadum" he was reassured as
to the whole situation. Soull and Victor, isolated as they now
were, would each be too weak to beat the Anglo-Portuguese
aimy. They were too far apart to make co-opemtion between
them possible, considering the geography of Central Portugal,
and the fact that the whole country behind each was in a state
of insurrection 1•
. But • the best defensive is a vigorous local ofl:ensive,' and
'VeIJesJey suw the advantage of the central position of the
British army upon the Tugus. A few marches would place
it at a point from which it could fall either upon Victor to the
right or Soult to the left, before either marshal could be in
a position to lend help to his colleague, probably long before
he would eyen be aware that his colleague was in danger.
'Wellesley could strike at the one or the other, with almost
perfect certainty of catching him unreinforced. Ney, it was
tme, lay behind Soult, but hc was known to be entangled in
the lrmmnc1s of the vigoroWl Galician insuITCCtiOIl. Victor hud
Scbastiuni in his rear, but thc 4th Corps was 'haYing occupation
found for it by the Spanish army of La .!\lanchs.. It was im-
probable that either Soult or Victor, jf suddenly attacked, could
call up any appreciable reinforcements. Victor, moreover, had
Cuesta to observe, and could not mo\'c off leaving 120,000
Spaniards behind him. Soult was known to be distracted by
Silveira's operations on the Tamega. 'Vellesley, therefore, saw
that it was well within his power to strike at either of the
marshals. He would, of course, be obliged to place a 'con-
taining for~' in front of the onc whom he resolved to leave
alone for the present. But this detachment need not be very
large, llnd might be composed for the most part of Portuguese
1 It is noteworthy that Wellesley, when be was placed in communiClltioD
l\ith ArgeDtou three days later, considered that one of the few useful
facts which he had got from the plotter was that Soult and his army had no
knowledge of where Victor might be, or of what he was doing, 'Ibis was
a far more precions piece of information than a.ny details as to the con-
spiracy, which Wellesley regarded from the first as doomed to failure: soo
Wellington DilpQ.tcnu, iv. 2H.
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troops: its duty would be to distract, but not to fight the
enemy.
On the whole Wellesley thought it would be best to make the
first onslaught on Soult. 'I should prefer an attack 011 Victor,'
he wrot~ two days after landing, 'in concert with Cuesta, if
Soult were not in possession of a fertile province of this kingdom,
and of the favourite tOWII of Oporto, of which it is mostdesimbll'
to deprive him. Any operation upon Victor, connected with
Cuesta's movements, would require time to concert, which may
as well be employed in dislodging Soult from the north of
Portugal, before bringing UIC British arm)' to tbe eastern
frontier 1•••• I intend to move upon Soult, as soon as I can
make some arrangement, on Which I can depend, for the defence
of the Tagus, to impede or dclll.)' Victor's progress, in casc he
should come on while I am absent.' •I think it probable;
he wrote on the same day but in another letter, ~ that Soult
will not remain in Portugal when I pass the Mondego: if he
does, I shall attack him. If he should retire, I am convinced
that it would be most advantageous for the common cause that
we should remain on the defensive in the North of Portugal,
and act vigorously in C<Klperation with Cue<>ta against Victor 2.'
E\u-ther forward it was impossible to look: n. blow at Soull,
followed by another at Victor, was all that could at present be
contemplated. Welle<>ley was directed, by the formal instructions
which he had received from Castlereagh, to do all that was
possible to clear Portugal and the froutier provinces of Spain
from the enemy. but not to strike deep into the Peninsula till
hc should have received permission from home to do so. Never-
theless he had devoted some thought to the remoter possibilities
of the situation. If Portugal were preserved, and Soult and
Victor beaten off, more ambitious combinations might become
possible. He expressed his conviction that the French occupa-
1 Wellesley to Cartlereagb, from Lisbon, April 24. J llave ventured to
8uhstitute (before bringing' in the last sentence for tlle unme:ming 'and
to llring' which is clearly a /a]J8l.lf Cfllami.
~ Wcllesley (to Mr. Frere, at Seville) from I,isboll, April 24. Iu many
sentences tltis dispatch is only IL repetition of that to Castlereagh. But in
otlll)r!1 Sir Arthur makes. Lis meaning more clear, by IL more detailed
explanation.
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tion of Spain would only be endangered when a very large force,
acting in unison under the guidance of a single mind, should
be brought together. The co-operation of t.he English army and
that of Cucsta 'might be the groundwork of further measures
of the same and a more extended description!.' He was under
no delusions as to the easiness of the task before him: he did
not hurryon in thought, to dream of the expulsion of the French
from the Peninsula as a goal already in sight. But he believed
that he amI his army' might be highly useful to the Spaniards
and might eventually decide the contest 2.'
It is the survey of documents such as these that enables us to
appreciate W'"ellesley at his best. He had gauged perfectly well
the situation and difficulties of the French, He saw exnctly
how much was in his own power. 'The whole history of the
Peninsular \-Var for the next two years is foreseen in his pro-
phetic statement, that with 30,000 British troops and the
Portuguese levies he would guarantee to hold his own against
any force of less than 100,000 French, and that he did not think
that the enemy would find it easy to collect an anny of that size
to send against him. This is precisely what he accomplished:
for the first fifteen months after his arrival he held with ease
that frontier which Moore had described f\.S 'indefensible against
a superior force.' '¥hen at last Napoleon, free from all other
continental troubles, launched against him an army under
Mns.'lena, which almost reached the figure that he had described
as irresistible in 1809, he showed in 1810-11 that he had built
up resources for himself which enabled him to beat off even that
number of enemies, Though four-fifths of Spain had been
sulxl.ued, he held his own, because he had grasped the funda-
mental truth that (to use his own words) 'the more ground the
French hold down, the weaker will they be at any given point.'
In short, he had fathomed the great secret, that Napoleon's
1 \Vellesley to Frllre, I"isoon, April 24, 18011.
t Memorandum on the fJt;[ence of PQrtu!JfII, of March 7.
S If to Masaena's field army of 60,000 ·mcn we add the troops Oil his
communications (viz. the 9t11 Corps and the garrisons of Rotlrigo and
Almeida) aud also the force which Soult and Mortlcr brought up against
Badajoiol and Elvas-a force sgninst which Weljesley hsd to provide,
by making large detachmcnts-the full number of 100,000 is reached.
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military power-vast as it was-had its limits: that the
Emperor could not send to Spain El. force sufficient to hold down
every province of a thoroughly disaffected country, and also
to provide (over and above the garrisons) a field army large
enough to heat the Anglo-Portuguese and capture Lisbon. [f the
French dispersed their divisions, and kept down the vast tracts
of conquered territory, they had no force left with which to take
the offensive against Portugal: if they massed their armies, they
had to give up broad regions, which immediately relapsed into
insurrection and required to be subdued again. This was as
true in the beginning of the war as in the end. In 1809 the
army that forced Wellesley to retreat after Talavera was only
produced by evacuating the whole province of Galicia, which
passed back into the hands of the insurgents. In 1812, in
a similar way, the overpowering force which beat him back
from Bnrgos, had been gathered only by surrendering to the
Spanish Government the whole of the four kingdoms of Anda-
lusia. On the other hand, during the long periods when the
enemy had dispersed himself, and was garrisoning the whole
south and centre of Spain, e.g. for the first six months of 1810,
and for the last six months of 1811, Wellesley held his own on
the Portuguese frontier in complete confidence, assured that
no sufficient force could be brought up against him, till the
enemy either procured ncw troops from France or gave up sollle
great section of the regions which he was holding down.
A detailed insight into the future is impossible to any general,
howe\'er great, but already in April 1809 "VelIesley had grasped
the main outlines of the war that was to be.
Before passing on to the details of the campnign on the
Douro, with which "Vellesle)"s long series of victories began,
it is well to take a glance at the man himself, as he sat at his
desk in Lisbon dictating the orders that were to change the face
of the war.
Arthur Wellesley was now within a few days of completing
his fortieth year. He was a slight but wiry man of middle
stature, with a long face, an aquiline nose, and a keen but cold
grej' eye. Owning an iron constitution on whieh no climate
or season seemed to make the least impression, he was physically
fit for all the work that lay before him-work more fatiguing
1809J ·WEll.ESLEY'S CHARACTER
than that which falls to most generals. For in the Peninsula he
was required, as it soon appeared, to be almost as much of a
statesman as of a general; while at the same time, owing to
the inexperience of the British officers of that day in warfare
on a large scale, he was obliged for some time to discharge for
himself many of the duties which properly fall to the lot of the
chief of the staff, the commissary-general, the paymaster-general,
and the quartermaster-general in a well organized army. No
amount of toil, bodily 01' mental, appeurcd too much for that
active and alert mind, or for the body which seven years of
service in India seemed to have tanned and hardened rather
than to have relaxed. During the whole of his Peninsular
campaigns, from 1808 to 1814, he was never prostrated by any
serious ailment. Autumn mins, summer heat, tile cold of
'\inter, had no power over him. He could put up with a very
small allowance of sleep, and when necessary could snatch useful
moments of repose~ at (lny moment of the twenty~four hours
whcll 110 pressing duty chanced to be on hand. His manner
of life was simple and austere in the extreme; no commander-
in~chief ever travelled with less baggage, or could be content
with more Spartan fare. Long after his wars were over the
habit of bleak frtlgality clung to him, and in his old age men
wondcred at the bare and comfortless sUlToundings that he
chose for himself, und at the scanty meals that sustained his
spare but active frame. Officers who had long served in india
were generally supposed to contract habits of hL"LUry and display.
but Welleslcy was the exception that proved the mle. He hated
show of any kind; after thc first few days of the campaign of
1809 he discarded the escort which was wont to accompany the
commander~in~chief. It was on very rare occasioJlli that he was
seen in his full uniform: the army knew him best in the plain
blue frock coat, the small featherless cocked hat, and the short
cape, which have been handed down to us in a hundred drawings.
Not wlirequcntly he would ride about among his cantonments
dresst..J. like a civilian in a round hat and grey trousers!. He
was as careless about the dress of his subordinates as about his
I See, for example, the anecdote ill Sir G. L'Estnmge's .HemillilflxnCet,
p.l94. Pieton WIIS eljllally given to the use (or abuse) ofm'if/i, and fought
Quo.tre Bms in 0. tall hat!
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own, and there probably never existed an army in which so little-
fllss was made about unessential trappings as that which served
ill the Peninsula from 1809 to 1814 1, Nothing could be less
showy than its head-quarters' staff-a small group of blue-coated
officers, with an orderly dr80"'Oon or two, riding in the wake of
the dark cape and low glazed cocked hat of the most unpreten-
tious of chiefs. It contrasted in the strangest way with the
plumes and gold lace of the French marshals and their elaborately
ornate stnffs 2,
Considered as a man 'Vcllesley had his defects and his limita-
tions; we shall have ere long to draw attention to somc of
them. But from the intellectual point of view he commands
our undivided admiration as a practical' soldier s. A careful
study of his dispatches leaves Wl ill a state of wonder at the
imbecility of the school of writers-mostly continental-who
have continued to assert fol' the last eight)' years that he
wus no more than a man ofordinary abilities, who had an unfair
share of good luck, and was presented with a series of victories
by the mistakes and jealousies of the generals opposed to him.
Such assertions are the results of blind ignorllllf..-e and prejudice,
·When found in English writers they merely reflect the bitter
llatred that was felt toward 'Vellesley by his political opponents
during the second and third decades of the nineteenth centurr.
In French military authors they only represent the rescntful
I 'Provided we brought our men into the field well appointed, and
with sixty good rounds in their pouches, he llel;er looked to see whether
our trousers were black or blue or grey. Scar<:ely any two officers dressed
alike. Some wore grey braided coats, others brown, some liked blue:
many from choice or necessity stuck to the "old red rag." 'Ve were
never tormented with that greatest of ooru on active senice, uniformity
of dress.' Grattao's With IM 88th, p. 60.
2 To find a humorous contrast to Wellington's staff, tlle reader migllt
consult Lejeune's account of tllat of Berthier, who llad allowed him to
design a special and gorgeous uniform, all fur fl;\ll.tllers alld braid, for
his aides-d0-(lamll. Lejeune dwells witll the enthusiasm of a tailor on his
efforts alld their glorious effect on parade [Lejeune, i. p. 9lil
~ Lord Roberts, in his Rise of Wetlillgtr)1/, ooly sligILtly o"erstates his
case when he observes that the more we study Wellesley's life in detail,
the more we respect him as a general and the less we like him as a man.
If we come Upoll much that is hard and unsympathetic, there are too
mauy redeeming traits to justify the statement in its entirety.
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earpings of the vanquished army, which preferred to think that
it w.as beaten by anything rather than by the abilit), of the con-
queror. In 1820 every retired colonel across the Channel was
ready to demonstrate that Toulouse was an English defeat, that
Talavera was a drawn battle, and that Wellesley was over-rash
or over-cautious, a fool or a coward~ according as their thesis
of the moment might demand 1. They were but echoing their
Emperor's rancorous remark to Soult, OIl the hillside of lA Belle
Alliance, when after teTIing the Marshal that he only thought
his old adversary a good geneml because he had been beaten
by him, be added, 'Et mai, je VOllS dis que Wellington est un
mauvais general, ct que Ies Anglais sont de mauvaiSl."S troupes 2.'
Bonaparte consistently refused to do justice to the abilities of
the Duke. He regarded him as a hitter personal enemy. and
his whole attitude towards ''''ellesley was expressed in the
scandalous legacy to Cantillon 3 which disgraces his last will and
testament. In strict conformity with their rnnster's pose, his
followers, literary and military. have refused to see anything
great in the victor of June 18, 1815. Even to the present day
too many historians from the other side of the straits continue
to follow in the steps of 'l'hiers, and to express wonder at the
incxplicable triumphs of the mediocre generlll who routed in
succession all the best marshals of Fmncc.
To clear away any lingering doubts as to ,"Vellesley's extra-
ordinary ability, the student of history has only to read a few
of his more notable dispatches. The man who could write the
two Memoranda to Castlereagh dated September 5. 1808,. and
March 7, 1809', foresaw the whole future of the Peninsular
War. To know, at that early stage of the struggle, that the
Spaniards would be beaten when- and wherever they offered
battle, that the l~rench, in spite of their victories, would never
I The reader curious in such things ma.y find as much as he desires
of this sort of stuff in 'fl:liebault, Marbot, Le Noble and Lemonnier
Delafosse.
~ These phrases a.re preserved in the notes ofSoult'saide-de-eampBaudus.
~ CantUlon was the assassin who fired 011 Wellington in Paris on
Sept. 10, 1818.
• Wellington to Castlereagh, Zambuja.l, Sept. 6, 1808, and London,
March 7, 1800.
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be able to conquer and hold down the entire country, that
30,000 British troops would be able to defend Portugal against
any force that could be collected against them, required the
mind of n soldier of the fu-st class. WllCn the earliest of those
memomnda was writlen, most Englishmen believed that the
Spaniards were about to deliver their country by their own
arlllS: \Vellesley saw that the notion was vain and absurd.
''''lCll, on the other hand, he \~'otc the second, the idea was
abroad that all was lost, that after Corunua no second British
anny would be sent to the Peninsula, and that Portugal was
indefensible. Far from shal'ing these gloomy views he asks for
30,000 men, and states that though Spain may be overrun,
though the Portuguese army may be in a state of hopeless dis-
array, he yet hopes with this handful of men to maintain the
struggle, and e'"tmtually to decide the contest. How many
generals hllS the world seen who could have framed such
a prophecy, and have verified it?
To talk of the good fortune of Wellesley, of his 'lucky star,'
is absurd. He had, like other generals, his occasional uncove·
nanted mercies and happy chances: but few commanders had
more strokes of undeserved disnppoilltlnent, or saw more of thcir
plans frustmted by a stupid subordinate, an unexpected turn of
the weather, an incalculable accident, or a piece of false news.
He had his fair proportion of the chances of war, good and bad,
and no more. If fortune was with him at Oporto in 1809, or
at El Bodon in 1811, bow many were the occasions on which she
played him scurvy tricks? A few examples may suffice. In
May 1809 he might have captured the whole of SouIt's army, if
Silveira had but obeyed orders and occupied the impregnable
defile of Salamonde. On the night of Salamanca he might have
dealt in a similar fllShion ""iUl Mannont's routed host, if
Carlos d'Espaila had not withdrawn the garrison of Alba de
Tormes, in flat disobedience to his instructions, and so left the
fords open to the flying French. It is need1es.'l to multiply
instances of such incalculable misfortune; any serious student
of the Peninsular 'Var can cite them by the dozen. Masscllu's
invllSion of Portugal.in 1810 would have been· checked by the
autumn rains, and never have penetrated far within the frontier,
but for the unlucky bomb which blew up the grand magazine at
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Almeida, and reduced in a day a fortress which ought to have
hcid out for a month. In the autumn of 1812 the retreat
beyond the Douro need never have been made, if Ballesteros had
obeyed orders, and moved up from Granada to threaten Soult's
flank, instead of remaining torpid in his Cllntonments 200 miles
from the theatre of war.
·Wellington was not the child of fortune; he was a great
strategist and tactician, placed in a situation in which the
military dangers furnished but half his difficulties. He had to
cherish his single precious British army corps, alld lo keep it
from any unnecessary loss, because if destroyed it could not be
replaced. With those 30,000 men he had promised to keep up
the war; the home government was reluctant to risk the whole
of its available field arm)' ill one quarter, and for years refused
to raise his numbers far above that total. It was not till the
middle of 1810 that his original five divisions of infantry were.
increased to six, nor till 1811 that his seventh and eighth
divisions were completed 1. Right down to 181!! it was certain
that if he had lost any considerable fraction of his modest army,
the ministry might have recalled him and abandoned POltUgal.
He had to fight with a full consciollsness that a single disaster
would have been irreparable, because it would have been followed
not by the sending off of reinforcements to replace the divisions
that might be lost, but by an order to evacuate the Peninsula.
His :French opponents fought under no such disabilities; when
beaten the)' had other armies at hand on which to fall back; and
behind all the incxhalliltiblc reserve of Napoleon's conscription.
Considering the campaigns of 1809-10-11 it is not 'Wellington's
oft-censured prudence that we find astonishing, but his boldnes."l.
Instead of wondering that he did not attempt to relieve ll.odrigo
or Ahneida in July-August 1810, or to fall upon l\{assena at
Salltarem ill January 1811, we are filled with surprise at the
daring which inspired the stonning of Oporto, and the offering
of battle at Busaco and luentes d'Oiioro. When a defeat spelt
ruin and recall, it required no small courage to take any risks;
but Wellcsley had the sanest of minds; he could dmw the line
with absolute accuracy between enterprise and rashness, between
1 The Fifth Divisioll was not completed till Oct. 8, l8lO) the Sixth and
Seventh OD March 6, lOll.
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the possible and the impossible. He had learned to gauge with
wonderful insight the difficulties and disabilities of his enemies,
and to see exactly how far they might be reckoned upon in dis-
counting the military situation. After some time he arrived
at an accurate estimate of the individual marshals opposed to
him, and was rendy to take the personal equation into considerlt4
tion, according as he bad to deal with Soult or Massena,
Marmont or Jourdan. In short, he was a safe general, not
a Cfutious one. 'When once the hopeless disparity between his
own resources and those of the enemy had ceased to exist, in the
year 1812, he soon s.howed the worth of the silly taunts which
imputed timidity to him, by the smashing blows which reduced
Ciudad'Rodrigo and Badajoz, and the lightning.stroke which
dnshcd to pieces Marmont's army at Salamanca. In the Ile~t
year, when for the first time he could cOllnt on an actual
l superiority of force 1, his irresistible march to Vittona displayed
his mastery of the art of using an advantage to the uttennost.
Napoleon himself never punished a strategic fault on the part of
the enemy with such majestic ease and confidence.
Of "Vellington as a tactician we have already had occasion to
speak in the fIrst volume of this work z. It is only necessar)' to
repeat here that the groundwork of his tactics was his knowledge
of the fact that the line could beat the column, whether on the
offensive or the defensive. The data for forming the conclusions
had been in possession of anyone who chose to uti1i7.e them,
but it was Wcllesley who put his knowledge to full account.
Even before he left India, it is said, he had grasped the great
secret, and had remarked to his confidants that' the French
were sweeping every·thing before them in Europe by the use of
the formation in column, but that he was fully convinced that
the column could and would be beaten by the line~.' Yet even
I Though el'en then the superiority} such aa it was, cousisted entirely
of Spanish troops of doubtful quality.
1 See pp. 114-22 ofvol. i.
3 The Bame idea is well marked iu a conven:;ation reported by Croker,
which took place in umdon, on the eve of WeUesley's dep.1,rwre to 3&!ume
command of ihe trOO}lS at Cork witb whom he was about to sail for the
Peninsula. Afler IL long rel'erie, he wlLlllLllkcd the subject of 11is thoughts.
'To say the truth; he rCI)!iClI,' I ILm thinking of tlle French I am going to
fight. 1 have not seen them since the catllpllign ill l-llLl\{lcrs [1794-6]
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though the epoch-making, yet half-forgotten, fight. of l\faida
had occurred since then, the first Peninsular battles came as a
revelation to the world. After Vimiel'o and 'l'alavera it became
known that the line was certainl)' superior for the defensive, but
it was only the triumphant line-advance of Salamanca that
finally divulg£;d the fact that the British method was equally
sure and certain for the attack. If "Vellesley's reputation rested
on the single fact that he had made this discovery known to
the world, he would have won by this alone a grand place in
military history_ But his reputation depends even more on his
strategical than on his tactical triumphs. He was a battle-
general of the first rank, but his talents all the day of decisive
action would not have sufficed to clear the French out of Spain.
His true greatness is best shown by his all-embracing grasp of
the political, geographical, and moral facto~ of the situation in
the Peninsula, and by the way in which he utilized them all
when drawing up the plans for his triumphant campaigns.
As to tactics indeed, there are points all which it would be
easy to point out defects in Wellesley\ method-in especial it
would be possible to develop the two old, but none the less true,
criticisms that he was 'pre-eminently an infantry general,' and
that' when he had won a battle he did not always utilize his
suc(.'CSs to the full legitimate cnd.' The two charl:,TCS hang
closely together, for the one defect was but the consequence ofthe
other; a tendency to refrain from making the greatest possible
use of his cavalry for breaking up an enemy who had already
begun to give ground, and for pursuing him aoulmllce when he
was well on the rUIl, was the natural cOIl(:omitant of Il. predilection
for the use of infantry in the winning of battles. If Napoleon
when they were capital soldiers, and a dozen years of victory under
Buonaparte must have made them better still. They bave beside8 a nell'
sY8tem of stra~gy, whi.ch has outmanreuvred and overwhelmed ail the
annies of Europe. 'Tis enough to make one thoughtful; but no matter,
the die is cast: ther ruay ol'erwhelm me, but I don't think tlley will
outruanoouvre rue. First, because I am not afraid of them, 38 everybodr
else seems to be ; and secondly, because, if all I hear of their system be
true, I think it a false olle against steady troops. I suspect all the
continental annies are 1lalf beaten before the battle begins. I, at least,
will not be frigiItened beforehand.' Croker's Diary and CorreapolldeTlctJ,
1'01. i. I" 13, untler tlle date June 14) llJ08.
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had commanded the British army at Salamanca, Mnrmollt's
troops would have been annihilated by a rapid cavalry pursuit,
inst~d of merely scattered. If 'Wellington had commanded the
French army in the Jena~Auerstn.dt campaign, it is reasonably
certain that Hohelllohe's broken divisions would have escaped
into the interior, instead of being garnered in piecemeal by the
inexorable and untiring chase kept up by the French horse.
The "ery distrust which Wellington expre.~sed for the capacities
of the British cavalry 1, who after all were ndmirable troops when
well handled, is but an illustration of the fact that he was no trne
IOYer of the mounted arm. But of this we have already spoken,
and it is unnecessary to dwell at greater length on his minor
deficiencies than on his numerous excellencies ou' the day of
battle.
e A far more serious charge against Wellesley than any which
can be grounded on his tactical faults, is that, though he
won thecollfidenee of his army, he could ne"er win theiraflection.
'The sight of his long nose among us on a battle morning,'
wrote one of his veterans, 'was worth ten thousand men, any
day of the week~: But it was not personal attachment to
him which nen.·ed his soldieI;s to make their best effort: he
was feared, respected, and followed, but never loved. Hc was
obeyed with alacrity, but not with enthusiasm. His officers and
his men believed, and believed rightly, that he looked upon them
as admirable tools for the task that had been set him, and did
his best to kecp those tools unbroken and in good repair, but that
he felt no deep personal interest in their welfare. It is seldom
that the veterans who have serveU under a great (:ommander
have failed to idolize as well as to respect him. But Wellesley's
men, while acknowledging all his greatness, complained that he
. systematically neglected both their feelings and their interests 3.
1 See vo1. i. p, 119.
, Soo Kincaid, chap. v, May 3, 1811,
1 ";e feelings, expressed more or less clearly in a hundred memoirs,
mal' be summed up in 8 paragraph by Wm. Grattan of the OOth. 'In his
parting General Order to the Peninsular ann)" he told Ul! that he would
never cease to feel the wannest interest for our welfare and honour. How
this promise was kept everyone knows. That the Duke of'Wellington is
oue of the most remarkable (perhaps the greatest) man of the present age,
few will deny. But that he neglected the interests and feelings of his
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It was hut too true: he showed for his army, the officers no less
than the rank and fil~ a certain coldness that was partly bred
of intellectual contempt, partly of aristocratic hauteur. There
are words of his on record conceming his men which can never
00 forgiven, and words, too, not spoken in the heat of action or
the moment of disappointment, but in the leisure of his later
,rears. Take, for example, the passage in Lord Stanhope's Co/t-
versaJ,WM ~cith tJJe Duke qf Wellington, where he is speaking of
the rank and file: 'they are the scum of the earth; English
soldiers are fellows who ha,'c enlisted for drink. That is the
plain fact-they have all enlisted for drink I.' He described
the men who won Talu\'cro as 'a rabble who could not bear
success,' and the 'Vaterloo troops as 'an infamous army'-
the terms are unpardonable. His notions of discipline were
worthy of onc of the drill scrgeants of Fredcric the Great. •
'I ha\'e no idea of any great effect being produced on British
soldiers,' he once said before a Royal Commission, 'by anything
hut the fear of immediate corporal punishment.' 110gging was
the one remedy for all evils, and be declared that it was
absolutely impossible to manage the army without it. For
any idea of appealing to the men's better feeling, or moving
them by sentiment, he had the greatest contempt.
The most distressing feature in 'Vellington's condemnation of
the character of his soldiery is that he was sinning I\,craillst the
light: officers, of less note but of greater heart., were appealing
to the self·respect, patriotism, and good feeling of their men,
with the best results, at the \'ery moment that Wellesley was
denouncing them as soulless clods and irreclaimable drunkards,
It was not by the lash that regiments like Donnelau's 48th or
Colbornc's 5flnd, or many other corps of the Peninsular army
were kept together. The reminiscences of the Nnpiers, and many
other regimental officers of the better class, are full of anecdotes
illustrating the virtues of the rank and file, There are dozens
of diaries and autobiographies of sergeants and privates of
"\Vellesley's old divisions, which prove that there were plenty of
Peninsular anny, as a body, is be)'ond all question, And were be in his
gral'e to-morrow, hundreds of voices that now are silent would echo what
I write' (p. 332).
1 OO"';eT8tltiOM with the Duke of JVeUhlgtol1, p. 14, (NOl" 4, 1831.J
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well-conditioned, intelligent, sober and religious men in the rankl\
-it is only necessary to cite liS examples the books of Surtees,
Anton, Morris, and Donaldso1l 1• If there were also thousands
of drunkards and reckless brutes in the service, the blame for
their misdoings must fall to a great extent on the system under
which they were trained. The ruthless mediaeval cruelty of the
code of punishment alone will aCCount fol' half the ruffianism of
the arm)',
The same indiscriminate censure which Wellesley poured on
his men he often vented on his officers, denouncing them elL
lILMSe in the most reckless fashion. There were careless colonels
and stupid subalterns enough under him, but what can excuse
such sweeping statements as that· "Vhen I give an order to an
officer of the line it is, I venture to say, 0. hundred to onc
against its being done a.t all,' or for his Circular of Novcmber,
181~, declaring that all the evils of the Burgos retreat were due
'to the habitual inattention of the officers of regiments to their
duty.' It was a bitt.cr blow w the officers of the many batta·
lions which had kept their order and discipline, to find themselves
confused with the offending corps in the same general blast of
censure. But by 1812 they were well accustomed w such
slashing criticism on the part of their commander.
Such a chief could not win the sympathy of his army, though
he might command their intellectual respect. Equally unfor-
tunate were his autocratic temper and his unwillingness to
concede any latitude of instructions to his subordinates, features
in his chamcter which effectually prevented him from forming
a school of good officers capable of carrying out large indepen-
dtmt operations. He trained admirable generals of division, but
not commanders of armies, for he always insisted on keeping the
details of operations, even in distant parts of the theatre of war,
entirely under his own hand. His preference for Hill as a com-
I It is often forgotten t1ll1.t there was 11 strong religious element ill the
rnuk and file of tho Peninsular army. In 11 letter from Cartal:O [1<'eb. 6,
1811], 'Vollingtou mentions, with no great pleasure, the fact that thero
were three separate Methodist meetings in the Guards' brigade alone, and
that in many other regiments there were officers who were accustomed
to preach and pray with their men. For the spiritual experiences of a
sergeant in the agonies of com·ersion, the reader roay CQnsult the diary
of Surtees of the 95th during the year 1012.
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mander of detached corps came entirely from the fact that he
could trust that worthy and gallant officer to make no movements
on his own initiative, and to play a safe waiting game which
gave his chief no anxiety. In his YOWlger days, while sen·ing
under other generals, ViTellesley had been by no means an expo-
nent of blind obedience or nnque.<;tioning deference to the orders
of his superiors. But when placed in command himsclf he was
autocratic to a fault. He was prone to regard any criticism of
his directions as insubordination. He preferred a lieutenant on
whom he could rely for a literal obedience to orders, to another
of more active brain who possessed initiative and would' think
for himself.' There was hardly an officer in the Peninsular RI'my
to whom he would grant a free hand even in the carrying out
of comparatively smnll tasks 1. His most trusted suhordinates
were liable to find tllemselves overwhelmed with rebukes delivered
in the most tempestuous fashion if they took upon themselves to
issue a command on their own responsibility, even when the great
chief was many leagues away. Sometimes when their inspirations
had been obviously useful and successful, he would wind up his
harangue, not with an expression of approval, but with a recom-
mendation to the effect that' matters had tUnJed out all right,
but they must never again act without orders 2.' This was not
I Robert Crauftud and Hill were perhaps the only uceptions.
I Take, for example, his behaviour to Sir James McGrijJQr, perhaps the
most successful of his chiefs of departments. lWGrigor, being at Sala-
manC3, while Wellesley was at :Madrid [Aug. 1812], ordered on his own
aut110rity the hringing up of stores for the mass of wounded left behind
there after tile hattlll. He then came 10 bring his report to Madrid.
'Lord Wellington was sitting to n Spanish Iminter (Goya] for his portrnit
when I arril'OO, and l\Sked me to sit down and give him n ulltnil a.q to the
state of the wOlluded at Salamanca. When 1 ClIme tl) inform him that
for their relief I had ordered up purveying and commissariat officers, he
started up, and in a violent manner reprobated what 1 had done. His
Lordship was in a passion, and the Spanish artist, ignorant of tl16 English
language, looked aghast, and at a loss to know what I had done to enrage
him EO much. "I shall be glad to know," he asked, "whe is to command
the army, I or rou? I establish one route, one line of communications for
the anny j you establish another, and order up supplies by it. As long
118 you live, sir, never do tll11t again j never do anything without my
ordere." I pleaded. that there was no time to consult him, and that I had
to save lives. He peremptorily desired me "never again to act without his
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the way to develop their strategical abilities, or to secure that
intelligent co-operation which is more valuable than blind obedi-
ence. It may be pleaded in Wcllesley's defence that at the COlll-
mencement of the war he had many stupid and discontented
officers under him, and that their earpings at his orders were often
as absurd as they were malevolenl Dut it Wll8 not only for them
that he rcserH.>cl his thunders. They fell not unfrequently OIl
able and willing men, who had done no more than think for
themselves, when an urgent problem had been presented to them.
Hc was, it must be confessed, 11 thankless master to serve: he
was almost as pitiless as Frederic the Great in resenting a mis-
take or an apparent disobedience to orders. The case of Norman
Ramsny may serve as an example. Ramsay was perhaps the
most brilliant artillery officer in the Peninsular army: the famous
charge of his guns through a French cavalry regiment at Fuentes
d'Qiioro is one of the best-known exploits of the whole wnr.
But at Vittoria he made an error in comprehending orders, and
moved forward from a village where the commander-in-chief
had intended to keep him stationed. He was placed under
arrest for three weeks, cut out of his mention in dispatches, and
deprived of the brevet-majority which had bt.-en promised him,
His career was broken, and two years later he fell, still a captain,
at Waterloo.
It would almost'seem that \Vellesley had worked out for
himself some sort of general rule, to the effect that incompetent
being more colllmon than competent subordinates, it would be
safer in the long rUll to prohibit all use of personal initiative,
as the occasions on which it would be wisely and usefully
employed would be less numerous than those on which it would
result in blunders and perils. He had a flne intellectual contempt
for mallY of the officers whom he had to employ, and never shrank
from showing it. 'VllClI once he had. made up his mind, he
could not listen with patience to advice or criticism. It wa.<;
onlers," .. , A month later T was able to 8/l.y to him, "My Lol'll,
recollect bow rou blamed me at Madrid Cor tho steps wllic11 I took 011
eornillg up to the army, when I could llotCOllSlllt your Lordship, nlld n.ctC(\
for myself. Now, if I had !lot, wlll\t would the COllSCltUences nll.ve boon ?"
He aIlllwllr'oo, " It is all right as has turned out; but I recommend )'Olll!ti\\
to have my orlhrtjor wOOt you do," This was a singula~ feature in the charac-
ter of IAlrd Wellington.' f\f<Grigor'g Autobiography, pp, 302-3 and 31l.
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this that made him such a political failure in his latter days;
he CllfTied into the cabinet the methods of the camp, and could
not ullderstn.nd why they were resented. His colleagues' started
up with crotchets,' he complained: 'I have not been used to that
in the early part of my life. I was accustomed to carry on things
in quite B different manner. I assembled my officers and laid
down my plan, and it wus cim..icd into effect without any more
words 1.' For councils of war, or other devices by which a weak
commander-ill-chief endeavours to discharge some of the burden
of responsibility upon the shoulders of his lieutenant'>, Wellesley
had the grcnl:cst dislike. He nevcr allowed discussion as IOllg
as he held supreme authority in the field: he would have liked
to enforce the same rule in the cabinet when he became prime
minister of England. Sometimes he had glimpses of the fact
that it is unwise to show opcn scorn for the opinion of others,
especially when they are men of influence or capacity!. But
it was not often that the idea occurred to him. His reception
of an officcr who came with a petition or a picce of advice wn.~
oftcn such that the \'isitor went away boiling with mge, or
prostmted with nervous exhaustion. Charles Stewart is said
to ha\"c wcpt after onc stonny interview with his chief, and
Picton, whose attempts at familiarity were particularly offensive
to the Dllke, would go away muttering words that could not be
consigned to print 3• A passage from the memoir of the chief of
one of his departments may suffice to paint the sort of scene
which used to occur:-
•One morning I WfiS in his Lordship's small apartment, when
two officers were there, to request leave to go to England.
A general officer, of a noble family, commanding a briwule,
advanced, saying, "My Lord, [have of late been suffering mllch
from rheumatism-." 'Vithout allowing him time to proceed
further, Lord Wellington rapidly said - "and you must go to
I Salisbury l\ISS., 1835. Quoted in Sir llerbert Maxwell's Welling/{)fI,
• ii. 194.
t Take, as a rare instance of rcuognitiun of this fact, his remark in 1828
that' \Vlien the Duke of NewellstJo llddressed to me a letter 011 the subject
of fonning-an Administrntion, I treated hilll with contempt. No man {ike&
to be treated with contempt. I Wll.9 wrong: ibid. ii. 213.
I .1'01' a record of such an interview by an eye-witness sce Gronow's
ReministflflCU, p. 66.
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England to get cured of it. By all means. Go there immedi-
ately." The general, sllrprisedat his Lordship's tonc and manner,
looked abashed, while he made a profound bow. To prevent
his saying anything more, his {.Qrdship turned to address me,
inquiring about the casualties of the preeeding night I,' &c.
Hardly less humiliating to lDany of 'Wellesley's subordinates
than personal interviews of this kind, were the letters which
t.hey received from him, when he chanced to be at a distance.
He had not the a~ probably he had not the wish, to conceal
the fnet that he despised as well as disliked many of those
whom the fortune of war, or the exigencies of home patronage,
placed under his command. The same icy intellectual contempt
which he showed for the needy peers, the grovelling place-hunters,
Klld the hungry lawyers of DubJjn, when he "'as under-secretary
for ll'cll\lld, pierces through llIallY of his letters to the officers
of the army of Portugal. Very frequently his mean opinion of
their abilities was justifiable-but there was no need to let it
appear. ]n this part of the management of men 'Wellesle)" was
deficient: he failed to sec that it is ~ttcr in t.he end to rule
subordinates by appealing to their zeal and loyalty than to their
fears, and that a little commendation for work well performed
goes further in its effect on an army than mueh censure for
what has been done amiss. When he has to praise his ollicers in
a dispatch, the terms used are always form~l and official in the
extreme-it is the rarest thing to find a phrase which seems to
come from the heart. The careful reader will know what
importance to attach to these expressions of approval, when he
llotes that the names of suborclinatC!l whom 'Velles1cy despised
and distrusted are inserted, all in due order of seniority, between
those of the men who had really done the work 2. All commanders-
in-chief have to give vent to a certain amount of these empt)' and
meaningless commendations, but few have shown more neglect in
discrimiuating between the really descrving men and the rest
than did the victor of Salamanca and V\'aterloo. Occasionally this •
carelessness as to the merits and the feelings of others took the
form of gross injustice, more frequently it led to nothing worse
I Sir Jamus MeGrigor's Memoirr, pp. 304-6.
, He hOllourabl)' mentioned Murray in his Oporto dispatch, nud Tripp in
his Waterloo dispatch! Both had behaved abominably.
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than a <:omplete lIlystification of the readers of the dispatch as
to the relative merits of the persons mentioned therein 1.
The explanation of this feature in \oVellesley's correspondence
is a fundamental want of broad sympathy in his chametcr. He
had a few intimates to whom he spoke freely, and it is clear
that he often showed consideration and c\'en kindness to his
aides-de-camp and other persollal retainers; there were one or
two of his relatives to whom he showed an unswerving affection,
and whose interests were always near his heart 2. Among these
neither his wife nor his elder brother Richard, the great Governor-
GCllem.! ofIndiu.. were to be numbered. Hc qunrrellcd so bitterly
with the latter that for mUll)' yeurs they never met. No doubt
there were faults on both sides, yet Wellington might have
borne much from the brother who started him on his career.
But for him the position of Ucsidcnt in ),fysore would Ilot
have been given to so junior an ofJk:er, nor would the COill-
mand of the army that won Assaye and Argaum have been
placed in his hands. It is small wonder that the grievances and
petty ambitions of thc average linc officcr Ilcver touched thc
hcart of the lllall who could be estranged from his own brother
by a secondary political question.
It has often been noted that when the WArs were over he
showed little predilection for the company of his old Peninsular
offic:.~rs. Some of his most trusted suborWnutcs hardly lookctl
upon his face after 1815: hc clearly preferred the company of
politicians and mcn of fashion to that of the majority of his old
generals. They only met him at the formal festivity of tht:!
annual 'Vatcr-loo BtLIllluet.
I Take, for example, the case of Baring of t]le K. G. L. at'Varerloo.
III a diapatch, not written immClliatcly after tlle battle (wllen accurate
information might lm,·c been difficult to procure), but tlCO '/I(ftllh8 later,
\Vcllealey says tlJ:~t 1...1 Haye s:.iote was U.kClIl at two o'clock,' througl. t11e
ncgligClllce of the officer who cornlll;\ndClI Ule post: Yet if anything i8
certain, it ill that Baring held out till sLy o'clock, that his nine companies
of tllo K. G. L. kcpt b:\Ck two whole Frellcll divisions, and that whell llc
WlL'l drivcn out, the sole cause was that lis ammunition "'M ex118ustClI, and
that 110 morc could be scnt him because the cncmy l18d cOlllp1ctcly
surrounded thc post. If Wellington had taken any trouble about the
ascertaining of the facts, he could not have failed to learn the truth .
• Sce especially his charnling letters to llis niece, Lady Burghel1l1l,
lately publishcd.
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The remembrance'of the countless panegyrics upon 'Vellington,
not only as a general but as a man, which ha,'e appeared during
the last sixty years, has made it necessary, if painful, to speak
of his limitnlions. For two whole generations it seemed almost
treasonable to breathe a. word against his personal character-
so great was the debt that Britain owed him for Salamanca and
Waterloo. His frigid formalism was regarded with respect and
c\"en admiration: his lack of geniality and his utter inability to
understand the sentimental side of life were even praised as
signs of Spnl"mn virtue. Certain episodes which did not fit in
too happily with the' Spartan hero' theory were delibe.rutcl)'
ignored 1. The popular conception of Arlhur Wellesley has
been largely built up on laudatory sketches written by those
who knew him in his old age alo~e. He lives in our memories
!l.S II kind of Nestor, replete with useful and interesting informa-
tion, as Lord Stanhope drew him in his Conversations 'l'itl~ the
Duke qf lVeUillgton. This was not the man kno.1TI to his
contemporaries in the years of the Peninsular 'Var.
Yet there Wl\S much to admire in ,Vcllcsley's personal character.
England has never had a more faithful servant. Though intensely
ambitious, he never allowed ambition to draw him aside from the
most tedious and thankless daily tasks. When once convinced
that it was his duty to undertake a piece of work, he Clll"rk..J. it
through with unswerving industry and perseverance, if Dot always
with much tact or consideration for the feelings of others 2•• He
was unsparing of himself, careless of praise or blame, honest in
every word and deed. He was equally ready to offend his king
or to sacrifice his popularity with the multitude, when he
\
1 His relations with the other sex were numerous and unedifying. From
his loveleS!! and unwise marriage, made 011 a point of duty wbere affe<:tion
had long vanished, down to his tedious 'corNl$polldeuce Witll M.iss J.;
there is nothing profitable to be discovered. See Gre"ille's Diariu [211d
Series], iii. 476.
f When we read Wellington's intermillalJ1e controversies witll the
Portuguese Regency and the Spanish Junta, we soon come to uudcrst:llId
not merely the way in which they llfOVokl.-d him by their tortuous sllUiHing
Ilnd their helpless procrastination, hut still more the way in which ho
irritated them by his unveiled seom, RIIlI his outsI}()kell exposure of nil
their meanucsscs. A little more diplomatic IllllgUlIgll would IIll,vc securcd
less frictioD, and probably better service.
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thought that he had to face a question in which right and
wrong were involved. He was essentially, what he once called
himself, using a familinr Hindustani phrase, 'a man of his salt.'
In spite of all his faults he stands out a majestic figure in the
histOJ); of his time. It is the misfortune of the historian that
when he sees so much to admire and to respect, he finds so little
that commands either sympathy or affection.
SECTION XIV: CHAPTER II
WELI.ESJ...EY RETAKES OPORTO
ON arriving at Lisbon, vVellesley, as we have already seen,
was o\'ct:i0Ycd to find tha.t the situation ill Portugal remained
just tl8 it hud been when he set sail fl'OllI Portsmouth: Victor
was still quiescent in his cantonments round Merida: Soult had
not moved forward on the road toward Coimbra, and was in the
midst of his unfruitful bickerings with the army of Si]veirll..
Lapissc had disappeared from his threatening position in front
of Ciudad Rodl'igo, and had passed away to Estremadul1l.
All the rumours as to an immediate French advance on Badajoz
and Abl"antes, which had arrived just as the new commnndcr-ill-
chief W8ll quitting England, had turned out to be baseless inven~
tions. ~11ere were reassuring dispatches awaiting him from the
English attaches with the armies of Cuesta and La llomana I,
which showed that Galicia was in full insurrection, and that
a respectable force was om.-e more threatening Victor's flank.
Accordingly it was possible to take into consideration plans for
assuming the offensive against the isolated l<'rench armies, and
the defensive campaign for the protection of Lisbon, which
Wellesley hud feared to find forced upon him, was not necessary.
Within thirty-six hours of his arrival the British commander-
in-chief had mo.tle up his mind as to the strategy that was
incumbent on him. He resolved, as we have already seen, to
leave a containing force to watch Victor, while he hastened with
the main body of his army to strike a blow at SOlllt, whO!;e
corps was clearly in ll. state of dispersion, which im,jtcd attack.
The Duke of Dalmatia WIll; operating at once upon the Minho,
the Tamega, and the Vouga, and it seemed likely that a prompt
stroke might snrprise him, in the midst of the movement for
I Monro to BeresforuJ April ]0, and MCKinley's inclosure from Vigo of
~\prill(iJ ]800.
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L'Oncentration which he would be compelled to make, when he
should learn t.hat the British WCl'C in HIe field.
The forL'e3 available for 'VVellesley's use consisted of some
~5,OOO British 1 and 16,000 Portuguese troops. Cradock, urged
on b)' Hill and Deresford, had advanced with the main body of
his Ilrllly to Lciria and lay there upon the twenty-fourth, the
day upon which he received Wellesley's notification that he had
been superseded and was to sail to take up the governorship of
Gibraltar. But four or five newly arrived corps still lay Il.t
Lisbon, and more were expected. '111c anny Wllij vcry weak in
cavalry, there were but four regiments and fractions of two
others available~. Of the infantry there were only present f"h-e
of the battalions 3 which had served at Vimiero and knew the
French and their manner of fighting. The rest were all in-
cxpcricllct.>d and Ilew to the field, and the majority indeed were
weak second battalions, which had not originally been intended
for foreign service, and had been· made up to their' present
numbers by large and recent drafts from the militia4• Even at
'l'alavero, six months after tile campaign hud begun, it is on
record that many of the men were still showing the names and
numbers of their old militia regiments on their knapsacks. The
battalions which had joined in Moore's march into Spain only
began to reappear in June, when Hobert Craufurd brought back
to Lisbon thc 1/43rd, l/52nd and 1/95th, which wcre to form
the nucleus of the famous Light Division. The remainder of
the Corunna troops, when they had been rested and recruited,
were drown aside to take part in the miserable expedition to
Walcheren. "Yhen 'Vcllcsley first took the field therefore,
these veterans of the campaign of 1808 were only represented
I Excluuing troollS that arrived at Lisbon just after 1Vcllosley's arril'lll.
~ TIle 3rd Drngoon GURrd~. 4th Dmgoolls, 14th auu 16tll Light DnLgoons,
witll onc sIlumlron of the 3rd Light Dragoons of the K. G. L., auu two of
the 20th Light Dragoons"
, The 2/9th, 1/4.5th, 20th, 6/GOth aud D7th.
• Of Wellesley's twenty-one British battalions, ten were 2nd battalions,
[of the 7th, Dth, 24th, 30th, 31st, 48th, 53rd, 66th, a3rd, 87thj, l\I.'o ""ere
single-battalion regimeuts [the 29th and 97th], t1lree first battalions rof
the 3rd, ;Uth and Mth], two Gnards' battalions [1st Coldstreams aud
1st Seotli Fusiliers], two' battaliollll of detachments,' onc a 3rd battalion
(27th), olle a Stll battalion [60th].
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by the two' battalions of detachments' which General Cameron
had organized from the stragglers alld convalescents of Moore's
'\ UJ'luy.
The Portuguese troops which ';Vellesley found available for
the campaign against Soult consisted entirely of the line regi-
ments from Lisbon and the central parts of the realm) whieh
Beresford had been reorganizing during the last two months.
The troops of the north had been destroyed at Oporto, or were
in arms under Silveira on the Tamega, Those of the south
were garJisoning Elvas, or still endeavollring to recruit their
enfeebled cadres at their regimenwl head quarters. But Bercsford
had massed at Thomar and Abrantes ten 1 line regiments, some
with one, some with their statutory two battalions, three newl)'
raised battalions of Cazadores, and three incomplete cavalry
regiments, a force amounting in all to nearly 15,000 sabres and
bayonets. Though Wellesley considered that they' cut a bad
figure)' und that the rank and file were poor and the native
officers 'worse than Mythillg he had ever seen,' he was yet resolvt'l1
to give them a chance in the field. Beresford assured him that
they had impro\'ed so much during the last few weeks, and were
showing such zeal and good spirit, that it was only fair that
they should be gi,'en a trial 2.
Accordingly Wellesley resolved to brigade certain picked
battalions among his English troops, and to take them straight
to the front, while he told off others to form part of the
'containing for<.-'C' which was to be scnt off to watch Victor
I These regiments were the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 10th, 13th, 16th, 16th,
l!)th, raised respe<:tivel}· at Lisbon (ht, 4th, 10th, 16th), EstremOll (3rd),
Setubal (7th),l'eniche (13th), Villa Vici«la (l.5th), Cascaes (l!Jth),Campo-
mayor (20th), the 1st, 4th and 5th Ca.7.a.dores, and 1st, 4th and 7t1l
Cavalry,
I It is fair to the Portuguese to note that other witnesses of May 1009
speak much more favourably of them. Londonderry (i. p. 305) writes
that (they Ilad applied of late so much amour to their military education
that some were already fit to take the field, and it only required a HUle
experience to put them on a level with tile best troops in Europe. TI,cre
was onc brigade,under Geueral Campbell (the 4th Rud 10th regiments),
whieh struck me as being ill the finest possible order: it went through
Il variety of evolutiolls with a precision and correctness whicll would Iuwe
done no discredit to our own army.'
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and the French army of Estremadura. The remainder, under
Deresford himself~ were to act as an independent division'during
the march C!1l Oporto.
Five days of unceasing work had to be spent in Lisbon before
'Vellesley could go forward, but while he was making his
arrangements with the }lortuguese regency, drawing out a Ilew
organization for Bcresfol'd's commissariat, und striving to get
into communication with Cucstn, the British troops were already
being pushed forward from Lciria towards Coimbra, and the
Portuguese were converging from Thomar on the same point, 80
that no time was being lost. It was during this short and busy
stay at Lisbon that Wellesley was confronted with the conspirator
Argenton, who hB.d come up to the capital in company with
Major Douglas. He did not make a good impression on the
commander-in-chief, who wrote home that he had no doubt us
to the reality of the plot against Soul~ and the discontent of
the French army, but thought it unlikely that any good would
come from the plot l . He refused to promise compliance with
Argcnton's two requests, that he would direct the Portuguese
to fall in with Bautt's plans for assuming royal power, and that
he would bring the British ~rmy forward to a position in which
it would threaten the retreat of the Qnd Corps on Lean. The
former savoured too much of Machiavellian treachery: as to the
latter, he thought so little of the profit likely to result from
the plot, that he would not alicr his plans ·to oblige the con-
spirators. The only information of certain value that he had
obtained from the emissary was that Soult had no idea of
Victor's position or projects. All that he granted to Argen-
ton was passports to take him and his ·two friends, 'Captains
l)upont and Garis,' to England, from whence they intended to
cross into France, in order to set their friends in the interior on
the move. Great ca're was taken that Argenton on his return
journey to Oporto should SC(! as little as possible of the British
army, lest he should be able to tell too much about its numbers
I WdlillgtQn ~pcttcMl/, iv. 213-6, 276. Tn Castlcrcagh. "Tdlesley
,;ay!. thut the plot will IJrow.t.ly fail, llud that even if the 2ud Corl)S
mutinied, the}' would not carry away tho otlLcr French armies, as
Argcntoll ltopl.'d. He had therefore refused 1.0 commit himself to
'lIlyULiug.
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and dispositions. He was conducted back by Douglas to the
Vouga, by a circuitous route, and sufely repassed Franceschi's
ontposts.
On the twent)'-ninth Wellesley at last got clear of ~isbon,
where the formal festivities tllld reception arranged in his
honour had tried him e\'en more than the incessant desk-work
which had to be got through before the organization of his base
for supplies was completed. On April SO he pushed forward to
Lciyrin., on May 1 to Pombal, on the second he rcaclled Coimbra
and found himself in the midst of his army, which had only
concentrated itself at that city during the last five days.
All was quiet in the front: Tl'ant, who was holding the lille
of the VOllga with 8,000 disorderly militia and some small
fragments rallied from the line regiments which had been dis-
persed at Oporto, reported that Franceschi and the French light
cavalry had remained quiescent for many days. The same news
Cilme in from \Vilson, who, after pursuing Lapisse to AlcantArn,
had collie buck with PlU't of his tl·oops to the neighbourhood of
Almeida, and had a detachment at Vizeu watching the flank of
the l·'rench advance. Silveira reported from Amaranle that he
was still holding the line of the Tamega, and had at leust
10,000 enemies in front of him. All therefore seemed propitious
for the great stroke.
Wellesley's plan, as finally worked out in detail, was to push
forward his main body upon Oporto with all possible speed,
while sending a flanking colulIlll under Beresfon:l to cross the
Douro near Lamego, join Silveira, and intert'ept Soult's line of
retreat upon the plains of Lean by way of the Tras-os-1tlontes.
If he could move fast enough, he hoped to catch the Marshal
with his army still unconcentrated. His design, as he wrote to
Castiereagh, was 'to beat or cripple Soult,' to thmst him back
into Galicia; he doubted whether it would be possible tu
accomplish more with the for<.'e that was at his disposal, but if
any chanL'e should occur for destroying or surrounding the
enemy he would do his best.. llumours that the Marshal was
preparing to evacnate Oporto were in the air: if they were true,
and the PI"Cnch were already ma.king I"CtIdy to retreat, it was
unlikely that they would stand long enough to run into danger.
1 lVellillglQIl DilfjJ(llche" ii. 306,
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The detailed arrangements for the distribution of the troops
were as follows :-
It was first necessary to provide a 'containing foree' to hold
back Victor, in case he should make an unexpected move down
the Tagus or the Gundiana. For this purpose Wellesley told
ofi' onc of his brigades, that of Mlwkenzie, together with two
regiments of heav)· cavalry and one of infantry which had lately
arrived at Lisbon, and were now on their march to Santarem.
With these four battalions, one field battery, and eight squadrons,
Mackenzie was to take post ut Abrantes, und behind the line
of the Zezere 1. There he was to be joined by the larger half
of lleresford's reorganized Portuguese army-se\'en battalions of
line troops, three of Cuzndores, five squadrons of cavnlry, and
three batteries~. He would also ha\'c thrce regiments of militia
at his disposal, to garrison the fortress of Abrnntes. His whole
force, excluding the militia, would amolmt to 1,400 British and
700 Portuguese 'cavalry, nearly 3,000 llritish infantry, 6,000
Portuguese infantry, and four butteries. These 12,000 men
ought to be able to hold back any fOl'Ce thut Victor could
detach for a raid along the Tagus: for, having Cuesta's army in
his front, it was absolutely impossible that he could march with
his whole corps into Portugal. If the Marshal moved forward
south of the Tagus, that river should be held against him, llnd
since it was in full flood it would be easy to keep him back, as
all the boats and ferries could be destroyed, and it would be
useless for him to present himself opposite VellA Ve1ha, Abrantes,
mm
716
120
3rd Dragoon Guards .
4th DrngoollS
One battery Field Artillery
[Captain Baynes's], six-
pounders
726
760
671
750
1 The regiments were, giving their force present with the colours from
the returu of May 6 :-
3/27111 Foue
2/318t "
1/41:.eh "
2/24th ,,[From Lisbon]
2,012 1,634
Total 4,446
I The Portuguese regiments were :-lst Foot [La Lippe] one batt.,
3nlllUd 16eb Foot [lst and 2nd of O!i\'enza] each one hatt., 4th 1<'oot
(I<'reire] and 13th Foot [Peniche] two hatts. each. 1st, 4th alld 6th
Cazadores, one hatt. each. }'he squadrons of the 4th Bnd 7th cavalry.
Total, 6,000 foot, 700 horse, and three field-batteries, about 7,100 men.
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or Santarem. If he advanced north of the 'l'agus, the line of
the Ze7.ere was to be maintained against him as long a..~ possible,
then those of the Nabao and Rio Mayor. But the main army
would be back from the north, to reinforce the f containing
force,' long ere the Marshal could push so far, As an outlying
post on this front Wellesley ordered Colonel Mayne, with the
pllrt of Wilson's Lusitanian Legion that 1100 not returned to
the north and a militia regimf'.Dt, to occupy A1cantara. He was
to break its bridge if forced ont of the position.
Victor being thus provided for, Wellesley could tW1l the rest
of his army against Soull at Oporio. For the main operation
he could dispose of 17,000 British and 7,000 Portuguese troops
present with the colours, after deducting the sick, the men on
detached duty, and one single battalion left in garrison at
Lisbon. He divided them, as we have already slated, into
a larger force destined to execute the frontal attack upon Soult,
and a smaller one which was to cut ofi' his retreat into central
Spain.
The flanking column, 5,800 men in all, was entrusted to Beres·
ford: it was composed of one British brigade (that of Tilson)
consisting of 1,500 bayonets l , a single British squadron (the 4th
of the 14th Light Dragoons) with five battalions 2, three
squadrons·, and two field~batteries of Portuguese. These troops
were originally directed to join Silveira at Amarante, and
po-operate with him in defending the line of the Tamega.· But
on May 3 there arrived at Coimbra the unwelcome news that
Llison had forced the bridge of Amarante, and that Silvcira in
conse<lucnce had retired south of the DOUIO and was lying at
Lamego with the wrecks of his army, some 4,000 men at most.
This untoward event did not cause ·Wellesley to change the
direction of Beresforo's column, but rendered him more cautious
as to pushing it beyond the J)ouro. He ordered his lieutenant
to pick \lP Sir Robert Wilson's small force at Vizcu", to join
1 Vb:. 2/87th, 669 bayonets, l/88th, 608 bayonets, five companies of the
6/GOth,306 bayonetll.
t Two battalions each of the regiments nos. 7 (Setubal), 19 (Cascaes),
and one of no. 1 (La. Lippe), as far as I can ascertain, composed tllis
force. I Regiment, no. 1.
~ \\rilson had 1,een remol'cd by Beresford from his own Lusitanian
Legion, and told to take up tlle command of the Brigade at Almeida:
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Silveira at Luncgo, and then to guide his further operations by
the attitude of the French, If they tried to pass the Douro he
was to oppose them strenuously; if they still clung to the
northern bauk and had not oomllecd far beyond Amarontc, he
might cross, and occupy Villa Real, if he thought the mo\'e
safe and the position behind that town defensible. But he was
to risk nothing; if the whole of Soult's corps should retreat
etlStward he was not to attempt to stop them, 'for,' wrote
Welleslcy, '1 should not like to see a. single British brigade,
supported by 6,000 or 8,000 Portuguese, exposed to be attacked
by the French army in any but a very good post 1.' If 1.oison
alone were left on the Tamega, Deresford might take post at
Villa Real and fight: if, however, Soult should appear at the
head of his entire force, it would be madness to await him: the
column must fall back and allow him to pass. 'Remember,'
added Wellesley in another letter2, 'that you are a oomm!\uder.
in-chief and must not be beaten: therefore do not undertake
anything with your troops if you have not some strong hope of
success,' Deresford's column was sent off' a da.y before the rest
of the army. in order to allow the flanking movement time to
develop before the frontal attack was pushed' home. He left
Coimbm on May 6, was at Vizcu on the eighth, and joined
Silveira at Lamego on the tenth; all his movements passed
completely unobserved by the enemy, owing to the wide sweep
to the right which he had been ordered to make.
'fhe illfantr)' of'Vellesley's main force, with which the frontal
attack on Oporto was to be made, consisted of six brigades of
British, one of the King's German Legion, and four picked
battalious of Portuguese who were attached respectively to the
brigades of A. Campbell, Sonlag, Stcwart, und Cameroll. Of
cavalry, in which he was comparatively weak, he had the whole of
the 16th, three squadrons of the 14th, and two of the 9l0th Light
Dragoons, with one squadron more from the 31'd J~ight Dragoons
of the King's Gel'man Legion. 'fheartillery, twenty-four guns ill
all, was composed of two British and two German field-batteries.
it WB.'!J apparently, witb two b.'lttalions drawn from the garrison of that
forlress that he now joined HcresfonJ.
1 Wcllcslcy to Bcre;fonlJ CoimlJmJ May 7. lVeJlillghm 1Ji8patchu,
iv. 309. t Ibid, iv. 320.
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No horse artillery had yet been received from England, though
'Vellesley had been urging his need for it on the home authori-
ties, at the same time that he made a similar demand for good
light infantry, such as that which hud formed the light brigade
of Moore's army 1, and for remounts to keep his cavalry up to
full fighting strength. The army was not yet distributed into
regular divisions, but the beginnings of the later dki'sional
arrangement were indicated by the telling off the brigade.s of
Richard Stewart and Murra)' to serve together under Edward
Paget (who had commanded Maore's reserve division with such
splendid credit to himself during the Corunna retreat), while
those of H. Campbell, A. Campbell, and Sontag were to take
their orders from Sherbrooke, and those of Hill and Cameron to
mo\'e under the charge of the former brigadier, The cavalry
was under General Cotton, with PaYlle as brigadier; the senior
officer of artillery was General E, Howorth 2,
.96
603
7G7
804
720
688
64.
Il33
6Q
710
721
667
6I
I Wellington Dypatcm, i,'. pp. 270,281,305.
I The whole force consisted of the following, present with the colours:-
CAI·AI.lIY: OjJi.l;erlf. Men. Qf!ice1'lI. Men.
14th Light Dragoons 20 471 R Stl;lwart's brigade:
16th H " 37 673 129th Foot 26
20th" " 6 237 1st Batt. Detachments 27
3rd" "K.G.L.3 Si l/lOth Portuguese
INI'ANTRV: i\lurray'sllrig:ule:
H. Campbell's brigade: lIst Line BatL K.G.I., 34
1
ColdS'tream Guards 33 1,19,1. 2nd" ,,32
. 3rd Foot Guards 34 1,228 5th" ,,28
One company 5/60th 2 61 7th" ,,22
A. Campbell's brigade: Hill's brigade:
j2/7th Foot 2G 6il9 i1/3rd Foot 282/63rd Foot 35 787 2/48th Foot 32One company 5/GOth 4 6* 2/66th Foot 34
1/10th Portuguese Onecompany5/GOFoot 2
Sontag's brigade: Cameron'g brigade:
lYitll Foot 22 fl72 j2/9th Foot 27
\ 2nd Batt Dct.'lchmcnts 35 7a7 2/&.'lrd }-'oot 29
) One company 5/6Oth 2 61 Onccompnny6j60.Foot 2
, 2/16th Portuguese 2/1Oth Portuguese -
With lawsou's battery of3-pounders,nnd Lane's, Hoyse's, and lWttbcrg's
of 6-pouudcrs. Allowing 600 eaeh for the Portugucsc 1J:lttnliolls, the tot..1.i
comes to 16,213 infantry, 1,604 cavalry, and 660 gunners, 81so sixty-four
men of the wagon train, and tbirtr-nine engineers. Total, 18,370.
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It will be noted that of the total force with which Wdleslc)'
was about to asS8.il the ~lld Corps, about 16,400 were British
troops and 11,400 Portuguese. Considering that Soult had at
least fl3,OOO sabres and bayonets, of whom not more than 2,200
were in his hospitals, and that over three-eighths of the allies
were untried and newly-organized levies, it cannot be denied
that the march on Oporta showed considerable self-confidence,
and a very nice alld accurate calculation of the chances of war
on the part of the British Commander-ill-chief.
On the very day Oil which the vanguard marched out from
Coimbra upon the northern road, Vlellesley received a second
visit from the conspirator Argenton, who had returned from
consulting his friends at Oporto and Amamnte. He brought
little news of importance: Soult had not yet proclaimed himself
king, and therefore the plotters had taken no open steps against
him, The French army had not begull to move, hut it appeared
that the :Marshal was pondering over the relative advantages of
the lines of retreat available to him, for Argenton brought
a memorandum given him by (or purloined fmm) some staff.
officer, which contained a long exposition of the various roads
from Oporlo, and stated a preference for tho.t by Villa Real and
the Tras-os-Montes 1. He had a number of futile propositions to
lay before Wellesley, and especially urged him to make sure of
Villa Ileal and to cut oft' the .Marshal's retreat on Spain, The
b'Uitol' was sent back, with no promises of compliance; and
every endeavour was made to keep from him the fad that the
allied army was already upon the move. Unfortunately he had
passed many troops upon the road from Coimbra to the Vouga,
and hnd guessed at what he had not seen. On the following
day he passed through the French lines on his return journey,
and by the way endeavoured to spread the propaganda of
treason. One of the infantry brigades which lay in support of
Franceschi's cavalry was commanded by a general Lefebvre, with
whom Argenton had 10llg served as aide-de-camp, Knowing
tlmt his old chief was wco.k and discontented 2, the emissary of
1 ·Wellington to Bercafonl, from CoijllbM.l, Muy 7, 1809.
2 He told \Vellesley t1mt the gonoral wns <a mall of weak intellect,' aud
tbnt he thought tllllt he had won him Ol'er to the plot from the way ill which
he received the news orit. Wellcs1cy lo Cnstlerengh, Muy 15, from Oporto.
OlUS'. JI
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the malcontents paid a midnight visit to him, revealed to him
the outlines of the conspiracy, and endeavoured to enroll him as
a fellow plotter. He had misjudged his man; Lefebvre listened
to everythil)g without showing any signs of surprise or anger,
but hastened to. bear the tale to Soult, all<! arranged for
Argcnton's arrest on his return to Oporto upon the followin~
morning. Confronted with the Marshal, the traitor held his
head high, and boasted that he was the agent of a powerful
body of conspirators. He invited Sotut to dechu'c against the
Emperor, and deliver France from servitude. He also warned
him that Wellesley had arrived at Coimbra, and told him that
80,000 British troops of whom 3,000 at least were cavalry, would
fall upon Franceschi that day. Thus, owing to his conference
with Argenton, Wellesley lost the chance of surprising Sowt,
who was warned of the oncoming storm exactly at the moment
when it was most important tllat he should still be kept in the
dark as to the force that was marching against him [May 8].
Soult sent back Argenton to his prison, after threatening him
"with death: but uncertain as to the number of the conspirator:>,
he was thrown for a moment into a state of doubt and alarm.
He probably suspected Loison and Lahoussaye of being in the
plot against him, as well as the real traitors-possibly Mermet
also '. Feeling the ground, as it were, trembling beneath hi~
feet, he began to make instant preparations for retreat: m"del":;
were sent to F'ranceschi to fall back 011 OpOl"tO, aud not to risk
anything by an attempt to hold off 'Vellesley longer than Wtl..'l
prudent. Loison was informed that he must clear the road
beyond Amarante, as the army was about to retire by the 'l'rM-
os-Montes, and he would now form its advanced guard. Lorges
at Drngll was directed to gather in the small fractious of Hcu-
delet's division which had been left at Viana and other places ill
I This may be perhaps inferred from Soult's letter to King JO!lCph,
written after the retreat, ill which lIe says that lie ilad illtendlJfl w pack off
Lahoussaye and Jlermet from the front: ( Aeette ellOqlle j'ai vOlllll f;'lire
partir cesgenemux, qui n'ont 1l:lS toujours fait cc qui et.'lit de leur pouvoir
pour le sueccs des operntiolls; mais j'ai prefcre attClldrc d'Cire arrive
a Zamors, stin de lie pas aooredit.er les bruits d'intrigues ct de COIt-
spirations qui eurent lieu 11. Oporto, auxquels Hs n'ont pas certainemcllt
pris aUCUlle part.' [Intercepted letter in Record Office.]
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the north, and to march in their company upon Amarante by
the way of Gnimaraens. The Marshal saw, with some dismay.
that thesc isolated detachmcnts would not be able to join the
main body till the fourteenth or fifteenth of May; it was neces-
sary to hold Oporto as long 8.'J possible in order to give them
time to come up.
Ncxtday Soull contrived to extort some more information from
the unstable Argenton. Receiving a promise of life for him~
self and pardon for his fellow conspirators (which the :MarshaJ
apparently granted because he thought that accurate informa-
tion concerning the plot would be worth more to him than
the right to shoot the plotters), the captain gave up the names
of all the leaders. Much relieved to find that none of hit{
gcnemls were implicated, Soult did no more than arrest the two
colonels, Lafitte and Donadieu, leaving the smaller fry Ull-
touched 1. He kept his promise to Argenton by hushing up
the whole matter. The colonels suffered no harm beyond theiJ·
arrest: Al'gcnton escuped from custody (probably by collusion
wiUl the officer placed in charge of his person) z, and got back.
to the English lines the day after the capture of Oporto 3•
Some months later he secretly revisited France, was recognized,
captured, and shot on the Plain of Grenelle 4.
At the very moment when Sonlt was cross-examining Argen-
tOll. issuing hurried orders for the concentration of his troops,
and preparing for a retreat upon Amarante, 'VeUesley's advanced
guard was drawing near the Vouga and making ready to pounce
1 80111t 80 far managed lo forget the whole hl1sineElS that he, t.....o yeal'H
later, sent the younger Lllfitte to present to the Emperor tile English tlllge
captured at Albuera! [See St. Chamaus, p. 133.]
j Most ofthis comes from Argenton's confession to Welleslcy on May 13.
See lVelii71gto'n DiGpatchu, iv. p. 339. He said that he slipped away from
the gendarmes at the advice of Lafitte, who told him that his friends would
come to no harnt if the chief witneElS agaillst them vanished.
J The extraordinary clemency shown to the conspirators by Soult, the
providential escape of Argenton, the favours which the Marshal after-
wards lavished on Lafitte, and the trouble which he took to hush up the
wllOle matter, led many of llis enemies to suspect tlUI.t he himself had beeu
in tIle plot, and had intended to combine his .scheme for Portuguese
kingship with a rising against Bouaparte at the head of his CQrpl d'armee :
Argenton's confession made tbis impossible.
4 For fnrthcr details on Argentou's fate, see the Appendix.
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upon Franceschi. Two roads lead northward (mm Coimbra, the
main chaltSsee to Oporto which runs inland via Ponte de Vouga
and Feira, and a minor route near the coast, which passes by
Avciro and Oval'. Five ofWellcsIcy's brigades and the whole of
his cavalry marched by the former route. Moving forward under
the screen of Trallt's militia, which still held the line of the
Vougo., they were to fall on the enemy's front at dawn on
May 10. The five squudrofL!J of the 14th and 16th Light
Drngoons under Cotton led the advance: then followed the
infantry of Edward Paget-the two brigades of MUITay and
Uichard Stewart. Shel'brooke's column marched in support, ten
miles to the rear. It was intended that the whole mass should
msh in upon :Franceschi's pickets, and roll them in upon his main
body before the advance from Coimbra was suspccted. Unhappily
Soult had already warned his cavalry commander of the coming
storm upon the ninth, and he was not caught unprepared.
~1eanwhile the remaining two infantry brigades of Wellesley's
army, those of Hill and Cameroll, were to execulc a turning
movement against Franceschi's flank. Orders had been sent
to the magistrates of the town of Aveiro. bidding them collect
all the fishing-boats which were to be found in the great lagoon
at the mouth of the Vouga-a broad sheet of shallow water
and sandbanks which extends for fifteen miles parallel to the
sea, only separated from it by a narrow spit of dry ground.
At the northern end of this s)'stem of inland waterways is the
town of Ovar, which lay far behind Fram:eschi's rear. Hill was
directed to ship his men upon the boats, and to throw them
ashore at Ovar, where they were to fall upon the flank of the
'French, when they should be driven past them by the frontal
ndvanee of the main body.
If all had gone well, the French detachment might have been
annihilated. Franceschi had with him no more than the four
weak cavalry regiments of his own division \ not more than
1,!WO sabres, with one light battery, and a single regiment of
infantry. But not far behind him was the rest of ! ..fenuet's
division, eleven battalions of infantry with u strcngth of some
3,500 men. One regiment, the 31st Uger, lay at Feira, near
lIst Hussaf'S, 8th Dragoons, 22nd Cha.sscurs and HllDOYcrian Chcmux-
ICgcrs.
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Ovar, while Ferrey's brigade was five miles further back, at
Grijoll.
On the night of the ninth the British advanced guard reached
the Vougs: after only a few hours' repose the cavalry mOllnW
again at 1 a.m., and pushed forward in order to fall upon the
enemy at daybreak. The night march turned out a failur~
as such enterprises often do in all ullcxplored coulltry.sidc
seamed with rocks and ravines. The rear of the cavalry <.:olumn
got astray and fell far behind the leading squadrons: much time
was lost in marching and countermarching, and at dawn the
brigade found itself still some way from Albergaria Nova, the
village where Franceschi's head quarters were established1, It was
already five o'clock when they fell in with and drove back the
F'rench outlying pickets: shortly after they came upon the whole
of Franceschi's division, drawn ont in battle array on a rough
moor behind the village, with a few companies of infantry placed
in a wood on their flank and their battery in front of their line.
General Cotton saw that there was no chance of a surprise, and
very wisely declined to attack a slightly superior force of all arms
with the 1,000 sabres of his two regiments. He resolved to wait
for the arrival of Richard Stewnrt's iufantry brigade, the leading
part of the mnin column. 'When Frnnl'(!;;chi advanced against
him he refused to fight and drew back a little 2. Thus some
hours of the monling were wasted, till at last there arrived on the
field Lane's battery and a battalion of the 16th Portuguese,
followed by the 29th and the 1st Battalion of Detachments.
Like the cavalry, the infantry had been much delayed during
I I<'or details of this fatiguing night march and its gropings ill the dark
see Tomkinson's (16th Dragoons) Dia1'!/,pp. 4-5, and Hawker's (14th Light
Dragoons) Jou'/7l(/l, p. 47.
1 The Light Dragoons, says Hawker (JounUJI, p. 48), 'finding oursehes
opposed by a lu>.a.vy column of caYlllry, retired a little.' Their total lOll!!
was one officer ami two men wOUluled, and one mall miflSing. Oil Ulis
I;leuder foundation Le Noble fOlllHI5 the following romance (I" 240). 'Le
general :I<'ranccsclli charge 11 III tCto de sa division ceux (Iui I'llttaqucnt
en front, rem'erse la llremihc Iignc, et t:mdis qll'elle sc retahlit, se retire, et
fond ILveo 6 pieces et deux regiments sur la. coloUlle qui le touTIl:lit l):lr
IlIL droite. L'clIllcmi est culbuM, la colonne reeulc, et la general se retire
sur Oliveirn 8.vee quel(lIHlS prisonniers: All this fuss produced f()IJ.r
easus1ti~s in the two English regiments. See officia.l report of casualties
for May 10, 1809.
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the hours of darkness, mainly by the impossibility of getting the
guns up the rocky dcme beyond the Vouga, where several caissons
had broken down in the roadway. It was only after daylight
had come that they were extricated and got forward on to the
upland where lies the village of Albergarin..
Wcllcsley himself came up along with Stewart's brigade, and
had the mortification of seeing all his scheme miscarry, owing to
the tardiness of the arrival of his infantry. For at the very
moment when Franceschi caught sight of the distant bayonets
winding up the road, he hastil)' went to the rear, leaving the
ht Hussars alone in position as a rearguard. 'This regiment
was. charged by the 16th Light Dragoons, and driven in with
some small loss. Under co\'cr of this skirmish the French
division got away in safety through the town of Oliveira de
A7.emis, which lay behind them, and after making two more
ineffectual demonstrations of a desire to stand, fell back on the
heights of Grijont when: Mermct's infantry division was awaiting
them.
The whole day's fighting had been futile but spectacular.
'I must note,' says an e)'c-witncss, 'the beautiful cffect of our
engagement. It commenced about sunrise on one of the finest
spring morniugg possible, on an immense tract of heath, with
a pine wood in rear of the enemy. So little was the slaughter,
and so regular the manreuvring, that it all appelu'Cd more
like a sham~£ght on 'Wimbledon CoullDon than an acliun in
a foreign countryl.' The .picturesque side of the day's work
must have been small consolation to "rellesley, who thus saw
the first stroke of his campaign foiled b}' the chances of a night
march in a rugged country-a lesson which he took to heart.
for he ral'Cly, if ever again, attempted a snrprise at dawn in an
une."'plored region.
An equal disappointment had takcn plaee on the flank near
the sea. Hill's brigade had marehed down to Aveiro, where the
local authorities had worked with excellent zeal and collected
a considerable number of boats, enough to carry ],500 men at a
, Hawker, pp. 49-00. Tomkillsoll 1Ias words to much the same effect,
• it was more like a field-day than an affair with the ellemr: all the shou
went over our heads, and no accident appeared to happen to anyone'
(p. G).
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trip. During the night of the ninth-tenth the flotilla was
engaged in sailing up the long lagoon which leads to Ovar.
It WM quite early in the morning when the brigndc Cllmc to
land, and if Franceschi had been drh"en in at an early hour
he would have found Hill in a most threatening position on his
flunk. Dut the French cavalry wus still ten or twelve miles
away, engaged in its bloodless demonstration !\brainst Cotton's
brigade. Finding from the peasants that there were French
infantry encamped quite close to him, at :Feira, and that the
English main column was still at a distance, Hill kept his men
within the walls of Ovar, instead of engaging in an attempt
to intercept }~ranceschi's retreat. He was probably quite right,
as it would have been dangerous to thrust three battalions,
without cavalry 01' gW1S, between Mennet's troops at Feirn and
the retiring columns of the French horscmen. Hill therefore
sent back his boats to bring up CamerOll'S brigade from Aveiro,
and remained quiet all the monling. At noon his pickets were
driven in by French infantry: Mcrmet had at last hCArd of his
arrival, and had sent out the three battalions of the 31st Leger
from Feira to contain him and protect Franceschi's flank. The
voltl{J/1l1r companies of tbis force pressed ill upon Hill, but would
not adventure themschcs too far. The afternoon was spent in
futile skirmishing, but at last the retreating French ca"alry went
by at a great pace, and the Engli~h Light Dragoons, following
them in hot pursuit, came up with the 31st Uger. Hill, seeing
himself once more in touch with his friem!s, now pushed out of
Oval' in force, and pressed on the French volt1geur companies,
which hastily retired, fell back on their regiment, and ultimately
retired with it and rejoined Mermet's main body on the heights
above Grijoll. The skirmishing had been almost bloodless-
Hill lost not a single man, llnd the French infantry only half-a-
dozen wounded 1.
On the morning of Ma.y -11, therefore, Hill's troops on the
left and Cotton's and Paget's on the right luy opposite the posi-
1 The best account of till!; litUe skirmish is in the JQllrllal of Fantin des
Ooloards of the 31st Ugcr (p. 230). Napier does not mention that the
reaSOll WllY Hill did not move in tlle afternoon was simply that be was
1I1reudy • I;ontained,' and engaged with n force of Frendl infantry of ucsrly
his own strength.
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tion which Mcrmet and Franceschi had taken up. Sherbrooke
wns still more than ten miles to the rear, having barely crossed
the Vouga., while Cameran had not yet sailed up from Aveiro.
Wdlesley had therefore some 1,500 cavalry and 7,000 infantry
under his IlUud, with which to nSSll.il the 1,~OO horse and 4,200
foot of the two French divisions. The enemy were strongly
posted: Grijon lies in a valley, with woods and orcharils aroum!
it alld a steep hillside at its buck. The Freneh tirailk-ur8 held
the village and the thickly-wooded slopes on each side of it:
behind them the fifteen battalions of Mermet were partly visible
among the trees Oil the sky-line of the heights.
lVellesley was anxious to see whether the enemy intended to
hold his ground, or would retire before a demonstration: he
therefore threw the light companies of Richard Stewart's brigade
into the woods on each side of Grijon. A furious fire at once
broke out, and the advancing line of skirmishers could make ))0
headway. Realizing that the French intended to fight a serious
rearguard action, Wellesley refused to indulge them with 1\
fronW attack and determined to turn both their flankJl. While
Cotton's cavalry and the two English battalions of Stewart's
brigade drew up opposite their centre, Murray's Germans
marched off to the left, to get beyond Mermet's flank, while
ColoncI Doylc, with thc battalion of the 16th Portuguese which
belonged to Stewart's brigade, entered the woods on the extreme
right. Hill's brigade, a mile or two to the left of Murray,
pushed forward on the Ovar~Oporto road, at a rate which would
soon have brought them far beyond the enemy's rear.
The meaning of these movements wns not long hidden from
the French; the 1st and 2nd battalions of the King's Gcrman
Legion, led by Brigadier Langwc.rth, were soon pressing upon
their right flank, while the Portuguese battalion plunged into
the woods on the other wing with great resolution. Wellesley
himself was watching this part of the advance with much interest;
it.was the first time that he had sent his native allies into the
firing linc, and he was anxious to sce how they would behave.
They surpassed his expectations: the 16th was a good regiment,
with a number of students of the Universit), of Coimbra in its
ranks. They plunged into the thickets without a moment's
. hesitation, and ill a few minutes the retiring sound of the
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musketry showed that they were making headway in the most
promising style. This sight was an enormous relief to the
Commander-ill-chief: if the Portuguese could be trusted in
line of battle, his tusk became immeasurnbly more easy. 'You
are in error in supposing that these troops will not fight,' he
wrote to a downhearted correspondent: 'onc battalion has
behaved remarkably well under my own eyes 1.'
l\fcrmct and Franceschi did not hesitllte for long, when they
saw their flank guard beaten in upon either side, and heard that
Hill was marching upon their rear. They gave orders for their
wbole line to retire without deJay; the plateau behind them was
so cut up with stoDe walls enclosing fields, that the cavalry could
be of no use in covering the retreat, so Franceschi went to the
rear first at a round trot. Mennet followed, leaving the three
battalions of the 31st Ugcr to /\.Ct as a rearguard 2.
The whole British line now pressed ill as fast as was possible
in the woods and lanes: the infantry could never overtake
the enemy, but two squadrons of the 16th and !lOth Light
Dragoons, galloping along the high road, came IIp with Mer-
met's rCllr a mile beyond the brow of the hill. Charles Stewnrt,
who was leading them on, was one of those cRvalry officers who
thoroughly believe in their arm, and think that it can go
anywhere and do anything. He at once ordered Major Blake
of the 20th to charge the enemy, though the French were
retiring along a narrow chall.saf:e bordered with stone walls.
Fortunately for the dragoons their opponents were ulrcady shaken
in morale: the three bnttalions were not well together, isolated
companies were still coming in from the flanks, and the colonel
of the 3lst had completely lost his head. On being charged,
the rearguard fired a volley, which brought down the front file!>
of the pursuing cavalry, but then wll.\"ered, broke, and began
scrambling over the walls to escape out of the high road into
the fields. There followed a confused meMe, for the English
dragoons also leaped the walls, and tried to follow the broken
enemy among thickets and ploughland. Of those of the French
I Wellesley to Mackenzie [the lattor Imd written that hedared Dot trust
Ilill Portuguese battalions], lVellillgt<m DiJrpatcM$, iv. p. 350.
~ Sce Fautin des Odoarda. Le Noble (incorrect as always) ~ys that
tIle 47th brought up tIle rear.
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who fled down the high road mall)' were sabred, and a consider-
able number captured: indeed the eagle of the regiment was in
considerable danger for some time. Dut the British had no
supports at hand; they scattered in reckless pursuit of the men
who had taken to the fields, and mnny were shot down when
they had got entangled among trees and walls. However, the
charge, if somewhat reckless, was on the whole successful: the
dragoons lost no more than ten killed, one officer and thirty
troopers wounded, with eight or ten missing, while the French
regiment into which they had burst left behind it over 100
prisoners and nearly as manY,killed and wounded I.
1"01' the rest of the day Mermet and Francescbi continued to
fall buck before the advancing British, without making more
than a momentary stand. At dusk they reached Villa Nova,
the transpontine suburb of Oporto, which they evacuated during
I There are two excellent accounts of this cbarge ill tbe diaries of
Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons and Fantin des Odoards of the
31st J.eger, TIle former (pp. 9-11) holds that the charge was illdeflJllsilJle,
aud blames Charles StewlIrt for orderiug it, sud Major Blako for cnrryiug
it out. A differcut impressiou is received from the I'-'reuch diarist, who
speaks of it as a complete rout of his regiment aud very disastrOll!:!.
, Assaillis en detail nous avons ete facilement mis en desordre, attendu
notre morcellement et la confusiqu que des charges audacieuses de C3I'alerie
mettaient dans 1106 raugs. Les trois hatailloll/! out liIche pied et se sout
enfuis il. vall dl} rOllte. Si le l~IYS lI'ul'ait pas offcrt des murs, dca fosses
et des haics, ils '"lraicnt e16 lmtierornent sabres. •.. Peu il. pOll leg
debris du rcgimcllt 8C sout rallies n l,~ divisiOJl, 'jui etait ell position" une
lieue de Porta, :-Iotre pcrte 11 e16 considerable, mais 1I0trc lIigle, qui a couru
de grlmds dangers dnns ccttc lmgIlrre, 11 fort henreuscment ete sau\'Ce. , ..
Les dmgons ctaicnt acluU"lll!s n nous poursuivre, et mal 1I pris ccux qui
au lieu de gagner leg coHines Ollt sui\'i 10 vallon et la grunde route' (p, 231).
It seems probable (a thing extremely rllre in military history) that
Tomkillson Ilnd Des Udoards, the two best narratQl'S of the fight, actulllly
met each other. 'Ibe former mentiOIl/! that he chased an isolated }'rench
iufalltry man, fired his pistol at his head, but missed, and that he was
at once shot in the shoulder by another Frenchman and disabled, Then
turning back, he was again fired at by se\'eral men aud brouA"ht down,
Des Otloards says tbat he was chased by a single English dragoon,ll'ho
got up to him, fired at him poiut blank lllld missed, whereupon a cerporal
of hi" company, '.1'110 hat! turned bllck to help him, s110t tlle drngoon, whu
,1roppcd his smoking pistol at Des OdO<'1rds' feet, aud rolled off his
llorse. The Ilurrath'esseem to tally perfectly.
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the night. The moment that they hud crossed the bridge of
boats Soult caused it to be blown up, and vainly believed him·
self secure, now that the broad and rapid Dauro was rolling
between him and his enemy. The totuJ. loss of the French in
the day's fighting had been about fl50 men, of whom 100 were
prisoners. That of the British was two officers and nineteen
men killed, six: officers and sixty-three men wowldcd, and sixteen
men missing. Nearly half the casualties were in the ranks of
the two squadrons of dragoons, the rest were divided between
the light companies of the 1st Battalion of Detaehmcllts, the
lst and 2nd battalions of the German Legion, and the 16th
Portuguese1.
On the night of the eleventh-twelfth, when 1\1ermet and
}~ranceschi had joined him, Soult had collected in Oporia the
llUlin body of his army: he had in hand of cavalry Franceschi's
four regiments, and of infantry fifteen battalions of Mermet's
division, seven battalions of Mexle'g (forming Ueynaud's brigade),
and seven of Delnborde':o, a foi·cc in all of about 10,000 bayonets
and ll~OO sabres. Only a few miles away, at Baltar, on the
road to Amarante, were Caulaincourt's dragoons and the remain·
ing regiment of Delaborde's division, an additional force of
~omewhat over ~,OOO men. 'Vith 13,000 men at his dis}Xlsnl
mld a splendid position behind the Douro, he imagined that he
might retreat at leisure, maintaining the line of the impassable
ri"er for some days more. He intended to hold Oporto long
enough to enable Loison to clear the road to Villa Real, and to
allOlI' Llrgcs und the belated troops from the north time to
march in to Amarante. He was somewhat vexed to have
received no news from Loison for four days, but, when last
heard of [on May 7], that geneml was moving forward into the
Tras-os·l\fonles, with orders to push on Md open it \\'ay for
1 The ofJi~ers killed were Captain Detmering of the 1at K. G. I,., Rntl
n Portuguese ellsign of the 1/16th. 'J1UIllC wounded were Captain Ovens
and Licul.cwmt \\'OOIlgate uf the 1st BntbiliOIl of Detachments, Lieutenants
Lodders IIlId LlIhugrell of the K. G. Lo, C<lrnet Tomkinson of the 16th
Light Dragoons, alld a Portuguese lieuteuant of the l/16th. 1t would
seem that some of the fourteen 'missing' were infantry killed ill the
\\'oods, whose bodies were never found, but se\Oeral belonged to the mal.
treated dragoon SquadrOllSJ and were taken from havinp: pursued wo fast
and far.
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the army us far as the Spanish border. Silveira having retired
to the south bank of the Douro, the Marshal had no doubt that
Loison would easily brush away the Ordenanza, and open for the
whole corps d'al'mlIe the passage to Zamora and the plains of
Leon.
Meanwhile the only danger which the Marshal feared was
that Wellesley might send forward the fleet of fishing~boats
which had carried Hill w Ovar, brillg them to the estuary of
the Daura, and use them to pass troops across its lowest reach,
just within the bar at its mouth. Accordingly he told Fran-
ceschi to patrol carefully the five miles of the river that lie
between Oporta and the sea. The infantry was comfortably
housed in the city, with pickets watching the quays: every
boat on the river, as it was supposed, had either been destroyed
or brought over to the north bank. Wellesley would, as Soult
calculated, be compelled to spend several days in· making his
prepa.rations for passing thc Douro, since he had no means of
pushing his army across the broad stream, save the fishing-
smacks \\'hich he might bring round from the lagoon of Ovar.
The Marshal therefore was quite at his ease, even though he
knew that W'ellesley's v~rd was at Villa Nova in force. He
imagined that he could ~ount on ample time for the evacuatiOll
of Oporto, and begall to make arrnngements for a leisurel)'
retreat. His first care was to send off eastward all his conva-
lescents, his reserve ammunition, and his wheeled vehicles, of
which he had collected a fair supply during his seven weeks' halt
at Oporto. These were to march, under the convoy of Mermet's
division, during the course of the morning. The other trooP'!
f\'Om Merlc's and DeJaborde's divisions, together with Franceschi's
horse, were to watch the lower Douro alld check any attempt of
the British to cross. The Marshal was himself lodged at a
villa on the high ground west of the city, from which he com-
manded a fine view of the whole valley from Oporto to the sea:
the view up-stream was blocked by the hill crowned by the Serrs.
Convent, where the river Itlakes a slight bend in order to get
round the projecting heights on the southern bank. So
thoroughly were both Soult and his smfF impressed with the
idea that Wellesley would endeavour to operate below, and not
above, the city, that while the lower reaches of the Douro were
]809] CARELESSNESS OF SOULT
watched with the greatest care, a very inefficient look-out was
kept on the banks above Oporto: there would seem to have
been but a single battalion placed ill that direction, and this
small force was lying far back from the dyer, with no proper
system of pickets thrown forward to the water's edge. Yet the
opposite bank WflS full of cover, of thickets, gardens and olive
b'l"Oves, screening several lanes and by-paths that had led down
to ferries. Such of the boats as had not been scuttled had been
brought over to the north bank, but they were not all protected
by proper guards. All this was inexcusably careless-the main
blame must fall on the Marshal for his pm'a pris in refusing to
look up-stream: though some must also be reserved for General
IJuesnel, the governor of Oporto, and for Fay, the brigadier
whose battalions wcre in charge of the eastern suburb of the
city. But the fact was that none of the French officers dreamed
of the possibility that Wellesley might make an attempt, on the
"ery morning of his arri val, to cross the tremendous obstacle
interposed in hill way by the rolling stream of the Douro. That
he would deliver a frontal attack on them in full daylight was
beyond the limits of the probable. They had no conception of
the enterprise of the man with whom they had to deal.
There Wll!l this amount of truth in their view, that the
Hritish General would not have made his daring stroke at
OpOtto, unless he had ascertained that the carelessness of his
ad \'ersaries had plnced an unexpected chance in his hands. By
ten o'clock in the morning Wellesley had concentrated behind
Villa )lova the whole of his force-the three columns of Pagct,
Hill, and Sherbl'ooke were !lOW up in line. They were kept out
of sight of the enemy, some in the lateral lanes of the suburb,
but the majority hidden behind the back slope of the hills,
where orchards and vineyards gavc thcm complete cover fl"Ulll
obserVCnI on the northern bank.
''Vhile the troops were coming up, Sir Arthul' lllounted the
Scrra height, and reconnoitred the whole country·side from the
garden of the convent. He had with him Portuguese notables
who were well acquainted with Oporto and its suburbs, includ-
ing several persons who had come over the river 011 the preceding
day, and could give him some notion ofthe general disposition and
emplacement of the French army. Sweeping the valley with his
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glasses he could see Frallceschi's vcdettes movi.ng about on the
heights down-stream, and heavy columns of infantry forming up
outside the no~-eastem gates of the city. At eleven o'clock
this body moved off, escorting El. long trai';l of wagons-it WAA
Mcrmct's division starting for Amarante in charge of Soult's
convoy of sick and reserve artillery. On the quays, below the
broken bridge, many French pickets were visible, ensconced at
the openings of the streets which lead down to the water. Dut
turning his glnss to the right, ,"Vellcslcy could' note that up-
stream matters looked very quiet, the rocky banks above the
deep-sunk river were deserted, and nothing was v.isible among
the gardens and scattered houses of the south-eastern suburb.
It was possible that French troops might be ensconced there,
but no sign of them was to be seen.
'Many intelligence-officers had alreAdy been sent off, to scollr
the southern bank of the river, and to llS(."crtain whether by any
chance the enemy had overlooked some of the boats belonging
to the riverside villages. In a short time two valuable pieces of
news were brought up to the Commander-in-chief. The large
ferry-boat at Barca d'Avintas, four miles above the city, had
been scuttled, but not injured beyond the possibility of hasty
repairs. It was already being baled out and mended by the
villagers. Nearer at hand a still more important discovery was
made. Colonel ',",aters, onc of the hest scouts in the army,
had met, not far south of the suburban village of Cobranloes,
an Oporto refugee, a barber by trade, who had crossed o\'er
from the north bank in a small skiff, which he had hidden in
a thicket. The man reported that the opposite bank was fOl'
the moment unguarded by the French, amI pointed to fOUl'
large wine-barges lying stranded below the bl'ink of the 1I0rthem
shore, with no signs of an ellemy in charge. Yet the position
was one which should have been well watched: here a massive
building, the bishop's Seminary, surrounded by a high garden
wall, lies with its back to the water. It was an isolated strue-
lure, standing well outside the eastern suburb, in fai.dy open
ground, which could be easily swept by artillery fire from the
dominating position of the Serra heights. 'Vaters had with
him as guide the prior of Amarante, and b)' his aid collectcrl
three or four peasants from the neighbouring cottages. After
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some persulUlion from the ecclesiastic, these men and the barber
consented to join the British officer in (l raid on the stranded
barges on the further bank. It was a hazardous undertaking,
for one French picket had lately been seen to pass by, and another
might appear at any moment. But the Ilccessnry half-hour
was obtained; Waters and his fellows entered the barber's skiff,
crossed the river Wlseen, got the four barges afloat, and returned
with them to the southern bunk. They turned out to be. big
clumsy vessels, capable of holding some thirty men apiece.
The explorer had noted that the Seminary buildings above were
perfectly empty.
On receiving this intelligence, Wellcsley resolved to take the
chance which the fates offered him. If the French had shown
themselves alert and vigilant, he could not have dared to· throw
troops across the river into their midst. Dut they seemed
asleep at high noon, and their manifest negligence CIlCOUrnged
him. His mind was soon made up: he ordered Murray with
two battalions of his brigade I, two guns, and two squadrons of
the 14th Light Dragoons, to march hard for Burca d'Avintas,
cross on the ferry, and seize a position on" the opposite bank
capable of being defended against superior numbers. But this
(as the small force employed sufficiently demonstrates) was only
intended as tl. diversion. The main blow was to be deliver«!
"nCtl.rcr at hand. \Vellesley had rcwlvcd to endeavonr to seize
the abandoned Seminary, and to throw his main bod)' across the
river at this point if possible. The local conditions made the
scheme less rash in fact than it appears on the map. The east
end of the Scrm hill completely commands all the ground about
the Seminar)': three batteries 2 were quietly pushed into the
convent garden and trained upon the roads leading to that
isolated building-one along the shore, the other further inland.
If the place could once be seized, it would be possible to protect
its garrison by fire across the water, There were only two
artillery positions on the French bank, from which the Seminary
could be battered: one, close to the water's edge, was completely
under the guns of the Serrs COllvent, The other, on the
lIst and 2nd Line battalions of the K. G. L., also a detached compauy
of riJlC6 of the K. G. L.
'I Lane's and Lawson's British guns, and one K. G. L. battery.
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heighl~ by the chapefof Born Fin, was rather distant, and could
not be used against boats crossing the river, as they would be in·
,'isible to gunners working on this emplacement. Cannon placed
there might do some damage to the Seminary buildings, but
could not prevent the garrison from being reinforced. llealizing
all this at a glance, 'Vellcslcy hurried down Hill's brigade to the
water's edge, and the moment that the leading company of the
Buff's had got on board the barges, bade them push off. In
a quarter of an hour the first vessel was over, and a subaltern
and twenty-five men rushed up into the empty enclosure of
the Seminary. and closed the big iron gate open'ing into the
Vallongo road, which formed its only land-exit. The men from
tJ;tc other barges were just behind: they set themselves to lining
the garden wall and to piling up wood and earth ~"'8.inst it, in
order to give themselves a standing-place from which they could
fire over the coping. The barges went back with all speed, and
were again loaded and sent off. Meanwhile Wellcsley and his
staff were looking down in breathless anxiety on the quiet bend
of the river, the silent suburb, and the toiling vessels. At any
moment the alarm might be given, and masses of the enemy
might debauch from the city and dash in upon the Seminary
before enough men were across to hold it. For the best part of
an hour the Commander-in-chief must have been fully aware
that his daring move might eud only in the annihilation of two
or three companies of a good old regiment, and a check that
would appear as the righteous retribution for recklessness.
But no stir was seen in Oporto: the barges crossed for a
second time unmolested: on their third trip they carried over
General Edward Paget, whom Wellesley had placed in command
of the whole movement. :More than half the Dutts had JX1Ssed,
and the Seminary wus beginning to be adequately manned, when
at last some shots were heard outside the gates, and a few
minutes later a line of French Uraillellra, supported by three
battalions in column, came rushing down upon the enclosures,
A full hour had passed between the moment when the first boat·
load of British soldiers had been thrown across the river, and
the time when the French discovered them!
The fact was that the cnemis commander was in bed, and his
staff' breakfasting! The Duke of Dalmatia bad sat up all night
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dictating dispatches, and making his arrangements for a leisurely
flitting. for he intended to stay two days longer in Dparto, so
as to cover the march of his other divisions towards Amarantc
and Villa Real. His desk-work finished, he went to bed at
about nine o'clock 1, in full confidence that he was wet! protected
by the ri"er, and that 'Velleslcy was probably engaged in the
laboriol18 task of bringing up boats to the mouth of the Douro,
which 1I"0uld occupy him for at least twenty-four hours. The
staff' were taking their coffee, after a late dljcuner, when the
hoof-beats of a furious rider startled them, and a moment later
Brossard, the aide-de-camp of General Foy, burst into the Villa
shonting that the English had got into the town. Led to the
Marshol's bedside, he hurriedly explained that Foy had just
discovered the enemy passing by boats into the Seminary, and
was massing his brigade for an attack upon them. The Marshal
started up, sent his staff' flying in all directions to warn the out-
lying troops, ordered all the remaining impedimenta to be sent
off on the Vallongo road, and dispatched Brossard back to Foy
to tell him to 'push the English into the rh"er.' He was hardly
dressed and on horseback, when the noise of a. distant fusillade,
followed b.y heavy artillery fire, gave the news that the attack
on the Seminary had already bef,ttln.
It had been only at half-past ten that Fay, riding along the
heights by the Chapel of Born Fin, had been informed that
there were boats on the river, filled with red-coated soldiery.
It took him wellnigh three-quarters of an hour to bring up his
nearest regiment, the 17th Uger, and only at n.S() did the
attack on the Seminary begin. The three battalions beset the
1 Soult'sdoings on this day are best told by his aide-d~mpSt. CbarnaIl!l,
who was with him all the morning. No attention need be paid to the
uarrative of his panegyrist Le Noble, who tells a foolish story to the effect
that a commandant Salel c~me at silC o'clock (more than fonr boara
before the Duffs began to pass), amI assured some of Soult'8 staff that
the English were already crOBSing the rh·er. <On hearing tIJis,' says
Le r.,·oble, <the Marahal sent for Quesncl, the governor of Oporto, aud
!t!lkcd if there was any truth in the rumour. TIle latter danied it and
Soult was reassured. If only Salel IHld been believed, all the English
who had then paaed might have been killed or captured,' and a disaster
i\voided. As a matter of fact QueenellVllS rigllt, alld uot a British soldier
llad rct crossed [Oampag:llc de GaiiCl!, p. U7}.
OllAH. It ,
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northern and western sides of the Seminary, and made a vigorous
attempt to break in, while some guns were hurried down to the
river bank, just below thc building, to fire upon the barge~
that were bringing up reinforcements.
V{ellesley, from his eyrie on the Serra heights, had been
watching for the long-expected outburst of the French. The
moment that they came pressing forward, he gave orders for
the eighteen guns in the convent garden to open upon them.
The first shot fired, a round of shrapnel from the 5l-inch
howitzer of Lane's battery, burst just O\'cr the leading French
gun on the further bank, as it was in the act of unlimbering,
dismounted the pieee, and by an extraordinary chance, killed or
wounded every man and horse attached to it 1. A moment later
came the blast of the other sc\'entcen gWIS, whiclrswept the lcvel
ground to the west of the Scminary with awful effect. The
lrench attack reeled back, and the survivors tied from the open
ground into the houses of the suburb, leaving the disabled
cannon behind them. Again and again thcy tried to creep
forward, to flank the English stronghold, and to fire at thc
barges as they wcnt Bnd came, but on every occasion they were
swept away by the hail of shrapnel. They could, therefore, only
attack the Seminary on its northcrn front, where the buildiu@S
lay between them and the Serra height, and so screened them
from the artillery. But in half an hour the 17th Uger was
beaten off and terribly mauled; they had to cross an open space,
the Prudo do Bispo, in order to get nCW" their adversarics, amI
the fire from the garden wall, the windows, and the fiat roof of
the edifice. swept them away before they could close.
Meanwhile the English suffered little; the only serious loss
sustained was that of General Edward Paget, whose arm Wa.'!
shattered by a bullet. He was replaced in command by Hill,
who (like him) had crossed in one of the earlier bargcs, The
number of troops in the building was always growing larger, thc
Buffswereallacross,and the66thand 48th werebeginning to follow.
. After a short slackening in the engagement, General Delabordc
came up, with the three hattalions of the 70th of the line, to
I This interesting fact I owe to the diary of Captain Lane, still ill
manuscript, of which a copy has been sent me by Col. Whinyates, R.A.,
a spedalist on the history of the Dritish artillery in the Peninsula.
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support his brigadier. This new force executed a far more sus-
mined and desperate attack on the Seminary than had their
predeeessots. I,Jill in his letters home called it 'the .teri01i.f
attack.' But it had no better fortune than the last: a thousand
English infantry, comfortably ensconced behind stone walls, and
protected on their flanks by the storm of shot and shell from the
opposite bank of the river, could not easily be moved. So well,
indeed, were they covered, that in three hours' fighting they
only lost seventy-seven men 1, while the open ground outside
was thickly strewn with the dead and wounded Frenchmen.
Soult was now growing desperate: he ordered up from the
city Reynaud's brigade, which had hitherto guarded the quays
in the neighbourhood of the broken bridge. His intention was
to make one more attack on the Seminary, and if that failed to
draw off in the direction of Vallongo and Amarante. This move
made an end of his chances; he had forgotten to reckon with
the Portuguese. The moment that the quays were left un-
guarded, hundreds of citi:r.ens poured out of their houses and ran
down to the water's edge, where they launched all the boats that
had been drawn ashore, llnd took them over to the English bank.
Richard Stewart's brif,18.de and the Guards who had been waiting
under cover of the houses of Villa Nova, immediately began to
embark, and in a few moments the passage had begun. The 29th
was first formed up on the northern bank, and dashed up the main
street into the city, meeting little or no opposition; tlle 1st
Battalion of Detachments and the Guards' brigade soon followed.
In half an hour they had come upon the flank of the French force
which was attacking the Seminary, and had taken in the rear
and captured one of Scull's reserve batteries, whose horses were
shot down before they could escape along a narrow lane. As
the British went pouring through Oporto the whole population,
half mad with joy, stood cheering at the windows and on the
roofs, waving their handkerchiefs and shouting Viva. The
rabble poured down into the streets, and began to attack the
French wounded, so that Sherbrookc had to detach a compuny to
proted Ulem from assassination 2.
1 Viz. 1/3rd, fifty meo, 2/48th, seventeen men, 2j66th, ten men, killed
and wounded. The French 17th alone lost 177 [Foy's Dispatch].
1 All this is weU described by Leslie of the 29th (p. 113), Stotherd
, 2
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When Soult found himself thus attacked in the flank, he saw
that there was no more to be done, and bade the whole army
I"ctrcli.t at full speed along the road to Vallollgo dud BaItal'.
They went off in a confused mass, the regimcnh all mingled
together, and the artillery jammed in the midst of the column.
Hill came out of the Seminary and joined in the pursuit, which
was urged for three miles. 'They made 110 fight,' writes an
eye.witness, 'every man seemed running for his life, throwing
away their knapsacks and arms, so that we had only the trouble
of making many prisoners every instant, all begging for quarter
and surrendering with great good humour 1.'
The French army might have been still further mauled, and
indeed almost destroyed, if Wellesley's detached force under
Murray had been well handled by its commander. The two
battalions of the German Legion, with their attendant squadrons
of the 14th Light Dragoons, had crossed the Douro at the "ferry
of &rCfl. cl' A ....illtas wholly unopposed. It Wll.<;l a slow business,
but the detachment was ovcr long ere Soult had abundoned his
attack on the Seminary. Advancing cautiously along the river
bank,Murray suddenly saw the whole French army come pouring
past him in total disorder on the line of the Vallongo road. He
might have made an attempt to throw himself across thcir path,
or at least have fallen upon their flank and endeavoured to cut
the column in two; but thinking them far too strong for his
small force, and forgetting their demoralization, he halted and
allowed them to go by. 'When all had passed, General Charles
Stewart, who had been sent in scarch of Murray by the Com·
mander·in-chief, came galloping up to the force, and took from
it a squadron of the 14th 2, with which he made a dash at the
enemy's last troops. The French had now formed a sort of rear-
guard, but the dragoons rode into it without hesitation. The
French gencrals were bringing up the rear, and trying to kccp
their men steady. Delaborde was unhorsed and for a moment
of the &018 Fusilier Guards (p. 41), lLud Coopc:r of the 2/7th, who crossed
later.
1 Leslie, ibid.
t 80 Hawker of that regiment, who took part in the charge, and
describes it well. In 1Vellesley's dispatch, tlCO equadrons are wrongly
named.
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WlLS a prisoner, but escaped owing to his captor being killed.
Foy received a sabre cut on the shoulder. The infantry broke,
and nearly 300 of them were cut off and captured. But the
dragoons also suffered heavily; of about 110 men who took part
in the chnrge no less thnn thirty-five men were killed Md
wounded. Murray, who watched the whole skirmish from his
position on a neighbouring hillsid~ gave no assistance to his
cantley, though the intervention of his two battalions would
ha\'c led to the captuI'C of the whole of Soult's rearguard. ]t
was to infantry of Sherbrooke's division that the dragoons turned
over their prisoners before rejoining their other squadron I.
So ended the battle of Oporto, daring in its conception,
splendidly successful in its execution, yet not so decisive as it
might have been, had l\iurray but done his duty during the
pursuit. The Dritish loss WQS astoundingly small-only twenty~
three killed, ninety-eight wounded, and two missing: among the
dead there was not a single officer: the wounded included 11.
general (Paget) and three majors. The casualties of the French
were, as was natural, much greater; the attacks on the
Seminary had cost them dear. They lost about gOD killed and
wounded and nearly as many prisoners in the field, while more
J TIle best accouut ~f Ulis chllrge is the (liary of Hawker j it rUllS ns
follows: 'Aft.cr going at full speed, enveloped iu l\ e10ud of dust for
nearly two miles, wc c1caroo our infantry, and that of the :French
appeared. A strong body Wa.!I drawn up in close column, with hayonets
ready to receive us on their front. 011 eacli side of the road was a stone
wall, bordered outwardly witli trees. On our left, in particular, numbetl!
of the French were posted with their pieces resting on the wall, which
flanked the road, ready to give us a running fire as we passed. This
coultlllot bllt he effectual, as our men (in threes) were close to the muzzlCf;
of their muskets, and barely out of the reach of a OOttl/ de wbre. In a few
seconds the grollnd WIiS ool'ercd will, our mell amI horses. Notwith-
standing this we peuetrated the battalion in the road, the men ofwhicb,
rcl)'illg Oil their bayouets, did not give way till we were close upon them,
when they fled ill confusion. }'or some time the C<Intest was kept up
hand to hand. After many efforts we succeeded in cutting off 300, of
whom most lVere secured as prisoners. .But our loss was very considerable.
Of fifty-two men in the leading troop ten were killed, and eleven severely
wounded (besides others slightly), aud six taken prisoners.' (Of the
last all gave one succeeded in slipping off aud got back.) Out of fOUT
officers engaged three were wounded: Hervey, the major in command,
lost an arm. }'oy called the attack 'une charge incrorable.'
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than 1,500 sick and wounded were CfLptnred in the hospitals of
Oporto 1. The tl'Ophies consisted of tile six field-pieces taken
during the fighting, EL great number of baggage wagons, and
fifty-two Portuguese guns, dismounted but fit for further service,
which were found in the arsenal. Soult had destroyed, before
retreating, the rest of the cannon which he had captured in the
Portuguese lines on .March 29.
I r'antin des Odoards (p. 233) says that the .French left 1,800 men
in the hospitals. This is probably a little too high an estimate: there
were only 2,160 French sick ill Draga, Viana, and Oporto ou May 10-
fi\'~ixt1ISof them at Oporto. But many convalescents had marcl11~l with
Mermet cnrly on the clevent]). ,"Vellingtoll ill his first disllntch merely
says that he had taken 700 sick in the hospitals. But three days later, in
a letter to Admiral Berkeley, he writes that he has 2,000 sick, wounded
and captured French in his hands, and must send tllem to England at
once (lVeliillgton IJispatchu, iv. 337). He therefore asks for shipping for
them at the rate of two tons per man. Allowing for 300 ulIwoulldeu
Ilrisollers at Oporto, [mu 100 at Grijon, there remain 1,500, or somell'hat
more, for the men in hospiUiI.
S:Ij:CTION XIV: CHAPTER III
SQULT'S REI'REAT FROM OPORTO
THE headlong charge of Heney's squadron of the 14th Light
Dragoons was the last molestation which fell to the lot of
Soult's retreating column on the afternoon of May 12. :March~
iug till dark, the disordered infantry encamped at Baltar, ten
miles from Oporto, where they fell in with the detached regi-
ment of Delabordc's division and with Caulaincourt's dragoons,
who had been guarding this half-way sl:af,"C between Amarante
and Oporto, ever since Loison had marched on into the Tras-os-
Montes ten days before. or the rest of the 1'rench army,
l"ranceschi (always in the post of danger) covered the rear
at VaUongo, just west of Baltar. Mermet, with the division
that had marched from Oporto before ,\'ellesley's attack was
developed, had encamped on the Souza river, four miles ahead
of the main column. The Marshal had thus nearly 18,000 men
concentrated, and proposed next do.y to push on for Amamnte,
in the wake of Loison, who (as he supposed) must now be well
ahead in the Tras-os·Montes, clearing for him the way into
Spain. It was disquieting, however, to find that no news from
that general had )"et come to hand-indeed he had not been
ileum of sine<! May 7, when he was just starting out on his
expedition. Wherever Loison might be, the Marshal was bound
to follow him in haste, since it was certain that Wellesley would
be close at his heels, and that no time was to be lost in
lingering.
At ho.lf-past one in the morning Soult was roused from sleep,
lllld informed tha.t thc long-cxpected messcnger from Loisoll
had at last tUTived. The news which he brought was nothing
less than appalling: the French detached corps had been not
only checked but beaten, the bridge of Amarante had been lost,
I Sec Le NoMe, Campa!fM fk Galice, pp. 2liO~2.
344 SOULTS RETlffiAT FROM OPORTO ["" 13
and Loisoll wa.~ hastily retreating to the north-west at the
moment that his chief was moving eastward to join him.
Beresford's turning movement, in fact, had been completel),
successful-far more so than INellesley had thought likely;
he had not only succeeded in placing himself across the French
line of retreat into Spain, but had beaten Loisoll and thrown
him back into Soull's arms.
What had happened was shortly this. On J\.fay 8 BeresCom
had picked up V\rilson's detachment at Vh',cu: on the tenth he
had met Silveira at Lamego. He had thus concentrated some
10,500 or 11,000 men, all Portuguese save Tilson's brigade and
the single squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons. Leaming at
Lamego that, as late 8S the ninth, Loison was still in the neigh.
bourhood of Amarante, and had not yet penetrated far into the
Tras-os-Montes, Beresford resolved to take the risk of passing
the Douro and to throw his army directly acroSll the path of the
advancing French. On the tentll, the same day on which the
force from Coimbra reached Lamego, he sent Silveira over
the river by the bridge of Peso da Regoa, wh.ich had nC~'er
passed out of the hands of the Portuguese and had a strong
We de pont 'on its northern side. Sil I'eira had barely croS5Cl:!
; ...hen Loisoll, who had spent the pre...ious day at Me"-Umfrio, ten
miles away 011 the Amarante road, came up against him with
Heudelet's and Sanut's infantry and Marisy's dragoons-about
6,500 sabres and bayonets. Emboldened by having entrench-
ments to help him, and by knowing that Beresford was close
behind, Silveira l:Itood firm ut the tete du pont and aceepLt-<!
battle.
Loison was somewhat discour~<red by his adversary's confi-
dence, and did not fail to note the masses of troops on the
southern bank of the Douro, which were moving up to the
bridge to support Silveira:. Howe...er, late ill the aftemooll be
attacked the POI"tllguese, but wwo steadily met and beaten off
with some loss I. Thereupon he drew back and retired to
Mezamfrio. On the following day (May 11) he continued his
I LoisOD reported to Soult tlHl.t lIe lost only a cMf de bataill(m and
~ighty men, bnt that tllC IlOracs of himself and Generals Hctlllclet and
i\laransin were killed undcr tllCllI. 111C figurl's gi...Cll are proooLly all
lludcl'I!tatement.
18oo} BERESFORD AT AMARA.'1TE
retreat to Amaral1te, closely pursued by 8ilveira, who kept.
driving in his rearguard wherever it attempted to make lL stand.
Beresford meanwhile brought his own troops across the Douro
on May 11, in the wake of 8ilYeira's division. On the twelfth
he pushed forward to Amarante, intending to fight Loison if
the latter should try to hold his ground be)'ond the bridge. But
on his approach he found that the French rearguard (8arrut's
brigade) had already been driven across the water by the
Portuguese 1. The bridge, however, sWl remained in Loison's
hands, and as it was uo less defensible from the' eastern than
from the western bank, the army could get no further forward.
Matters were now at a deadlock, for if Beresford could not
cross the Talllcga, it was clear that Loison, even if heavily
reinforced froni Oporto, would not be able tu force the impos-
ing position on the heights commanding th~ btidge, which was
now held by 11,000 men, including a British brigade. But he
\night, and should, have eontinued to hold the town and the
bride,"C-hend, till further orders reached him from 80ult. Instead
of.doing so, he made up his mind to retreat at once, and
marched off early on the evening of May 12 along the road
to Guimaraens and Dl'aga. Thus at the moment when 80ult
was ret.iring on Amurolltc, Loisoll uOOudolll..'<1 the position which
covered his chief's chosen line of retreat. :Moreo....er, he was so-
tardy in sending news of his intentions to bead quarters, that
the aide-de-camp who bore his dispatch only reached Baltar after
midnight on the twelfth-thirteenth: this was the first report
t.hat Soult had received from him since May 8. It was a. mili-
tary crime of the highest magnitude that he had neither informed
his chief of the check at Peso da Regoa on the tenth, nor of his
retretLt to Amamnle on the ele\'enth, Knowledge of these facts
would have been invaluable to the Marshal, since it would have
shown him that the route through the Tl'as-os-Mol1tes was
I The Driti!!.h 1lrigade of 'lilson Wll.S to lHwe led tho attllck, l1lCy were
burning for I. figllt. (J never witnCSSt.'l1 so much enthusin.sm,' writes un
eyc-witlless, • as Wllll shown by the men. The advllnce WIlS a perfcet trot,
but on our arrival we found the enem)' had fled.' (From an nnpublished
letter of Lord Gough, then colonel of the 67th regiment, which has been
placed at my disposal by the kindnCM of Mr. R. Rait of New College, who
iM preparing a life, of that officer.)
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blocked, and that he must not count upon an undisturbed retreat
into Spain. If he had known of this, he would not have c\"acuated
Oporta by the Baltar rond, but would have been forced to
march northward on Braga or Guimaraens, instead of due east.
So strange, in fact, was Loison's slackness, that SouIt's advocates
have not hesitated to accuse him of deliberate treachery, and
htll'c hinted that he was engaged ill Argenton's plot-a hypo-
thesis which would have explained his conduct clearly enough.
But, as a matter of fact, Argenton's revelations to Wellesley
show that this was not the case, and that the conspirators
looked upon Loi5011 and Delaborde as the two officers who were
most likely to give them trouble. It must therefore h,ne been
sheer military incapacity, and disgust at the whole Portuguese
expedition, which lay at the bottom of Loison's misbehaviour.
Disbelie"ing in Soult's plan of campaign, he was probably bent
on compelling his chief to retire to Bragn, and was (of course)
quitc ignorant of the fact that 'Velleslcy's capture of Oporto
had changed the whole face of affairs, and that the retreat in
\ that direction was 110 longer open.
Despondent, tired out by the work of the preceding day, and
suffering physically from a heavy fall from his horse during the
retreat., Soult was roused from his slumbers to read Loison's
disastrous dispatch. 'Vhen he had made out its full meaning
he was appalled. All his plans were shattered, and he was
clearly in imminent danger, for Wellesley from Oporio and
Deresforo from Amarante might converge upon him in the
morning, with nearly 30,000 men, if it should chance that they
had made out his position. ~o help could come from Loisoll,
who, having now reached Guimaracns, was separated from the
main bgdy by the roadless expanse of the rugged Serra de
Santa Catalina. Eastward lay one hostile force, westward an-
other, to the south was the impassable Douro,' to the north
the inhospitable mountains. It was useless to think of making
u desperate dush at Bcrcsford's army: in open ground an attack
on the Portuguese might have been practicable, but the bridge
of Amarante was a post impossible ~o force in a hurry, and
while the attack on it was in progress, it was certain that
\'VellL'Sley would come up from the rear. The situation and
the remIts of Baylen would inevitably be reproduced.
1809J SOULT ABANDO~S HIS GUNS 347
Realizing this, the Duke of Dalmatia cnme to the conclusion
that the only course open to him was to abandon everything
that could not be carried OD his men's backs, and to make a
desperate attempt to cross the Serra de Santa Catalina before
the news of his straits had reached the enemy. He imagined
that there must be some sort of 1\ footpath from Bnltar or
Pcnaf1el to Guimaraens: in a thickly peopled country like
Northern Portugal, the hill-folk have short cuts of their own-
the only difficulty for the stranger is to discover them. Hasty
inquiries in the bivouac of the arm)' produced a Navarese camP"'
follower, who snid that he knew the localities and could point
out a bad mule-track, which elimbcd the hillside above the
Souza torrent, and came down into the valley of the Ave. not
far south of Guimarnens I. It was the kind of path in which
the army would meet every sort of difficulty. and where the
head of the column might be stopped by a couple of hundred
Ordenatlza, if it should chance that the Portuguese peasantry
were on the alert. But it seemed the only practicable way out
of the situation, and the Marshal resolved to try it.
At daybreak the army was warned of its dauger; and wasting
no time on councils of war or elaborate orders, Soult sent round
word that the troops were to abandon everything that could
not be carried on the backs of men or horses, aud to take to the
hills, An immense mass of baggage and plunder had to be left
on the banks of the SourA, including the whole of the heavy
convoy which Mermet had cs{.'Ortcd out of Oporto on the
previous day. The Marshal even decided that the infantry
should turn out of their knapsacks everything except food and
cartridges, an order which those who had in their possession
b"Old plate and other valuable plunder of small bulk to..ok care
to disobey. The cannon were destroyed by being placed mouth
to mouth and discharged simultaneously in pairs. As much of
the reserve ammunition for infantry as could be packed in
convenient bundles was laden on the bucks of the artillery
horses. The rest, with all the powder wagons, was collected in
I 'Un de ccs Nnvarrius, qui "ont tous les ails en Portugal parcourir
les villages pour YOOUl)er les eooholl9 qu'on veut eugrni8Ber; says Le Noble
[po 264). 'Une espeue de ~utrekmdjer que le geneflll Dulal110i uvait
trouv~; says St. ('1mmaus, Soult's aide-de-camp (p. 147).
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a mass, ready to be fired when the anny should have ab~conded.
Oue curious circumstance, which displays better than anything
else the hurry of the retreat, is worth mentioning. The
military chest of the 2nd Corps was well filled-it is said to
hayc contained nearly £50,000 in Portuguese silver. The:!
Marshal ordered the paymaster-ill-chief to scn"c out all that
he could to the regimental paymasters. Only two of these
officials could be found, and they were unable to carry air
more than a fradian of the money. Soult then ordered the
treasure-chests to be broken open, and sent word that the men,
as they passed, might help themselves. But hardly a soldier
took advuntage of the offer: they looked at the bulky bags of
cruzad08 1I.OVO,I\ shook their heads, and hurried 011. Those whu
were tempted at first were seen, later in the day, tossing the
weighty pieces into the ravine of the SOUZtl.. Perceivjng that
there was no w&)' of brcttiug rid of th~ mass of silver, Soult at
last ordered thefourgo1l3 containing it to be dragged alongside
of the powder wagons, ·When the train was exploded, after the
rearguard hOO passed, the money was scattered to the winds.
For years after the peasants of Penafiel were picking up stray
coins on the hillside I,
As the French arm)' was beginning its weary climb over the
Serm de Santa Catalina a heavy drenching rain commenced to
fall. It lasted for three days, and added mueh to the miseries
1 Several of the I<'rench diarisL8 relate this CUriOllS incident. 'L'argent
blanc ue tentait personne,' says Fantin des OUOlLrus, p. 234; 'u cauSCl
de sa pesauteur et de son illUtiliM momentaire. On permit le pillage des
fourgons du payeur, et chose illouie, it u'y fut presque pas touche. Le~
soldats regardaient en passant les sacs, secouaient la rete et s'eloignaicnt
sans y mettre la main. Ponr moi, je m'emparai d'un sac de 2,4,00 francs;
cette lourde somme m'embarassait: elle aurait bless6 mou cbeval, et
apres I'a\·oir porte:e pendant uue lieue je l'abaudonnai' [po 234,J. <Lea
grenadiel'8 du 70- servaient d'escorte au tresor,' says Le NoMe, 'l'in-
tellllant-geuliral les invita de prellllre ues fonus. Ayant n:mcontre leur
oflicier, le lieutenant Langlois, a ']'OTO, iI lui demallda ce qu'avaient pll
emporter Se8 SQldats. «Rien," repliqulV-t~il,"Us portaiellt la caisse a tour
de role pour qnelque distance, et la jeterent ensuite.'" Naylies also
mentions the dispersion of the treasure. The reader will compaN this
incident with the rolling of Moore'8 treasure down the cliffs of Herrerias
during the Corunua retreat, Soult certainly S<:lI.ttered his cash more
widel)'.
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uf the retreat; but it was not without its advantages to the
fugitive host, for it kept the Portuguese peasantry indoors,
and it would seem that no one in the mountain villages got
wind of the movement for many hOllrs. It was not till the
French had crossed the ridge and dcs(:endcd, late in the dusk, on to
the village of Pombeiro in the valley of the A n~ that they began
to be molested by the Ordenanza. After a few shots had been
fired the peasants were driven off. Next morning [May 14]
Soult got into commnnication with Loison, who was still lying
III Guimo.racns with nIl his troops. On the some day Lorges'
dragoons and the garrison of Viana came in from the north, and
the whole army, still over !lO,OOO strong, was reconcelltrated.
The first danger, that of destruction piecemeal, had beeil
l\Voided. But SOlut's desperate move had only warded off' the
peril for the moment: he had still to fear that "\Vellesley !\Dd
lleresford. might close in upon him before he could get clear
of the mountains,
It remains to be scen how the two British generals had
employed the day during which the French were scaling the
heights of the Serra de Santa Catalina. Wellesley had crossed
in person to Oporio long ere the fighting was over, and had
e~tablished his head quarters in SouIt's villa Oil the heights,
where he and his staff thought themselves fortunate in findiug
ready for their consumption the excellent dinner which had
been prepared for the Marshal. As long as daylight lasted
the British infantry continued to be ferried over to the city,
but they were not all across when night fell. The artillery, the
train, and all the ~gimenta1 baggage were still on the wrong
side of the river, and as the great bridge was destroyed beyond
hope of repair, all the- impedimenta had to be brought over in
boats and barges. It wa.~ mainly this fact that delayed
Wellesley flXlffi making an early move on the thirteenth. He
could not advance without his guns and his rcsern:: ammunition,
and did not receive them till the day was far spent and the
natural hour for marching was past. There were other circum-
stances which hindered him from pressing on as he would have
liked to do, The infantry were tired out: they had marched
more than eighty miles during the last four days, and had
fought hard nt Grijon and Oporto. Human nature could do no
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more without ll. halt, and Welles1ey was forced to grant it.
Moreover, there wns the question of food to be taken iuto
considemtion. The troops had outrun their supplies, and the
provision wagons were still trailing up from Coimbra. In Oporta
no stores of any importance were discovered, for Soult had
stopped collecting more than he could carry. the moment that
he made up his mind to retreat, and had been living from hand
to mouth during the last fe..... days of his SOjOUMl in the city.
The only thing that abounded was port wine, and from that the
soldiers had to be kept away, or results disastrous to discipline
would have followed 1.
With great reluctance, therefore, 'Vellesley resolved to halt
for ll. day, only sending forward Murray and the Gennan Legion,
with ll. couple of squadrons, along the Baltar road. This brigade
did not come up with Sault's rearguard, though they found
ample traces of his passage in the shape of murdered stragglers
and abandoned plunder. No doubt the Commander-in-chief
would have directoo them to push 011 further, and have sup-
ported them with every battalion that could still march ten miles,
if only he had been aware of the fact that Beresford had got
possession of tllC bridge of Amarantc, aud that thc enemy WtL~
therefore in a trap. But he was only in communication with
his lieutenant by the circuitous route of Lamego and M'C7.amfrio,
and the last ncws that he had received of the turning column
led him to believc that it was still in thc neighbourhood of
Villa Real, and that Loison continued to hold the passage
of the Tamega. Writing to Bcresford on the night of the
capture of Oporto, he desired him to make every effort to hold
on to Villa Real, and to keep Soult in check till he himself
could overtake him 2.
It was lIot till the a.tternoon of the thirteenth that Wellesley
obtained infonnation that put him on the right track. The
intelligence officer with Murray's column 3 sent him back word
1 When the troops got at the wine the}'drank only too well: Hartmanu
in his Journol reoords that twenty of his German Legion gunners drank
forty-one bottles of port at a sitting (p. 71).
~ Welling/on DiBpatclie8, iv. 321. To Marshal Beresford, from Oporto,
night of the twelfth.
$ ACaptain Mellish, Wellington Di8patche" iv. 300 [to l\Iurray) and 332
[to Bcresford).
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that hea\'y explosions had been heard at PCl1afie~ and that the
smoke of large fires was "isible along the hillside above it. This
gave a. strong hint of what was probably taking place in that
direction, but it was not till five in the afternoon that full
information came to hand. This was brought by the Portuguese
secretary of General Quesnel, who had deserted his employer and
ridden back to Oporto, to give the valuable news which would
save him from being tried for treason for serving the cllClily.
Hc gave an accurate and detailed account of all that had
happened to Soult's column, and had seen it start oft' on the
break-neck path to Guimaraens. Only about Loison was he
Ilucertuin-thllt officer, he said, was probably still at Amarante,
holding back Silveira and Bcresford I,
On receipt of this important intelligence Wellesley sent orders
to Murray to press on his small force of cavalry, and llOme
mounted rifles (if he (.'Quld secure horses or mules) as far as
Penaficl, to verify the secretary's informatioll 2• A later dispatch
bade him press on to Amarante, if Loison was still the~ in
order to take that officer in the rear; but if he were gone, the
Legionary brigade was to follow Soult over the hills towards
Guimaraens and Braga, and endeavour to catch up his rCllrguard 3.
The orders arrived too latc: Murray, on the morning of the
fourtccnth, learnt that Loisoll had long ago departed, and that
Soult ;'VtlS far on his way. He followed the Marshal across the
Serra de Santa Catalina, but never got near him, though he
picked lip many French stragglers, and saw the bodies of many
more, who had been assassinated by the peasantry 4.
Meanwhile Beresford had acted with great decision, and with
an intelligence which he did not always display. When, on the
morning of the thirteenth, he found that the French had
disappeared, and that Amarante (after having been thoroughly
:>acked) 6 had been abandoned to him, he did not waslc time in
1 Deposition of the Secretarr to the late Governor of Oporto. Wellingt()11
pupplemenl.6ry DispaJCMI, vi. 262 [:\Jay 13, afternoon].
, WellingtOIl Di8patchu, h'. 330, afternoon of May 13.
• Ibid. iv. 332, morning of May 14.
• It is astonishing to find that Murray r;uceeeded in taking two light
three-pounder guns over this difficult path. The fact reflects great credit
011 his gunners.
6 The state of Amarante was dreadful. • I was never witness to such
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(I, fruitless pursuit of Loison in the direction of GuimRracns, but
resolved to endeavour to cut off the retreat of the whole French
army towards the north. If they had absconded by way of
Bragu, the chase would fall to 1Vellcslcy's share, but if they
had taken the other road by Chaves, all would depend on his
own movements.· Accordingly he resolved to march at once on
the last named towu, without waiting for orders frolll the
Commander·in-chief. Having hastily collected three days' pro-
visions, he moved oft' himself by the high-road up the valley of
the Tamcgn, detaching Silveira Ilnd his division to strike across
country, and occupy the defiles of Ruivllells and Salamonde on
the Brnga-Chaves rond, where it would be possible to dcl:.nin, if
not to stop, the retreating columns of Soult if they should take
this way [May 14]. While on his march Beresford received
Wellesley's letters, which prescribed to him exactly the line of
conduct that he hud already determined to pU~UC1. After three
difficult marches in drenching rain, which turned every rivulet into
an almost impasSAble torrent, and spoilt the inadequate provi-
sion of bread which had been served out to the men, the division
reacht-d Chavcs about U p.m. on the night of the sixteenth-
seventeenth. The men were absolutely exhausted; though the
distance covered had 1I0t exceeded some fourteen or fifteen miles
per day, yet the rain, the starvation, and the bad road had much
thinned the ranks, and those who had kept np with the colOUr!
were dropping with fatigue. TIle slowness of the (,'olumn'sadvancc
was certainly not Beresforo's fault; he had allowt'<1 only a six
hours' halt each day on the fourteenth, fifteenth. and sixteenth,
and had been pushing on as ha:d as was, humanly speaking,
possible. Nevertheless he was too late: on the seventeenth,
the all-importlUlt day of the campaign, he held Chaves, but his
a SCCllC of mieery :loud Ilorror as llere presented itself,' says Lord Gongh ill
an unpublished letter to Ilis father. (Every house Bnd public building of
every descriptioll, with tILe exception of 3 monastery which covered the
passage of tIle bridge, n chnpel, nlld noout fivo detached houses. was burut
w the ground, with many of the late inhabitants lying dead in the
streets. '
I The best testimony to Heresford's good conduct is that Wellesley
(Wellington m'JXItchu, iI'. 343) sa}'8 that he had exactly anticipated
tlle instructions sent him, and carried them out Oll his own initiative.
N:l.picr's criticism (ii. }1(;-7) is unfair and misleading.
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troops were too tired to start early or to march far. The bad
weather which made the French retreat so miserable, had at
least saved the flying army from its pursuers 1,
Soult meanwhile had gathered in Loison and Lorges, and his
whole army wa.<; concentrated at GuimarAens on the morning
of the fourteenth. From the point where he now lay, in the
upper valley of the Ave, there are only two carriage roads, that
to Amarante by which Loison had arrived, and that to Braga.
There was a bare chance that if Wellesley had received his
information Jate, and moved slowly, it might be possible to
escape from him by the road to Brags.. If, however, he had
marched promptly from Oporta, he would be able to intercept
the retreating army at that place. Soult refused to take this
risk, and resolved illstead to plunge once more into the mOUll-
tains, and to cross the watershed between the Ave and the
Cavado by a rugged hill-path, DO better than that which had
served him between llenafiel and Guimaraens. It was accord~
ingly neeessary to sacl'ifice all the guns, munitions, alld baggage
belonging to Loison and Lorges, just as those of Mcrmct and
Delaborde had been destroyed on the banks of the Souza. The
guns were burst, the ammunition exploded, the baggage piled
1 The best account of Beresford's forced ma.rch is to be found in the
unpublished letter of Lord Gough (then major of the 87UI) which, as I have
already mentioned, has OOell showD me by Mr. R. Rait of New College.
He says: (The business of croseing the river took tile Brigade (1i180n's),
four hours: tllC evening set in witll a mOllt drC3llful filII of rain, which
continued all night, and Ule next three days and nights, Our mad lay
over almost impassable mountains, made more so b}' tllC rain tl13t swelled
the mountain rh·ulcts into rivers, In the dark many men lost the column,
several fell into pits excal·ated by the falling water: mally lay down in
the road from fatigue and hunger, and the greater part lost their shoes.
. . . Next day we pursued onr melancholy march at five o'clock, the men
nearl)' fainting with hunger: about tweh·e we fell in with some cars of
bread belonging to a Portuguese division, which Gt'n. Tilson pressed for
the men; this (with Ilome wine) enabled U8 to proceed, and that night
at twelve we reached Chavcs, after a (orced march of three days, with
only twelve hours' halt. The men "ere without a shoe to their feet, and
hundreds fallen out from (atigue and hunger.... The 88th had, o(
700 with which the)" joined us, only 160 in the ranks.... Part of the
officers and nearly all the men had their (eet cut to the bone for want of
shoes.'
OllAS. n
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bayonetted, the rest fled in dismay-they were but a few score
of peasants, and were helpless when once the passage had
been won.
For six hours SouIt's sappers were working hard to replace
tRe flooring of the ruined bridge with tree trunks, and boards
torn from the houses of the neighbouring village. At eight it
was practicable, and the trooP'! began to cross. It was a long
business: for ~O,OOO men with 4,000 cavalry horses and a great
drove of pack-animals had to be passed over the narrow, rickety,
and une\'en structure, whose bulustrades had not been replaced.
All the day was spent in hurrying the troops across, but they
got forwe,rd so slowly that Soult saw himself forced to place a
strong rearguard in position, to hold back the pursuers till the
main body was safe. He left behind a brigade of Merle's
division, and two of Franceschi's 'cavalry regiments, ranged
behind a lateral ravine which crosses the road some distance
below the bridge. The)' were placed with their right all the
rough river bank and their left on the cliffs which overhang
the road; orders were given to the effect that they must hold on
at all costs till the army had completed the passage of the
POlite Nova. At half-past one the British light dragoons
arrived ill front of the position, saw that they could not force
it, and started a bickering fire with the French pickets, while
they waited for the main body to come up.
Owing to the long disUl.m:c which Wellesley's infantry had to
cover, the day wore on without any serious collision on this
point. But meanwhile Soult found tha'& another and more
serious danger lay ahead of him. After crossing the Cavado at
the Ponte Nova thCl'e were two paths available for the anny-
the main road lewh eastward to Chaves by Wll)' of RuivllCllS, a
branch, however, turns ofi' north to Montalc/:,>Te and the sourl'CS
of the Misarclla, the main afHuent of the Cavado. The former
was the easier, but there was a grave doubt whether Chaves
inight not already be in the hands of Deresford and his turning
column-as a matter of fact it only arrived there a few hours
after Soult stooo uncertain at the parting of the wap. Bear-
ing this in mind, the Marshal resolved to take the more rugged
and difficult path; but when Loison and the vanguard were
en~<7ed in it they found that the bridge over the l\lisarella, the
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Saltador as it was called from the bold leap which its single
arch makes across the torrent, was held against them. Again it
was only with OrdenOllza that the army had to deal: Beresford
had just reached Chavcs, but his troops were some miles fmiher
back; Silveira, who ought to have been at Ruivaens that mom·
ing, had not appeared at all. But Major'Warre, an officer of
Beresford's stafl~ had ridden ahead to rouse the peasantry, and
had collected scveral hundred half-armed levies at the Saltador
bridge, which he encouraged them to hold, promising that the
regulars would be up to support them before nightfall. Unfor-
tunately he could not persuade them to destroy the bridge, on
which all the cross-communications of the Misarella valley
depend. But they had thrown down its parapets, built an abaUis
ACross its head, and thrown up earthworks on each side of it so
as to command the ppposite bank. This, unhappily, was not
enough to hold back ~O,OOO desperate men, who saw theu' only
way of sah'ation on the opposite bank.
When Loison fOllnd his advance barred, he made an appeal
to that same Major Dulong who had forced the Ponte Nova all
the preceding night. Again that daring soldier volunteered to
conduct the forlorn hope: he was given a company of voUigeurs
to lead the column, and two battalions of Heudelet's division to
back them. Forming the whole in one conl;inuoU8 mass-there
WRS only room for four men abreast-he dashed down towards
the bridge amid a spluttering and ineffective fire from the
Portuguese entrenchments on the opposite bank. The column
reached the arch, passed it, was checked but a moment while
tearing down the abatti3, and then plunged in among the scared
Ord,mallza, who fled in every direction, leaYing the passage free.
Dulong WM wOlmded, but no more tha.n eighteen of his com·
ptmions were hit, and at this small SEJ.crifice Ute army was saved.
Late in the afternoon the whole mass began to stream up the
Montalegre road; they had no longer anything more to Cenr
than stray shots from the scattered Orde1W'/Iza, who hung about
011 the hillsides, firing into the (.'Olumn from inac(."essible rocks,
but doing little damage.
If Dulong had failed at the Saltador Soult would have been
lost, for just as the passage was forced the mmbling of cannon
began to be heard from the rear, i\1erle was attacked by the
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British, and was being driven in, At five o'clock the Guards'
brigade, forming the head of WclleslC::\"s infantry, had come up
with the French rearguard. It was formidably posted, but Sir
Arlhur thought that it might be dislodged. Accordingly he
. placed the two three-pounders, which accompanied the column,
on the high road, and began to batter the French centre, while
he sent off the three light companies of the brigade 1 to turn the'
French left flank on the cliffs to the south. When the crackling
of their musketry was heard among the rocks, he silenced his
guns and flung the Guards upon the enemy's main bod}'. They
broke, turned, and fled in confusion, though the regiment on the
road, the 4th Uger, was considered one of the best in the French
army 2.
The chase continued as far as the Ponte No\'a, which the
broken troops crossed in a struggling mass, thrusting each other
over the edge (where the balustrades were wanting) till the
torrent below was choked with dead men and horses. The
British guns were brought up and played upon the welter-
ing crowd "ith dreadful effect. But the night was already
looming all, and the darknesS hid from the pursuers the full
effect of their own fire. They halted and encamped, having
slain many and taken about fifty prisoners, of whom one was
an officer. It was only at daybreak that they realized the
terrors through which the French had passed. 'The rocky bed
of the Cavado,' says an eye-witness, 'presented an extraordinary
spectacle. Men and horses, sumpter animals and baggilj,,"C, had
1 The brigade had 11. company of the 5/00th attaclled, so had three inllU'.-.d
of two light companies.
il , n y Iwait aJ'nrricre-gnrde UIl exccllent regiment d'infallterie ICgere,
qui (vu la nature du terrain) pouvait fllCilcmcnt braver une II.nllce entiere:
et bien, a l'apparition de I'ennemi, i1 s'est debande sans qu'on ait pu Ini
faire entendre raigon. la confusion qui R eU le resultat de cette terreur
panique a etC epouvantable. Fantassills et cavalieril se precipitaient leg
llns sur les autres, jetaient leurs armes, et luttaient 1L qui courrait le plus
vite. Le pont fu<lit et IllI.IlS parapet ne pouvait suffire aI'impatience des
fuyards, ils se pressaient tellement que Domhre d'bommes furent precipitb
et Doyes dausle torrent ou ecrases sous les pieds des chevaux. Si les Anglais
avaient etC en mesure de profiter de cette epouvante, je De sais pas ell
verile ce que noUll serious devenUll, tant la peur est contagieuse, meme
oilEr.: ICII plug bravCII soldats.' Fantin des Odoards, p. 236. I
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been precipitated into the river, and literally choked its cmrne.
Here, with these faW accompaniments of death and dismay,
'Was disgorged the last ~f the plunder of Oporto. All kinds of
valuable goods were left on the road, while above 300 horses,
sunk in the water, and mules laden with baggage, fell into the
hunds of the grenadier and light companies of the Guards.
These aelive.fingered gentry found that fishing for boxes and
bodies out of the stream produced pieces of plate, and purses
und belts full of gold money. Amid the scenes of death and
desolation arose their shouts of the most noisy merriment 1.'
On the night of the 11th Soult's army poured into Montalegre,
a dilapidated old town on the edge of the frontier, from which·
all the inhabitants bad fled. Little or no food could be pro-
cured, and the houses did not suffice to shelter more than a part
of the troops. Next morning the flnd Corps took to its heels
once more, and climbed the SeITa de Gerez, which lies just
above the town. On descending its northern slope lhey had
at last entered Spain, and had reached safety. But the country
was absolutely desolate: for twenty miles beyond Montalegre
there was hardly a single village on this rugged by-path. Still
drCilding pursuit, the Marshal urged Oil lds men as f~t as they
could be driven forward, and in two long marches at last reached
Orense.
Wellesley, however, had given up any hope of catching the
!nd Corps, when once it had passed the Saltadorand reached the
Spanish frontier. ~e had halted the British infantry at Rui-
vaens, and only sent on in chase of the flying host the 14th Light
Dragoons and the division of Silveira, which had at last appeared
on the scene late in the evening of the seventeenth. What
this corps had been doing during the last fort)'-eight hours it is
impossible to discover. It had started from Amarante on the
same day that Beresford marched for Chaves, and ought to have
been at Ruivaens on the sixteenth, when it would have found itself
just in time to intercept SouIt's vanguard after it had passed
the Ponte Nova. Apparently the same wild weather and con-
stant rain which had delayed Beresford's column had checked
his subordinate. At any rate it is certain that Silveira, though
he had a shorter route than his chief, only got to Ruivaens late
I Lord Munster's Oampaign of 1809, pp. 177--8.
360 souvrs RETREAT FROM OPORTO [MAY 19
on the seventccnth, while the other column had reached Chnvcs
more than twelve hours earlier.
The French had disappeared, and it was only next morning
that Silveira followed them up all the Montalegre road. He
captured a few laggards by the way, but on reaching the little
town found that Soult's rearguard had quitted it two hours
before his arrival!. By ""Vellesley's orders he pushed on for one
day more in pursuit, but found that the ellemy was llOW so far
ahead that he could do no more than pick up moribund
stragglers. On the nineteenth, therefore, he turned back and
retraced his steps to Montalegre 2•
Much the same fortune had befallen Beresford's column. By
'Vellesley's orders Tilson'g brigade and their Portuguese t."Om-
panions marched from Chaves by Monterey on the eighteenth, on
the chance that Sault, after pMSing the Serrade Gerez, might drop
into the l\:(olltere)'·Orensc road. But the Mo.rsbal had not takcn
this route: he had. kept to by"pa.ths, and marched by Porquera
and Allariz, to the left of the line on which Beresford's pursuit
was directed. At Ginzo the cavalry of the pursuing column
pich'i.l up 6fty stragglers, and came into contact with a small
party of Franceschi's chasaeura, which Soult had thrown out to
cover his flank. Learning from the peasantry that the French
had gone off by a different route, nere~ford halted and returned
to Chavcs. His men were so thoroughly won} out, and the
strength of the column was so much reduced, that he could have
done little more even if he had come upon the main body of the
enemy 3.
On May 19 SouIt's dilapidated and starving host poured into
Orensc, wherc they could at last take a day's rest and obtain
a decent meal. The l\Iarshal caused the troops to be numbered.
and found that he had brought back 19,713 men. As he had
started from the Spanish frontier with !!2,OOO sabres and
I The J....rench rearguard actually saw Silveira arriving. Naylies, p. 90.
2 For this part of the pursuit see the diary of Hawker [of the 14th
Light Dragoons1 who returned to MOlltalegre with Silveira's men.
I These details are mainly from tIle letter of Gougb of Ul6 87tlt, which
I have already had occasion to quote, when dealing with Bercsfonl's mOI'6-
menta. I cannot find any corroboration for N"'pier'll o.ccount of 8cresfonl's
and Silveira's pursuit in H. pp. 112-3 of his history.
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bayonctSt and had received 3,500 more from Tuy, when Lamnr-
tiniere's column joined him, it would appear that he had left in
all some 5,700 men behind him. Of these, according to the
French accounts 1, about 1,000 had fallen in the early fighting,
or died of sickness, before Wellesley's appearance on the Vouga.
.A.bout 700, mostly convalescents, had been captured at Cha\'cs
by Silvcira 2. After the storm of Oporta the British army
found 1,500 sick in the hospitals of that city, of Brags. and
of Viana s. They also took some 400 wlwQunded prisoners at
Oporto and at Grijon·, It results therefore that the losses of
the actual retreat from Baltar to Orens~ between the thirteenth
and the nineteenth of May, must have been rather more than
2,000 men. But all these had been able-bodied fighting-men-
the sick, as we have seen, were abandoned before the break-neck
march over the mountains began: adding them and the prisoners
of the eleventh-twelfth, to the a(,tual casualties of the retreat,
on the same principle which we used when calculating the losses
of :Moore's army in the Conmna £8,mpaign, we should get a total
of 4,000 for the deficiency in the French ranks duriug the nine
da.ys which ela.psed between \Vellesley's passage of the Vouga
and Soult's arrival at Orense. Thus it would seem that about
one~sixth of the ~nd Corps had been destroyed in that short
time-a proportion almost exactly corresponding to that which
Moore's force left behind it in the retreat from Sahagun to
Corunna, wherein 6,000 men out of 33,000 were lost.
In other respects these two famous retreats afford some
interestiug points of comparison. Moore had an infinitely
longer distance to cover: in mere mileage his men marched more
than twice as far as Soult's 0: their jounley occupied twenty
days as against nine. On the other hand the French had to
I See mainly Le Noble's calculation on pp. 3.53-4 ofhis eampagnt de 1809.
i The rest of Silveira's prisoners were Hispano-Portuguese 'legionaries,'
see p. 266.
, Napier (H. 113) says, <1,800 at Viana and Drags, 700 at Oporto,
tigurel3 that sllould be reversed,' for at the two last places only tllC sick of
Heudelet's ant! Lorges' divisions were captured, while at Op'orto the main
centml hospital fell into the hamls of the British. Le Noble 8a}1l that
there were 2,160 men ill hospital altogether Oil May 10.
• See p. 34I.
6 The respective distances seem to be about 265 and 120 miles.
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use far worse roads. From Benavente to CorunDa there is a good
chaU88ee for the whole distance: from Baltar to Orense the 9lnd
Corps had to follow impracticable mule-tracks for more than half
the way. ·As to the weather, there was perhaps little to ehoose
between the two retreats: the nine days of perpetual rain,
during which Soult effected his passage of four successive moun·
tain chains, was almost as trying as the cold and snow through
which the British had to trudge. Moore's men were not so
hardly pressed by starvation as the 2nd Corps, and they were
moving through a country-side which was not actively hostile,
if it could scarcely be described as friendly. On the other hand
they were pursued with far greater vigour than the French:
their rearguard was beset every day, and had constantly to be
fighting, while Soult's troops were hard pressed only Oll two days
-the sixteenth and seventeenth of May. This advantage the
Marshal gained by choosing an unexpected line of retreat over
obscure by-paths: if he had taken either of the high-roads by
Bragaand Chaves his fate would have been very different. On this
same choice of roads depends another contrast between the two
retreats: to gain speed and safety Soult sacrificed the whole of
his artillery and his transport. 'When he aITived at Orense, as
onc of his officers wrore, 'the infantry had brought ofi' their
bayonets and their eagles, the cavalry their horses and saddles-
everything else had been left behind-the guns. the stores, the
treasure, the sick.' Moore, in spite of all the miseries of his
march, carried down to Corunna the whole of his artillery, part
ofhis transport, and the greater number of his sick and wounded.
re he lost his military chest, it was not from necessity but from
the mismanagement of the subordinates who had charge of it.
His army was in coudition to fight a successful battle at the end
of its retreat, and so to win for itself.a safe and honourable
departure.
Both generals. it will be obsen'ed, were driven into danger by
causes for which they did not regard themselves as responsible.
Soult was placed ill peril by attempting to carry out his master's
impracticable orders. Moore thought himself bound to run the
"risk, because he had realized that there was a political necessity
that the English army should do something for the cause of
Spain, for it could not with honour retire to Portugal before it
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had stnlck a blow. In their management of their respective
campaigns both made mistakes. Maore hurried his men too
much, and did not take full advantage of the many positions in
which he could have held: off the pursuer by judicious rear-
guard actions. Soult's fimIts were even greater: nothing can
excuse his smy at Oporta during the days when he should have
been directing Loison':I movements at Amarante. That ata)'
was undoubtedly due to his vain intrigues with the Portuguese .
malcontents; it was personal ambition, not any military necessity.
which detained him from his proper place. Still more worthy
'Of blame was his disposition of his forces at the moment when
the British troops crossed the Youga: they were scattered in
a dangerous fashion, which made concentration difficult and
ullccrl:.nin. But the weakest feature of his whole conduct wa...
that he allowed himself to be surprised in Oporto by W cllesley
on May U. Wben an army ill close touch with the enemy
is taken unawares at broad midday, by an irruption of its
opponents into the middle of the cantonments, the general-in-
chief cannot shift the blame Oil to the shoulders of subordinates.
It was Soult's duty to see that his officers were taking all reason·
Rble precautions to watch the British, and he most certAinly did
not do so. Indeed, we have seen that he turned all his attention
to the point of least danger-the lower reaches of the Doma-
and neglected that on which the British attack wus really
delivered. It was only when he found himself OIi the verge of
litter min, on May 13, that he rose to the occasion, and saved his
army, by the daring march upon Guimaraens which foiled
WellesleJ's plans for inten:cpting his retreat. To state that' his
reputation as a general was nowise diminished by his Portu~ese
CIlmpaign' is to do him more than justice I. It would be more
tme to assert that he showed that if he could commit faults,
he could also do much towards repairing their consequences.
As to Wellesley. it is not too much to say that the Oporto
campaign is one of his strongest titles to fame. I-le had, a... we
11Iwe already seen, only 16,400 British and ]],4<00 Portuguese
troops 2, of whom the latter were either untried in the field or
demoralized by lheir pre\'ious expericnces beyond thc Douro.
His su~iority in mere numbers to 8oult'8 corps of 23,000 men
I Napier, ii. 113. t See p. 321.
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was therefore smalt. and he was lamentably destitute of cavalry
and artillery. It was no small feat to expel the enemy from
Northern Portugal in nine days, and to cast him into Galicia,
stripped of his gUlls and baggage, and with a gap of more than
4,000 men in his ranks. This had been accomplished at the
expense of no more than 500 C8..'1ualties, even when the soldiers
who fell by the way from sickness and fatigue arc added to the
300 killed and wounded of the eng~rements of May 11, l~, and
17. There is hardly a campaign in history in which so much
was accomplished at so small a cost. Wcllesle)' had exactly
carried out the programme which he had set before himself
when he left Lisbon-the defeat of the enemy and the deliver.
ance of the two provinces beyond the Douro. He had expressly
disclaimed any intention or e...peetation of destroying or captur-
ing the 2nd Curps \, which somc foreign critk'S havc ascribed
to him in their anxiety to make out that he failed to execute the
whole project that he had taken in hand.
There was, it is true, one short moment at which he had it
in his power to deal Soult a hea\'ier blow than he had contem·
plated. On the night of May Ht-IS, when the Marshal in his
bivouac at Baltar learnt of Loisou's cVlIcuatioll of Amarante,
the main body of the Qlld COI'pS was ill a deplorable situation,
and must have been destroyed, had the British been close at
hand. If WeUesley had pursued the Bying foe, on the afternoon
of the victory of Oporto, with all his cavalry and the less fatigued
regiments of his infantry, nothing could have saved the French.
But the opportunity was one wn.ich could not have been fore-
seen: no rational officer could have guessed that Loison would
evacuate Amnrante, and so surrender his chief's best line of
retreat. It was impossible that Wcllcsley should dream of such
a chance being thrown into his hands. He constructed his
plans on the natural hypothesis that Soult had still open to him
the route across the Tamega; and he was therefore more con-
cerned with the idea that Beresforo might be in danger from
the approach of Soult, than with that of taking measures to
1 I In respect to Soult, I shall omit nothing that I can do to destroy
him-hut I am afraid that with the foree I have at my disposal, it is not
in my power to prevent him retreating into Spain.' Welles1ey to Flere,
May 9J 1809.
1809] CAUSES OF SOULTS ESCAPE 865
capture the .Marshal. His men were fatigued with the long
march of eighty miles in four 'days which had taken them from
the Mondcgo to Oporta: his guns and stores had not yet
passed the bridgeless Douro. It was natural, therefore, that he
should allow himself and his army a night's rest before pressing
on in pursuit of Soult. It will be remembered that he did push
Murmy's brigade along the Baltar road in the tracks of the
Marshal, but that officer never came up with the French. If
blame has to be allotted to anyone for the failure to discover
the unhappy situation of the 2nd Corps upon the morning of
the thirteenth, it would seem that MllITSY must bear the burden
rather than the Commnndcr-ill-chicf. Hc should have kept
touch, at all costs, with the retreating French, and if he had
done so would have been able to give Wellesley news of their
despemte plight.
As to the pursuit of Soult, between tile fourteenth and the
eighteenth, it is hard to see that more could have been done
than was actually accomplished. •It is obvious,' as Wellesley
wrote to Castlereagh, •that if an army throws away all its
cannon, equipment, and baggage, and everything that can
strengthen it and enable it to act together as a body; and if it
abandons all those who are entitled to its protection, but add
to its wcight and impede its progress 1, it must be able to march
by roads 'on which it can not be followed, with any prospect of
being overtaken, by an army which has not made the same
sacl'ifices 2.' This puts the case in l\ nutshell: SOIUt, after he
had abandoned his sick and destroyed his guns and wagons,
could go much fastcr than his pursuers. The only chance of
catching him was that Beresford or Silveira might be able to
intercept him at the Misarella on the seventeenth. Dut the
troops of the former wcre so cxhausted by their long march in
thc rain from Amarnnte, that although they reached Chaves on
the night of the sixteenth-seventeenth, they were not in a con-
dition to march eighteen miles further on the following morning.
Whether Silveim, who had taken a shorter but a more rugged
route than Beresford, might not have reached Ruivaens ten or
twelve hours earlier than he did is another matter. Had be
I From Monta.legre. May 18, 1809.
I i. e. its sick and wouuded.
•
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done so, he might have held the cross-roads and blocked the
way to Montalegre. 'We have nd details of his march, though
we know that he had a bad mountain-path to traverse in
abominable weather. All military critics h8.\"c joined ·in con-
demning him I, but without a more accurate knowledge of the
obstacles that he had to cross, and of the state of his troops., we
CUll 1I0t be sure of the exact amount of blame that should fall
upon him. It is at any rate clear that \Velleslc)' was not
responsible for the late arrival of the Portuguese division at
Ruivacns and the consequent escape of the enemy.
Beyond MontaIegre it would have been useless to follow the
flying French. An advance into Galicia would have taken the
British army too far from Lisbon, and have rendered it impos-
sible to return in time to the Tagus if Victor should be on the
move. That marshaJ, as we shall see, was showing signs of
stirring from hiS long spell of torpidity, and it was a dispatch
from Mackenzie, containing the news that the Ist Corps was on
the mO\'e, that made Wellesley specially anxious to check the
pursuit, and to draw back to Central Portugal before matters
should come to a head in Estremadura.. He (:ould safely calcu-
late that it would be months rather than weeks before Soult
would be in a condition to cause any trouble on the northem
frontier.
1 Napier, Arteehe, and Schepeler all agree in this, the former only
making the excuse that Silveira may oot have fully understood Beresford's
orders, owing to the difficulty of language, Dut Beresford apoke and
wrote Portuguese flueotly.
N. D.-There are admirable accounts of t11e horrors of SouIt's retreat ill
the works of Le Noble, SL C1lamails, Fantin des Odoards, and Narlies.
111C l'urilllit of t]IC Wllin body of tllc English army is well described by four
eye-witnesses-Lord Londonderry, Stothcrt, Hawker, and Lord Munster.
For the march of Beresford's corps I have only the details given by Lord
Gough's letter, cited heretofore.
•
SECTION XV
OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN SPAIN
(MARCH-JUNE 1809)
CHAPTER I
NEY AND LA ROl'l1ANA IN GALICL~ AND THE ASTURIAS
W RILE following the fortunes of Soult and the 2nd Corps i.n
Northern Portugal, we have been constrained to withdraw our
attention from Galicia, where we left Marshal Ney busied in
a vain attempt to beat down the insurrections which bad sprung
up in every corner of the kingdom, at the moment when the
melting of the snows gave notice that spring was at hand. It
was with no good will that the Duke of Elchingen had seen his
colle8.0"Ue depart from Orensc and plunge into the Port~"11ese
mountains. Indeed he had done his best to induce Soult to
disregard the Emperor's orders, and to join him in a strenuous
effort to pacify Gulicia before embarking on the march to
Oporto I. Wheu he found that his appeal had fuiled to influ-
ence the Duke of Dalmatia, and that the !:2nd Corps had passed
out of sight and left the whole of Galicia upon his hand~, he
was constrained to take stock of his position and to think out
a plan of campaign.
Ney had at his disposal some 17',000 men, consisting of the
twenty-four infantry battalions of his own corps, which fonned
the two divisions of Marchand and Maurice Mathieu, of the two
regiments of his corps-ca\'alry, and of Fournier's brigade of
Lorges' dragoons, which Soult., by the Emperor's orders, had
transferred to him before crossing the Millho. Among his
resources it would not be fair to count the two garrisons o:t
1 See p. 102.
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Vigo and Tuy which the flnd Corps had left behind it. The}'
numbered more than 4,000 men, but were so placed as to be
more of a charge than a help to Ne)'. They failed to keep him
in touch with Soult, and their necessities distracted some of his
troops to their aid when he was requiring every man for other
purposes.
On March 10, when he was left to his own rcsources, Nc)' had
concentrated the greater part of his corps in the north-western
corner of Galicia. He had placed one brigade at Lugo, a second
with Fournier's dragoons at Mondoncdo, in observation of the
Asturias, a third at Santiago, the remainder at Corunna and
Ferro!. The outlying posts had been called in, save a garrison
at Villafranea, the important half-way stage between Lugo
nnd Astorga, where the Marshal had left a battalion of the
flGth regiment, to keep open his communication with the plains
of Leon. The insurgentll were already so active that touch
with this detachment was soon lost, the peasantll having cut the
road both east and west of Villafranca.
The whole month of March was spent in a ceaseless endea"our
to keep down the rising in Northern Galicia: the southern
parts of the kingdom had been practically abandoned, and the
French had no hold there sa....e through the garrisons of Tu)'
and Vigo, both of which (as we have seen in an earlier chapter)
wcre blockaded by the local lc\"ics the moment that Soult had
passed on into Portugal.
Ney's object was to crush and cow the insurgentll of Northern
Galici8: by the constant movement of flying columns, which
marched out from the towns when his brigades were established,
and made desccn~ on every district where the peasantry had
IWCmbled in strength. 'I1lis policy had little success: it was
easy to rout the Galicians and to burn their villages, but the
moment that the column had passed on the enemy retunled to
occupy his old positions. The campaign was endless and incon-
clusive: it was of little use to kill so many scores or hundri.'<1s
of peasantll, if no attempt was made to hold down the districts
through which the expedition had passed. This could not be
done for sheer want of numbers: 16,000 men were not sufficient
to garrison the whole of the mountain valley!;! and coast villages
of this rugged land. The French columns went far afield, even
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as far as Corcubioll on the headland of Cape Finisterrc, and
Ribadeo on the borders of Asturias: but though they scathed
the whole region with fire and sword, they made no impression.
Moreover, they suffered serious losses: every expedition lost
a certain number of strugglers cut off by the peasantry, and of
foragers who had wande"red too far from the main body in
search of food. All were murdered: for the populace, mad at
the burning of their homes and the lifting of their cattle-
their only wealth-nevC1" gave quarter to the unfortunate soldiers
who fell into their hands.
It is curious and interesting to compare Ney's actual operations
,dth the orders which the Emperor had sent -to him~. In these
he was directed to establish his head quarters at Lugo, and to
leave no more than a regiment at FerroI and another regiment
at Betanzos and Caronna. He was to keep a movable column
of three battalions at work between Santiago and Tuy. to 'make
examples' and prevent the English from landing munitions for
the insurgents. With the rest of his corps, fiw) regiments of
infantry and a brigade of cavalry, he was to establish himself at
Lugo, and from thence to send out punitive expeditions against
rebellious villages, to seize hostages, to lend' aid if necessary
to Soult's operations in Portugal, and finally' to utilize the
months of March and April, when there is nothing to fear on
the Galician coasts, for an expedition to conquer the Asturias.'
Here wc have all Napoleon's illusions concerning the character
of the Peninsular Vhr very clearly displayed. He supposes
that a movable column of one regiment can hold down a rugged
coast region one hundred miles long, where 20,000 insurgents
are in arms. He thinks that punitive expeditions, and the
taking of hostages, will keep a province quiet without there
being all)' need to establish garrisons in it. 'OrganiiIC Galicia,'
he writes, 'make examples, for severe examples well applied are
much more effective than garrisons.... Leave the policing of the
country to the Spanish authorities. If you cannot occupy every
place, you can watch every place: if you cannot hold every
shore-battery to prevent communication with the English, you
can charge the natives with this duty. Your movable columns
will pWlish any of the people of the coast who behave badl)'"
1 Napoleon to Ney, from Parig, Feb. 18,1809.
O.ll.l.N. 11 Bb
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To Ney, when he received this dispatch, mall)' weeks after it
had been written, all this elaborate advice must have appeared
very futile. Considering the present attitude of the whole
population of Galicia, he must have been much amused at the
proposal that he should entrust them with the task of keeping
off the British, should' organize' them, and' make them police
themselves.' .As to 'severe examples' he had now been burning
villages and shooting monks and alcaldes for two months and
more: but the only result was that the insurrection flared up
more fien'Cly, and that his own stragglers and foragers were
being hung and tortured every day. As to the idea of movable
columns, he had (on his own inspiration) sent Mancune to
carry out precisely the operations that the Emperor desired ill
the country between Santiago and Tuy. The column had to
fight every day, and held down not one foot of territory beyond
the outskirts of its own camp. And now, in the midst of all
his troubles, he was ordered to attempt the conquest of the
Asturias, no small undertaking in itself. The Emperor's letter
ended with the disquieting note that' 110 further reinforcements
can be sent to Galicia. It is much more likely that it may be
necessary to transfer to some other point one of the two
d.ivisions of the Sixth Corps 1,'
W'"e have hitherto had little occnsion to mention the two
Spanish regular armies on which Ne)', in addition to all his
troubles with the insurgents, had to keep a watchful eye. The
first was the force in the principality of Asturias, which had
been 1i>St to sight since the day on which it fled homeward after
the battle of Espinosa. 'TIle second consisted of the much~tried
troups of La Romana, whu sincc their escape from Monterey had
enjoyed some weeks of comparati,'e rest, and were once more
ready'to moye.
The Asturian force was far the larger in point of numbers,
and ought to ha"e made its influence felt long ere now, But
even more thnn the other Spaniards, the Asturians were given
over to particulnrism and provincial selfishness. In 1808 they
had done nothing for the common muse save that they had lent
th~ single division of Aceyedo-eomprising about half their
\ 'Ne comlltcz sur QUCUIl renfort: cro)'lll', plutotqu'on pourraitHredans
le cus tie llO.rter ailleurs nDC de \'us divisions.'
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provincial levy I_to the army which Blake led to defeat in
Biscay. After Espinosa this corps had not :retired with La.
Romana to Loon, but had fallen back within the frontier of its
native principality, and had joined the large reserve which had
never gone forward from Oviedo, During the three winter
months, the Asturians lll\d contented themselves with reorgan~
izing and increasing the numbers of their battalions, and with
guarding the passes of the Cantabrian chain, They had refused
to send either men or money to La Romans, thereby provoking
his righteous indignation, and furnishing him with a grudge
which he repaid in due season, Wben he was driven away from
their neighbourhood. and forced to retire towards Portugal,
they still kept quict behind their hills, and made but the weakest
of attempts to distroet the attention of the enemy, Thcre ,":cre
at first no French forces near them save Bonnet's single division
at Santander, which was fully occupied in holding down the
Montana, and a provisional brigade at Leon consisting of some
stray battalions of the dissolved Eighth Corps 2• .All neither of
these forces had any considerable reserves behind them R, when
once Ney and Soult had passed on into Galicia, it is clear that
a demonstration in force ~<Y'i\inst Santander or Leon would have
thrown dismay along the whole line of the French communica-
tions, and have disarranged all the Emperor's plans for further
luhance.
The only operation. however, which the Asturians undertook
was a petty raid into Galicia with 3.000 or 4,000 men, who
1 Ace'edo's division, deducting the regular troops [Hibernia (two batt8.).
and Provincial of OviedoJ, llad rome 6,000 men :' wllile 0,200 remained
behind in Asturias, Soo pp. 632 and 637 of vol, i-
s Apparently consi!ting in }'cbruary of three battalions and a Spanish
Legion which Napoleon had organized out of the prisoners of Blake's and
La Romana's armies: 2,998 men in all. The Legion waited till it had
received a.rms and clothing, and then deserted en mq48e and went to join·
the illsurgents. For allgry correspolldence on this incident see Napoleon
to King Joseph, Feb. 20, and King Joseph to Napoleon, March 7, 1809.
I The total of French troops in Old Castile, garrironing Valladolid.
Soria, PaJenoia, and Burgos, &0., was only 5,342 men. Nothing was dis-
posable for field operations save I\ellermann's division of dragoons. In
Bisen)', behind Bonnet, there were only 1,762 men, and in Alava 876.
Practically nothing could have been sent to reinforce Leon or Sautander,
till i\1ortier's corps came up.
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~ent to beat up Ney's detachment at Mondonedo on April 10,
and were driven off with easel, The Junta had fully flO,OOO
men under arms, but they contrived to be weak at every point
by trying to guard every point. They had sent, to observe
Bonnct, the largest body of their troops, nearly 10,000 meD, under-
General BallasterQs: he had taken up the line of the Deba, and
lay with his head quarters at Colombres, skirmishing occasionally
with the French outposts. At the pass of Pajares, watching
the main road that descends into the plain of Leon, were 3,000
men, and 2,000 more at. La Mesa. guarded El minor defile.
Another division of 4,000 bayonets was at Castropol, facing
Ney's detachment which had occupied Mondonedo: thig was the
column which had made the feeble advance in April to which
we have already alluded. FiualIy, a Swiss LieuteniLUt~Gelleral
named \Vomer lay at O"iOOo, the capital of the principality,
with a small resen'e of 9l,OOO men. It does not seem that
Cienfuegos, the Captain-General of Asturius, exercised any
real authority, as the Junta took upon itself the settling of
every detail of military affairs 8. Thus a whole army was wasted
I For this fiasco see Toreno, i. pp. 400-1.
I These dispositions of the Asturian army, which have never before been
published, are taken from a dispatch from the Junta at Oviedo, which
Mr. Frem sent to Lord Castlereagh on March 24 (Record Office]. The
regiments were:-
At Colombres, undor Maj.-Gcneral F. :&llasteros:
Luanco, Castropol, Navia, Luarca, Villaviciosa, LlanCll, Cangas de Oilill,
Cangas de Tineo, Don Carl09.
.j\.t Pajares and .1"arna, under Brigadier Don Christoval Lili :
Siero, Provincial..of Oviedo, Qwadonga.
At La Mesa, under Brigadier Don F. Manglaoo;
Riva de Sella, Pra"ia.
At Castropol, under Colonel T. Valdez :
Lena, Grado, Salas, Ferdinando VII.
At Oviedo, under Lient.-General 'Vorster:
Gijon, Inl1esto. •
TIle Junta f,eport tllat they llaVe over 20iJOO meu, the regiments being
rery strong, some of them rcacllillg 1,200 ,ooyonets, Of even more.
~ Carrol to La Romana, March 28, 'The Junta, in fact, command
the armies in e\'ery respect. 'lbey have absolute po\ver, and have
rendered tbernselvCIl highly obnoxioUll to the people of the province, and
are at present entirely guided by the will and caprice of three or four
individuals... '
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by being distributed all along the narrow pro\'ince, awaiting
an attack from an enemy who was far too weak to dream of
advancing, and who, as a matter of fact, did not move till May.
La RommJa might well be indignant that the Asturians had
done practically nothing for the cause of Spain from December
to March, especially since they had obtained more than their
share of the British arms and money 1 which had been distributed
in the autumn of 1808.
Ney's new troubles in April did not spring from the activity
of the Asturitul troops, but from that of the much·battered
army of Galicia, which was destined ill this month to achieve
the tirst success that had cheered its depleted ranks since the
combat of Guenes. Vvhen La Romanar on March 8, had
found llimself fro:! from the pursuit of Franccschi's cavalry, he
had marched by leisurely stagei to Pucbla de Scnabria on the
borders of Leon. He doubted for a moment whether he should
not tum southward and drop down, along the edge of Portugal,
to Ciudad Rodrigo, the nearest place of strength in Spanish
hands. But, after much consideration, he resolved to leave
behind him the weakest of his battalions-and his numerous sick,
together with his small pro,-ision of artillery, and to strike back
into Galicia with the best of his men. It would seem that he
was inspired partly by the desire of cutting Ney's communica·
tions, partly by the wish to get into touch with the Asturians,
whose torpidity he was determined to stir up into action_ Ac-
I..'ordingly he left at Puebla de Senabria his guns and about 2:,000
men, the skeletons of mtUly ruilll..J. regiments, under Gcncrul
Martin La Carrera, while with the 6,000 infantry that remained
he resolnd to cross the Sierra. Negra and throw himself into
the upper valley of the Sil. The road by Corporales and the
SOUn.-ell of the Cabrera torrent proved to be abominable; if the
1 Such also was tile opinion of Captain Carrol, the British represenmti"e
at Ovied-o. He writes to Castlercagll on Feb. 10 in tlle following tcmlS:
'I am sorry to have to represent that the supplies llitherto granted to
this provinoo 11;,lVC not heeu applied (to uso the milllest CJt:llressions) witl,
that judgment and ooeonomy that might llave bccn expct:ted, IInd that tile
benefits resultilJg to tbis province and the commou cause ILre hy 110 means
pr<lportionate to the liherality with which those supplies were grnJJted b}'
the 8ritish Government' [H.ecord OBicel 'foreno, as a patriotic Asturiau,
hushes up all these scandals.
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anny had possessed eaunon or baggage it could not have reached
its goal. Dut after several hard marches lA llomana descended
to Ponferrada on March 16. He leantt that the insurrection
had compelled the French to concentrate all their small posts,
and that there was no enemy nearer than Villafranea on the
one haud and Astorgn. on the other. Thus be found himself
able to takc possession of the high-road from Astorga to Lugo,
and to make use of all the resources of the Vierzo, and of
Eastern Galicia. He might have passed on undisturbed, if he
hOO chosen, to join the Asturians. But learning that the French
garrison at Villafranca was completely isolated, he resolved to
risk a blow at it, in the hopes that he might reduce it before
Ncy could learn of his arrhal and come down from Lugo to its
aid. He was ill prepared for a siege, for he had but one gun
with him-a Ill-pounder which he had abandoned in January
when retreating from Ponferrada to Orense, and which he now
picked up intact, with its store of ammunition, at a mountain
hermiWoa-e, where it had been safely hidden for two months.
j\lIarching on Villafranca ne.'l:t day he fell upon the French
before they had any conception that there was a hostile fon:e
in their neighbourhood. He beat them out of the town into
the citadel after a sharp skirmish, and then surrounded them in
their refuge, and began to batter its gates with his single gun.
If the garrison could have held out for a few days they would
probably have been relieved, for Ney was but three marches
distant. But the governor, regarding the old castle as untenable
against artillery, surrendered at. the first snmmons. Thus La
Romana captured a whole battalion of the 6th Uger, 600
strong 1, together with several hundreds more of COll\'alescents
and stragglers who had been halted at Villafranca, owing to the
impossibility of sending small detachments through the moun~
tains 2 when the insurgents were abroad 3.
Having accomplished this successful stroke lA Romana was
1 TIlO number of Ullwoumled prisoners was :;74, that of killed and
wounded nearly 700.
I The captives were sent off immediately into the Asturias. Carrol saw
them arrive at O,-iOOo.
S There is a long dispatch of Menclliabal to La Romana in the Record
Office, giving details of the storm of Villafranca, which was all over in
four hours. (
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desirous of pursuing his way to the Asturias, where he wns deter~
mined to ·make his power fclt 1, He took with him only onc
regiment (that of La Prillcesa, one of his old corps from the
Baltic), and handed over the temporary command of the army
to General :\lahy, with orders to hold on to the Vier7.0 as IOllg
as possible, but to retire on the Asturins if Ney came up against
him in force. The .Marshal, however, did not move from Lugo;
when he heard of the fall of the garrison of Villafranca., he was
already so much entangled with the insurrection that he could
spare no troops for an expedition to the Vierzo. In order to
reopen the communication with Astorga he would have had
to call in his outlying brigades, and at the present moment he
W/l8 more concerned about the fate of Tuy and Viga than about
the operations of La Romnna. Accordingly, Mnhy WllS left
unmolested for the greater part of a month in his cantonments
along the banks of the Sil; it was a welcome respite for the
much-wandering army of Go.licia.
Romo.nll. meanwhile betook himself to Oviedo with hig escort,
and on arriving there on April 4 entered into a furious contro-
versy with the Junta. Finding them obstinate, and not disposed
to carry out his plans without discussion, he finally executed
a petty Cf:mp d'etat it. It bears an absurd resemblancc to Cram·
1 Captain Carrol had written to him a fell" dal'S before to beg him to
hasten to Oviedo: 'I strongly advise your Excellency's repairing to this
city (O\"iOOo), and adopting such plans and measures for the better govern-
ment of the province and the active operations of the army as your
Excellency shall think moot.' TIlCre were similar appeals from Spaniell
officers discontented with the Junta.
I It may be worth while to quote the opening clauses of La nomaoa's
proclamation ell:plaining his coup tNtat; it is dated the day after his
<purge' of the Junta: a copy exists in the Record Office, fonvarded to
Castlereagh by Carrol :-'.Me es fonoso manifestar con mucho selltimiento
que la actual Junta de Asturias, aunque de las Illas favorecidas por la
generosidad britannica en toda cla.sse de subsidi06, es la flue mellos lla
.coadyuvado a la grandc y heroyca cmpresa de arrojar a 108 encmig06 de
lIucatro patrio suelo. Formada cata Junta por illtriga, y por in prepotcncia
de algull06 sugetos r familias conexiOlladas, se propuse arrogarse Ull 110061'
ab90luto c indefinido; servcn 108 individuos mutuamellte Cll sus proyectos
y despiqu6S, desechall ooll prctext.os infundidos y aun calumlliosos III que
no subseribiese a ellos, y contentan a loa menesterosos COil comisiones
o cncargoa de interes; &0.
•
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well's famous dissolution of the Long Parliament. Coming into
their council-room, with Colonel Joseph O'Donncll and fifty
grenadiers of the Princesa regiment, he delivered an harangue
to the members, accusing them of all manner of maladministm·
tion and provincial selfishness. Then he signed to his soldiers
and bade them clear the room I.
La Romana then, on his own authority, nominated a new
Junta; but many of its members refused to act, doubting the
legality of his action, while the dispossessed delegates kept up
a paper controversy, Ilnd sent reams of objurgntory letters to the
Government at Seville. Ballasteros and his anny, at the other
side of the Principality, seem to have paid little attention to
La Romana, but the Marquis so far got his way that he began
to send much-needed stores, medicines, munitions, and clothing
to his troops in the Vierzo. He even succeeded in procuring
a few field-pieces for them 2, which were dragged ",-ith difficult)'
over the passes via. Cangas de Tineo.
Thus strengthened Mahy, much to his chief's displeasure,
advanced from the Vierzo towards Lugo, with the intention of
beating up the French brigade there stationed. He took post
at Navis de Sual'llR, just outside the borders of the Asturias,
and called to his standards all the peasantry of the surrounding
region. La Uomana wrote him urgent letters, directing him to
avoid a battle and to await his own return. 'He should
remember'that it was the policy of Fabius Maximus that saved
!-lome, and curb his warlike zeal s,' It is satisfactory to find
that one Sptlnish general at least was free from that wild desire
for pitched battles that possessed most of his contemporaries.
Mah)', thus warned, halted in his march towards Lugo, and
remained in his cantonments in the valley of the Navis. His
chief Sh9uld have returncd to him, but lingered at Oviedo till
April was over, busy in the work of reorganization and in the
1 Carrol, who was an eye:-witness of the scene, thonght that the MarquiS
'had reformed the Junta in the most quiet, peaceable and masterly manner.'
TIle last epithet seems the most appropriate of the three. Carrol to
ClIstlereagh, April ]0, 1809 [in Record Office].
t J.ctWItl of Le Romalla to Mahy in Appendix to Arteehe, vo1. vi.
p.14.5.
S Ibid., p. 146.
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forwarding of supplies. Meanwhile the French hold on Southem
Galicia. had completely disappeared: Vigo had fallen in March,
Tuy had been evucunted. MnllclIue's column had cut its way
back to SWltiago with some difficulty, bringing to Ney the news
of Soult's capture of Opona, but also the assurance that the
whole volley of the Minho and the western COllStlaud had passed
into the hands of the insurgents.
What the Duke of Elchingen's next move would have been,
if he had not received further intelligence from without, we
cannot say. But in the first week in May the long-lost com-
munication with Madrid was tIt lnst reopened, and he was
ordered to take his part in a new and broad plan of operations
against La Romana's army and the Asturias.
Ever ShlCC La Romana had stormed Villafmnca, and all news
from Galicia had bt'<m completely cut off, King Joseph und his
adviser Jouroan had been in a state of great fear and perplexity
as to the condition of affairs in the north-west. Soult had long
passed out of their ken, and now Ney also was lost to sight.
In default of accurate information they ra·dved all Illallner of
lugubrious rWllours from Lean and Astorga, and imagined that
the Sixth Corps was ih far DlO~ desperate straits than was
actually the case. Fearing the worst, they resolved to filld out,
at all costs, what was going on in Galicia. To do so it was
necessary to fit out an expedition sufficiently strong to brush
aside the insurgents and communicate with Ney. Troops, how-
ever, were hard to find. Lapisse had already marched from
Salamanca to join Victo'l'. In Old Castile and Leon there were
but Kellermann's dragoons and a few garrisons, none of which
could leave their posts. Marshal Bessieres, to whom the genernl
charge of the northern provinces had been given by the Emperor,
could show conclusively that he was not able to equip a column
of even 5,000 men for service in Galicia.
The only quarter whence troops could be procured was Aragon,
where everything had remailled quiet since the fall of Saragossa..
The Emperor bad issued orders that of the two corps which had
taken part in the siege, the Third only should remain to hold
down the conquered kingdom: hence Mortier and the Fifth
should have been disposable to reinforce the troops in Old
Castile. But, with the Austrian war upon his hands, Napoleon
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was thinking of withdrawing Mortier and his 15,000 men from
Spain. In a dispatch dated April 10, he announced that the
Marshal was to retire from Amgon to Logrofio in Navarre,
from whence he might possibly be recalled to France if circum-
stances demanded it '. At the same moment King J oseph was
writing to MOl-tier to summon him into Old Castile, and point~
ing out to him that the safety of the whole of ~orthern Spain
depended upon his presence. Much perplexed by these contra·
dietory orders, the Duke of Trev\so took a half-measure, and
marched to Burgos, which was actually in Old Castile, but lay
only three marches from Logrono and upon the direct route to
France. A few days later the Emperor, moved by his brother's
incessant appeals, and seeing that it was all-important to reopen
the communication between Neyand Soult, permitted l\Iortier
to march to Valladolid, where he was in a good position for
holding down the entire province of Old Castile. He also ga"e
leave to the King to employ for an expedition to Galicia the
tll'O regiments of the Third Corps, which had escorted the
prisoners of Saragossa. to Bayonlle, and which were now on their
\ homeward way to join their dh'ision in Aragon.
It was thus possible to get together enough troops to open
the way to Galicia. The charge of the expedition was handed
over to Kcllcrmanll, who was given his own dragoons, the two
regiments from Bayonne, a stray battalion of Le"al's Germans
from Segovia, a Polish battalion from Buitrago, and a pro-
visional regiment organized from belated details of the Second
and Sixth Corps, which had been lying in various garrisons of
Castile and Leon 2. He had altogether some 7,000 or 8,000
men, whom he,concentrated at Astorga on April 27. Marching
on Villafranca he met no regular opposition, but was harassed by
the way by the peasantry, who had abandoned their villages
and retired into the hills, Mahy had mO"ed off the main road
by making his advance to Navia de Suarna, and was not sighted
by KeIlermann, nor did the Spaniard think fit to meddJe with
such a powerful force as that which was 110'1' passing him.
On May 2 the column reached Lugo, where it fell in with
I Napoleon to Joseph, from Paris, April 10, 1009.
~ For details concerning the compositioo of this expedition see Jourdao's
,Merrun'rU, p. 196,
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1\.{aurice Mathieu's division of the Sixth Corps, and obtained full
information as to NeY'1i position. The Marshal was absent at
Corunna, but sent his chief of the staff to meet Kcllcrmann and
concert with him a common plan of operations. It was settled
that they should concentrate their attention on La. Romana
and the Asturians, leaving southern Galicia alone for the
present, and taking no heed of Smut, of whom they had
received no news for a full month.
For the destruction of.the Spanish armies of the north a con-
centric movement was planned. Ne)" undertook to concentrate
the main body of his corps at Lugo, und to fall on the Astu-
riallS from the west, crushing Mahy on the way. He stipulated,
however, that he should be allowed to return to Galicia as
quickly as possible, lest the insurgents should make havoc of his
garrisons during his absence. Kellcl'mtmn was to retrace his
steps to Astorga and Leon, and from thence to march on the
Asturias by the pass of Pajares, its great southern outlet. At
the same moment Bonnet at Santander was to be requested to
fall on from the east, and to attack Ballasteros and the division
that lay behind the Dcoo.
When it was reported to Maby and La Romana that KeBer.
mann had turned back from Lugo, and was retreating upon
Astorga, they failed to grasp the meaning of his movement, and
came to the conclusion that his expedition had been sent out
with no purpose save that of communicating with Ney. Uncon-
scious that a simultaneous attack from all sides was being
prepared against them, they failed to concentrate. By lea,;ng
sm~ll 'containing' detachments at the outlying posts, they
could llave massed 20,000 men against anyone of the French
columnlS: but they failed to see their opportunity aud were
caught in a state of complete dispersion. Ballasteros with
9,000 men still lay opposite Bonnet; Worster at Castropol did
not unite with Mahy's army at Navia de Suarna; and La
Romana remailled at Oviedo with two regiments only.
Hence came hopeless disaster when the French attack was
at last let loose upon the Asturias. On May 13 the Duke
of Elchingen drew together at Lugo four of the eight infantry
regiments which formed the Sixth Corps, with two of his four
cavalry regiments, and eight mountain-guns carried by mules,
380 NEY AND LA ROMANA IN GALlCIA [MAY tU
This formed a compact force of 6,500 bayonets and 900 sabres 1•
He left behind him four battalions and a co.,·alry regiment
under MauculIe at Santiago, the same force under the cavalry
brigadier Fournier at Lugo, two battalions at Corunna, one at
lletan7.0s, and one at Ferrol.
The obvious route by which thc Marshal might have advanced.
on Oviedo was the coast~road by Mondonedo and Castropol,
. which "Vorster was guarding. But in order to save time and to
fall upon the cnemy on nn unexpected line, he took a shorter
but more rugged mountain road by Meyra and Ibias, which led
him into the valley of the Navia. This brought him straight
upon Mahy's army: but that general, whell he lell.rnt of the
strength that was directed against him, retreated in haste after
a skirmish at Pequin, and fled, not to the Asturias, but
westward into the llpper valley of the MinllO, [May 14.]
This move was ve:tatious to Ney, who would have preferred to
drive him on to Oviedo, to share in the general rout that was
being prepared for the Asturians. The Marshal refused to
follow llim, and pushed on to Cangas de Tinea in the valley
of the Narcea, capturing there. a large convoy of food and
ammunition which was on its way from La Uomana to Mahy,
On May 17 hc hurried 011 to Sw, on the 18th he was
at the bridge of Gallego3 on the Nom river, only ten miles
from Oviedo. Here for the first time he met with serious
opposition: hitherto he had suffered from nothing but casual
'sniping' on the part ofthe pcasll.ntry. His march had been so
rapid that La Romana bad only heard of his approach on the
seventeenth 2. and had not been able to call in any of his out-
1 The force tllat mllrched on the Asturias was comllOSOO of the 26th Uger,
27th lIud 69th of Mlluricc :\tllthieu's divisioll. the 39th from J\Iarchand's.
the 3rd Hussars, aud 26th Dragoons.
l\laucUlle'!;I detachment consisted of two battaliOU!;I each of the 6th Uger
aDd the 76th. \l'ith the 15th Chasseun and one battery.
Fournier's detachmeut was composed of the 15th Dragoons, two
battalions of the 69th, and one of the 76th.
t earrol gives au excellent accouut of the French im'asiOIi iu a long
dispatch written from Vigo on June 3. He says that the MarquiS only
heard of Ney's approach by the peasants tlying from Cangas de Tinoo
on the morning of May 17, He himself was sent out to verify the incre-
dible information, and came on the French 38 they were crossing the Navia,
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lying detachments. The Marquis was .forced to attempt to
defend the passage of the Nota. with nothing more than his
small central reserve-the one Galician regiment (La Princesa,
only 600 bayonets) that he had brought with him from Villa-
franca, and one Asturian battalion-not more than ] ,500
men. Naturally he was routed with great loss, tho1'l.gh Ney
allows that the Princesa regiment made a creditable defence at
the bridge 1, The Spanish troops therefore dispersed and fled
eastward, while Romana rode dowll to the seaport of Giholl and
took ship on a Spanish sloop of war along with the members of
his Junta. The Marshal seized Oviedo on the nineteenth: the
place was pillaged in the most thorough fashion by his troops. In
his dispatch he makes the excuse that a few peasants had at-
tempted to defend some barricades in the suburbs, and that they.
not the soldiery, had begun the sack, Credfd J1/daett8 Apella!
The ways of the bands of Napoleon are too well known, Ilnd we
shall not believe that it was Spaniards who stole the cathedral
plate, or tore the bones of the early kings of Asturias from their
resting-places in search of treasure 2, On May 20 Ney marched
with one regiment down to Gijon, where he found 250,000 lbs. of
powder newly landed from England, and a quantity of military
stores, An English merchantman was captured and another
burnt 8. A detached column occupied Aviles, the second seaport
of the Asturias.
On the following day, May f21, El. detachment sent inland
from O"iedo up the valley of tIte Lena, with orders to search
for the column coming from the south, got into touch with that
only thirty miles from Oviooo. He rode back in haste, anil meton6 Asturian
battalion coming up, and afterwards the regiment of La Pcincesa. Romana
hail no other troops, and only a few hundred balf-armed peasantry joined
in the defence of the bridge of GalIegos.
I 'Ce dernier pont de Gallegos fut assez bien dUendu par le regiment de
la Princesse, maie neaumoills il fut enleve, ainei qu'uue piece de douze,'
Ney to King Joseph, Oviedo, May 21.
2 < Les rnagasills et lee plus riches rnaiSOllS de la ville furent pilIes par
le!! paysaoe et la populace. Cas malheureux, ivxes d'eau-de-vie, entre-
llrireut de dCfeudre la ville et tireDt feu daoB toutes le!! rues,' Ner to King
Joseph, Ovieo:1o, Ma)' 21.
S TIley were called tlle Pique and the PlutllS, Carrol was neatly
captured while burning tJ;1e latter, and CSC.1.pOO in au open boat.
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force. Kellermann had duly reached Loon, where he found
orders directing him to send back to Aragon the two regiments
of the Third Corps which had been lent him I, tlnd to take in-
stead a division of Mortier's corps, which was now disposable for
service in the north. Accordingly he picked up Girard's (late
Suchct's) division, and leaving OIlC of its brigades at Loon,
marched with the other and the remainder of his original fol"l'e,
to storm the defiles of Pajares. He had with him between
6,000 amI 7,000 troops, t\ force with which he easily routed the
Asturian brigade of 3,000 men \loder Colonel Quixano, which
had been set to guard the pass. At the cnd of two days of
irregular fighting, Kellcrmnnn descended into the valley of the
una and met Ney's outposts on May 21. The routed enemy
dispersed among the hills.
It rcmlLin$ to speak of the third French column which started
to invade the Asturias, that of Bonnet. This general marched
from Santander on May 17 with 5,000 men, intending to attack
Dallasteros, and force his way to Oviedo by the coast-road that
passes by San Viucente de la Barquera and Villaviciosa. But
he found no one to fight, for Ballasteros had been summoned by
La Romana to defend Oviedo, and had started off by the inland
road via Cangas de Quia and In6csto. The two armies there-
fore were marching parallel to each other, with rough mountains
between them. On reaching Infiesto on May ~l, Ballasteros
heard of the fall of Ovicdo and of the forcing of the puss of
Pajares: seeing that it would be useless to run into the lion's
mouth by proceeding any further, he feU back into the moun-
tains, and took refuge in the upland valley of Covadonga, the
site of King Pelayo's famous victory over the Moors in the )'ear
7lB. Here he remained undiscovered, and was gradually joined
by the wrecks of the force which Key had routed at Oviedo,
including O'Donnell and the Princesa regiment. Bonnet passed
him without discovering his whereabouts, advanced as far as
Inficsto and Villaviciosa, and got into touch with Kcllermann.
Thus the three French columns had all won their way into
the heart of the Asturias, but though they had seized its capital
find its seaporls, they had failed to catch ils ann)'. and only
half their task hud been performed. Of 0.11 the Asturian troops
I The 116th anti 117th of Morlot) divisioll.
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only t.he two small forces at Oviedo and Pajare.'i had been met
and routed. 'Vorster had not been molested, Mnhy had
doubled back into Galicia, -Ballasteros had gone up into the
mountains. If the invasion was to haye any definite results,
it was necessary to hunt down all these three divisions. But
there was 110 time to do so: Ne)' was anxious about his Galician
garrisons; Bonnet remembered that he hnd left Santnndcr ill
charge of n weak detachment of no more than 1,~OO men. Both
refused to remain in the Asturias, or to engage in a long stern
chase after the elusive Spaniards, among the peaks of the Pellas
de Europa and the Sierras Albas. They decided that Keller·
mann with his 7,000 men must finish the business. Accordingly
they departed each to his own province-and it was high time,
for their worst expectations had been fulfilled. Mahy in the
west and Ballasteros in the east had each played the correct
game, and had fallen upon the small garrisons left exposed in
their rear. Moreover, the insurgents of Southern Ga1icia had
crossed the mill. and marched on Santiago. If Ney had re-
mained ten days longer in the Asturias, it h probable that he
would have returned to find the half of the Sixth Corps which
he had left in Galicia absolutely €.xterminated.
The· Marshal, however, was just in time to prevent this
disaster. Handing over the charge of the principality to
Kellermann, he marched off on May 22 by the coast-road which
leads to Galicia by the route of Navia, Castropol, and Ribadco.
He hoped to deal with Worster by the way, having learnt that
the Swiss general had advanced from Castropol by La Romana's
orders, and was moving cautiously in the direction of Oviedo.
But Worster was fortunate enough to escape: he went up into
the mountains when he heard that Ney was near, llnd had the
satisfo.ction of learning that the Marshal had passed him by.
The rivers being in flood, and the bridges broken, the French
had a slow and tiresome march to Ribadeo, which they only
reached on May 26. Next day the Duke of Elchingen was at
Castropol, where he received the news that Lugo had been in
the gravest peril, and had only been relieved by the unexpected
appearance of Soult and the Second Corps from the direction
of Orense.
The sequence of events during the Marshal's absence had
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been as follows. 'Vhen Mahy found that 11C had escaped
pursuit, he had immediately made up his mind to strike ut the
French garrisons. He tried to persuade Worster to join him, or
to attack Fcrrol, but could not induce him to quit the Asturias.
So with his own 6,000 men :Mahy marched on Lugo, bent
General Foumier (who came out to meet him) in a skirmish
outside the walls, and drove him into the town. Lugo had no
fortification save a mediaeval wall, and the Spaniards were in
great hopes of storming it, as they had stormed Villufranca.
But when they had lain two days before the place, they were
surprised to hear that a large French force was marching against
them; it WPS not Ney returning from the Asturias, but the
dilapidated corps of Soult retreating frolll Orense. Wisely
refbsing to face an army of 19,000 men, Mahy raised the siege
and retired to Villalba in the folds of the Sierra de 1..000. 011
May ~~ Soult entered Lugo, where he was at last able to gi\'e
his men nine days' rest, and could begin to cast about him for
means to refit them with the proper equipment of an army, for,
as we hll\"e sccn, they were in a condition of absolute destitution
and wholly unable to take the field.
At Castropol Ney heard at one and the same moment that
Lugo had been in danger and that it had been relieved. But
he also received news of even greater importance from anotheI"
quarter. Maucune and the detachment which he had left at
Santiago had been defeated :in the open field by the insnrgents
of Southem Galiein, and had been compelled to fall back on
Corunna. This was now the point of danger, wherefore the
~1arshal neither moved to join Soult at Lub"O, nor set himself
to hunt Mahy in the mountains, but marched straight for Corunna
to sucl!our Maueune.
The force whicb had defeated that general consisted in the
main of the insurgent'l who had beleaguered Tuy tUld Vigo in
March and April. They were now under Morillo and Garciu
del Barrio, who were beginning .to red\lce them to some sort of
discipline, and w~.re ,organjzing them into battalions and com-
panies. Hut the core of the' Division of the Minho,' as this
force WM now cnlled, was composed of the small body of regulars
which La Romana had left at Puebla de Senabria, under Martin
La Carrera. That officer, after giving his feeble detachment some
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weeks of rest, had marched via Monterey and OreDse to join the
insuITectionary army. He brought with him nine guns and
2,000 men. On May 22 Carrera and Morillo crossed the Ulla
and oovanced on Santiago with ]0,000 men, of whOUl only 7,000
possessed fireamls. Maucune came forth to meet them in the
Campo de Estrella 1, outside the city, with his four battalions
and a regiment of cha.'iSeurs, thinking to gain an easy success
when the enemy offered him battle in the open. But he was
outnumbered by tIuoce to one, and as the Galicians showed much
spirit and stood steadily to their guns, he was repulsed with
loss. Camra then attacked in his turn, drove the French into
Santiago, chased them through the town, upd pursued them for
a league beyond it. Maucuue was wounded, and lost 600 men-
s. fifth of his whole force-and two guns. He fell back in
disorder on Corunna. He had the audacity to write to :Key
that he had retired after an indecisive combat: but the Marshal,
reading between the lines of his dispatch, hastened to Corunna
with all the troops which had returned from the Asturias, and
did not consider the situation secure till he learnt that Carl'cra
had not advanced from Santiago.
Leaving his main body opposite the' Division of the Minho,'
the Duke of Elchingen now betook himself to Lugo, to concert
a joint plan of operation with Soult [l\fay 30]. -The results of
their somewhat stormy conference must be told in another
chapter.
Meanwhile the situation behind them was rapidly changing.
On May 24 La Romana, who bad landed at Ribadeo, rejoined
Mahy and his army at Villalba. The Marquis, on surveying
the situation, came to the conclusion that it was too dangerous
to remain in the northern anglc of Galicia, between the French
army at Lugo and the sca. Hc resolved to return to the
southern rcbrion of the province, and to get into touch with
Carrera and the troops on the ~1inho. He therefore bade his
army prepare for another forced march across the mountains.
They murmured but obeyed, and, cautiously slipping past
SouIt's corps by a flank movemen~ crossed the high-rood to
Villafmnca and :reached MonfOlie de Lemos. From thence
I TIle plain from which Santiago gets its name of Santiago de Compo-
stella.
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they safely descended to Occuse, where La Romana established
his head quarters [June 6]. Thus the Spaniards were once
more in line, and prepared to defend the whole of Southern
Galicia.
We have still to deal with the state of aff'airs" in the Asturias.
After Ney's departure on May!t~ Kellermann lay at Oviedo and
Bonnet at Infiesto. But a few days later the Itltter general
received the disquieting news tbat Ballastcros, whose movements
had hitherto escaped him, was on the move towards the eMt, and
might be intending either to make a raid into the plains of
Castile, or to dest'end on Santandcr and its weak garrison.
·Ballasteros, as a matter of fact, had resolved to stir up trouble
in Bonnet's rear, with the object of drawing him off from the
Asturias. Leaving his refuge at CovMonga on May 24 he
marched by mule-tracks, unmarked on any map, to Potes in the
upper valley of the Deba. There he remained a few days, and
finding that he was unpursued, and that his exact situation
was unknowll tQ the French, resolved to make a dnsh for
Santander. Starting on June 6 and keeping to the mountains,
he successfully achieved his end, and arrived at his goal before
the garrison of that place had any knowledge of his approach.
On the morning of June 10 he stormed the city, driving out
General Noirot, who escaped with 1,000 men, but capturing flOO
of the garrison and 400 sick in hospital, as well as the wllole of
the stores and munitions of Bonnet's regiments. Among his
'other prizes was the sum of £10,000 in cas~, in the military
chest of the division. Some of the French tried to escape by
sea, in three corvettes and two luggers which lIly in the harbour,
but the British frigates ..lmelia and Statira, which layoff the
coast, captured them all. This was a splendid stroke, and if
Ballasteros had been prudent he might have got away unharmed
with all his plunder. But he lingered in Santandcr, though he
knew that Bonnet must be in pursuit of him, and resolved to
defend the town. The French general had. started to protect bis
base and his dep6ts, the moment that he ascertained the real direc·
tion of Ballasteros' march. On the night of June 10 he met the
fugitive garrison and learnt that SantaDdcr had fallen. Late on
the ensuing day he rcacht.>d its suburbs, nnd sent in two battalions
to ,make a dash at the place. They were beaten off; bnt next
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morning Bonnet attacked with his whole force, the :Asturians
were defeated, and Ballasteros' raid ended in a disaster. He
himself escaped by sea, but 3,000 of his men were captured, and
the rest dispersed. The French recovered their sick and prisoners,
and such of their stores as the Spaniards had not consumed 1,
The wrecks of Ballasteros' division drifted back over the -hills to
their native principality, save one detachment, the regulars of
La Romana's old regiment of La Princesa. This small body of
300 men turned south, and by Rn astounding march across Old
Castile and ~4.ragon reached Malina on the borders of Valencia,
where they joined the army of Blake. l1tey had gone 250 miles
through territory of which the French were supposed to be in
military possession, but threaded their way between the garrisons
in perfect safety, because the peasantry never 'betrayed their posi-
tion to the enemy.
Disastrous as was its end, nallasterosi expedition had yet
served its purpose. Not only had it thrown the whole of the
French gnrrisons in Biscay and Guipuzcoa into confusion, but
even the Governor of Ba)'onne had been frightened and had sent
nlanning dispatches to the Emperor. This wa;s comparatively
unimportAnt, but it V..as a very different matter that Bonnet
had been forced to evacilate the Asturias, all of whose eastern
region was now free from the invaaers.
:More was to follow: Kcllermann still lay at Oviedo, worried
but not seriously iDt.'ommodct1 by '~Vorster and the Asturians of
the west. But a few days after Bonnet's departure he received
a request from Morlier (backed by orders from King Joseph),
that the division of the 5th Corps which had been lent him
should instantly return to Castile. This was one of the results
of Wellesley's campaign on the Douro, for Mortier, hearing of
Soult's expulsion from Northern PortUo""it~ imagined that the
British army, being now free for further action, would debauch
by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and fall upon Sn.llll11anea.
He needed the aid of his second division, which Kellermann
was forced to send back. But it would have been not only
useless but extremely dangerous to linger at Oviedo with the
small remnant of the expeditionary force, when Girard's regiments
I All this may be studied in two dispatches of Bonnet to King Joseph,
dated Santander, June 12 and June 20.
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had been withdravm. Therefore Kellermann wisely resolved to
evacuate the whole principality, and returned to Lean by the pass
of Pajares in the third week of June.
Thus ended in complete failure the great concentric attack on
the Asturias. The causes of the fiasco were two. (1) TP-e :French
generals chose as their objecti vc, not the enemy's armies, but his
capitAl and base of operations. Both Ney and Bonnet while
marching on Oviedo left what (adapting a naval phrase) we may
call an 'army~in~being' behind them, and in each case that army
fell upon the detachments left in the rear, and pressed them so
hard that the invading forces could not stay in the Asturias, but
were forced to turn back to protect their communications.
(J!) In Spain conquest was useless unless a garrison could be left
behind to hold down the territory that was overrun. But
neither Ney, Kellermann, nor Bonnet had any troops to devote
to such a purpose: they invaded the Asturias "ith regiments
borrowed from other regions, from which they could not long
be spared. As later experience ill 1811 and 1812 showed, it
required some 8,000 men merely to maintain a hold upon Oviedo
and the central parts of the principality. The invaders had no
such force at their dispositiou-the troops from the 6th Corps
were wanted in Galicia, those of the 5th Corps in Castile, those
of Bonnet in the Montalla. If it were impossible to garrison
the Asturifl.6, the invasion dwindled down into a raid, and a raid
which left uutouched the larger part of the enemy's field arm)'
was useless. It would have been better policy to hWlt Mahy,
'Vorster, iUld Ballasteros rather than to secW'c for a bare three
weeks military possession of Qviedo and Gihon. If Soult had
not dropped from the clouds, as it were, to save Lugo: if
Ballasteros had been a little more prudent at Santander, the
Asturian expedition would have ended not merely in a failure,
but in nn ignominious defcat. It should never have been under-
taken while the Galician insurrection was still raging, and while
no troops were available for the permanent garrisoning of the
principality.
Searching a little deeper, may we not say that the ultimate
cause of the fiasco was Napoleon's miseonception of the character
of the Spanish war? It was he who ordered the invasion of the
Asturias, and he issued his orders under the hypothesis that it
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could be not only conquered but retained. But: with the numbers
then at the disposal of his generals tbis was impossible, because
the insurrection absorbed so many of their troops, that no more
could be detached without risking the loss of all that had been
already gained. By grasping at the Asturias Napoleon nearly
lost Galicia. Only Soult's appearance prevented that province
from falling completely into the hands of' Mahy and La Carrera;
and that appearance was lIS involuntmy as it was une.'''peeted,
If the Duke of Dalmatia had been able to carry out his original
design he would have retreated from Oporto to Zamora and not
to Orense. If .Beresford had not foiled him at Amarante, he
would have been resting on the Douro when Foumier WllS in such
desperate struits at: Lugo. In that CllSC Ney might have returned
from Oviedo to find that his detachments had been destroyed,
and that Galicia was lost. It was not the Emperor's fault that
this disaster failed to occur.
SECTION XV: CHAPTER Il
THE FRENCH ABA,,'o'nON GALLCIA
WHEN, upon May SO, 1809, Ney arrived at Lugo, and met
Soult in conference, it seemed that, now or never, the time had
come when a serious endeavour might be made to subdue the
Galician insurgents. The whole force of the 2nd and 6th Corps
was concentrated in the llarrow triangle between Ferrol, Coruunll,
and Lugo. The two marshals had still 33,000 men fit for
service, after deducting the sick. If they set aside competent
garrisons for the three to\ms that we 118ve just named, they
could still show some ~5,OOO' men 8.\'ailable for field operations,
and with such a force Ney was of the opinion that the insur-
rection might be beaten down, It was true that the 2nd Corps
was in 0. deplorable condition as regards C<Juipment, but on the
other hand Corunna and FermI were still .full of the stores
of arms and ammunition U1at had been captured when they
surrendered. Clothing, no doubt, was lamcnt.ably deficient, and
Ney could only supply hundreds where Soult asked for thousands
of boots and 'capotes; but he refitted his colleague's troops with
muskets and ammunition, and furnished him with eight moun·
tain-guns-fie1d.pieces the Duke of Dalmatia would not take,
though a certAin number were offered him; for after his
experience of the way that his artillery had delayed him in
February and March he refused to accept them. Horses and
mules were unattainable-nearly half Soult's cavalry was dis~
mounted, and he had lost most of his sumpter·beasts between
Guimaraens and Montalegre. Nevertheless, the corps, after
a week's rest at Lugo, was once more capable of service. Its
weakly men had been left in hospiLul at Oporto, or hud fallen
by the way in the dreadful defiles of Ruivaens and Salamonde.
All that remained were war-hardened veterans, and Soult, out
of his 19,000 men, had no more than 800 sick and wounded.
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He resolved to disembarrass himsel'f of another hindrance, his
dismollnted cavalry, and in each regiment made the Srd and 4th
squadrons hand over their chargers to the Ist and !:2nd. The
1,100 troopers thus left without mounts were armed with
muskets, and formed into a column, to which were added the
cadres of certain infantry battalions belonging to the regiments
which had suflj~red most. In these the Srd, or the 3rd and 4th,
battalions turned over their effective rallk and file to the others,
while the officers and non-commissioned officers were to be sent
home to their depOts to organize new units.. The whole body
was placed under ~neralQuesncl, who was directed to cut his way
to Astorga by the great high-road: it WM hoped that he would
come safely through, now that La Romana had withdrawn his
army to Southern Galicia. The expedient was a hazardous
one; but the column was fortunate: it was forced to fight
with ll. large assembly of P.CflSllnts nt Doncos, halfway between
~ugo and Villafmnca, but reached its goal with no great loss,
though for every mile of the march it was being' sniped' and
harassed by the guerrillas.
Soult's available force, after he had. sent his sick into the
hospitals of Lugo, and had. dismissed Quesnel's detachment, was
about 16,500 or 17,000 sabres and bayonets. Ney had about
15,000 men left. The two marshals were bound, both by the
Emperor's orders and by the mere net:essities of the situatioll, to
co-operate with ea.ch. other. But there was a fundamental diver~
gence between their aims and intentions. Ney had been given
charge of Galicia, and he regarded it M his duty to conquer and.
hold down the proyinee. He refused to look beyond his orders,
or to take into consideration the progress of operations in other
parts of the Peninsula. SouIt, on the other hand, always loved
to play his own game, and had. rro desire to stay in Gnlicin. in
order to lighten his colleague's task. ::He was disgusted with
the laud, its mountains, and its insurgents, and was eSf,"Cr to
find some excWlC for quitting it. He had no difficulty in discover-
ing many excellent reasons for retiring into the plains of. Loon.
The first WM the dilapidated state of his troops: in spite of the
resources which Ney had lent, the 2nd.Corps still lacked cloth·
ing, pay, and transport. Soult had written to King Joseph on
~lay 50 to ask that all these necessaries might be sent forward
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to Zamom., where he intended to pick them up. A still more
plausible plea might be found in the general state of affairs in
Northern Spain. 'TIle Emperor's main object was the expulsion
of the British army from the Peninsula. But if the 2nd Corps
joined the 6th in a long, and probably fruitless, hunt after the
eVll,Sive La Romnllu, "Vcllesley would be left free to mareh
whithersoever he might please. He might base himself 011
Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and make a sudden inroad into
Leon and Old Castile, where the small corps of Mortier would
certainly prove inadequate to hold him back. Or he might go
off to the south, and fall upon Victor in Estremadura, a mo"e
which might very probably lead to the loss of Madrid. Son]t
therefore Wll,S of opinion that his duty was to drop down into
Loon, and there join with Mortier in making such a demonstra-
tion against Portllgal as would compel the British army to
stand upon the defensive, and to abandon any idea of illvadi~g
Spain either by the valley· of the Douro or that of the Tagus.
I He could not keep his eye off Portugal,' as Jourdan and King
Joseph, no less than Ney, kept complaining 1. There cannot
be the least doubt that Soult was quite right in turning his
main attention in this direction. It was the English army that
was the most dangerous enemy; and it was the flanking position
of Portugal that rendered the French movements toward the
south of Spain hazardous or impracticable.
Nevertheless all the Duke of Da.lma.tia's arguments seemed to
his colleague mere excuses destined to cover a. selfish determina-
. tion to abandon the 6th Corps, and to shirk the duty of
co-operating in the conquest of Galicia. He insisted that Soult
must aid him in crushing La Romana before taking any other
task in hand.. And he had a strong moral claim for pressing
his request, because i~ was from the resources which he had
fllrnished that the 2nd Corps had been re-equipped and rendered
capablc of renewed service in the field. 'TIle marshals wrangled,
and their followcril copied them, for a fierce feud, leading to i\.
copious exchange of recrimination and many duels, sprang up
during the few days that the staffs of the two corps lay together
at Lugo 2. At last Soult yielded, or feigned to yield, to Ney's
I The phrase occurs in 1I disll<'1tcb of Jourdnn's written in August.
~ There is clear evidence of this quarrcl in the diaries and memoirs
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instances: he promised to lend his aid for the suppression of the
Galiciall insurrection under certain conditions. A plan for
combined action was accordingly drawn up.
Accordillg to this scheme Ney was to advance from Corunna
to Santiago with the 6th Corps, and was la drive the main OOdy
of the insurgents southward in the direction of Vigo and Tuy.
following the line of the great coast-road. Soult meanwhile
was to operate in the inland, against the enemy's exposed flank.
He W/lS to march f!'Olll Lugo down the vllJley of the upper
i\finho, pushing before him all that stood ill his way. with the
object of thmsting the enemy 011 to Orense, and then towards
the sea. If all went right, La Romuna's ftrmy as well as the
insurgents of the coast, would finally be enclosed between the
two marshals and the Atlantic cliffs, and, as it was hoped., would
be exterminated 01' fOl'ced to sUlTender, The obviously weak
point of thc plan was that it did not allow sufficiently for the
power whieh the eneUl)' possessed of escaping, by dispersiOII, or
by taking to the mountains, Eyen if the details of the two
movements had been carried out with perfect accuracy, it is
pl'obable that the Galicians would han crept out of some gap,
of the officers of both oorps, 'Nons fUmes d'abord hien ~s i Lugo '-
writes ~oult's aide-de-camp St. Chama'nS-' mais le Mareehal Ney I'!tant
arrive, les choses ehangerent de (ace, et on eut dit que nollS n'etions 'Plus
un oorps frano:;ais: tout nous etait refuse: meme nos malades mouraient
ell fonle dans les hdpitanx, faute d'aliments; car tout etait reserve, par
les or,lrcs de Ne)', pour son corps d'armee, et 011 pent hien dire qu'oll
nOlls traita de Ture en Manre' (p. ltiO). Des Odo.lrlls is equally precise:
'Vne tacheuse mesintelligeIlCC a lfclntc entre lea troupes de Ney et les
notrea: les duels sont snr\'enus, et peu s'en est fallu qu'oubliant que nons
sommesJ les uns et les autres, enfants de la France, il n'y ait eu engage-
ment general. Le DOn-SUCCes de Dotre entreprise, l'etat de delahrement
de notre tenne, ont servi de texte aux mauvaiscs plaisanteries, aux propos
outrageants, dont des scenes sanguinaires out lite la suite. Les soldata
seuls ont d'abord pris part it ces ri"es, puis eUes ont gngne les officiers;
et s'il faut croi~ certain bruita, les marlfchaux out Cll CU"-IllClnCS une
entrevue fort orageu.se' h). 240), Aeconliug to tllC common report tJlis
'srenny inten'iew' actually ended in Nor's drawing hill sword upon Soult, .
mid being ouly prevented by General Manrk-e Mathien from assailing
11im, This tale was toW re C'!l{nill Boothby (see Jli8 Mef1lQir" ii. p. 31)
Ily 11. .Frcnch officer who saill that lie had becu an eye-wituess of the
6Cene,
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or slipped a.way between the converging corps, or sa\'ed them-
selves by a headlong retreat into PortugaL The Marshals might
have captured Vigo and Ocense: it is e.xtremcly unlikely that
they could'have done' more, especially as they had to deal with
a general like La nomana, who had made up his mind that his
duty '.I'M to avoid pitched battles, and to preserve his amiyat
all costs, If Cuesta or Blake had been in command the scheme
would have been much more feasible; but La Uomana was the
only Spanish commander thcn ·in the field who had resolved
never to fight if he could help it.
On June 1 Neyand Soult parted, starting the one upon the
road'to Corulllln, the other upon that which makes for Oreuse
by the valley of the upper l\1inho. It would seem that neither
of them had any great confidence in the success of the plan
adopted, and that each was possessed by the strongest doubts
as to the 10)'l.Ilty with whidl his colleague would support him 1.
Soult was on the watch for any good excuse for throwing up the
scheme and retiring to Zamora. Ney was determined not to
risk himself and his corps overmuch, lest he should find himselC
lcft in the lurch by Soult at the critical moment 1.
Meanwhile the Spaniards had been straining every nerve to
reorganize the army of Galicia, employing the short time oC
respite that they had gained in drafting back into the old corps
, the numerous stragglers who began to retw'n to their colours as
the sUlIlmcr drew on, and in raising new battalions of volunteers.
La Romana lay in person at Orense with the main body of the
original army, which had now risen to a force of about 7,000
properly equipped men, and nearly 8,000 unarmed recruits: he
had still only four guns 2. 'l1.e' Division of the Minho' was
no longer under Carrera and }\forillo: they 1100 been superseded
by the arrival of the Conde de Noroi'ia to whom the Central Junta
had given over the command. This officer found himself at the
I 'Jl se .s€par& de Ney, avec lequel il eut l'air d'arreter, pour la
eonsen'ation de la Galiee, un plan de campagne auquel toU8 les deux
etaient, je crois, risolus d'avance de lie pas 66 conformer, car ils voulaient
le llIoins possible se trouver ensemble.' tit. Clia.maus Cp, 151), 111is repre-
sents the view of 8ou1t's staff.
S La Romana (JW16 1, in tbe Uecord Office) gives pre...«ent at Orcuse
9,633 men-of whom 7,004 were old soldiers, including 381 clwalryand
37!) artillery.
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head ofabout10,000 men, of whom onlyabout ~500were regulars,
'the rest were peasantry new to the career of anns, but so much
exhilarated by their late successes at Vigo and the Campo de
Estrella, that it wa.~ hard to hold them back from taking the
offensive I. .Fortunately Norofia was gifted not only with tact
hut with ,caution : he knew how to keep the horde together
without allowing them to get Qut of hand, tl.nd utterly refused
to risk them in the open field z.
On June 5 Ney arrived before Santiago with the main body
of the 6th Corps-eighteen battalions, three cavalry regiments
and two batteries: he had again left Contnun, FerroI. and
Lugo ill the charb'C of very small garrisons, and was by no
means without misgivings as to their fate during his absence.
But he thought that his first duty was to concentrate a field
force sufficiently large to fnee and beat the whole army of
Galicia, in case La. Romll.nll. should join Noroua for a combined
Ilttuck on the 6th Corps.
On the news of the Marshal's approach the Spanish general
drew biwk all his force!! behind the estuary known as the
Octavem (or Oitaben), a. broad tidal stretch of water where
several small mouutain to.rrents mcct at the head of a long bay.
Noroila might have disputed the lines of the Ulla and the Vedra,
but neither of these rivers affords such a good defensive position
as the Oitabeu. Here the hills of the interior come down much
nearer to the sea than they do at the mouths of the Ulla and
the Vedru, so that there is a much shorter line to defend, between
Iow-water mark and .the foot of the inaccessible Sierra de Suido.
There was no road inland by which the position could be turned,
so that the Galicians had only to guard the six miles of rh'er~
bank between the sea and the mountain. There were two
bridges to be watched: the more important was that of Sampayo,
where the main cha~9M to Vigo passes the Oitaben just where
it narrows down and ceases to be tidal. The second was that
of CaIdelas, four miles further inland, where a side-road to the
village of Sotoma)'or crosses the Verdugo, the most northem of
the three torrents which unite to form the Oitaben. Noroi'ia
had broken down· four archcs of the great Sumpayo bridge.
I Carrol to Castlereugh, from Vigo, ,June 11.
t For some notes concerning Norofio.'s character liCe Artc<:he, vi, 188.
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That of Caldclns he had not destroyed, but had barricaded: he
had drawn a double line of trenches on the hillside that domi.
nates it, and placed there a battery containing some of his small
provisiop of. artillery-he had but niJle fielq-gulls and two
mortars taken from the walls of Vigo. Morillo was given charge
of this part of the position, ~orona took post himself at
Sampayo. He had neglected no minor precaution that was
possible-some gunboats, onc of which was manned by English
sailors drawn from the two frigate<> in the bay, patrolled the tidal
part of the Oitaben, and flanked the broken bridge. Winter, the
senior navol officer present, put his marines on shore: along witb
sixty stragglers from Moore's army. who had been liberated by the
peasants from F'rench captivity, they garrisoned Vigo, which lies
a few miles beyond the Oitaben.
On June 1 Ney reached the front of the position and ascer-
tained that the bridge of Sampayo was broken. His artillery
exchanged some objectless salvos with that of Norolia, while
his cavalry rode inland· to look for possible points of passage.
They could find none save the fortified bridge of Caldelas, and
a very difficult ford just above it, commanded, like the bridge,
by the Spanish trenches on the hillside. The Marshal was also
informed that at the Sampayo itself there was another ford,
passable only at low tide for three hours at a time.
These reports were by no means encouraging: the Spanish
position was almost impregnable, and there was no way of
turning it. Indeed the only road by which the enemy could be
taken in flank or rear was that from Oreme to Vigo, along the
Minho. This Ne)' could not reach: but supposing that Soult had
Cilrried out the plan of operations to which he had assented on
June 1, it was just possible that he might appear, SOOller or
later, On that line, and so dislodge the enemy. However it was
equally possible that he might be still far distant, and so Ney
. resolved to make an attempt to force the passage of the Oitaben.
On the morning of June 8 therefore, after a long but fruitless
cannonade, one body of infantry endeavoured to pass at the ford
opposite the village ofSampayo 1,while another,with some cavalry,
1 CarroI, writing from Vigo two llays later, EarS that the French
infantry' sccmed determined at allY ri~k to cross the water at low tide,' t1iat
they came on very boldly, but could not face tiLe fire, amI finally gave hack.
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attempted to cross the other ford at Caldelas, and to storin its
bridge. At both places the Galicians stood their ground, and
the heads of the column were exposed to such a furious fire
that they suffcred hcuvily and failed to reach the further bank.
The Marshal therefore drew them back, and refused to persist
in an attack which would only have had a chance of success if
the enemy had misbehaved and gh'en way to ptUlic. The
Frcnch lost sc,'eral hundred men 1, the Gnlicians, safe in their
trenches, suffered far less.
That evening Ney received news which convinced him that
Soult had left him in the llll'Ch, and had no intention of
prosecuting his march ,on Oreme, to turn the enemy's flank. It
was reported that the 2nd Corps, after making only two days'
march from Lugo, had stopped short at Monforle de Lemos, and
showed no signs of moving forward. Indeed the Duke of
Dalmatia had put the regimcnts into cantonments and was
evidently ,about to make a lengthy halt.
Since the Duke of Elchingen was now convinced that the
enemy could not be dislodged from behind tlle Oitaben without
his colleague's ai.cl, and since that colleague showed no signs of
appearing within any reasonable time, the game was up. On
the morning of the ninth Ney gave orders for his troops to
draw off, and to retire by the road to Santiago and Corunna.
He made no secret of his belief that Soult had deliberately
betrayed him, and had never intended to keep his promise 2.
Without the aid of ,the !tnd Gorps he had no 'hopes of being
able to suppress the Galicinn insurrection. But till he should
learn precisely what his colleague was doing, he could not make
up his mind to abandon the province. He therefore sent off on
June 10 an aide-de-camp with a large escort, by the circuitous
route via Lugo. This officer bore a dispatch, which explained
the situatioll, reported the check at Sampayo, and demanded
1 Carrol, in the letter just quoted, sa)"s that thirty-uine dead bodies
were left. before the bridge-head of Caldelas, which the Frendl could
not carry off because of t11e hot fire tllat played upon -the spot. He
estimates the French mtallo6S at 300, w]lile tllat of Noroiia was (Iuly 111,
t < I have heen assured,' says Naliier (ii. 127), 'by an officer of NEly's
personal staff [Col. D'Esmenard] that he rashly concluded that personal
feelings !lad swayed Soult 10 betray the 6th Corps. In this error he
returned in wratl. 10 Corunna.' But was his conclusion rasll, or Wr(,lUg?
\398 THE FRENCH ABANDON GALICIA ['0., 11
that' th~ 2nd Corps should not "move any further away, but
should' return to lend aid to the 6th in its time of need. It
was more than ten days before an answer was received. But on
the twenty-first Soult's reply cwne to hand: he had been found
marching, not towards Orens~, but eastward, in the direction of
the frpntiers of Leon. He refused to turn back, alleging that
this was not in the bond signed at Lugo, and that his troops
were in such a stale of exhaustion that he was forced to lead
them into the plains, to rest them and refit them. Such a reply
seemed to justify Ney's worst suspicions; abandoned by his coi·
league, and with the care of the whole of Galicia thrown upo.1l
his hands, he refused to risk the safety of the 6th Corps in the
unequal struggle. He evacuated Corunna and Ferrol on the
twenty-second and concentrated his whole force at Lugo. There
he picked up the sick and wounded of Soult's corps as well as
his own, and in six forced marches retired along the high-road
by VillafrallCll. to Astorga, which place he reached on June 30.
Every day he had been worried and molested by the local
guerrillas, but neither Norona nor La Uomana had dared to
meddle with him, In his anger at the constant attacks of the
insurgents, he sacked every place that he passed, from Villafranca
and Ponferrada down to the smallest hamlets. Twenty-seven
Galician towns and villages are said to have been bumed by
the 6th Corps during its retreat. Such conduct WIlS unworthy
of a soldier of Ney's calibre: it can only be e.xplained by the
fact that he was almost beside himself with wrath at being
foiled by Soult's breach of his plighted word, and vented his
fury on the only victims that he could reach.
'Ve must now turri back to trace the steps of the 2nd Corps
in its devious march from Logo to the plains of Leon. Soult
had sent out Loisoll with onc division by the road down the left
bank of the Millho on June 1. He 1umsclf followed with the
rest of the army on the n~t day. On the third the Marshal
reached the little town of Monforte de I.emos, between the
Minho and the SiI, which he found deserted by its inhabitants,
In obedience to La Romann's orUers they had all gone up into
the mountains,
If Soult had been honestly desirous of carryil,lg out his
compact with Ne)', his next step would have been to make
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a rapid march on Orcnsc. He must ha.ve been able to calculate
that his colleague would now be in touch with Norona.'s forces
somewhere to the south of Corunna, and it was his duty to
co-operate by descending the :Minho in the enemy's rear. The
mere fact that he remained for the unconscionable space of eight
days at Monforte, is a sufficient proof that he never intended to
carry out his part of the compact. During this time [June 3-
111 while Ney was fighting out to an unsuccessful end his
campaign against ~oroiia, Soult was absolutely qUies<.'Cllt, at
. a place only thirty miles from his starting-point at Lugo. He
w.as unmolested save by small bands of local guerrillas, who fled
to the hills whenevllr they were faced. His official chronicler
Le Noble pleads that there were no fordS to be found either over
the Minho or over the Sill, But in eight days, unopposed by
any serious enemy, the engipeers of the ~nd Corps could certainly
have built bridges if the Marshal had ordered them to do so.
Meanwhile the troops rested, and rejoiced in the abundant
supplies of food and wine which they gathered in from the .
neighbourhood, for Monforte lies in the centre of a fertile
upland and its neighbourhood had never before suffered from
the ills of war 2,
On the eleventh Soult at last moved on. Dut it was not in
the direction of Orcnse. He lu\d no news of Ncy, and professed
to be concerned that the 6th Corps had not yet been hcard of
on the Orense road. Finally he announced that hc was corn·
pelled to believe that the Duke of Elchingen had not executed
his part of the joint campaign 3, and that there was no longer
any reason that the ~nd Corps should carry out its share 'of the
plan. Accordingly he marched, not toward Ney, but in the
opposite direction, up the valley of the Sil, with his face set
towards the east. He pretended that he hoped to catch and
disperse the corps of La Romans, to whom he attributed a design
of marching on Puebla de Senabria-the same movement that
the Marquis had executed once before in the first days of March.
Dut as a matter of fact La Uomana was at Orense, and far from
1 Le NoMa, 1'- 280.
~ FUlitin des Odoards, p. 242.
, (l.e Marichal crut, OU feifl'lit de croiTll, que Ney avait change d'idee,'
says bisuill6-d.e-camp St. Chamans, p. llil.
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having any intention of retreating ea.~tward, if he were attacked
by the flnd Corps, he WM looking on Portugnl as his line of
retreat 1.
On the thirteenth Sault reached Montefurado, where the Sit
is bridged by masses of rocks which ha\'c 'fallen into its bed:
the river forces its way beneath them by a tunnel sixty feet
broad, which is supposed to have been cut by the Romans.
Crossing on this natural bridge, he turned southward to follow
the valley of the Bibey, which leads to Puebla de Senabria and
the plains of Leon. I-le met no resistance save from the local
insurgents, headed by the Abbot of Cnsoyo and a partiSllll
called El Salamanquino, who received little or no aid from the
regular army_ Indeed the only Spanish troops in this remote
.corner of Galieia were flOO men under an officer called Eche·
vama, a depOt left behind at Puebla pe Senabria by La Carrera,
when he had marched to Vigo in May. 'l'his handful of men
joined the local guerrillas. and the appco.rallce of their uniforms
among the enemy's ranks served Soult as an excuse for stating
that he was contending with the army of La ROillana, Any
reader of· his dispatches would conclude that during the last
days of June he was opposed by a considerable body of that
force. As a matter of fact he was never anywhere near the
Galician army, which la)' first at Orcnsc, then at Celanovll,
finally at Monterey on the Portuguese frontier, always moving
to the right, parallel with the 1I-Iarshal's advance, so as to avoid
being outAanked on its southern wing. It was with the
peasants of the valley of the llibey nlone that Soult had to do.
Thrusting them t.o right and left, and cruelly ravaging the
country-side on both banks of the river, he reached Viana on
June 16. From thence Franceschi sent a flying expedition over
the hills to 'La. Gudina, 011 the road from l\fonterey to PlIebla de
Senabria.. It brought back news that La Romana had come
down to Montercy when the ~nd Corps moved to Viana, but
that he was evidently not marching eastward. It had met and
I La. Romall3 writes to Carrol from Orense, on June 9, to say that he
had been intending to march by cross-roads to fall on Ney's .flank, and so
aid the division of Norofia. Dut Smut's appearance at l\fonforte with
12,000 men [an uuder-estiUliiw} oowpels him to remain behind to obsen'e
thllt marshal [Rword Office}.
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routed a party of Spanish cavalry sent out from l\.Ionterey 1; the
prisoners taken from them said that the Marquis was returning
to Orense now that he had seen the ~nd Corps committing itself
to an advance up the valley of the Bibey, and passing away in
the direction of the plains of Leon.
It was while halting at Larouco,. during this march, that
Soult received the dispatch which Ney had v_ritten to him from
Santiago on June 10. His reply, as we have already seen, was
a peremptory refusal to turn lm:k to the aid of the 6th Corps.
He asserted that he had fulfilled his part of the bargain made
at Lugo (which he assuredly had not), and refused to undertake
any further offensive operations v';th troops in a state of utter
destitution and fatigue. He declared to his staff, and 'wrote to
King Joseph, that he believed that Ney had deliberately mis·
managed his expedition against Vigo, and had suffered himself
to be checked, in order to have an excuse for detaining the
2nd Corps in Galicia 2. Why, he asked, had not the Duke of
Elchingen sent a turning column against Orense, instead of
making a frontal attack against the line of the Oitaben? The
plain answer to this query-viz. that Ney with a field~forcc of
only 10,000 men, and having three )'leak garrisons behind him,
could not afford either to divide his army. or to go too far from
Conmna and Lugo--he naturally did not give.
Accordingly, on June 23, Soult abandoned the valley of the
Bibey, and crossed the watershed of the Sierra Segundera in
two columns, one descending on to La Gudina, the other on to
1 Carrol WAS with l1lis party, He had come out from Vigo to join
La lWmllna, WlI.'l at La Guuinll 011 JUlle 16, and retreated to Monterey
wllen FraocesclLi attnckCll t1mt point. TIle Marquis tunled back when
he saw Franceschi mo\'c off custwanl, and retired to his old 'If'd quartel'!l
at,Orouse. 1f Soult had pushed westward, the Spaniards haa the choice
bctween the road to Chaves aud that back to Crense, alld were in no
danger.
'i 'n (Ney) m'engageait a rester en Galioo, et me ropresentait qu'il
pourrait lllsulter pour lui de Iacheuses consequences si fell sortais.
Cette proposition m'etonuo.: it me parut que M. le Marechal Nor se
couduisait a m'obliger a re!lter en Calice: car certainement rien ne
l'empechait de manoouvrer sur Oreuse, tandis que moi-meme j'agissais
cantre La Romana...• Je me crus enoore plus oblige qu'auparavant
de liUivre mon premier projet.' Soult to Josepb, June 26.
OMAN. IJ D d
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Lohian. On th~ twenty-fourth aud twenty-fifth the whole army
was united at Puebla de Senabria. The town was taken with-
out a shot being fired; and the French found there several
cannon which La Carrera had not carried oft' when he marched
to Vigo, and which Echemrria had spiked but neglected to
destroy. The corps. rested for five days in Pllchla de Senabritt,
where it obtained abundance of food and comfortable lodging.
But Franceschi and his light-horse, now reduced to not more
than 700 subres, were pushed on at once to Zamora, to bear
news to King Joseph of the approach of the ftnd Corps, and to
beg that the stores, money, artillery, and clothing, which Sotut
had demanded in his letter from Lugo, might be forwarded to him
as soon as possible 1. Although the authorities at Madrid had
heard nothing of the doings of the Marshal since June 1, they
had already prepared much of the material required, and sent it
to Salamanca. From thence it was now transferred to Zamora
and Denavenw, where it was handed over to the war-worn
ftnd Corps. Other stores were procured from Valladolid and
·even from Bayonne. But the artillery, the most important of
.all the necessaries, was long in coming.
Soult's main body had broken up from PuebJu de Scnabria on
June 29: from thence Mermet's, Delaborde's, and Lorges'troops
marched to Benavente, and those of Merle and Heudelet to
Zamora. In these places they enjoyed a few da)·g of rest and
began to refit themselves. But it was not long before they were
called upon to take part in another great campaign, and once
more to face their old enemies the English.
1 On reaching Zamora, Frauceschi hauded over the charge of his
division to General Pierre Soult, the Marshal's brother, and rode on
towards Madrid with no escort but two aides-de-eamp. They were
captured near Toro by the celebrated guerrilla chief El Capuchino (l<"ray
Juan Delica), who sent the important dispat.ch09 which they were bearing
to Seville; Frora instantl)' forwarded a cop)' to Welles.ley (July 9), who
thus got illvllluable information lIS to Soult's situation and future
intentions. 1n the Record Office there 1lI a letter requesting that the
news of ji'ranceschi's captivity may be sent to his wife in Paris, which was
duly done. The unfortunate general was imprisoned first at Granada
and then at Cartagena: in both placeg,' it is said, he wag treated with
unjulJtifiable rigour, and kept in close confinement within four walls-
it was the same usage that Napoleon meted out to Palafox. He died of
a fever in 1811, after two years' captivity.
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The first care of the Duke of Dalmatia., after he had cmerb'ed
from the Galician Sierras, had been to write long justificatory
dispatches to the Emperor and King Joseph. They are most
interesting documents, and explain with perfect clearness his
reasons for abandoning Ne)' and returning to the valley of the
Douro. His main thesis is that it was his duty to keep the
English in check, since they were the one really dangerous
enemy in the Peninsula. Since it was notorious that 'Vellesley
had quitted Northern Portugal, it was practically certain that he
must be intending to march southward, to fall upon Victor, and
strike El. blow at Madrid. It was necessary, therefore, that the
2nd Corps should follow him, and be ready to aid in the defence
of the capital. The safety of Madrid was far more important
than the subjection of Galicia, and the Marshal had no hesitation
in sacrificing the lesser object in order to secure the greater.
Ney, he thought, would be strong enough to make head against
Norona and La Romana united: but he could not hope to hold
down the whole of Galicia, and he would have either to be
reinforced, or to be permitted to evacuate the province.
As to the conquest of Galicia, it would take many men and
many months, At present i,t wonld be impossible to find the
forces necessary for its complete subjection. '111is could only
be done by fortifying not merely Corunna, Ferrol, and Lugo,
but also Tuy, Monterey, Viantl, and Pueblu. de Senabria. Each
of these places should be given a garrison of 5,000 or 6,000 men,
and furnished with stores calculated to last for four months.
In addition there would have to be blockhouses built along the
high-road from Lugo to Villafrancn, and on several other lines.
Colwnns operating from each of the sevcn great garrisons should
be continually moving about, keeping open the commWlication
between stronghold and stronghold, and chastising the insur-
gents. .
Thus Soult calculated that the subjection of Galicia would
require from 35,000 to 42,000 men, continually on the move,
and ncver liable to be called upon for any service outside the
province. It was absurd, therefore, for him to suggest in a later
paragraph that Ne)' might be left to hold his own. What was
the use of setting 15,000 men to work on a task that would
strain the energies of 85,000? And where was King Joseph
Dd'
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to flnd the additional 20,000 men, if the 2nd Corps were with-
drawn into Leon to watch the British army? No such foft'e
could be drawn from any other part of Spain, and it would be
useless to ask for reinforcements from France while the Austrian
'Vat was calling every available man to the Danube. Soult's
view, clearly, was that Galicia would have to be abandoned for
the present, though he did not choose to suy so. Till the
English had been destroyed, or driven into the sea, King Joseph
would never be able to find 35,000 men to lock up in the remote
and mountainoWl north-western corner of the Peninsula 1.
There is not the slightest doubt that Soult's views were
perfect!y correct. Looking at -the war in the Peninsula as
a whole, it was a strategical blunder to endeavour to hold
Galicia before Portugal had been conquered. And while the
force of the French armies in Spain remained at its present
figure, it was impossible to spare two whole army corps for this
secondary theatre of operations. The attempt to subdue the
province had only been made because Moore had drawn after
him to Corunna the armies of Soult and Ncy: and, since they
were on the spot, the temptation to use them there was too
great to be withstood. This is hut one more instance of the
way in which the famous march to Sahagun "had disarranged all
the Emperor's orib,jnal plans for tbe conquest of the Peninsula.
It has often been debated whether it would be truer to say
that Galicia was delivered by Wellesle)"s operations or by the
...·alour and obstinacy of its own inhabitants. After giving all
due credit to the gallant peasnntry who checked Ney and
harassed Soul!, to the prudence of the untiring La. Romana,
and to Noroi'ia's cautious coul'l1orre, it is yet necessary to decide
that the real cause of the evacuation of the provinoo by the
invaders was the presence of the victOrious British army in
Portugal. The two Marshals might have maintained themselves
there for an indefinite time, if they could have shut their eyes to
l There is so much valuable information in these dispatches of SouIt,
dated June 25, from Puebla de SCllabria, tllat I ha.ve Ilrinted the most
important pnmgmphs lIS an Appcndix-omitting thc length)' uarm.tivc of
the operations on the Si! n.nd the Bibey in which the Marshal vainly
flattered himself that he had dispersed tho armiel of La Roma.ull. and
f Chavarria' (i. c. Echevarria).
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what W!lS going on elsewhere. But Soult W!lS quite right in
believing that it would be mad to persist in the attempt
to subdue Galicin, while Welleslcy was in the 6eld, and nothing
la}' between him and l\{adrid but the ~~,OOOmen of the 1st Corps.
If he and Ney had lingered on in the north, engaeaed in fruitless
hunting after La Romnnn, while July and August wore on,
Madrid would have fallen into the hands ofWellesley and Cuest&,
and King Joseph would once more have been forced to go upon
hi~ travels, to Burgos or elsewhere. The Talavera campaign
only failed of success because the ~lld and the 6th Corps were
withdrawn from the Galician hills just in time to <.'(lncentratc nt
Salamanca and fall upon the rear of the victors. If they had
been wandering around Monterey or Mondonedo at the end of
July, instead of being cantonoo in the plains of Leon, the capital.
of Spain would undoubtedl)' have been recovered by \Vellesley
and (,'uesta-though whether those ill-assorted colleagues could
have held it for long is another question. Into such possibilities
it is useless to make inquiry.
N.R-My best authority for this campaign is the set of dispatches by
Carrol iD the Record Office. He was at Vigo from June 3 to June i4;
with La l{omana from June 16 to July 11. Thus he was on the spot
for the 6ght on the Oitabell, and also for the operatious agaiost Soult.
Napier's narrative is more than usuaUy faulty in dealing with the end
of the Galician campaign. He writes as a partisan of Soult, Bnd his whole
tale is drawn from the .Marshal's dispatches and from the book of tlle
panegyrist, Le Noble. His whole picture of the desperate condition of
La RomaDa is untrue: the Marquis had always open to him a safe retreat
illto Portugal, and his army was never engaged with Soult at all. Carrol's
dispatches make this quite clear. The map (facing p. J25 of vo1. ii.)
is I;() hopelelisly inaccurate both 'as to distances, and as to the relative
positions of lllaces to each other, that I can only compare it to those
ingenious t1iagr<llTlS Wlliell a railway produces, in order to show that it
posse8Sell the shortest route from London to Edinburgh, or from Brl1ssem
to Berlin.
SECTION XV: CHAPTER III
OPERATIONS IN ARAGON: ALCANIZ AJ.'ID BELCHlTE
(MARCH-JUKE ]8(9)
WHEN, upon February 20, the plague.stricken remnant of the
much-enduring garrison of Saragossa laid down their firms at
the feel; of Lauues, it seemed probable that the whole of ~Olth­
Eastern Spain must full a helpless prey to the invader. The time
had come when the :'kd snd the 5th Corps, freed from the long
strain of the siege, were once more available for field-operotiolls.
For the last two months almost every dispatch that the Emperor
or King Joseph "Tot~ had been tilled with plans and projects
that began with the words' When Saragossa shall have fallen.'
]f only Palafox and his desperate bands were removed, it would
be easy to trample down Aragon, to take Catalonia in the rear,
and finally to march to the gates of Valencia, and end the
struggle on the eastern coast.
Now at last the 30,000 men of Mortier and Junot could be
turned to other tasks, and there seemed to be every reason to
expect that they would suflit.'C to carry out the Emperor's
designs. There was no army which could be opposed to them,
for, only a few days after the capitulation of Saragossa, Reding
had risked and lost the battle of Vails, and the wrecks of his
host ha? taken refuge within the walls of'Tarragona.
Thc only surviving Spanish force which was undcr arms in the
valley of the Ebl'o consisted of the single division, not more than
4,000 strong, under the :Marquis of Lazan. After his vain
attempt to come to the rescue of Saragossa in the early days of
l~ebruary, Lazan had drawn back to Fl1locra and Monzon, forced
to look on from afar at the last stage of hi!! brother's despemte
resistan<.-e. In the rest of the kingdom of Aragon there were
but two or three scattered battalions of new levies I, and some
guerrilla bands under }lerena and other chiefs.
1 See sect. lid. chap. i. pp. 101-2.
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The mistaken policy which had led Joscph Pll.lafox to'shut up
in Saragossa not only his own 8,nny but also the succours which
he had procured 'from Valencia and .Murcie., now bore it... n:uit.
There was no force left which could tnke the field against the
victorious army of Lanncs. It s('''emed therefore that the war in
Aragon must come to a speedy end: the French had but to
advance and the whole kingdom must fall into their hands. The
llational cause, howev"er, was not quite so desperate as might have.
been supposed. Here, as in other regions of Spain, it was ere
long to be discovered that it was one thing to destroy a Spanish
anny, and another to hold down a Spanish province. A l"rench
corps that was irresistible when concentrated 011 the field of
battle, became vulnerable when forced to divide itself into the
number of small garrisons that were needed for the permanent
retention of the territory that it had won. Though the capital
of Aragon and its chief towns were to remain in the hands of
the enemy for the next five yen.rs, yet there were always rugged
comers of the land where the struggle was kept up and thc
invuder baffled and held in check.
Yet immediately after the fall of Saragossa. it seemed for
a space that Aragon might settle down beneath the invader's
heel. !.alines, whose health was still bad, returned to France,
but Mortier and Junot, who now once more resumed that joint
responsibility that they had shared in December, wellt fortll
conquering and to conquer. They so divided their effort8 that
the 5th Corps operated for the most part to the north, and the
Srd Corps to the south of the Ebro, though occasionally their
lines of opemtions crosGed each other.
The kingdom of Aragoll <:onsists of three well-marked divi-
sions. On each side of the Ebro there is a wide and fertile plain,
generally some thirty miles broad. But to the north and the
south of this rich valley lie range on range of rugged hills.
Those on the north arc tile lower spurs of the Pyrenee.;; those.
to tile south form part of the great central ganglion of the
Sierras of Central Spain, which lie:; just where Aragun, Valencia,
and New Castile meet.
The valley of the Ebro gave the French little trouble: it was
not a region that could easily offer resistance, for it was destitute
of all natural defences. Moreover, the flower of its manhood
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had been enrolled in the battalions which had perished at Sara-
gossa, and few were left in the country-side who were capable
of bearing arms-still fewer who possessed them. The plain oC
Central Aragon lay exhausted at the victor's feet. It was other-
wise with the mountains of the north and the south, which
contain some of the most difficult ground in the whole of Spain.
There the rough and sturdy hill-folk found every opportunity
for resistance, and when once they had learnt by experience the
limitations of the invader's power, were able to keep up a petty
warfare without an end. Partisans like Villacampa in the
southern hills, and Mina in the Pyrenean valleys along the edge
of Nav~ succeeded in maintaining themselves against every
expedition that was sent against them. Always hunted, often
brought to bay, they yet were llever crushed or destroyed.
But in March 1809 the Aragonese had not yet recognized
their own opportunities: the disaster of Saragossa had struck
such a deep blow that apathy and despair seemed to have spread
over the greater part of the kingdom. \Vhen Mortier and
Junot, after giving their corps a short rest, began to spread
movable columns abroad, there was at first no resistance. The
inuccessible fortress of Jaca in the foot-hills of the Pyrenees
surrendered at the first summons; its garrison was only 500
strong, yet it should have made some sort of defence against
a force consisting of no more than a single regiment of Mortier's
corps, without artillery. [March 21 1.] The fall of this place
was important, as it commands the only pass in the Central
Pyrenees which is anything better than mule-track. Though
barely practicable for artillery or light vehicles, it was useful
for communication between Saragossa and France, and gave the
French army of A.raocron a line of communication of its own, inde-
pendent of the longandcireuitous route byTudelaandPruupelunn.
I Toreno gives .some curious details about the surrender of Jaca, which
he says was largely due to the intrigue!! of a friar named Jose de
Consolation, who preached resignation and submi08iou to GOIl'S ",ill in
such mo\'ing terms that tlle grc&tcr part of the garrisoIl de.sertetl! He
was aftcrwanls foulld to llave been tin ugCJJt of the French, The central
Junta sent the Governor Campus, the Gorregidor Arc6nJ and the offioo1'8
commanding the artillery and engmee1'8 before a court-martial, which
condemned them all to death, Only the engineer was caught (he had
openly joined the French) and shot. [ArtecheJ vi. p. 10.]
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Other columns of Morlier's corps marched a",nainst Monzon
und Fmga, the chief towns in the vnllcy of the Cinca. On their
approach the Marquis of Lazan retired down the Ebro to
'forloss, and both lowns were occupied without offering resislM
ruu:e. Another colullIll marched against Mequinenza, the fOltress
at the junction of the Ebro and Segre: here, however, they met
with opposition; the place was only protected by antiquated
sixteenth-century fortifications, but it twice refused to surrender,
though on the second occasion Mortier himself appeared before
its walls with a whole brigade. The Marshal did not besiege it,
deferring this task till he should have got all of ]~asternAragon
well in hand. At this same time he made an attempt to open
communications with St. Cyr in Catalonia, sending a regiment of
cavalry under Colonel Briche to strike across the mountains
beyond the Scgre in SCllrch of the 7th Corps. Briche executed
half his mission, for by great good fortune combined with very
rapid movement, he slipped between Lerida and Mequinenza,
got down into the coast-plain and met Chabot's division of
St. Cyr's army at Montblanch. \Vhen, however, he tried to
return to Aragon, in order to convey to the Duke of Treviso
the information us to the distribution of the 7th Corps, he was
beset by the somatelle8, who were now on the alert. So vigorously
was he assailed that he was forced to turn back and seek refuge
with Chabot. Thus Mortier gained none of the news that he
sought, and very naturally came to the conclusion that his
fiJing column had 'been captured or cut to pieces.
Meanwhile J unot and the Srd Corps were opera~ing south
of the Ebro. The Duke of Abrantes sent one of his three
divisions (that of Gmndjenn) against Caspe, Alcani7" and the
valleys of the Guadalope und Martin, while unother (that of
Musnier) moved out against the highlands of the south, and
the mountain-towns of Daroca and Molina. Most of the
battalions of his third division, that of MorIol, were still
engaged in guarding on their way to France the prisoners of
Samgossa.
Of the two expeditions which Junot sent out, that which
entered the mountains effected little. It lost several small
detachments, cut off by the local insurgents, and though it
ultimately penetrated as far as :Motinn, it was unable to hold
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the place. The whole population had fled, and after remaining
there only six days,. the French were forced to return to the
plains by want of food. [March 22--AprillO.] The Aragonese
at once came back to their former position.
Grandj"ean, who had mo\'ed against Alcafiiz, had at first more
favourabl~ fortune. He ovelTan with great ease all the low.lying
country south of the Ehro, and met with so little oppositioll
that he resolved to push his advancc even beyond the bordeN
of Valencia. Accordingly he ascended the valley of the
Bercantes, and appeared before l\lorella, the frontier town of
that kingdom, on March 18. The plw::c was strong, but there
was only a very small garrison in charge of it \ which retired
after a slight skirmish, abandoning the fortress and a large store
of food and equipment. If Grandjean could ha\'e held MoreUa,
he would have secured for the French army a splendid base for
further operations. But he had left many men behind him at
Caspe and Alcani7.., and had but a few battalions in hand. He
had gone too far forward to be safe, Ilnd when the Junta of
Valencia sent against him the whole of the forces that they
could collect-some 5,000 men under General Roca-be was
compelled to evacuate Morella and to fall back on AJcaniz.
[Mnreh 25.]
Mortier and J unot were concerting a joint movement for the
completion of the conquest of Eastern Aragon, and an advance
against Tortosa, when orders from Paris suddenly changed the.
whole face of affairs. The Emperor saw that wal' with Austria
was inevitable and imminent: disquieted as to the strength of the
new enemy, he resolved to draw troops from Spain to reinforce
the arm)' of the Danube. The only corps which seemed to him
available was that of Mortier, and on April 5 he ordered that the
Duke of Treviso should concentrate his troops and draw back to
Tudcla and Logroiio. It migilt still prove to be unnecessary to
remove the 5th Corps from the Peninsula; but at Logroiio it
would be within four marches of France if the Emperor dis-
covered that he had need of its services in the north. On the
same day Napoleon tcmovedJullot from his command, probably
I Only the single regiment, America, whose cadre, sent back br
Infantado from Cuenca, was being filled. up with recruits from the
Morolla district. [Junot to Kiug JOIleph, from SaragOllsa, March 25.].0
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on acconnt of the numerous complaints as·to his conduct sent
ill by King Joscph. To replace him General Suchct, the com~
mander of one of Mortier's divisions, was directed to take
charge of the Srd Corps 1. /
Ten days later the imperial mandate reached Saragossa, aud
on receiving it Mortier massed his troops and marched away to
Tudela. 'We have alread}' seen 2 that his corps was never with~
drawn from Spain, but merely moved from Arngon to Old
Castile. But its departure completely changt.'C1 the balance of
fortune on the Lower Ebro. The number of French troops in that
dil-eetion was suddenly reduced by one half, and the Srd Corps
had to ~pread itself out to the north, ill order to take over all
the positions evacuated by Mortier. It was far too weak for
the duty committed to its charge, and at this moment it had
not even received back the brigade sent to guard the Saragossa.
prisoners, which (it will be remembered) had been called off and
lent to Kellermann s. There were hardly 15,000 troops left in
the whole kingdom of Aragon, and these were dispersed in
small bodies, with the design of holding down as much ground
as possible. The single division of Grandjeau had to (:aver the
whole line from Barbastro to Alcailiz-plllces seventy miles
apart-with less than 5.000 bayonets. The second division,
Musnier's, with its head quarters at Saragossa, had to watch the
mountains of Upper Aragcm: Of the Srd division, that of
• Morlot, the few battalions that were available were garrisoning
Jaca and Tudela, on the borders of Navarre. 1\-0 SOOl)cr had
l\fOliier's corp;; departed, than a series of small reverses occurred.
the inevitable results of the attempt to hold down large districts
with an inadequate force, Junot, who was still retained in
colllllland till his smx:cssor should arrive, seemed to lack the
{.'Ourage to draw in his exposed detachments: probably his
heart was no longer in the business, since he was under sentence
of recall. Yet he had six weeks of work before him, for by.
some mischance the disp!~teh nominating Suchet to take his
place reached Sarugossa after that general had marched off at
the head of his old division of Mortier's corps. Cross-communi·
I See Joseph'sletter of April 6. and the Emperor's orders, from Paris.
of April 6 and April 10.
~ See p. 378. a Scc p. 378.
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cation being tardy and difficult, it failed to catch him up till he
had reached Valladolid. Returning from thence with a slow-
moving escort of infantry, Suchet did not succeed in joining his
corps till May 19. He found it in a desperate situation, for the
last four weeks had seen an almost unbroken series of petty
reverses, and it looked as if the whole of Aragon was about to
slip out of the hands of the French.. It Wl\S fortunate for the
Srd Corps that its new commander, though hitherto he had
never been placed in a positioll' of independent responsibility,
proved to be a man of courage and resource-perhaps indeed
the most capable of all the French generals who took part in
the Peninsular 'Var. A timid or unskilful leader might have
lost Arl\,O'()ll, and imperilled the hold of King Joseph on Madrid.
It is hardly an exnggemtion to say that the entire French
position in Spain would have been gravely compromised if
during the last weeks of May the 3rd Corpi!' had been under the
charge of a less skilful and self-reliant co)umander.
III the month that elapsed before Suchet's arrival the conse-
quences of the withdrawal of the 5th Corps from the Lower
Ebro were making themselves :felt.· The A'l"agonese were not
slow to discover the decrease ill the numbers of the invaders,
and to note the long distances that now intervened between
post and post. The partisans who had retired into Catalonia,
or had taken refuge in the monntains of the south and the
north, began to descend into the plains aIid to fall upon the
outlying French detachments. On May 6 Colonel Pcrena came
out of Lerida, and beset the detachment of Grandjean's di\;sion
which held the town and fortress of Monzon, with a horde of
peasants and some Catalan miquektu. The governor, Solnicki,
thereupon feU bMk to Barbn.stro, the head quarters of Habert's
brigade. That general considered that he was in duty bound
to retake l\fonwn, and marched against it with six battalions
and a regiment of cuirassien. He tried to cross the CinC8., not
opposite the town, but mnch lower down the stream, at the
ferry of Pomar. [Ma)' 16.] But just as his vanguard 1 had
I It oonsisted of eight CQfflpagniu d"~/ite, "iz. the oo/tigellr companies of
the 14th Line, and the 2nd of the Vistula, and the grenadier and voltigeur
c:ompanies of the 116th of the Line, with half a squadron of the 13th
CUirll88ier8. [Von Drandt, p. 62.]
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established itself on the other bank, a sudden storm caused such
a rising of the waters that its communication with the maiu
body was completely cut off. Thereupon Habert marched
northward, and tried to force a passage at Monzoll, so as to
secure a line of retreat for his lost detachment. The bridge of
that town however had been barricaded, and the castle garri·
soned: Habert was held at bay, and the 1,000 men who had
crossed at the ferry of Pomar were all cut off and forced to
surrender. After marching for three days among the insurgents,
and vainly endeavouring to force their way through the horde,
they had to lay down their arms when their cartridges had all
been exhausted. [~fay 19.] Only the cuirassicrs eScaped, by
swimming the river when the flood had begun to abate, and
found their way back to Barbastro.
In consequence of this disaster the French lost their grip all
the valley of the Cinea, for the insurgents, under Perl?na and
the Catalan chief Baget, moved forward into the Sierra de
Alcuberre and raised the whole country-side in their aid.
Haoort, fearing to be cut off from Saragossa, thereupon retired
to Villafranca on the Ebro, and abandoned all North-EflStern
Aragon 1.
Meanwhile the other brigade of Grandjean's division, .....hich
still lay at Alcaitiz, south of the Ebro, was also drh'en in by
the Spaniards. Its commander Laval was attacked by a large
force coming from Torlosa, and was forced to draw ba.ck to
San Per and Hijar [May 18-19]. At the news of his retreat
all the hill-country of Southent Aragon took arms, and the
bands from Molina and the other rnountain-cities extended.
their raids down the valley of the HuerJ;a and almost to the
gates of Saragossa.
The Spanish force which had seized Alcaiiiz was no mere
body of armed peasants, but a small regular army. General
I This little campaign can be studied in detail in Vou Bralldt, pp. 60-8.
He was serving as lieutenant ill the 2nd of tILe Vistuln., and gi"eE! many
rletails wbich are not to be found in Suchet or Artecho. Toreno would
seem (ii. 10) to be wrong in aa.ying that "aOOrt triQd to storm Monwll,
and got over Ule river there, but \\'lIS beaten back by &get. VOIl Brandt
MyS tbat there was nothir~ but a lLOt fire across tlle water, and tllat tbe
attack could not be pushed home.
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Blake had just been given the post of commander-in-chief of all
the forces of the Coronilla-the old kingdom of Aragon and its
dependencies, Valencia. and Catalonia. Burning to atone for
his defeats at Zornoza and Espinosa by some bl·iIlinllt fent of
arms, he was doing his best to collect a new 'Army of the
Uight.' From Catalonia he could draw little or nothing: the
troops which had fought undcr Booing at Vnlls were still cooped
up in Tarragona, and unfit for field-service. But Blake had
concentrated at Tortosa the division of the Marquis of Lazan-
thc solc surviving fraction of th~ old A.l'my of Aragon-and the
troops which he could draw from Valencia. These last consisted
at this moment of no more than the reorganized division of
Roca from the old' Army of the Centre.' Its depleted crib'ea
had been sent back by Infantado from Cuenca, and tbe Junta had
shot into them a mass ~f recruits, who in a few weeks had raised
the strength of the division from 1,500 to 5,000 bayonets.
Other regiments were being raised in Valencia, but in the early
weeks of May they were not yet ready for the field, though by
June they gave Dlake a reinforcement of nearly 12,000 men '.
Ml.'l1.
6,000
6,000
800
"'"800
4,000
11,881
Total 29,081
These figures are exclusive of canlry and artillery, and in BOrne cases
(1) To join the division of LlamflS in the' Army of the Centre'
(lttea·s later division), thirteen battalions, about .
(2) To join the divi,sion of O'Neille in Aragon, one regiment.
(3) To join the division of St. Mareh in Al'Rgon, nine
battalions . , .
(4) Joined Palafox at Saragossa between the date ef Tudela
and the commencement of the siege, one battalion
(5) Sent to Catalonia. in December, two battaliollll
(6) Raised to recruit Roca's division in January
(7) Raised to join Blake between April and June 1809
1 It is nece>;!;3l'y to enter (I. protest against N"pier's statement (vo1. H.
p. 252,), tl",t V"lellcill did not do ita fair share in defending the gencrol
cause of SpaiIl~that 'from the very commencement of the insurrection
ita poliey was characterized by a Sillgular indifference to the calamities
that overwhelmed the other parts of the country.' Tbe contribution uf
Valencia to the national armies raised ill 1008-0, compares well with that
of the other provinces. These troops, too, were not used for local defence,
bllt employed in other parts of Spain. Al'giielles' answer to Napier on
this point $Urns conclusive: (see the appendix-volume of his Ofmrm·
ciot/ea, &c.). TIle troops sent out by Valencia were:-
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Murein could provide in May only one single battalion for.
·Blake's assistance: all its field army had perished at Saragossa.
The total force of the new 'Army of the Uight' when it
ndval.leed against Alcaiiiz was less than 10,000 men-the ¥alen-
,dans in its ranks outnumbered the Aragonese by four to three.
When Suchet therefore arrived at Saragossa on May ]9, and
took over the command of the Srd Corps from the hands of"
Junot, the prospect seemed a gloomy one for the French.
Their outlying detachments had been forced back to the neigh-
bourhood of Saragossa: the centrnl reserve (MDsnier's two
brigades) was small: the third division (with -the exeeptioll of
onc regiment) was still absent-one of its brigades was with
Kellermann in Loon I, and some detachments were scattered
among the garrisons of Navarrc. After the sick and the absent
had been deducted, Suchet found that he hlld not much more
than 10,000 men under arms, though the nominal force of the
·Srd Corps was still about ~O,OOO sabres and bayonets. Nor
was it only in numbers that the Army of Aragon was weak; its
morale also left much to be desired. The ncwly-formed regimcnts
which composed, more than half of the infantry 2 were in a
.deplorab~e condition, a natural consequence of the haste with
which they had been organized and sent into the field. Having
been originally composed of companies drawn from many
quarters, they still showed a mixture of uniforms of different
cut and colour, which gave them a motlcy appearance and,
according to their commander, degraded them in their own
eyes and lowered their self-respect 3. They had not yet fully
recovered from the physical and moral strain of the siege of
Saragossa. Their pay was in arrear, thc military chest cmpty,
the food procured from day to day by marauding. There was
. much grumbling among the officers, who complained that the
Me ullder-estimated, Illl nO morning-states of the troops survil'e for the
earlier months of the carnpaigu of 1808, and these totals are taken from
returns made late in the year, when tile regiments had begun to ron low
in numbers. For the enormous monetary contribution made by Valencia
in llJ08..9, see the tables in Argilelles.
1 See p. 376.
t The 114th, ll/ith. 116th, llith, and 121st of the line were all formed
from the 'ProvLsional Regiments' of 1600,
• Suchefs Mlmoiru, i. p. 11.
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promotions and rewards due for the capture of Saragossa had
ahnost all been reserved for the 5th Corps. The guerrilla war·
fare of the last few weeks had disgusted the rank and file, who
thought that Junot had been mismanaging them, and knew
absolutely nothing of the successor who had just replaced him.
The whole corps, says Suchet, was dejected and discontented 1.
Nevertheless there was no time to rest or reorganize these sullen
battalions: the Spaniards were pressing in so close that it was
necessary to attack them at all costs: the only,other alternath'e
would have been to abandon Saragossa. Such a step, though
perhaps theoretically justifiable under the circumstances, would
have ruined Suchet's military career, and was far from his
thoughts. Only two days after he had assumed the command
of the corps, he marched out with Musnier's division to join
Laval's troops at Hijar. [May fl.1.] He had sent orders to
Habert to cross the Ebro and follow him as fast as he was able:
but that general, who was still on the march from Darhastro to
Villafranea, did not receive the dispatch in time, and failed to
join his chief before the oncoming battle 2.
I {Le 3IDe corps avait bc.'Iucoup souffcrt au sit!ge do Saragossc. L'iu-
fanterie lltait cousiMrablement affaiblie: les rigiments de Douvelle
formation surrout se trouvaient dall8 un etat deplorable, par les vices
inseparables d'une organisation recente et precipitee•..• Des habits
blanes bleus et de formes differentes, reetes choquanta de divers change-
menlll dans I'hahillement, oocasiollllaient dans lee rangs une bigarrure qui
achevait d'elllever a des soMata deja faibles et abattus toute idee de
consideration militaire. L'apparence de la misCre lee degradait a leuI'9
propres yeux .•• Daus un l!tat voisin dn dlf<:ouragement, cette anllee
etait loin de eompenser par sa force morule le danger de sa faibl0036
lIumcrique.' SlIchet, p. J6.
Von Brandt speaks te much the same effect, and says that some of the
troops gave a bad impression, and that he saw battalions which looked.
as if they would net stand firm against a sudden and fierce attack, 'such
as that wbich .Mina and his guerrillas used to deliver [po 61].
2 .fo'rODl a casual reading of Sncbet, i. 17-21, it might be thought that
the general had been joined by Habert before the battle. But he certainly
was not, as the Memoirs of Von Drandt, who was with Habert, show that
this brigade was at Villafranca, fort}' miles from Alcaliiz, on the twenty~
third, and only started (too late) to join ita chief on the twenty~fourtb.
The mcntion of the 2nd of tIlC Vistula on p. 21 of Suchet is a misprint for
the 3rd of the Vistula of MuslIier's division. Half the 13th Cuirassiol'8 was
algo absent with Habcrt.
1809) SUCHET ATTACKS BLAKE 417
On :May fc!3, however, Suchet, with Musnier's and Laval"s
men, presented himself in front of Dlake's position at Alcafiiz.
He had fpurtcen battalions and five squadrons with him-
a force in all of about 8,000 men, with .eighteen guns 1. He
found the Spaniards ready and willing to nght. They were
dl'iLWn up on a line of hills to the cast of Alca.fiiz, covering that
town and its bridge. Their position was good from a tactical
point of \;ew, but extremely dangerous when considered strate-
gically: for Blake had been tempted by the strong ground into
fighting with the river Guadalope at his back, and had 110 way
of crossing it save by the single bri~o-e of Alcaiiiz and a bad
ford. It was an exact reproduction of the deplorable order of
battle that the Russians had adopted at Friedland in 1807,
though not destined to lead to any such disaster. The northern
and highest o(the three hills occupied by the Spaniards, that
cnl.lcd the Ccrro de 108 Pucyos, was held by the Amgoncse troops.
On the central height, called the hill of Las Horcas, was placed
the whole of the Spanish artillery-nineteen guns-guarded by
three Valencian battalions: this part of the line was immedi~
ately in front of the bridge of Alcafli7., the sole line of retreat.
The southern and lowest hill, that of .Ln Perdigucra, was
he14 by Roca and the rest of the ValcllciallS, and flanked by the
small body ofcavalry-only 400 sabres-which Blake possessed~.
J According to Suchet's OWll figures from his May 15 return, the forces
engaged must have been :- •
l\Jusnier's Division: Laval's Brigade:
{
114th Lino (tlLreo batts.). 1,627 I14th Line (two batts.) , 1,080
llMh Line (three hatts,) , 1,732 3rd of the VistuIa (two
1st of the Vistula (two batts.),.. 9G4
batta,) . . • 1,039 Cavalry,4t11 Hussars 326
121st Line (one batt. onl)') 400 Half 13th Cnirasaiors 200
Detachment of the 64th Artillery 320
and 40th of the Line
[General's escort] 450
/),248 2,890
Total 8,138
1 The Spanish line-of-battle WllS as follows:-
Left wing, General Arei7.aga :
DlI.roen, Vohllltoers of Aragon, Tiradores de Doyle, Reserve
of Arngoll, ht Tiradores lie Murcia, Company of Tirmlores
de Car1:agCna-fivc and olle-sixth batts. 2,669
01l.u<. Il E e
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The whole army, not quite 9,000 strong, outnumbered the
enemy by less than 800 bayonets, though in French narratkes
it is often slated at 12,000 or 15,000 men t.
Suchet seems to hij.vefound some difficulty at first in making
out the Spanish position-the hills hid from him the bridge
and town of Alcafiiz, whose position in rear of Blake's centre
was the dominant military fact of the situation. At any
rate, he spent the whole morning in tentative movements,
!\!ld only delivered his main stroke in the afternoon. He
began by sending Lava!'s brigade against the dominating
hill on the right flank of the Spanish position, Two assaults
were made upon the Cerro de los Pue)'os, .which Suchet in
his .autobiography calls feints, but which Blake considered
so serious that he sent off to this flank two battalions
from his left wing and the whole of his rovalry. w:hether
intended as mere demonstrations or as a real attack, these mo\'e-
ments had no success, and were repelled by General Areizaga,
the commander of the Aragonese, without much difficulty.
The Spanish cavalry, however, was badly mauled by Suchet'!:l
hussars when it tried to deliver a flank charge upon the enemy
at the moment that he retired,
'Wllcn all the fighting on the northern extremity of the line
had died down, Suchet launched his main attack against Blake's
centre, hoping (as he says) to break the line, seize the bridge of
Alcnfiiz, which lay just behind the hill of Lns Horca.s, and thus
to capture the greater part of the Spanish wings, which would
have no line of retreat. The attack was delivcred by two of
Centre, MarquiS of Lazan :
Volunteers ofValcncia, lo'erdilllmdoVllJ 3rd hatt. of America,
detachment of Traxler's Swiss-three and a half batts" 1,605
Right wing, General Roca:
3rd batt. of Savoia, 2nd batt. of America, 1st of Valencia.
(three hatts,), 2nd Cazadores of Valencia, 1st Volunteers
of Saragossa-seven batts. 3,742
Ca.\'a.1ry (detachments of S:1utiagoJ Olivenza, and Husares
Espaiioles) 446
Artillery 246
1 KapierJ for example, following French sources, gives Blake 12,000
men,
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Musnier's regiments 1 formed in C1lIumns of battalions, and
acting ill a single muss---a. force of over ~,600 men. A column
of this strength often succeeded in bursting through a Spanish
line during the Peninsular War. But on this day Suchet was
unlucky, or his troops did not display the usual t:lan of French
infantry. They advanced steadily enough across the flat
ground, and began to climb the hill, in spite of the rapid and
accurate fire of the artillery which crowned i~ summit. But
when the fire of musketry from the Spanish left began to beat
upon their flank, and the guns openel1 with grape, the attacking
columns came to a." standstill at the line of a ditch cut in the
slope. Their officers made every effort to carry them forward
for the few hundred yards that separated them from the Spanish
guns, but the mass wavered, surged helplessly for a. few minutes
under the heav)' fire, and then dispersed and fled in disorder.
Suchet rallied them behind the five intact battalions which he
still possessed, but refused to renew the attack, {lond drew off ere
night. He himself had been wounded in the foot at the close
of the action, and his troops had suffered heavily-their loss
must have been at least 700 or 800 men 2. Dlake, who had lost
no more than 300, did not attempt to pursue, feu.ring to expose
his troops in the plain to the assaults of the French cavalry.
The morale of the 3rd Corps had been so much shaken by its
unsuccessful debut under its new commander, that a panic
broke out after dark among Lava!'s troops, who fled in all direc~
tions, on a false alarm that the Spanish cavalry had attacked
Md captured the rearguard. Next morniug the army poured
into San Per and Hijar in complete disorder, and some hours
had to be spent in restoring discipline. Suchet discovered the
man who had started the cry of sauvc qui peut, and had him shot
before the dny WtlS over 3.
1 Three klttalions of the 114th of the Line, and two of the 1st of thl!
Vistnla.
1 Suchet gives a very poor account of AlcaiHz in his J/lmoi'rU. In spite
of his many merits, he did not take a beating well, and slurs o,'er thip
action, julOt 8S ill 1812 he slurs over his defeat at Castalla. He does Dot
e,'en give an estimate of his killed Ilud wounded, and has the assurance
to sa)" that he left the enemy only 'l'opinion de la victoire' (i. 20).
Blake dead)' makes too much of the French attack on his right in his
dispatch. ' Suchet, Mbnoinl, p. 20:
.. ,
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The French had expected to be pursued, and many critics
have blamed lllake for not making the most of his victory and
following the defeated enemy at full speed. The Spanish
general, however, had good reasons for his quiesccnce: he saw
that Suchet's force was almost as large as his own; he" could
not match the French in caynlry; and having noted the orderly
fashion in which they had left the battlefield, he could not have
guessed that during the night they would disband in panic.
Moreover-and this was the most important point-he was
expecting to receive in a few days reinforcements from Valencia
which would more than double his numbers. Till they had
come up he would not move, but contented himself with sending
the news of Alcmiiz all over AragOll and stimulating the activity
of the insurgents. As he had hoped. the results of his victory
were impod:ant-the French had to evacuate every outlying
post that they possessed, and the whole of the open country
passed into the hands of the patriots. Perena and the insurgents
of the north bank of the Ebro pressed close in to Saragossa:
other bands threatened the high-road to Tudela: thousands of
recruits flocked into Blake's camp. but he was unfortunately
unable to arm or utilize them.
Within a few days, however. he began to rct:cive the promised
reinforcements from Valencia-a number of fresh regiments from
the rear, and drafts for the corps that were already with him.
He also used his authority as supreme commander in Catalonia
to ·draw some reinforcements from that principality-three
battalions of ROOing's Granadan troops and one ofmUJueletea: no
more could be spared from in front of the active St. Cyr. Within
three weeks after his victory of Alcaiiiz he had coUectOO an
army of 25,000 men. and considered himself strong enough to
commence the march upon Saragossa. It was in his power
to udvance directly upon the city by the high-road along the
1 The drafts were so large that the troops of Lazan's division, which
hafl numbered 3,979 ill May, were D,679 in June, those of lw,a rose
similarly from 3,449 lo 5,525. TIle Valeuciau JUUtll claimed to have sent
in all 1] ,881 men to reinforce Blakc. and the returns bear them out. They
also gave him 2,000,000 reals in cash-about £22,OOO-raised by li special
.contribution in fifteen days. Their report says tbat they had sent (lU lJ;very
armed man in the province. and that the city was only guarded by peasant3
armed with pikes. (Argiielles.)
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Ebro, and to challenge Suchet to a battle outside its southern
gates. He did not, however, make this move, but with a caution
that he did not often display, kept to the mountains Rnd marched
by a side-road to Belchite [June Ht]. Here he received news of
Napoleon's check at Essling, which had happened on the twent)'-
second of the preceding month; it was announced as a complete
and crushing defeat of the Emperor, and encouraged the
Spaniards in no small degree.
From Belchite Blake, still keeping to the mountain~ pur-
sued his march eastward to Villanueva in the valley of the
Huerba. This move revealed his design; he was about to place
himself in a position from which he could threaten Suchet's lines
of communication with 'fudela and Logrofio, and so compel him
either to abandon SarAgossa withont fighting, or to come ont
and attack the Spanish anny among the hills. Blake, in short,
was trying to manceuvre his enemy out of Saragossa, or to induec
him to fight another offensive action such as that of Alcamz
had been. After the experience of 1\1ay fl5 he thought that he
could trust his army to hold its ground. though he was not
willillg to risk an 8lhance in the open, across the level plain in
front of Saragossa.
Suchet meanwhile had concentrated his whole available force
in that city and its immediate neighbourhood; he had drawn: in
every man save a single column of two battalions, which was lying
at La Muela under General Fabre. with orders to keep back the
insurgents of the southern mountains from making a dnsh at
Alagon and cutting the high-road to Tudcla. He had been
writing letters to Madrid, couched in the most urgent terms, to
beg for reinforcements. But just at this moment the Asturian
expedition had drawn away to the north 11.11 the troops in Old
Castile. King J oseph could do no more than promise that the
two regiments from the Brd Corps which had been lent to
Ke1lermann should be summoned back, and directed to make
forced marehes on Saragossa. He could spare nothing save
these six battalions, believing it impossible to deplete the
garrison of Madrid, or to draw from Valladolid the single
division of !\tortier's corps, which was at this moment the only
solid force remaining in the valley of the Douro.
Suchet was inclined to believe that he might be attacked
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before this small reinforcement of 3,000 men could arri\'e,
and feared that, with little more than 10,000 sabres and bayonets,
he would risk defeat if he attacked Blake in the mountains.
The conduct of his troops in and after the battle of Alcllluz
had not tended to make him hopefUl of the result of another
action of the same kind. Nevertheless, when iUake came down
into the valley of the Huerba, and began to threaten his eom·
rnunications, he resolved that he must fight once again; the
alternative course, the evacuation of Saragossa and a retreat up
the Ebro, would have been too humiliating. Suchet dC\'oted the
three weeks of respite which the slow advance of the enemy
allowed him to the reorganization of his corps. He made
strcnuous excrtions to clothe it, and to provide it with iti:! arrears
of pa)·. He inspected every regiment in person, sought out and
remedied grievances, displaced a. number of tmsatisfactory
officers, (Lnd promoted lllilJIy deserving individuals. He claims
that the improvement in the morale of the troops during the
three weeks when they la)' encamped at Saragossa was enormous l ,
and his statements may be verified in the narrative of one of his
subordinates, who remarks that neither Moncey nor Junot had
ever shown that keen personal interest in the corps which
Suchet always displayed, Bud that the troops considered their
new chief both more genial and more business·like than any
general they had hitherto seen, and so resolved to do their best
for him 2.
Forced to fight, but not by any means confident of victory,
the French comlllilJIder discharged on to Tudela and PampelullR
his sick, his heavy bagg~"C, and his parks, before marching out
to meet Blake upon June 14. The enemy, though still clinging
to the skirts of the hills, had now moved so' close to SaragosSll.
that it was clear that he must be attacked at once, though Suchct>
would have preferred to wait a few days longer, till he should
have rallied the brigade from Old Castile. 'l'hese two regiments,
under Colonel Uobert,hadnowpassed Tudela,and wereexpeeted to
arrh'e on the fifteenth or sixteenth. But Blake had now descended
the valley of the Huerba, and had pushed his outposts to within
ten or twelve miles of Saragossa. He had reorganized his anny
1 Sucbet, NemQirelJ, p. 23.
t Von Brandt, A.IU meinem uben, i. 67.
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into three divis'ions, one of which (mainly composed of Aragonese
troops) was placed under General Areizaga, while Roca and the
Marquis of~11 headed the two others, in which the Valencian
levies predominated. or the total of fl5,OOO men which the
muster-rolls showed, ~O,OOO were in line: the rest were detached
or in hospital. There were about 1,000 untrustworlhy cavalry
and twenty-five guns.
In his final advance down the Huerha, Blake moved in two
columns. Areizaga's division kept to the right bank and halted
at Botorita, some sixteen miles from Saragossa. The Com~
mander-in-chief, with the other two divisions, marched on the left
bank, and pushing further forward than his lieutenant, reo.ched
the village of Ma1'ia, twelve miles from the south-western front
of the city. A distance of six or ~ven miles separated the two
corps. Thus Blake had taken the strategical ofFensi,-e, hut
was endeavouring to retain the tactical defensive, by placing
himself in a position where the encmy must attack him. But
hc seems to have made a grave mistake in keeping his columns
80 far apart, on different roads and with a river between
them. It should have been his object to make sure' that
every m~n was on the field when the critical moment should
arrive.
Alrend;r on the morning of the fourteenth the two annies
came into contact. Musnier's division met tJle Spanish van-
guard, thrust it back some way, but then came upon Blake and
the main body, and had to give ground. Suchet, on the same
evening, established his head quarters at the Abbey of Santa .Fe,
and,there dictated his orders for the battle of the following day.
Having ascertained tha.t Areiznga's dh·ision was the weaker of
the two Spanish columns, he left opposite it, on the Monte
Torrero, a mile and a half outside Saragossa, only a single
brigade-fi,-e battalions-ullder General Laval, who had, now
become the commander of the 1st Division, for Grandjciln had
been sent back to France. Protected by the line of the canal of
Aragoll, these 2,000 men 1 were f:9 do their best to beat off any
attack which Areizaga might make against the city, while the
main bodies of both armies were ensaolJ'Cd elsewhere. The charge
1 44th of the Line, 1,069 bayonets, and 3rd of the Vistula, 964 bayonets,
according to Suchet's figures.
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of Saragossa itself was giHn over to Colonel Haxo, who had
but fi. single battalion of infantry 1 and the sapper-companies
of the fi.l'lllY.
Having set aside these 3,000 men to guard his flank and rear,
8uchet could only bring forward l\fusnier's diyision, and the
remaining brigade of Laval's division (that of Habert), with
two other battalions, for the llluill attack. But he retained
with himself the whole of his cavalry and all his artiUery, save
one single battery left with the troops on Monte Torrero. This
gave him fo.wteen battalions-about 7,500 infantry-BOO horsc,
and twelve guns-less than 9,000 men in all-to commence the
battle. But he was encouraged to risk an attack by the news
that the brigade from Tudeln. was now close at hand, and could
reach the field by noon with 3,000 bayoncts more. It would
seem that Suchet (though he does not say so in his .i1temoires)
held back during the morning hours, in order to allow this heavy
reserve time to reach the fighting-ground.
Blake was in order of battle along the line of a rolling hill
sepn.rated from the, French lines by less than a mile. llehind
his frout were two other similar spurs of the Sierra de la Muela,
each separated from the other by a steep ravine: On his right
flank was the river Huerba, with level fields half a mile broad
between the water's edge and the commencement of the rising
ground. The village of Maria lay to his right rear, some way
up the stream. The Spaniards were drawn out in hl'o lines,
Uoca's division on the northernmost ridge, Lazan's in its ·rear
on the second, while the cavalry filled the spaee between the hills
and the river. Two battalions and half a battery' were in reserl'e,
in front of Maria. The rest of the artillery was placed in the
intervals of the first line.
The French occupied a minor line of heights facing Blake's
front: Habert's brigade held the left, near the river, having
the two cavalry regiments of 'Vathier in support. l\fusnier's
division fonned the ccntre 3nd right: a squadron of Polish
lancers was placed far out upon its flank. 'The only reserve
consisted of the two stray battalions which did not belong
I Apparently a battalion of the 12lst of the Line, the rest of which
nogimcnt was still in Navarre.
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either to Musnier 01' Haberl-one of the 5th Uger, another of
the 64th of the Line 1.
Blake's army was slow in taking up its ground, while Suchet
did not wish to move till the brigade from Tndela had got
within supporting distance. Hence in the morning hours there
was no serious collision. But at last the Spaniards took the
initiative, and pushed a cautious advance against Suchet's left,
apparently with the object of worrying him into assuming the
offensive rather than of delivering a serious attack. But the
cloud of skinnishers sent agajnst Haberl's front grew so thick
and pushed so far forward, that at last the whole brigade was
seriously engaged, and the artillery was obliged to open UpOll
the swarm of Spanish tirailkllTS. They fell back when the
shells began to drop among them, and sought refuge by retiring
nearer to their main body 2.
About middu)' the bickering died down on the French left,
but shortly after the fire broke out with redoubled energy in
another direction. Disappointed that he could not induce
Suchet to attack him, Blake had at last resolved to take the
offensive himself, and columns were seen descending from his
e.ureme left wing, e"idently with the intention of tUMling the
French right. Having thus made up his mind to strike, the
Spanish general should have sent prompt orders to his detached
division under Areizaga, to bid it cross theHuerbawith all possible
I TIle battalion of tJle 5th Uger belonged to l\Iorlot's division, the rest
of which WI\.S dispen;ed in Kavarre or absent: that of the 64th was one
Wllicll Suchet Illld brought from Valladolid as his personal escort, and
which properly belonged to the SUI Corps.
1 Suchct says the morning was occupied ill mere < tirnillemcllt' of tlle
Spanish skinnishers and the 2nd of the Vistula.. This ill not borne out
by the narrative of Von Brandt, of that corps. He says that the euemy
came 011 I schr lebhaft; that both battalions of his regiment were deeply
engaged, that a regiment of Spanish dragoons in yellow [he calls it
Numancia, but it was really Oli,'enl.a] charged illto the skinnisllillg-liue
and nearly broke it. The 2nd of the Vistula need up all its cartridges,
and lost ground. <Die Kavallerieziige wurden jedoch jedesmal zuriick·
gewiesen, aber nichtsdestoweniger verloren wir allmahlich Terrain.' The
Spaniards were only driven off by a battery being drawn forward into the
lighting-line. Then the fight stood still, but the regiment had suffered
very heavily, and was finally drawn back and put into the reserve. (Au,
meinem Leben, pp. 71-2.)
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speed, and hasten to join the main body before the engagement
had grown bot. It could certainly have arriyed in two hours,
since it was but six or seven miles away. But Blake made no
attempt to call in this body of 6,000 men (the best troops in his
army) or to utilize it in any way. He only employed the two
divisions that were under his haud on the hillsides above Muria.
The attack on the French right, made between one and two
o'clock, precipitated matters. When Suchet saw the Spanish
battalions beginning to descend from the ridge, he ordered his
Polish lancers to charge them in flank, and attacked them in
front with part of the 114th regiment and some voltigeur com~
panies. The enemy was thrown back, and retired to rejoin his
main body. Then, before they were fully rearranged in line of
battle, the French general bade the whole of Musnier's division
,advance, llnd storm the Spanish position. He WIlS cmboldened
to press matters to an issue by the joyful news-that the long-
expected brigade from '!'ude1a had passed Sar~<Y'QSSR, and would
be on the field in a couple of hours.
The eight battalions of the 114th, 115th, and the 1st of the
Vistula crossed the valley and fell upon the Spanish line
between two and three o'clock in the afternoon. Roca's men
met them ~ith resolution, and thc fighting was for some time
indecisive. Along part of the front the French gained ground,
but at other points they were beaten back, and to repair a
severe check suffered by the 115th, Suchet had to engage half
his rescrve, the battalion of the 64th, und to draw into the
fight the ~nd of the Vistula from Habert's brigade upon the
left. This movement restored the line, but nothing appreciable
had been gained, when a violent hailstorm from the north
suddenly swept down upon both armies, and hid them for
half an hour from each other's sight.
Before it was over, Suchet learnt that Robert and his brigade
had arrived at the Abbey of Santa Fe, on his right rear. He
therefore resolved to throw into the bnttle the wing of his army
which he had. hitherto held back,-Habert's battalions and the
cavalry. When the storm had passed over, they advanced
against the Spanish right, in the low ground near the river.
TIle three battalions l of infantr)' led the way, but when their
I Tbe 2nd of the Vistula baving been distracted to the centre, Habert
••
"'''"V 1!~".' 19011
~ $,,~ Co,..b~, 0 J"L~
:foh-.""'''''''''"Y • F~
-"".,,~.,... I
BATTLE OF MARIA
.JU"E 15'_"/809
:1J .s"wu..",,,~ 0 ;"'~"'Y
:fo h-o-. ""'""""Y • T~
- ...".,;
.... 426
1800] DAT'l'(E OF MARIA 427
fire had begun to take effect, Suchet bade his hussars and
cuira.ssiers charge through the intervals of the front line. The
troops here opposed to them consisted of 600 cavalry under
General O'Donoju-the whole of the horsemen that Blake
possessed, for the rest of his squadrons wcre with Areizaga, far
away from the field.
The charge of 'Vathier's two regiments proved decisive: the
Spanish horse did not wait to cross sabres, but broke and fled
from the field, exposing the flank of the battalions which lily
next them in the line. The cuirassiers and hussars rolled up
these unfortunate troops, and hunted them along the high~road
as far as the outskirts of Maria; here they came upon and rode
down the two battalions which lllake had left there as a last
reserve, and captured the half-batteJ), that accompanied them,
The Spanish right was annihilated, und-what was worse-
Blake had lost possession of the only road by which he could
withdraw and join Areimga. Meanwhile Habert's battalions
had not followed the ctwa.lry in their charge, but had turned
upon the exposed flunk of the Spanish centre, find were attack·
ing it in side and rear. It is greatly to Bla"e'~ credit that his
firmness did not giv:e way in this distressing moment. He
threw back his right, and sent up into line such oC"wan's
battalions from his rear line as had not yet been dravm into the
fight. Thus he saved himself from utter disaster, and though
losing ground n.ll through the evening hours, kept his men
together, and finally left the field in a solid mass, retiring over
the hills and ravines to the southward. •The Spaniards,' wrote
an eye·witness, I went off the field in perfect order and with
a good military bearing 1.' But they had been forced to lenve
behind t.hem all their guns save two, for they had no rond, and
could nut drag the artillery up the rug~":d slopes by which they
saved themselves. Blake also lost l,()(K) killed, three or four
times that number of wounded, and some hundreds of prisoners.
bad only the two battaliong ofthc 14th efthc Line, and one of the 6th Uger
from the reserve.
1 t lbr Riickzug geschah in aUer Ordnung uod militiirischer Haltullg.
Sie lagerten in dcr Nacbt uos gegentioor, und hielteo am anderen Mergen
die Hiihen VDn Botorita ganz in dcr Nahe des 8chlachtfeldes.' [Von Braudt,
i. 73.]
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The steadiness of the retreat is vouched for by the small number
of flab"S captured by the French-only three out of the thirty-
four that had been upon the f1eld. Suchet., according to his
own account, had lost no more than between "700 and 800 men.
'Vhen safe from pursuit t.he beaten army crossed the Huerba
far above Maria, and rejoined Areizaga's division at Botorita
'\ on the right bank of that stream.
Next morning, to his surprise, Suchet learnt that the euemy
.....as still in position at Botorita and was showing a steady front.
The victor did not march directly against Blake, as might have
been expected, but ordered Laval, with the troops that had
been guarding Sarngossa, to turn the Spaniards' right, while he
himself maureU\Tcd to get round their left. These cautious
proceedings would seem to indicate that the French army had
been more exhausted by the battle of the previous day than
Suchet concedes. The turning movements failed, and Blake
drew off undisturbed at nightfall, and retired on that same road
to Delchite by which he had marched on Saragossa, in such
high hopes, only four days back. .
The battle of Maria had been on the whole very creditable to
the Valel1cian troops. But the subsequent course of events was
lamentable. On the way to Belehite many of the mw levies
began to disband themselves: the weather was bad, the road
worse, and the consciousness of defeat had had time enough to
sink into the minds of the soldiery. When lllake halted at
Delchite, he found that he had only l~,OOO men with him:
deducting the losses of the fifteenth, there should have been at
least 15,000 in line. Of artillery he possessed no more than
nine guns, seven that had been with Arei:r.aga., and two sa\"ed
from Maria 1.
It can only be considered therefore a piece of mud presump-
tion on the part of the Spanish geueral that he halted at
Belchite and again offered battle to his pursuers. The position
in front of that town was strong-far stronger than the grotmd
at Maria. But the men were not the sume; on June 15 the)'
I Suchet(i. 24) says that Dlake had been reinforced by 4./100 Valeucians,
when he fought at Belchito. This J>eems to have been an error, his
reillforecmellt beillg AreiOl8&"s 0,000 wen picked up at Botorita, who were
all AragOIlCSC.
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had fought with confidence, proud of their victory at Alcailiz and
intending to enter Saragossa in triumph next day. On June
18 they were cowed and disheartel1ed-they had already done
their best and had failed: it seemed to them hopeless to try the
fortunes of war again, and they were half beaten before a shot
had been fired. The mere llumei'ica1 odds, .too, were no longer
in their favour: at Mada. Blake had 13,000 men to Suchet's
9,000-if we count only the troops that fought, and neglect the
S,OOO French who came up late in the day, and were never
cll,gaged. .At Belchite, Blnke had about Ul,OOO men, and Suchet
rather more, for he had gathered in !.aval's and Robert'g
brigades-full 5,000 bayonets, and could put into line 13,000
men, even if allowance be made for his losses ill the late battle 1.
It is impossible to understand the temerity with which the
Spanish gencral courted ll. disnster) by resolving to tight a second
battle only three days after he had lost the first.
Blake's centre was in front of Belchite, in comparatively low.
lyhlg ground) much cut up by olive groves and enclosures. His
wings were drawn up on two gentle hills, called the Calvary and
El Pueyo: the lcft was the wetl.ker flank) the ridge there being
open and exposed. It WM on this wing therefore that Suchet
directed his main cffort; he sent against it the whole of
Musnier's division and a regiment of cavalry, while Habert's
brigade marched to turn the right: the centre was left unat·
tacked. The moment that Musnier's attack was well pro·
llounced, the whole of the Spanish left wing gave way) and fell
back on Belchite, to cover itself behind the walls and olive-
groves. Before the French division could be reformed for a
second attack, an even more disgraceful rout occurred on the
right wing. Habert's brigllde had just commenced to close in
upon the Spaniards, when a chance shell exploded a caisson in
rear of the battery ill Blake's right-centre. Thc fire communi·
catcd itself to the other powder-wagons which were standing
near, and the whole group blew up with a terrific report.
'This piece of luck threw the whole line into panic,' writes an
eye-witness, 'the enemy thought that he was attacked in the
1 He had twenty·two battaliollS and eight squadrons at Belcbite (as
he ~aJ'1l himselr, Mimqjrel, i. p. 34), while at Maria he had only fourteen
battalions and seven squadrons.
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rear. Every man shouted Treason! whole battalions threw
down their arms and bolted. The disorder spread along the
entire line, and we only hod" to run in upon them and seize
what we could. If they had not closed the town-gates, which
we found it difficult to batter in, I fancy that the whole
Spanish army would havc been captured or cut to pieces. But
it took some time to break down the narrow grated door, and
then a. battalion stood at bay in the Market Place, and had to
be" ridden down by our Polish lancers before we could get on.
Lastly, we had to pass through another gate to make our exit,
and to cross the bridge over the Aguas in a narrow formation.
This gave thc Spaniards time to show a clean pair of hcels, and
they utilized the chance with their constitutional agility, Wc
took few prisoners, but got their nine guns, some twenty
munition wagons, and the whole of their very considerable
magazines. Gt?:ncral Suchct wrote up a splendid account of
the elaborate manreuvres that he made. But I believe that my
tale is nearer to the facts, and that the order of battle which he
published was" composed aprea COI/P. The whole aftair did not
last" long enough for him to carry out the various dispositions
which he details 1.'
The" whole Spanish army was scattered to the. winds. It was
"some days before the Amgonesc and Co.talo.ns begnn to rally o.t
Tortosa, 4and the Valencians at Morello.. The total loss in the
battle had not been large-Suchet says that &ly one regiment
was o.ctunlly surrounded and cut to pieces, and only one flag
taken 2. But of the 25,000 men who had formed thc •Army of "
the Right' on June 1, not 10,000 were a.vailable a month later,
and these were in a state of demoralization which would have
mooe it impossible to take them into action.
Suchet was therefore able to set himself at leisure to thc task
of reducing the plains of Aragon, whose control had passed out
of his hands in May. He left Musnier's division at Alcaiiiz to
watch all that was left of Blake's army, W,hile he marched with
the other two to overrun the central valley of the Ebro.. 011
1 Ccrtnil.lly on rcadillg Suchet'8 report oue would llot he iuelillod to
think tha.t the whole matter wns such a disgraceful rout as You Dramlt
(i" 74-5) describes in the above paragraphs.
2 ;;Ufmoil'U, p. 30,
•
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June 25 he sei7ro Caspe and its long wooden briclge, and crossed
the river. :Kcxt he occupied Frogs llnd Monzon, and left
Habert 1 and the 3rd division to watch the valley of the
Cines. ·With the remaining di vision, that of Laval, he marched
back to Saragossa [July 1], sweeping the open country clear of
guerrilla. bands. Then he sat down for a space in the Amgoncse
capital, to busy himself in admiuistmtive schemes for the
governance of the kingdom, and in preparation for a systematic
campaign against the numerous insurgents of the northern and
southern mountains, who still remained under arms and seemed
to have been little affected by the disasters of Maria and
Bclchite.
Thus ended Blake's invasion of Aragon, an undertaking which
promised well from the day of Alcan,iz down to the battle of
June 15. It miscarried mainly-through the gross tactical error
which the general made in dividing his army, and fighting at
Maria with only two-thirds of his available for~. His strategy
down to the actual moment of battle seems to have oc>eo well-
considered and prudent. If he had put the Aragonese division
of Areizaga in line between the river and the hill, instead of his
handful of untrustworthy cavalry, it seems likely that a second
Alcafiiz might have been fought on the fatal fifteenth of June.
For Suchet's infantry attack had miscarried, and it was only the
onslaught of his cavalry that won tlle day. Had that charge
failed, Saragossa must havc been eVflCuatcd that night, and the
Srd Corps would have been forced back on Navarre-to the
entire dislocation of all other French operations in Spain. If
King J oseph had received the news of the loss of Aragon in the
same week in which he learnt that Soult and Ney had evacuated
Galicia, and Kellermann Ule Asturias, he would probably have
called back Victor and Sebastiani and abandoned Madrid:
For a disaster in the valley of the Douro or the Ebro, as
Napoleon once observed, is the most fatal blow of all to an
invader based on the north, and makes central Spain untenable.
'VI~ile wondering at Dlake's errors, we must not forget to lay
part of the blame at the door of his lieutenant Areizaga-the
incapable man who afterwards lost the fatal fight of Ocana.
1 Jlorlot's division had been handed over to Ha.bert, who resigned his
brigade of Laval's dhision to the Polish colonel Chlopicki.
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All officer of sound "iews, when left without orders, would have
'marched to the cannon' and appeared on the field of Maria in . ,
the afternoon. Areizaga sat quiescent, six miles from the battle-.
field, while the cannon were thundering in his ears "from eleven
in the morning till six in the afternoon!
As for Suchet, we see that he took a terrible risk, Rnd came
safely through the ordeal. There were many reasons for evacu-
ating Saragossa, when Blake came down the valley of the Huerba
tQ cut the communications of the grd Corps. But an enter·
prising general just making his debut in independent command,
could not well take the. responsibility of retreat without first
trying the luck of battle. Fortune favoured the brave, and
a splendid victory SD.vcd Saragossa and led to the recpnquest of
the lost plains of Aragon. Yet, with another cast of the wee,
l\1aria. might ha,'e proved a defeat, and Suchet have gone down
to history as a. rash officer who imperilled the whole fate of the
French army in Spain by trying to face over-great odds.
,SECTION XVI
THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER I
WELLESLEY AT ABRANTES: VICTOR EVACUATES
ESTREMADURA
'VHEN Wellesley's columns, faint but pursuing, received the
orders which bade them halt at Ruimcns and Montalegre, their
commander was already planning out the details of their return·
march to the Tagus. From the first moment of his setting forth
from Lisbon, he had looked upon the expedition against Soult
as no more than a llece'iS8.ry preliminary to the more important
expedition against Victor. He would have preferred, as we
have already seen \ to have directed his first blow against the
French army in Estremadura, and had only been induced to
begin his campaign by the attack upon Soult because he saw
the politicalllecessity for delivering Oporto. His original inten·
tion had been no more than to rnanreuvre the 2nd Corps out
of Portugal. But, owing to the faulty dispositions of the
Duke of Dalmatia, -he had been able to accomplish much more
than this-he had beaten the Marshal, stripped him of his
artillery and equipment, destroyed a sixth of his army, and flung
him back into Galicia by a rugged and impracticable road, which
took him far from his natural base of operations. He had done
much more than he had hoped or promised to do when he set
out from Lisbon. Yet these 'uncovenanted mercies' did not
distract him from his·original plan: his nmill object wns not the
destruction of Soull, but the clearing of the whole frontier of
Portugal from tlul danger of ill\'asion, and this could not be
accomplished till Victor had been dealt with. The Ilc<:cssity
for a prompt movement against the ht Corps wus 9mphnsizcd
I See p. 292.
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by the news, received on :May 19 at Montalegre, that its
commander was already astir, and apparently about to assume
the offensive. Mackenzie reported from Abrantcs, with some
signs of dismay, that a strong French colunin had just fallen
upon Alcan,tAra, and driven from it the' small Portuguese
detachme.nt which was covering his front.
Accordingly Wellesley turned the march of his whole anny
southward, the very moment that he discovered that the 2nd
Corps had not fallen into the trap set for it at Chavcs and
Ruil'aens. He had resolved to leave nothing but the local
levies of Silveira and Botilho to watch Galicia, and to protect
the provinces north of the Douro. 'Soult,' he wrote, 'will be
"ery little formidable to any body of troops for some time
to come.' He imagined-and quite correctly-that the Galician
guerrillas and the army of La Romana would suffice to find him
occupation. He did not, however, realize that it was possible
that not only Soult but Ney also would be so much harassed
by the insurgents, and would fall into such bitter strife with
each other, that they might ere long evacuate Galicia altogether.
This, indeed, could not have been foreseen at the moment when
the British turned southwards from Montalegre. If Wellesley
could have guessed that by July 1 the three French Corps in
Northern Spain-the 2nd, 5th, and 6th-would all be clear
of thc mountains and concentrated in the triangle Astorga-
Zamora.-Valladolid, he would have had to recast his plan of
operations. But on Mar 19 such a conjunction appeared most
improbable, and the British general could not have deemed it
likely that a French army of 55,000 men, available for field·
operations, would be collected on the central Douro, at the
moment when he had committed himself to operations on the
'l'agus. Indeed, for IlOme weeks afte,r he had departed from
Oporto the information from the north made any such (,'OIlCCU-
tration appear improbable. While he was 011 his march.to the
south he began to hear of the details of Ney's and Kellermann's
expedition against the Asturias, news which he received with
complacency 1, as it showed that the French were entangling
themselves in new and hazardous enterprises which would make
,it more ~fficult than ever for them to collect a force opposite
1 See the letter to Colollel Bourke, Wtllingt01llMpatchu, iv, 390-400.
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the frontier of Northern POltUgal. Down to the "ery end of June
'Vellesley had no reason to dread any concentration of French
tro!lPS upon his flank in the valley of the Douro. It was ollly
in the following month that Soult was heard of at Puebla
de Senabria. and Ne)' at Astorga. By that time the British
army had already crossed the frontier of Spain and commenced
its operations against Victor.
At the moment when "\"ellesley turned back from Montalegre
and set his face southward, he had not yet settled the details
of his plnn of campaign. There appeared to be two courses
open to him. The first was to base himself upon Almeida and
Ciudad Rodrigo, and advance upon Salamanca. This movement,
which he could have begun in the second week of June, would
undoubtedly have thrown into disorder all the French ammge·
ments in Northern Spain. There would have been no force
ready to oppose him save a single division of Morlier's corps-
the rest of that marshal's troops were absent with Kellermann
in the Asturias. This could not have held the British army
back, and a bold march in advance would have p1a.eed \Vellesley
in a position where he could have intercepted all communications
between the French troops in Galicia and those in and about
Madrid. The movement might appear tempting, but it would
have been too hazardous. The only fon.-e that could have been
used for it was the 20,000 troops of \Vellesley's own anny,
backed by the l!l:,OOO or 15,000 Portuguese regulars whom
Deresfom could collect between the Douro and the Tagus.
The Spaniards had no troops in this direction save the garrison
of Ciudad Rodrigo, and a battalion or two which Carlos d'Espw1a
had raised on the borders of Leon and Portugal. On the other
hand, the news that the British were at Salamanca or Toro
would certainly have forced Ney, Soult, and Kellermann to
evacuate Galicia and the Asturias and hfLSten to the aid of
Mortier. They would have been far too strong, when united,
for the 80,000 or 35,000 men of Wellcsley nnd Beresford:
La Romuna and the Asturians could ha~'e brought no corre-
sponding reinforcements to assist the British army, and must
necessarily have arrived too late-long after the French corps
would have reached the Douro I. The idea of a movement oil
1 Napicr (ii. 149) calls this alternati'\'e plan of campaign' a mO\'ement
Ff2
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Salamanca, therefore, did not even for a moment enter into
Wellesley's mind.
The other alternative open to the British general, and that
which he had from the first determined to take in hand, was
(as we have already seen) a march against Victor. Such a move·
ment might be carried out in Olle of two ways. (1) It would be
possible to advaul'C against his flank and rear by keeping north
of the Tagus. and striking, by Coria and Plasencia, at Almaraz
and its great bridge of boats, across which ran the communica·
tion between the Ist Corps and Madrid. This operation would
have to be carried out by the British army alone, while the
Spanish army of Estremadura, acting from a separate base, kept
in touch with Victor but avoided. compromising itself by any
rash attack upon him. The :l\1arshal, placed in a central position
between Wellesley's and Cuesta's forces, would certainly tr)' to
beat onc of them before they got the chance of drawingtogcther.
(~) It was equally possible to operate against Victor not on
separate lines, but by crossing the Tagus, joining the Spaniards
somewhere in the neighbourhood of Budo.joz, and falling upon
the' Marshal with the united strength of both armies. This
movement would be less hazardous than the other, since it
would secure the concentration of an army of a strength suffi-
cient to crush the 25,000 men at \I'hich the Ist Corps might
reasonably be rated. But it would only drive Victor back upon
Madrid and King .Joseph's reserves by a frontal attack, while
the other plan-that of the march on Almamz---would imperil
his flank and rear, and threaten to cut him off from the KiJlg
and the capital.
Before making any decision between the two plans, Wellesley
wrote to Cuesta. from Oporto on May 2~, a letter requesting
him to state his views as to the way in which the operations
of the British and Spanish armies could best be combined. Hc
in conjunction 'With :Beresford, del Parque, and Romana by Salamanca.'
This is 8. most inappropriate description of it: about June 10, when
operations might have commenced, Del Parque's army did not yet exist.
There were only three or four of Carlos d'Espaiia's battalions at or near
Rodrigo. Ul. Romana, on the other hand, was at OreD86 facing Soult, and
could not have rcacbed Almeida or Rodrigo for weeks after the campaign
would have begull.
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informed him that the troops which had defeated Soult were
already on their way to the south, that the head of the column
would reach the Mondego on the twenty-sixth, and that the whole
would be concentrated near Abrantes Cilrly in June. It was
at that place that the choice would have to be made between
the two possible lines of attack on Victor-that which led to
Almaraz, and that which went on to Southern Estremadura.
A few da)'s later 'Yelleslcy dispatched a confidential officer of
his staff-Colonel Bourke-to bear to the Spanish general
a definite request for his decision on the point whether the
allied armies should prepare for an actual junction, or should
manreuvre from separate bn.~es, or should' co-operate with com~
munication,' Le. combine their mo\'cments without adopting
a single base or a joint line of advance. Bourke. was also
directed to obtain all the information that he could concerning
the strength, morale, and discipline of Cuest&'s army, and to
discover what chance there was of securing the active assistance
of the second Spanish lIl'my in the south-that which, under
General Venegas, was defending the defiles in front of La
CArolina 1.
It was clear that some days must elapse before an answer
could arrive from the camp of the Estremaduran army, and
meanwhile Wellesley continued to urge the counter-mal'ch of his
troops from the various points at which they had halted between
Oporto and Mont.alegre. All the scattered British brigades
were directed on Abrantes by different routes: those which had
the least distance to march began to arrive there on the eleventh
and the twelve of June.
The Commander·in-chief had resolved not to take on with
him the l'ortuguese regulars, whom he had employed in the
campaign against Soult. noth the brigades which had marched
on Amarante under Beresford, and the four battalions which
had fought along with 'Wellesle)' in the main column, WCl'(! now
dropped behind. They were destined to form an army of obser-
vation, lest Mortier and his 6th Corps,' or allY other French
force, might chance to assail the fronf between the Douro and
the Tagus, during the absenL'e of the British in the south.
I See the' Memorandum for Lieut.-Col. Bourke' in lVelIinst01l1Ji8patcllet,
iv. 372-3.
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Beresford, who was left in command, was directed to arrlU\:,"e
his troops 50 as to be able to support Almeida, and resist any
raid from the direction of Salamanca or Zamora. The main
body of the army lay at Guarda, ibl reserves at Coimbra. The
Portuguese di vision which had been lying on the Zezere in
company with Mackenzie's troops, was also placed at Beresforo's
disposition,sothat he had-about cightC<lD bnttalions,founegiments
of cavalry, and five or six batteries-a force of between l~OOO
and 15,000 men. It was his duty to connect 'Yellesley's left wing
with Silvcira's right, and to reinforce either of them if necessary.
The Commander·in-chief was inclined to belic,'c, from his know-
le<1ge of the disposition of the F'rench corps at the moment, that
110 very scrioWi attack was likely to be directed against ~orthem
Portugal during his absence-at the most Soult might threaten
Draganza or Morlier Almeicla. But it was necessary to make
some provision against even unlikely contingencies.
The only Portuguese force which 'Vellesley had resolved to
utilize for the campaign in Eslremadura Will; the battalion of
the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, uncleI' Colonel MaYTlc, which had
been stationed at Alcanwa. watching the movements of Victor,
Sir Robert "Vilson, now recalled from Beresford's column and
placed once more with his'own men, was to take up the command
of his old force, and to add to it the 5th Cazadores, a regiment
which had hitherto been lying with Mackenzie's dh'ision at
Abrantes. 'Vith these 1,500 men he Will; to serve ill; the northern
flank-guard of the Dl'itish army wheT! it should enter Spain.
When 'Vellesley first started upon his march, he was under
the impression that his plait of campaign might be settled 'for
him by the mO\'ements of Victor rather than by the devices of
Cuesta. The rapidity of his progress was partly caused by the
news of the Marshal's attack on Alcantara, an operation which
might, as it sccmed, turn out to be the prelude of a raid in
force upon Central Portugal. That it portended an actual
invasion with serious designs Welles"'ey could not believe, being
convinc~ that Victor would have to leave so large a proportion
of his army to. observe Cuesta, that he would not be able to set
aside more than 10,000 or l~OOO men for operations ill the
valley of the Tagus I, But such a force would be enough to"
l Wellesley to Mackenzie, from San Tyrso, 1tIay 21.
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sweep the country about Castello Branco and Villa VeUm, and·
to beat up Mackenzie's line of defence on the Zezere.
The actual course of events on the 'l'agus had been as
follows. Victor, even aficr having received the division of
Lapisse, considered himself too weak citllcr to march 011 Cuesta
",Dd drive him over the mountains into Andalusia, or to fall
upon Central Portugal by an advance along the Tagus1. He
had received vague information of the formation of Mackenzie's
corps of observation 011 the Zczerc, though apparently he had
1I0t .discovered that there was a strong British contingent in
its ranks. But he was under the impression that if he crossed
the Guadiana in force, to attack Cuesta., the Portuguese would
advance into Eslremadura and cut his communications; while
if he marched against the Portugucse, Cuestll. would move
northward to attack his rear. Aeeordingly he maintaincd for
some time a purely defensive attitude, keeping his three French
infantry divisions concentrated in a central position, at 'l'orre-
mocha, Montanches, and Salvatierrll. (near Caceres), while he
remained himself with Leval's Gennans and Latour-Maubourg's
dragoons in the neighbourhood of Merida, observing Cucsta
and sending flying columns up and down the Guadiana to watch
the garrison of Badajoz and the guerrillas of the Sierra de
Guadalupe. He had not forgotten the Emperor's orders that
he was to be prepared to execute a diversion in favour of
Marshal Soult, when he should hear that the 2nd Corps was on
its way to Lisbon, But, like all the other F'rench generals, he
was profoundly ignorant of the position and the fortunes of the
Duke of Dalmatia. On April 22 the head-quarters staff at
Madrid had received no more than a vague rumour that the
2nd Corps had entered Oporto a month before! They got no
trustworthy information concerning its doings till May was far
advanced 2. Victor, therefore, depending on King Joseph for his
news from Northern llortugal, was completely in the dark as to
the moment when he might be called upon to execute his
diversion on the Tagus, The Portuguese and Go.Iician insur~
1 Compare the two dispakh~s of Victor to Jourdan of April 25 (acknow.
IOOging the receipt of Lapisse's division) and of May 21.
• See Kiug Joseph to Napoleon, of the dates April 22 and May 24,
1809.
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gents had succecded in maintaining a complete blockade of
Soult, and·thus had foiled all Napoleon's plans for combining
the operations of the 1st and the llnd Corps.
Victor wt\S only stirred up into a spasmodic activity in the
second week in May, by the news that a Portuguese force had
crossed the frontier and occupied Alcantara, where the great
Roman bridge across the Tagus provided a line of communi-
cation between North·Western and Central Estremadura. This
detaehment-as we have already seen-consisted of no more
than Colonel Mayne's 1st battnlion of thc Loyal Lusitanian
Legion, brought down from the passes of the Sierra de Gata,
and of a single regiment of newly-raised militia-that of the
frontier district of Idanllll. They had with them the six gullS
of the battery of the Legion and a solitary squadron of cavalry.
Wellesley had thrown forward this little force of 2,000 men to
serve t\S an outpost for Mackenzie's corps on the Zezere. But
rumour magnified its strength, and Victor jumped to the con-
clusion that it formed the vanguard of a Portuguese army which
wt\S intending to concert a combined operation with Cuesta, by
threatcning the (,'Omumnicntion of the 1st Corps while the
Spaniards attacked its front.
Labouring under this delusion, Victor took the division of
Lapisse and a brigade of drngoons, and marched against Alcan-
tam upon the eleventh of May. AJ> he approached the river he
was met at Brozas by Mayne's vedettes, whom he soon drove in
to the gates of the little town. Alcantara being situated on
the south side of the Tagtls, it was impossible to defend it: but
l\:lll)'nc had barricaded and mined the bridge, planted his gullS
so as to command the passage, and constructed trenches for his
infantry along the northern bank. After seizing the town,
Victor opened a heavy fire of artillery and mus~etry against the
]lortuguese detachment. It was met by a vigorous return from
the further bank, which lasted for more than three hours before
the defence began to flag. The Marshal very properly refused
to send forward his infantry to attempt the storm of the bridge
till his artilleI')· should have silenced that of the defenders. At
about midday ·tbe Idanha militia, who hurl already suffered not
inconsiderable losses, deserted their trenches and fled. There·
upon Mayne fired his mine in the bridge, but unhappily for
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him the tough Roman cement defied even the power of gun-
powder; only one side of the arch was shattered; the crown of
the vault held firm, and the passage was still possible. The
Legion still kept its ground, though it had lost many men, and
had seen one of his guns dismounted, and the rest silenced by
the French artillery. But when Victor hurled the leading
brigade of Lapisse's division at the bridge he succeeded in
forcing it 1. l\fa~'ne drew aIr his legionaries in good order and
retreated to the pass of Salvaterra, leaving behind him a gun
and more than 250 killed and wounded 2 [:May 14]-a heavy
loss from the 1,000 men of the single battalion which bore the
whole brunt of the fighting.
Victor went 110 further than Alcantara, having satisfied him-
self that the Portuguese force which had mOOc such a creditable
resistance consisted of a single weak brigade, and did not form
the yanguard of an ann.y bent on invading Estremadura. After
remaining for no more than three cfays at Alcantara, and trying
in vain to obtain news of the whereabouts of Soull-who was
at that moment being hunted past Guimaraens and Braga in the
far north-the Marshal drew back his troops to Torremocha
near Caceres.
His advance, though it had only lasted for six days, and had
not been pushed more than a few miles beyond Alcantara, had
much disturbed General Mackenzie, who dreaded to find himself
the next object of attack and to see the whole of the Ist Corps
debouching against him by the road through Castello Branco.
Wellesley wrote to him that he need not be alarmed., that
Victor could not spare more than 10,000 or 12,000 men for his
demonstration, and that the 8,000 British and Portuguese troops
behind the Zezere were amply sufficient to maintain defensive
operations till the main army from the north should come up.
He expressed his opinion that the French force at Alcantara
was 'a mere reconnoitring part)", sent out for the purpose of
• Comllll.re Victor to JOUMlUI of May 21, ""itb tile f\.CCount of the combat
in Appendix I of Mayne aUtI Lillie's lAuittlnian J.egi07I. •
t The exact 100ll'le~ of the L. 1.. L. were-killed, three officers and 103
rank aDd file; WOUlH!t.>dJ five offiooMl and 143 nwk aDd file; missing, fifk"Cll
rank and file. Of the Idanha militia, Mayne returned the whole as misaicg
next morning.
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ascertaining what has become of Soult,' a conclusion in which he
was perfectly right. Mackenzie I, who betrayed an exaggerated
want of confidence in his Portuguese troops, was profoundly
relieved to see the enemy retire upon the seventeenth. He had
advanced from Abrantes and tAken up a.defensive position along
the Sobreira Formosa to resist the Marshal, but he had done
so with many searchings of heart, and was glad to see the
danger pass away. When Victor had retired into Central
Estremadura, Mayne came lw:k with all due ca~tion, and re-
occupied the bridge of Alcanmm.
Wellesley, therefore, had been perfectly well justified in his
confidence that nothing was to be feared in tills direction.
The French could not possibly have dared to undertake more
than a demonstrulion in the direction of Castello BraneD.· Killg
Joseph's orders to Victor had prescribed no more 2, and the
'Marshal Bad accomplished even less. In his letter of excuse
to Jonrdan he explained that be would gladly have left
Lapisse's division at Alcantara, or even have moved it forward
for some distance into Portugal s, if he had not found it abso-
lutel)' impossible to feed it in the bare and stony district north
of the Tagus, where Junot's army bad been wellnigh stan'ed
in November 1807. The peasantr)' of the .villages for fifteen
leagues round Alculltam had, as he declared, gone off into the
mountains with their cattle, after burying their corn, and he
had found it impossihle to discover food for even three days'
consumption of a single division.
During Victor's absence at Alcantara, Cuesta had sent down
a part of his troops to make a raid Oil Merida, the Marshal's
advanced post on the GuadiallB" It failed entirely; the garri-
son, two battalions of Leval's G-erman division, maintained
.themselves with case in a large convent outside that town,
which Victor had patched up and turned into a place of some
little strength. On hearing that the Spaniards were deSL'Cnding
I See Welles1ey to Mackenzie, May 21, and also Welles1ey to Fre1'e on
the same day. WellingUm ~tche8, iv. 360-1.
~ See Jourdan's Mbllmre" p. 190.
1 A move by which he flattered himself that he would not only' inquierer
les Anglais,' but also 'digager le due de Dalmatie,' an end whicb no raid
.with 0,000 or 10,000 men to CastelIo Dranco could possibly have accom-
plished. Victor to Jourdan, May 29.
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from the mountains, King Joseph ordered the Duke of BeIJuno
to attack them at once. But on the mere news of the Marshal's
approach Cuesta culled back his detachmcnt into thc passes,
sweeping off at the same time the inhabitants of all the villages
along the Gua.diana, together with their cattle and their stores
of provisions.
At the beginning of June Victor began to press the King and
Jourdan for leave to abwldon his hold on Southern Estremadura,
and to fall back towards the TagWl. He urged that his posi.
tion was very dangerous, now that Cuesta's army had been
recruited up to a force of ~2,OOO infantry and 6,000 horse,
especially since the Portuguese had once morc got possession of
Alcantara. His main contention was that he must either be
reinforced up to a strength which would permit him to attack
Andalusia, or else be permitted to withdmw from the c-xhausted
district between the Guadiana and the Tagus, ill order to seek
a region where his men would be able to live. The only district
in this neighbourhood where the country-side was still intact
was that north of the Tagus, around the towns of Plasencia
and Coria-the valleys of the AJagon and Tietar. To move
the army in this direction would "involve tbe evacuation of
Central Estremo.dura-it would be necessary to abandon l\Ieridlt,
Truxillo, and Caceres, with the sacrifice of a certain amount of
prestige. But unless the 1st Corps could be reinforced-;-and
this, as Victor must have known, was impossible I-there was
no other alternative. TIle intcfllal condition of the army WM
growing worse day by day. 'The troops are on half rations of
bread: they can get little meat-often none at all. The results
of starvation are making themselves felt in the most deplorable
way. The men are going into hospital at the mte of several
hundre<hl a day 2.' A few days later Victor adds, .. If I could
even get together enough biscuit. to feed the army for merely
seven or eight days I should not feel so uncomfortable. But
we have no flour to issue for II bread ration, so cannot bake
biscuit a: And again he udds, 'The whole population of this
I He suggests in a letter of June 0, that J\.Iortier's corps should be
brought up to Plasencia to help him. But this was wholly impmcticable.
t Victor to Jourdan, from Torremocha, May 24•
• Victor to Jourda.n, Ma.y 29.
444 WELLESLEY AT ABRANTES [JUNE 19
region has retired within Cuesta's lines, after destroying the
ovens and the mills, and removing every scrap of food. It
seems that the enemy is resolved to starve us out, and to leave
a deserl in front of us if we advance.... Carefullyestimatillg
all my stores I find that I have bnrely enough to last for five
days in hand. We are menaced with absolute famine, which we
can only avoid by moving off, and there is no suitable canton-
ment to be found in the whole space between Tagus and
Guadiuna: the entire country is ruined.'
Joseph and Jourdan replied to the first of these dismal letters
by promising to send the lst Corps 800,000 rations of biscuit,
ilnd by urging its commander to renew his attack on Alcantara,
in order to threaten Portugal and 'disengage the Dukc of
Dalmatia '-who, on the day when their dispatch was written,
was at Lugo, in the norlh of Galicia, some 300 miles as the
crow flies from Victor's head quarters 1. They received the
answer that such a mO\'e was impossible, as Mayne had just
blown up the bridge of Alcantara, and it was now impossible to
cross the Tagus 2.
A few days later the news arrh·ed at Madrid that Soult had
been defeated and flung out of Portugal'. It had taken three
weeks for information of this transcendent importance to reach
the king! Seriously alarmed, Joseph and Jourdan sent Victor
his long-denied permission to retire from Estremadura and
place himself behind the Taglls. They do not seem to have
guessed that the \·ictorious Wcl1csley would make his next
move against the 1st Corps. but imagined that he would
debouch into Old Castile by way of Rodrigo and Salamanca,
wherefore their main idea was to strengthen Mortier and the
army in the valley of the Douro 4. Thus it fell in with their
"ie\\"s that Victor should draw back to the line of the 'fagus,
a general concentration of all the French troops in the Peninsula
seeming advisable, in face of the necessity for resisting the sup-
I Jourdan to Victor, June 1.
I Victor to Jourdan, June 8. Oddly enough he was wrong in his
stat.ement by two days, for Mayne blew up the bridge on the tenth only.
s June 10, Joseph to Napoleon.
• Cf. Joseph'6 letters of JUlle 10 and JUlle 16 to Napoleon: hut there
8Elelllll to be much vacillation in his decisions.
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posed attack on Old Castile. Another reason for assuming
tl defensive attitude was the gloomy news from Al'agon, where
Suchet, after his defeat at Alcarnz, had retired on Saragossa
and was sending despairing appeals for reinforcements to
~lailiid.
Acconlingly, the ht Corps evacuated Estremadura between
the fourteenth and the nineteenth of June, and, crossing the
Tagus, disposed itself in a position on the northern bank, with
its right wing at Almam.z llnd its left at Talavera. Here Victor
intended to make his stand, being confident that with the
broad river in front of him he could easily beat off any attack
on the part of' the Spanish army.
But when Wellcslcy and Cuesta first began to correspond
concerning their joint movement against the French in Estre·
Madura, Victor was still in his old cantonments, and their scheme
of operations had been sketched out on the hypothesis that he
lay at Merida, TOrTemocha, and Caceres. It was with the design
of assailing rum while he still held this advanced position, that
Cuesta drew up rus paper of answers to "rellesley's queries and
dispatched it to Abrantes to meet the British general on his
arrival!.
If the old Captain-General's suggestions were by no means
marked with the stamp of genius, they hud at least the merit of
variety. He offered \Vellesley the choiec between no less than
three plans of campaign. (1) His first proposal was that the
British army should descend into Southern Estremadura, and
join him in the neighbourhood of Badajoz. From thenee the
united host was to advance against Victor and assail him in
front. But meanwhile Cuests. proposed to send out two sub·
sidiary columns, to turn the Marshal's flanks and surround him.
One was to base itself on Alcantara and march along the
northern bank of the Tagus to seize Almarnz: the other was
to push by La Serena through the Guadalupe mountains to
threaten Talavera. By these operations, if Victor would be
good enough to remain quiet in his present cantonments,
he would be completely surrounded, his retreat would be cut
I Cue8ta's replies, sent on by Bourke, are dated June 4 and June 6,
i. e. ten and eight days respe<:tively before Victor began his retreat beyond
the Tagll$ on June 14.
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off, and he would finally be compelled to surrender. The
scheme was of course preposterous. 'Vhat rational man could
have supposed it likely that the Marshal would remain quiescent
while his flanks were being turned? He would c::ertainly
have hastened to retire and to throw himself upon the detached
columns, onc or both of which he could have annihilated before
the main armies of the allies could get within touch of him I,
Wellcsley refused to listen for tl moment to this plan of cam·
paif,1Tl. C~) The second proposal of Cuesta was that the British
army should pass the Tagus at Alcantara and operate against
Victor's flank, while the Spanish anllY attacked him in front.
'1'0 this the same objection could be W'gcd: it presupposed that
the Frenchman would remain fixed in his present cantonments:
but he certainly would not do so when he heard that he was to
be ~sailed on both flanks; he would retire behind the Tagus at
once, and the British army would have wasted its march, and be
obliged to return to the north bank of that river: moreover, it
would involve a very long movement to the south to get in
touch with Victor's flank. Probably it would be necessary to
descend as far into Estremadura as Caceres, and, when that
point was reached, the .Marshal could make the whole manreuvre
futile by retiring at once behind the Tagus at Almaraz. To
follow him to the north bank the British would have to retrace
their steps to Alcantara..
The third proposal of Cl,lcsta-the only one in which
\Velleslcy could find any prospect of success, was that the
Dritish army, keeping north of the Tagus, should march by
Custello Branco all Plascncia. There it would be in the real'
1 Wellesley writes in commenting on this plan [Wellington J)i.I-patchu,
iv. 402]: < At all event!> these two detachment!> on the two fianks appear
to me to be too weak to produce any great effeet upon the movements
of Victor.. . I think it would be nearly certain that the Marshal would
be able to defend the passage [of tIle Tagus) with a part only of his force,
while with the other part he would beat one or. both of the detachments
sent round his flank. Indeed the detachment which should have been
sent from La. Sarcua toward Talavera, being between the corps of Victor
and Scbastiaoi, could hardly escape,' Well08ley also points out that it is
uscICS!I to e"pL'et tlmt Victor would wait ill his present cantonments: at
the first news of Ul(~ approach of the British army he will retire to
Almarnz and Arzobispo. .
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of Victor's best line of retreat by the bridge of Almartl.z. If
the manreuvre could be kept very secret, and executed with
great speed, Almaraz, perhaps also the subsidiary passage ~t
Ar7.0bispo, might be sei1.ed. Should the Marshal get earl>' news
of the movement, und hurry back across the Tagus to fend ofl'
this stab in the rear, W'"elleslc)' was prepared to fight him in
the open with equal forces, conceiving that he was' sufficiently
strong to defend himself against any attack which Victor might
make.' He hoped that Cuesta was able to guarantee that he
also was competent to hold his own, supposing that the Marshal,
neglecting the British diversion, should concentrate his corps and
strike at the Spanish army.'
On the whole, therefore, Wellesley was not disinclined to fall
in with this plan, which had the extra merit of remaining feasible
e\'en if Victor withdrew norlh of the Ta..,ous before either of the
allied armies had completed its march. He made Olle counter-
suggestion, viz, that Cuesta might move eastward, with the
whole or part of his army, join the army of Venegas in La
i\lancha, and attack Sebastiani, leaving the British alone to
deal with Victor, But he did not wish to press this plan, think·
ing that an attack on the enemy's left was on first principles
less advisable than onc on his right, because it did not offer
any chance of cutting him off from Madrid I,
The answer to Cuesta's proposals was sent off from Abrantes,
which We11esley, preceding his army by three or four days'
mareh, reached upon Junc B, Hc had uow under his hand
?lla.ckenzie's Anglo-Portuguese force, hut the leading brigades
of the troops who had fought at Oporto could not arrive before
the eleventh or twelfth, There was thus ample time to concert
the joint plan of campaign before the whole arlllY would be
coneentrated and ready to move, But when Cuesta's reply to
the dispatch of June B came to hand upon June 13, Wellesley
was much vexed to find that the old Captain-General had
expressed a great dislike for the idea that the British army
should march upou Plasencia and Almaraz-though it had been
oue of his own three suggestions. He now pleaded urgently in
r!l\'our of the first of his original alternatives-thatWellesley
1 I print as an Appendix this all-important letter to .BourkeJ regarding
Cuesta's throo plaus of campaign.
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should come down to lladajoz and join him in a frontal attack
upon Victor. With much reluctance the British general
resolved to comply, apparently moved by his ally's openly
expressed dislike to being left to face Victor alone. 'I must
acknowledge,' he wrote to Colonel Bourke, 'that I entertain no
apprehension that the French will attack General Cuesta: I am
much more afraid that they are going away, and strengthening
themselves upon the Tagus l .' To the Spanish General he sent
a dispatch to the same eWeet, in which lIe pledged himself to
march to join the army of Estremadura, though he frankly
stated that all his information led him to believe that Victor
had no intention of taking the ofl'ensh'c, and that the junction
was therefore unnecessary. He expressed his hope that Cuesta
would avoid all fighting till they had met, the only possible
danger to the alliL-d cau9C being that one of the two armies
should suffer a defeat before the other had started on the com~
billed movement to which they were committed 2.
Fortunately for all parties concerned, the Illarch on Dadajo7.
which Wcllcsley SO much disliked never had to be begun, for on
the day after he had sent off his dispatch to Cuesta he received
reliable information from several sources, to the effect that Victor
had eVf!.Cuated and blown up the fortified convent of Merida,
and had sent off all his baggage and heav)' artillery towards
Almaraz, During the next four days the whole of the Ist Corps
marched for that all~important bridge, and crossed it. On the
nineteenth Victor had established his entire army north of the
Tagm., at Almar8.7" Arzobispo, and Talavera. Thus the whole
face of affairs was changed, llnd the advance of the British army
into Southern Estremadura was rendered unnecessary. It was
fortunate that the news of the retreat of the 1st Corps was
received at Abrantes just in time to allow of the coulltermand·
ing of the march of 1Vellesley's army on Badajo7., for that fruit~
less movement would have begun if the Duke of Belhmo had
been able to retain his starving army in its positions for 0. few
days longer.
J Welles1ey to Bourke, from Abrantes, June 14.
J Wellesle)' to Cuesta., from Abrantee, June 14.
SECTION XVI: CHAPTER 11
WELLESLEY E~'TERS SPAIN
ThE retreat of Victor beyond the Tagus forced 'Wellesley to
conceIt yet another plan of operation with Cuesta, since the
position of the French army, on which the whole of the r~el1t1y
adopted scheme depended, had just suffered a radical change.
It was clear that every consideration now pointed to the nere~sity
for adopting the combination which 'Wellesley had urged upon
,his coUeague in his letter of June 8, viz. that the British army
should move on Pluscncia and Almamz. It would IlO\\' be strik·
ing at the 'flank instead of the rear of Victor's corps, but it was
clear that under the new conditions it would still be in a position
to roll up his whole army, if he should endeavour to defend the
passages of the Tagus against the Spaniards, who were now
approaching them from the front. For Cucsta 'had descended
from the mouutains when be heard of Victor's retreat, and WM
now approaching Almaraz,
It took some time, however, to induce the Captain-General to
consent to this move, To the extreme vexation of his colleague
he produ<.-'Cd other plans, so gratuitously impractiCf.l.ble that
Wellesley wrote to Castlcrcn.gh to say that he <.-"Quld <'-"QIl<.-'Civc no
explanation for the old man's conduct save a desire to refuse
ally scheme urged on him by others, 'and a resolve to invent and
advocate alternative plans of his own out of mere pride and
wrongheadedness, 'The best of tllC v/holc story,' he added 1.
was that Cuest.a was now refusing, to accept a plan which
he himself had suggested in one of his earlier letters. merely
because that plan had been taken up and ad\'ocated by his
ally> 'The obstinacy of this· old gentleman,' he concluded, 'is
I Wellesley to Castlereagh, Abralltes" June 17. The real cause of
Cuesta's angry and i~practicab1e attitude will be shown iu tbe next
chapter.
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throwing out of our hands the finest game that any armies
ever had 1.'
The necessity for working out a new sc4cmc for the combined
operations of the British and Spanish armies, in view of Victor's
retreat to Almaraz., entailed the loss of a few days. It would
have been impossible to start on the advance to Plasencia till
Cuesta had promised to accept that movement llS part of the
joint campaign. There was also some time to be allowed for
concluding an agreement with Venegas, the General of the
La Carolina army, whose COllllcxioll with the campaign must
become much more intimate, now that the fighting was to take
place not in Estremadura, but further north, in the valley of the
Tagus. For while Victor lay at Merida and Sebastiani at 1I.[anm-
nafCS amI Ciudad Reol, the Spanish forces which faced them were
very far apart. But when Victor retired to Talavera, and Sebas~
tiani to Madridejos, in the end ofJune, Cuesta and Venegas-each
following the corps opposed to him---could draw closer together.
It was evident that the Andalusian anny ought to be made to
play an important part in the combined operations of July.
It would be unfair to the Spanish generals to let it be supposed
that the necessity fOl" settling on a common scheme of operations
with them was the sole cause whieh detained Wellesley lit
Abrantes from the eighth to the twenty-seventh of June. The
leading brigades of the British troops from Oporto had begun
to reach Abralltcs on the eleventh, and the more belated
columns came up Oil the fourteenth and fifteenth. Dut it would
have been impossible to have moved forII'llI'd without some
further delay, even if 'Yellesley had been in possession of a com-
plete and satisfactol)' plan of operations on the day upon which
his whole force was concentrated on the line of the Zezere. At
the least be would have required anothel' week for preparations.
His hindrances at this moment wer(! manifold. The first was
the distressed (.'oudition of those of his brigades which bad seell
most service d?cing tlie aporia campaign, Many regiments
had been constantly on the march from l\fay 9 to June 14, with~
out obtaining more than two days' rest in the whole time,
Their shoes were worn out, their jaded baggage-animab bad
dropped to the rear, and they were leaving so many stragglers
1 Wellesley to Frere from the same pla.eel June H.
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on the way that it was absolutely nece~sary to give them
a moderate rest at Abrantes, in order to allow the ranks to,
grow full and the belated baggage t9 come up. The regiments
which had followed &resford in the forced march from.
Amarante to Chaves were worst off-they had never completely
recovered from the fatigues of those three days of constant rain
and storm spent on the stony roudsof the Tras,os4Montcs I, In
any case some delay must have occurred before all the troops
were ready to march. But many circumstances conspired to
detain the anny at Abrantes for several days after the moment
at which 'Wellesley had determined to start fol" Plasencia. The
first was the non-arrival of convoys of shoes and clothing which
he had ordered up from Lisbon. The transport of the army
was not yet fully organi7.ed. its officers were lacking in experience.
if not in zenl, and ordcrs were slowly executed. Many corps
had, in the end, to start for Spain without I'e<.'eiving the much-
needed stores, which were still trailing up from Santarem to
Abmntes when 'Vellesley gave the signal to advance. Another
hindrance was the lack of money; thc army wus obliged to pay
for its wants in coin, but han! cush was so difficult to procure both
in London and in Lisbon that arrears were already beginning to
grow up. At first they vexed the soul of· Wellesley almost
beyond endurance, but as the war dragged on they only grew
worse, and the Commander~in~chiefhad to endure with resigna-
tion the fact that both the pay of the men and the wages of the
Portuguese muleteers and followers were overdue formanymonths.
In June 1809 he had not yet reached this state of comparath'c
callousness, and was cndeavouriJlg to scrape together money by
every possible device. He had borrowed 213,000 in Portuguese
silver from the merchants of the impoverished city of Oporto: he
was trying to exchange bills on England for dollars at Cadi7.,
where the arrival of the American contribution had produced
a comparative plenty of the circulating mcdiull1. Yet after all
1 With regard to these regiments [o/GOth, 2/87th, l/88th), Wellesley
writes in very bitter terms to Doukin on June 10, saying that the number
of their stragglers was seandaloWl, and that tlle laggards were. committing
1111 manner of ilisonlcn; ill the re:J.r of the army. Tt is ftlir to remember
that the battalions had Buffered exceptional hanlships, as may bo seen
from the narratives of Gough of the 8ith, and Grattall of the 88th•
• g2
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he had to start from Abrantes with only a comparatively
moderate sum in liis military chest I, the rest had not reached
·him on June !ea, the treasure convoy. having taken the uncon-
scionable time of ele\'en days to cmwl forward from Lisbon to
Abrantes-a distancc ofno more than ninety miles 2.
A third cause of delay was the time spent in waiting for
reinforcements from Lisbon. Eight or nine regiments had
landed, or were cxpec:tcd to arrive within the ncxt few days.
It was in every way desirable to unite them to the army before
the campaign should begin. Tl'his was all the more necessary
because several corps had to be deducted from tne fi::ll'Ce which
had been used. in the Oporto campaign. Under stringent ordcrs
from home, WellesJey had'sent back two infantry battalions
and part of tw,o cavalry regiments to Lisbon. to be embarked
for'Gibraltar and Sicily 3. In return he WllS to receive a much
largcr body of troops. Blit while the deduction was immediate,
the addition took time. Of all the troops \\llich were expected
to reinforce the army, only one battalion caught him up at
Abrantes, while a second and one regiment of Light Dragoons ~
joined later, but yet ill time for Talavera. 11ms at the com-
mencement of the actual campaign the force in the field wa.~, i'f
anything, slightly less in numbers than that which .ha.d been
available in :May. It was particularly \'exations that the
brigade of veteralllight infantry, for which Wellesley had made
a special demand on Castlereagh as early as April, did not reach
Abrantes till long after the army had moved forward. These
three battalions, the nucleus of the famous Light Division '\
1 The main convoy only reached Abrantei when Wellesley had advanced
to l'lasencia, in Spain. Sce letter to the officer commanding Artillery
at Castello Br3nco, dated July 8, from l'lasencia.
~ Cf. \Vellesley to Frare, June 14, to Commissary.General l\Iurray,
June 16, both from Abralltes, and to CastIereagh, June 27.
s The' 2j9th and 2j3Oth were sent to Gibraltar in May. The two
sqnadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons and the one squadron of the ani
Hussars of the K. G. L. were sent to Sicily at the same time.
• TIle IJ48th, Ij61l!t, alld 23rd Ligbt Dmgo01l8.
& Ij43rd, Ij62nd, Ij{J6th. Of these tllT(,'e unii$ only l/43rd 11Ild been
in Robert Cranfurd's old brigade, duriug tbe march to Sahag«n. The
other two had been in Anstruther's hrigade of Psget's reserve; they had
therefore fought at Corunna, while Craufurd and the' flank brigade' which
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had all gone throngh tlw e.'i:periences of l\loore's campaign, and
were Ollec more under their old leader Robcrt Crauful'd.
Detained by baffling winds in the Downs, the transports that
bore them only reached Lisbon at various dates between Jun~
!l8 and July fl, though they had sailed on May 25. Their
indefatigable brigadier hurried them forward with all speed to
the front, but in spite of his e.xerlions, they only came up
with the main army after the day of battle was over. The
same was the fate of two batteries of horse artillery I_an arm
in which 'Vellesle)" was wholly de6eient when he mar,ched into
Spain. They arrived late, and were still far to the rear when
the march from Abrantes began.
It thus resulted that although there were m'er 83,000 Dritish.
troops in the Peninsula at the commencement of July 1809,
less than 21,000 could be colll.'<:ted for the advallce on Plnsencill
which was now about to begin. More than a,roo men lay at
Lisbon, or were just starling .from that city, while 4,500 were
in hospital 2. The sick seemed more numerous than might
have been expected at the season of the year: though the
fatigues of the Oporto campaign accounted for the majority of
the invalids, yet Wellesley was of opinion that a contributory
cause might be found in the slack discipline of certain regiments,
where inefficient commanding officers had neglected sanitary
precautions, Ilnd allowed their men to neglect personnl cleanli..,
ness, or to indulge to excess in, wine and unripe fruit and
,-egetables. It was his opinion that the' number of men in
hospital should never exceed ten per c~llt. of the total force.
Eut all through the war h.e found that this proportion was
exceeded.
incl»des the 1/43rd, had been detached from the main army and had
embarked at Vigo. •
I A and I troops. The first joined in company with CraufuM. The
~ond only appeared muc]. later.
~ Writing to Castlereagh ou June 30, Wellesleyremarks that' according
to your account I have 35,000 men-according to my own I have only
18,000; but this was before lIe llad been joined by the 1/6lat, the 23rd
Dragoons, and certain details. It is certain, from Ule careful roble of
troops engaged at Ta]avel'\l. which is to be fowld in the Rccor(l Officc,
that somewhat over 22,000 men entered Spaiu, and Utat after deducting
!>iek left at Plasencia and elsewhere, just 20,600 fought at Talal'era.
454 WELLESLEY ENTERS SPAIN (Jurn-: 28
With the internal condition of many of his regiments Welles-
ley was far from satisfied. His tendency to use the plainest,
indeed the harshest, terms concerning the rank and file, is 80
well known that we are not surprised to find him writing that
'the arlllY behn~·c terribly ill: they arc n rabble who cannot bear
success any more than Sir John Moore's army could bear
failure I.' He complained most of aU of the recruits sent him
from the Irish militia, who wcre, he said, capable of every sin,
moral or mi1ita~. Though he was 'endea\'ouring to tame the
troops,' yet there were several regiments in such had order that
he would gladly have sent them home in disgrace if he could
ha"c spared a man. The main offencc, of course, 'vas robbery
of food from the Portuguese peasn.ntry, often accompanied by
violence, and now and then by murder. The number of assist-
llnt-provost-marshals was multiplied, some offenders were caught
and hunged, but marauding could 110t be suppressed, cvcn while
the troops were receiving full rations in their cantonments at
Abrantes. Wben they were enduring real privation, in the
wilds of Estremadura, matters gtew much worse. Thongh
llIany regiments were distinguished for their good behaviour,
yet there were always some whose excesses were a disgrace to
the British anny. Their Commander never shrank from telling
them so in the most incisive language; he was always complain-
ing that he could llot get a sufficient number of t.he criminals
. flogged or hanged, and that regimental court-martials were far
too lenient in their dealings with otfenders 2•
It was at Abrantes that WeHesley first arranged his army in
divisions, aud gave it the organization which, with certain
modifications, it was to maintain during the rest of the war.
His six regiments of ClI.valry were to fonn a single division
consisting of one heavy and two light brigades, commanded
respectively by Fane, Cotton, and Anson. 'fhe twenty-five
1 These topics occur in DlallY dispatches to Castlereagh. Perhaps t}le
most notable is that of May 31, 1809, written at OJimbra.
! 'Vellesley's anxiety to make examplea may be traced in tlle series
of letters concerning a primte of the 29th which occur in his July
dispatchea. TIle man had been acquitted by a court-martial on the
ground of illsauit)', but tliis did uot satisfy Hie OJrnmander-in-cIiief, "'ho
sends repeated orders that tlLl,! awanI must be revised, alld tIle man, if
pmsiblc, exeeuu..'tl.
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battalions of infantry were distributed into four divisions of
lUlequal strength under Generals Sherbrookc, Hill, Mackenzie,
and A. Campbell. Of these the first was by far the Inrgcst,
'Counting four brigades of two battalions each: the first (Henry
Campbell's) was fonned of the two battalions of Guards, the
second (Cameron's) of two line regiments, the third and fourlh,
under Low and LUlgwerth, comprised the infaJltry of the King's
German Legion. The second and third divisions cw.:h consisted
of two brigades of three battalions each I. The fourth, and
weakest, showed only five battalions in line. Of artillery there
were only thirty guns, eighteen English and twelve German:
all were field-batteries, os nonc of the much-desired horse
l,Uiillery had yet reached the front 2. They were all of very
light calibre, the heaviest being a brigade of heavy six-pounders
belonging to the German Legion.
Oil June 28 the army at last moved forward; tha~ day the
head qun.rters were at Cortir.;ada, on the Sobreira Fonnosa.
On the thirtieth Castello Branco, the last Portuguese town, was
reached. On.July:3 the leading brigades passed the Elga, the
frontier river, and bivouacked o.n the same night around Znrza-
la~Major, the first place in Spanish Estremadurn. At the
same time Sir Robert 'Vilson's small colulllll of 1,500 Portu-
guese crossed the border a little further north, and advanced in
a direction parallel to that of the main anny, so as to serve as
a flank guard for it in the direction of the mountains.
King Joseph meanwhile was in a state of the most profound
ignorance concerning the impending storm. As late as July 9
he wrote to his brother that the British had not as yet made
any pronounced movement, and that it was quite uncertain
whether they would invade Galieia, or strike at Castile, or
remain in the neighbourhood of Lisbon S! On that day the
hend of the British army had entered Plasencia, and was only
125 miles from Madrid. It is impossible to give any better
testimonial than this simple fact to the way in which the insur~
gents and the guerrillas served the cause of the allies. Wellesley
1 Viz. 2nd, Ti1son and Richard Stewarl; 3rd, Mackenzie and Donkin;
4th, A. Campbell and Kemmis.
t A and I batteries R.. H. A. were both late for Talavera.
3 Josepll to Napolooll, from Talavera, Jul)' 9, 1809.
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had be€n able to march from Oporto to Abrantes, and from
Abrantes to Plasencia, without even a rumour of his advance
reaching Madrid. All that Joseph had learnt was that there
was now an allied force of some sort behind Alcalltara, in the"
direction of Castello Brnnco. He took it for granted that they
were Portuguese, but in one dispatch he broaches the theory
that there might be a few English with them-perhaps from
having heard (l. vague report of the composition of Mackenzie's
division on the Zezere in l\-Iay. He therefore wrote in a cheer-
ful tone to the Emperor that' if we have only got to deal with
Cuesta and the Portuguese they 'V;ill be beaten by the 1st Corps.
If they have some English with them, they can be beaten
equally well by the 1st Corps, aided by troops which I can send.
across the Tagus via Toledo' (Le. the"5,000 or 6,000 men of
the Central Reserve which could be spared from Madrid). 'lam
not in the least disquieted,' he continued, 'concerning the
present condition of military affairs in this part of Spain 1.' In
another epistle to his brother he added that' if the English
should be at the back of Cllestn, it would be the happiest chance
in the world for the concluding of the whole war 2.'
It was lucky for the King that he was not induced to try the
experiment of falling npon \Vellesley and Cuesta with the
28,000 men of Victor and the Central Reserve. If he had done
80, he would have suffered a frightful disaster and have lost
Madrid
In the end of June and the first days of July Joseph's main
attention had been drawn ofi-' to that part of his front wnere.
thCl'C was least danger, so that he was paying comparatively
little heed to the movements of the allies on the lower Tagtls.
He had been distracted by ll. rash and inexplicable movement of
the Spanish army of La :Mancha. When General Venegas had
heard of the retreat of Victor from Estremadurn, and had been
informed that Cuesta was about to moye forward in pursuit of
the 1st Corps, he had concluded that his own troops might also
advance. He argued that Scbastiani and the 4th Corps must
I Joseph to Napoleon, from Mmagro, July 2, 1809.
2 Joseph to Napoleon, from Madridejos, July 3, 1800. It is fair to the
King to sny tlJat ill this letter ILc concludes that be had better call Mortier
down into Nc\\" Castile if the ElIglisll are really on the move.
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bent n. retreat, when their right filUlk was uncovered by Victor's
el'RcuatiOIl of the valley of the Guadian&. He was 'partly
justified in his idea, for Joseph had drawn back Sebastiani's
main body to l\Iadridejos when Victor abandoned Merida. It
was safe therefore to advance from the Despefia Perms into the
southern skirts of La Mancha, as far as Manzanares and the line
of the Guadianll., But to go further forward was dangerous,
unless Venegas was' prepared to risk a collision with Sebastiaui.
This he was certainly not in EL condition to do: his troops had
not yet rcco\'eroo from the moral eff€(:ts of the rout of Ciudad.
Real, and his brigades were full of new battalions of untried
Al).da.lusian reserves. He should have been cautious, and have
refused to move without concerting his operations with Cuesta;
to have had his corps put lum de combat at the very beginning
of the joint campaign of the allied armies would have been. most
disastrous.
Nevertheless Venegas came down from the passes of the
Sierra Morena with 18,000 infuntry, 3,000, horse, ulld twenty~
Ijix guns, and proceeded to thrust back Sebastiani's camlry
screen and to push in hh outposts in front of Madridejos.
The French general had in hand at this moment only two
infantry divisions and Milhaud's dragoons; his third division
and his light cavalry were still absent with Victor, to whom
they hOO been lent in March for the campaign of Moocllin..
But with 13,000 foot and ~,OOO horse 1 he ought not to have
feared. Venegas, and could have given a good account of him
had lie chosen to attack. nut ha.ving receiYed exaggerated
reports of the strength of the Spanish army, he wrote to ~e
King that he was beset by nearly 40,000 men and must be
reinforced at once, or he would have to fall back on Madrid 2'.
Joseph, fully believing the news, sent orders to Victor to restore
to the 4th Corps the divisions of Leval and MCl·]jn, and then,
doubting whether these troops could arrive in time, sallied out
1 The July strength of Sebastiani's corps, prtUIlt8 8QU8 k8 Grille" was
1st division (French) 6,U8, 2nd division (Valence's l'oles) 4,704, Milhaud's
dragoons 2,249-total15,Hil.
, Joscpb to Napoleon, from 11l~, JUlle 23: 'Le general Sebastiani
n de"Rut lui des forces triples des siennes.' Joseph to Napoleon, from
Morol, July 1: < L'armee de 36,000 il. 40~OOO Ilolllmes qui memurait le
4"'° Corps a'est enfuie et 8 reJlft£llC la Sierre Morena.'
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of Madrid on June ~~ with his Guards and half the division of
Dessolles-nbout 5,500 men.
It was lucky for Venegas that Scbnstiani had refused to fight
him, but still more lucky that the news of the King's approach
reached him promptly. On hearing that Joseph had joined the
4th Corps on J line fl5 he was wise enough to tum on his heel
and retreat in all haste towards his lair in the passes of the
Sierra Morena. If he had lingered any longer in the plains he
would have have been destroyed, for the King, on the arrival of
Leval's and Merlin's division~, would have fallen upon him at the
head of fl7,OOO men. As it was, Venegas retired with such
promptitude to Santa Cruz de ::M:udela, at the foot of the passes,
that the l"rench could never catch him. Joseph pursued him
as far as Almugro and El Moral, on the southern edge of La.
l\Iancha, and there stopped short. He had received, on July ~,
a dispatch from Victor to the effeet that Cuesta had repaired
the bridge of Almaraz and begun to cross the Tagns, while
a body of 10,000 allied troops, presumably Portuguese, had
been heard of in the' direction of Plasencia 1. (This was in
reality the whole army of Wellesley!) Rightly concluding that
he had pushed the pursuit of Venegas too far, the King turned
back in haste, left Scbastiaui and the 4th Corps behind the
Gnadiana, and returned with his reserve to Toledo, in order to
be in a position to support Victor. His excursion to Almagro
had been almost as reckless and wrongheaded as Venegas's advance
to Madridejos, for he bad separated himself from Victor by a gap
of flOO miles, at the moment when the British anny was just
appearing on the Marshal's flank, while Cuesta was in his front.
If the allied generals had concentrated their forces ten days
earlier-a thing that might well have happened but for the
vexatious delays at Abrantes caused by Cnesta's impracticabiHt),
-the 1st Corps might have been attacked at the moment when
Joseph lay at the foot of the Sierra l\forena, in a position too
:remote from Talavera to allow him to come up in time to
succour Victor.
While the King was absent on his expedition in pursuit of
Vellegas the most important change in the situation of affairs
1 for all this see Joseph to Napoleon, from Moral [July 1], and from
Almagro [July 2J,
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on the Tagus was that the Duke of Belluno had drawn back
his troops from the line of the 'l'agus, where they had been
I),ing since June ]9, and had retired behind the Alberche.
His retreat was not caused by any apprehension as to the
appoornnce of 'Wellesley on his flank-a fact which was com-
pletely concealed from him-but by sheer want of provisions.
On June 25 he sent to the King to say that his army was again
starved out of its cantonments, and that he had eatcn up in
a week the small remnant of food that co~d he squeezed out
of the counb')'.side between the Tagus and the 'rictal', and was
forced to transfer himself to another region. 'The position,'
he wrote, 'is desperate. The 1st Corps is 011 thE: eve of dissolu.
tion: the men are dropping down from mere starvation. I have
nothing, absolutely nothing, to give them. They are in a state
of despair.... I am forced to fall back all Talavera, where there
are no more re50mces than here. ,"Ve must have prompt succour,
but where can it be found? If your Majesty aoondous me in my
present wretched situation, I lose my honour, my military reeord
-everything. I shall not be to blame for the disaster which
menaces my troops, but I shall have to bear the blame. To-
morrow I shall be at Talavera, waiting your Majesty's orders.
The enemy [Cuesta] has a pontoon-train: if he wishes to cross
thc Tagus he can do so, for the Ist Corps can no longer remain
opposite him. Never was there t\. more distressing situation
than ours I.'
On June ~6, therefore, Victor transferred himself to Talavera,
and adopted a position behind the Alberche, after burning the
materials of the late pontoon bridge at Almara7., which he had
taken up and stored ill case they might again be needed. His
movement was a lucky one for himself, as it took him further
awa)' from Wellesley's army, which was just about to start from
Abrantes with the object of turning his flank. It puz,ded Cuesta,
who sought for some other explanation of his dcp(uturc than
mere starvatioll, and was very cautious in taking advantage
of it. However, on the day after the French had withdrawn,
he pushed troops across the Tagus, and prepared to construd
I Victor to King Joseph, from the head quarters of the 1st Corps,
Calzada, near Oropesa, June 26. Intercepted dispatch in the RC(:ord
Office.
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another bridge at Almaraz to replace that which the French
had destroyed. His cavall)' pushed out to Navalmoral and
Oropesa, and fm-thcr to the east he passed some detachments
of infantry acros."the bridge of Ar'lObispo, which Victor-most
unaccoWltabl)'-had left intact. Fortunatel)' he did no' more,
-\lnd refrained from advancing against Talavers, a step which
from his earliel' l"C<.'Ord wc should judge that he might well hu\'c
taken into consideration.
On the part of the allies things were now in a state of suspense
from which they were not to stir' for a. fortnight. Cuestn was
waiting for 'Vellesley, 'Vcllesley was pushiug forward from
Zarza-la·Major to join Cuesta. Venegas was recovering at
~llta Cruz de Muclela from the fatigues of his fruitless e.'\':pedi-
lion into La Mancha.
But 011 the French side matters suffered a sudde.n change in
the last days of July-the hand of the Emperor was stretched
out from the banks of the Danube to alter the gellel'ill disposi-
tions of the tmny of Spain. On June 12 he had dictated at
Schonbrunn a new plan of campaign, based on information
which was already many weeks old when it reached him. At,
this date the Emperor was barely aware that Soult was being
pressed by 'Wellesley in Northern Portugal. He had no detailed
knowledge of what was taking place in Galicia or the Asturias,
{l,nd was profoundly ignorant of the intrigues at Oporto which
afterwards roused his indignation. Dut he was convinced that
the English army was the one hostile force in Spain which ought
to engage the attention of his lieutenants. Acting on this 1xllief
he issued an order that the ~nd, 5th. and 6th Corps-those of
Soult, MOliier, and Ney-were to be united into a single army,
and to be told off to the task of evicting Wellesley from POl'-
tuga!. They were to put aside for the present aU such subsidiary
enterprises as the subjection of Ga1icia and the Asturias, and to
deyote themselves solely. to 'beating, hunting down. and casting
into the sea the British army. If the three Corps join ill good
time the enemy ought to be crushed, und then the Spanish war
will come to an cnd. But the troops must be moved in masses
a.nd not march in small detachments. . .. Putting aside all
personal considerations, I give the command of the united army
to the Duke of Dalmatia, as the senior marshal. His three
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Corps ought to amount to something between 50,000 and
60,000 men I,'
This dispatch reached King Joseph at El Moral in La Mancha
on July 1, and Soult at Zamora on July~. It had been drawn
up in view of events that were taking place about Ma:y 15.
It presupposed that the 'British army was still in Northern
Portugal, in close touch with Soult, and that Victor was in
Estremadura 2• Ai> a matter of fact Soult was on this day
leading his dilapidated corps dOlI1l the Esla, at the end of his
retreat from Gll.licia. Ne)', furiollil at the way in which hi;> col~
lellooue had deserted him,·had descended to Astorga three days
before. Morlier ,i,ss at Valladolid. just about to march for
Vi~-Castin and Madrid, for the King had determined to draw
him down to aid in the defence of the capital. Finally, Cuesta,
instead of lying in the Sierra :.\forena, as he was when Napoleon
drew up his orders, was now on the 'l'ac"lls, 'l\Tiile Wellesley was
no longer in touch with Soult Oll the Douro, but preparing to
fall upon Victor in New Castile. The whole situation WitS
so changed that the commentary which the Emperor appended.
to his orders was hopelessly out of date-as was always bound
to be the case so long as he persisted in endeayouring to direct
the course of affairs in Spain from the suburbs of Vienna.
SOlut was overjoyed at receiving the splendid charge which
the Emperor's decree put into his hands, though he mllst 'have'
felt secret qualms at the idea that ere long some aceo~llt of his
doings at Oporto must reach the imperial head quarters and
provoke his master's wrath, There was a bad quarter of an hour
to come s, But meanwhile he was given a formidable army. and
might hope to rctrieyc the laurels that he Imd lost in Portugal,
being now in a position to attack the British with an over-
whelming superiority of numbers. [t must have been specially
1 Napoleon to Clarko [i\Iinisoor of Wnr), from SChUlIllr\lllll, Junc'12,
1909.
1 TIle Emperor's dispatch contained many rebukcs to Victor for not
pushing towards the North, to join hands with Soult, Jourdan vcry truly
remarks that if the 1st Corps had been sent in that direction, King Joseph
must infallibly have lost Madrid.
I 'nle Emperor's stormy dispatch came iu due course, but only ill
September, see pp. 276-7.
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delightful to him to find that Ney had been put under his orders,
$0 that he would be able to meet his angry colleague in the
character of a superior officer dealing with an insubordinate
lieutenant.
Soult's first action, on finding himself placed in command
of the whole of the French forces in North-west.ern Spain, was
to issue orders to Monicr to march on Salamanca, and to Ney to
bring the 6th Corps down to Benavente. These dispositions
clearly indicate an intention of falling upon Ciudad Rodrigo
and ~o\lmeida, and assailing Northern Portugal-the plan which
the Duke of Dalmatia had broached. to the King in his letter
from Puebla de Senll.bria on June :!5. befllre he had received
the news that the 5th and 6th Corps had been added to his
command.
It is clear that 011 July 2 Soult had no knowledge of'VVellesley's
movements, and thought that the British army was quite as
likely to be aiming at Salamanca as at Madrid. It is also
evident that he was aware that he would be unable to move for
some weeks. Till the 2nd Corps should have received the
clothing, munitions, and artillery whicll had been promised it,
it could not possibly take the field for the imasion of Portugal.
Soult, therefore, was obliged to wait till his stores should be
replenished, and till the two corps from Astorga and Valladolid
should concentrate on his flanks. It was while he WI\S remaining
perforce in this pooture (If expectation that the news of the real
condition of affairs in New Castile was at last brought to him.
SECTION XVI: CHAPTER HI·
WELLESLEY Al\T)) CVESTA
IT was not till the third day of July that "\Vellesley had been
able to cross the Spanish border. Since Victor had assumed his
new position to the north of lheTagus as early as the nineteenth
of the pre<:eding month, there was a perilous fortnight during
which Cuesta and his army were left alone to face the French.
All through this time of waiting, the British Commander-ill-chief
was haunted by the dread that the old Captain~Gencral might
repeat his earlier errors, and once more-as at Rio Seco and
Medellin-court a pitched battle. Wellesley had done his best
to urge caution, by letters written not only to Cuesta himself,
but to his Chief-of-the-staff' O'Donoju and to Colonel Roche,
who had now replaced Dourkc us British representative at the
head quad.ers of the Army of Estremadura. Fortunately they
were not needed: the Spanish General was for once cautious:
.he followed Victor at a respectful distance, and when he had
.reached the Tagus and repaired the bridge of Almaraz, held
back his army to the southern bank and only pushed a few
small detachments beyond the stream to search for the enemy.
Since the French had withdrawn to Tala\'era on June 26 there
was no collision. The cavnlry of the Ist Corps were discovered
upon the upper TietAr and the Alberche, but they preserved
a defensive attitude, and the Spaniards did not provoke them
by any rash attempt to drive them back upon their main
body. All remaim..od quiet, as 'Wellesley had rather desired than
expected.
Cuesta's strategical position, therefore, was perfectly se<:ure.
since he kept his main body to the south of the river, and showed
no desire to meddle with Victor before the arrival of the British,
At this moment military allairs were not the only things that
were engaging the attention of the old Cuptain-General. He
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was watching with considerable anxiety the course of events at
Seville, where he was aware that he had many enemies. Ever
since his high-handed. action against the deputies cif Leon in the
preceding autumn, he knew that the Central Junta, and especially
its Liberal wing, viewed him with suspicion and dislike. It
was with great reluctance that 'they had placed. him in command
of the Estremaduran army, and if ~e had not been popular
with the Conservative and clerical party and with some of the
military cliques, he would not have retained his post for long.
At this moment there were many intrigues stirring in Andalusia,
and if some of them were directed against the Jun~ others had
no other end than the changing of the commanders of the
various armies. Wbile the Junta were debating about fonlls'
of government, and especially about the summoning of a national
Cortes in the autumn, there were a number of officers of
damaged reputation whose main ob,iect WW:l to recovel' the
military rank of which they had been deprived after misfortunes
in the field. Infantado, who thought that it was absurd that
he should have been disgraced after Uc1es, while Cucsta had
been rewarded after i\'ledcllin, was at the hend of one, party of
intriguers, which included Francisco Palafox and the Conde de
Montijo, and had secured the aid of Colonel Doyle, late British
agent in Aragoll and Catalonia, an officer who showed. a lllmellt·
able readiness to throw himself into the intestine quarrels of the
Spanish factions 1. Their actions went to the very edge of high
treason. for Montijo stirred up a riot at Granada on April 16,
attacked the provincial Iluthorities, Ilnd almost succeeded in
carrying out a pronulIciamiellto which must ha\'e led to civil war.
The Juntil. did no more than banish him to SaIl Lucar, from
which place he continued his plots with Infantado, in spite of
the warning that he had received.
In Seville, faction if not so openl}' displa>'ed was equally
violent. There was, as we have already said, a large soct.ion
of the Junta whose dearest wish woulq. have been to displace
Cuesta: it was they who had obtained the nomination of Venegas
1 Doyle, as biB numerous letters in the Record Office show, was such
a furious p....rtisan of the family of Palafox, that he belie,·oo that all tile
Spanish authoritiClj were ill a conspiracy to keep them dOII'"fi. He especially
hated .Blakc.
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to take charge of the troops in La Mancha, merely because he
was known to be an enemy oftbe elder general. Yet since the
two annies would have to co-operate in any attempt to recover
Madrid, it was clearly inexpedient that their commanders should
be at enmity. Some of the politicians at Seville were set
on giving high command to the Duke of Albuquerque, an
energetic and ambitious officer, but one gifted y\ith the talent
of quarrelling with every superior under whom he served: he
was now bickering with Cuesta just as in March he had bickered
with Cartaojal. The Duke was a great admirer of all things
English, and a personal friend of Frere, the British minister.
The latter did his best to support his pretensions, often
expressing in official correspondence with the Junta a desire
that Albuquerque might be given an independent corps, and
entrusted with the charge of the movement that was to be
concerted in conjunction with WeJIesley's army.
But it was not so much Albuquerque il8 WeUcsley himself
that Cuesta dreaded as a possible successor. For Frere was
possessed with the notion that the time had now arrived at
which it would be possible to press for the appointment of
a single Commander-in-chief of all the Spanish armies. The
obvious person to fill this post was the victor of Vimiero and
Oporto, if only Spanish pride would consent to the appointment
of a foreigner. Frere had sufficient sense to refrain fmm openly
publishing his idea.. But he was continually ventilating it to
his private friends in the Junta, in season and out of season.
There can he no doubt that both from the mili~ and the
political point of view the results of Wellcsley's exaltation to
thc position of Gcncmlissimo would havc becn excellent. If he
had controlled the whole of the Spanish armies in the summer
of 1809, the course of affairs in the Peninsula would have taken
a very difterent turn, and the campaign of Talavera would not
have been wrecked by the hopeless want of co-opemtion between
the allied armies. But it was not yet the time to press for
the appointment: great as Wellesley'g reputation already was,
when compared with that of any Spanish general, it was still
not so splendid or so commanding as to compel assent to his
promotion I. Legitimate national pride stood in the way. and
1 On June 9, lo'rere writes to tell WeJlesley that if he could only. have
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even after Espinosa., and Thdela, and Medellin the Spaniards
could not believe that it was necessary for them to entrust the
whole responsibility for the defence of their country to the
foreigner. Only a few of the politicians of Sc"i1le showed any
liking for the project. We11esley himself would have d,esired
nothing so much as this appointment, but being wiser and less
hopeful than Frere, he thought it useless to press the point.
Mien the sanguine diplomat wrote to him, early in June, to
detail his attempts to bring home the advisability of the project
to his Spanish friends, the general's' reply was cautious in the
extreme. 'I am much flattered,' he said, 'by the notion entcr~
tained by,some of the persons in authority at Seville, of appoint~
ing me to the command of the Spanish armies. I have received
no inst.ruction from GoveMlment upon that subject: but I
believe that it was (.'Onsidered an object of great importance ill
England that the Commander~in-chiefof the British troops
should have that situation. But it is one more likely to be
attained by refmining from pressing it, and leaving it to the
Spanish themselves to discover the expediency of the arrange-.
ment, than by any suggestion on our parts.' He concluded h)'
informing Frere that he could not conceive that his insinuation
was likely to havc any effect, and that the opinion of the British
Minist~y was probably correct-viz. that at present national
jealousy made the project hopeless '. \
Now it was impossible that F'rere's well-meaning but mistaken
endeavours should escape the notice of Cuesta's fricnds in Seville.
The British Minister had spokcn to so many politicians on the
subject, that we cannot doubt that his colloquies were promptly
reported to the Captain-General of Estremadura. This fact
goes far to explain Cuesta's surly and impracticable behaviour
towards Wellesley during the Talavera campaign. He disliked
his destined colleague not only because he was a foreigncr, and
because he showed himself strong-willed and outspoken during
destroyed Soult at O!lorto, inlltcad of merely chasing him across the
frontier, it would have been possible to !lOOure him the post of (}(:nct'8lissiruo
at once. This chance had gone by, hut' your friends here (amoug whom
you may count Mr. de Gars)") are doing their best for you: (Rerord
Office, from Seville, June 9,1809.]
1 Wellington to Frere, from Abrantes, June 10, 1809.
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their intercourse, but because he believed that the English-
man was intriguing behind his back to obtain the post of
Generalissimo. This belief made him determined to assert his
independence on the most trifling matters, loth to fall in with
even the most reasonable plans, and suspicious that every pro-
posal made to him concealed some trap. He attributed to
'Vellesley the design of getting rid of him, and was naturally
determined to do nothing to forward it.
The English officers who studied Cuesta's conduct from the
outside, during the Tala\'era campaign, attributed his irrational
movements and his hopeless impracticability to a mere. mixture
of pride, stupidity, and obstinacy. They were wrong; the
dominant impulse was resentment, jealousy, and suspicion-a
combination far more deadly in its results than the other. He
awaited the approach of Wellesley with a predisposition to
quarrel and a well-developed personal enmity, whose existence
the British general had not yet realized.
We have dealt in the last chapter with the strength and
organization of the British arm~' at the moment when Wellesley
crossed the frontier on .July 3. It remains to speak of the two
Spanish armies which were to take part in the campaign. 'Ve
have already seen that Cuesta's host had been reinforced after
Medellin with a new brigade of Granadan levies, and tl. whole
division taken from the army of La Mancha 1. Since that date
he had received large drafts both of infantry and cavalry from
Andalusia. Six more regiments ofhorse had reached him, besides
.reinforcements for his old corps. All were now strong in num-
bers, and averaged between 400 and 500 sabres, so that b.y the
middle of June he had fully 7,000 mounted men under his orders.
Eight or nine additional regiments of infantry had also come to
hand since April-some of them new Andalusian levies, others
old corps whose cadres had been filled up since the disaster of
Ucles. His infantry counted about 35,000 bayonel:8, divided into
I I can nowhere find the date of the transference, but it took place
,before July: the old regiments of Calatrava, Sagunto, Aleantara, and
Pavia, which were with Venegas's army in March, had been transferred to
Cnesta's by June, as also the new regiments of Sevilla, and Cazadores de
Madrid. My ffi06t valuable source of information is au unpublished
dispatch of CUe!lta's ill Ule Madrid 'Var Office, which gives all the lIames
of regiments, but not their uumbers. .
.h'
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five di\'isions and a 'vanguard': the latter under Zayas was about
4,000 strong, each of the others exceeded 5,000. The cavalry
formed two divisions, under Heuestrosa and Albuquerque, one
composed of seven, onc ofsix regiments. There were thirty guns-
some of heavy calibre, nine- and twelve-pounders-with about
800 artillerymen. The whole army. inclusive of sick and
detached, amounted to 42,000 men, of whom perhaps 36,000 were
cfficicnb present with the colours 1.
The second Spanish anny, that of La Mancha under Venegas,
was much weaker, having furnished heavy detachments 1!'
reinforce Cuesta before it took the field in June. Its base was
the old' Army of the Centre,' which had been commanded by
Castanos and Infantado. Some twenty battalions that had
seen service in the campaign of Tudela were still in its ranks:
they had been recruited up to an average of 500 or 600
bayonets. The rest of the force was composed of new Anda-
lusian regiments, raised in the winter and spring, some of which
had taken part in the rout of Ciudad Real under Cartaojal,
while others had never before entered the field. The gro!$ total
of the annyon June 16 WM 26,298 men, of whom 3,388 were
cavalry. Deducting the sick in hospital, Venegas could dispose
of some !!3,OOO sabres and bayonets, distributed into Dve
divisions. The horsemen in this army were not formed into
separate brigades, but allotted a.~ divisional cavalry to the
infantry units. There was little to choose, in point of efficiency,
between the Estremaduran army and that of La Mancha; both
contained too many raw troops, and in ooth, as was soon to be
proved, the bulk of the cavalry was still as untrustworthy as it
had shown itself in previous engagements.
The Spaniards therefore could put into the field for the CAm~
paign of July on the 'I'agus some 60,000 men. But the fatal
want of unity in command was to prevent them from co-ordin-
ating their movements and acting as integral parts of a single
army guided by a. single will. Venegas was to a certain degree
supposed to be under Cuesta's authority, but as he was con-
tinually receh'ing orders directly from the Junta, and was
I These totals ma.y be regarded 119 certain, being drown from tile 11ispatch
ofCuesta's alluded to above, which 1was fortunate enough to find at Madrid.
Unfortunately no regimental figures are given, only the gross totaL
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treated by them as an independent commander, he practically
was enabled to do much as he pleased. Being a personal enemy
of Cuesta, he had every inducement to play his own gnme, and
did not scruple to do so at the most important crisis of the
campaign,----covering his disregard of the directions of his senior
by the easy pretext of a desire to execute those of the central
government.
On July 15, the day when his share in the campaign corn·
menced, the head quarters of Vcnegas were at Santa Cruz de Mu-
deIa, just outside the northern exit of the Despella Perros. His
outposts lay in front, at El Moral, Valdepenas, and Villanueva
de Ins Infantes. He was divided by a considerable distance-
some twenty-five miles-from the advanced cavalry ofSebastiani's
corps. whose nearest detachment was placed at Villaharm, where
the high-road to Madrid crosses the river Giguela.
Meanwhile we must return to'Vellesley, who having crossed
the frontier on July 3, was now moving forward by short
marchE!$ to Plasencia. On the fourth the head quarters were
at ZarUl, la Mayor, on the sixth at Coria, on the 5Cventh at
Galisteo; on the eighth Plasencia was reached, and the general
halted the army, while he should ride over to Almaraz and
confer in person with Cuesta on the details of their plan of
campaign. In the valley of the Alagon, where the country was
almost untouched by the hand of war, provisions were obtain:
able in some quantity, but every Spanish informant agreed that
when the troops dropped down to the Tagus they would find
the land completely devastated. Wellesley was therefore most
anxious to organize a, great depOt of food before moving on:
the local authorities professed great readiness to supply him,
and he contracted with the Alcaldes of the fertile Vera de
Plascncin for fl50,OOO rations of flour to be delivered during the
Ilcxt ten days 1. Lozano de Torres, the Spanish commisslil'y-
general sent by the Junta to the British head quarters, promised
his aid in collecting the food, but even before ,,,ellesley de-
parted to visit Cuesta, he had begun to conceive doubts whether
supplies would be easily procurable. The difficulty Wll.'l want of
b:nDliport-the army had marched from Portugal with a light
equipment, Md had no carts to spare for scow-ing the country-
1 Welles1ey to Frcre, Welling/on JMpldchu, iv. 624.
,
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side in search of flour. The General rad relied on the assurances
sent him from Seville to the effect that he would easily be able
to find local trUllsport in the intact regions about Coria and
Plasencia: but he was disappointed: very few carts could be
secured, and the store of food in the possession of the army
seemed to shrink rather than to increase during every day that
the army remained in the valley of the Alagon, though the
region was fruitful and undevastated. It is certain that the
British commissaries had not yet mastered the art of gathering
in provisions from the country.side, and that the Spanish local
authorities could not be made to understand the necessity for
punctuality and dispatch in the delivery of the promised supplies.
On July 10 Wellcsley started off ",'ith the head-quarters
staff to visit Cuesta, at his camp beyond the bridge of Almaraz,
there to concert the details of their joint advance. O\\'ing to
an error made by his guides he arrived after dusk at the hamlet
below the Puerto de Mirabete, around which the main body of
the Anny of Estremadura. was encamped. The Captain-General
had drawn out his troops in the afternoon for the inspection of
the British commander. ·When at last he appeared they had
been four hours under arms in momentary expectation of the
arrival of their distinguished visitor, and Cuesta himself, though
still lame from the effect of his bruises at Medellin. had sat on
horseback at their head during the greater part of that time.
Two admirable accounts of the review of the Estrcmadurall
host in the darkness were written by members of Welleslcy's
staff. It is well worth while to quote one of them I, for the
narrative expresses with perfect clearness the effect which the
sight of the Spanish troops made upon their allies;-
'Our arrival at l the camp was announced by a general dig..
charge of artillery, upon which all immense number of torches
were made to blaze up, and we passed the entire Spanish line in
review by their light. The effect produced by these arrange-
ments was one of no ordina.ry character. The torches, held
aloft at moderate intervals, threw a red and wavering light o\'er
the whole scene, permitting at the same time its minuter parts
I That of Charlea Stewart (Lord Londonderry) on pp. 382-3 of the first
volume of hie HilJtory of[he Pl!11i118Ular War.
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to be here and there cast into the shade, while the grim and
swarthy vi5ao0'eS of the soldiers, their bright arms and dark
uniforms, appeared peculiarly picturesque as often as the flashes
fell upon them. Nor was Cuesta himself an object to be passed
by without notice; the old man preced~ 11S, not so much
sitting upon his horse lIS held upon it by two PBhcres, at the
imminent risk of being overthrown whenever a cannon was dis-
charged, or a torch flamed out with peculiar brightness. His
physical debility was so observable as clearly to mark his
unfitness for the situation which he heleL As to his mental
powers, he gave us little opportunity of judging, inasmuch a.s
he sC8rt.ocly uttered five words during the continuance of our
visit: but his corporal infirmities were ever at absolute variance
with all a general's duties.
•In this way we passed by about 61000 cavalry drawn up in
rank entire, and not less than twenty battalions of infantry,
each of 700 to BOO bayonets. They were all, without exception,
remarkably fine men. Some indeed were very young-too
young for service-parHcularly among the recruits who had
lately joined. But to take them aU in all, it would not have
been easy to find a stoutcr or more hardy looking body of
soldiers in any European service. Of their appointments it was
not possible to speak in the same terms of commendation.
There were battalions whose arms, accoutrements, and even
clothing might be pronounced respectable 1: but in general
l As to the equipment of tile Spauiards, the following quotation from
Leslic (po 135) may be worth giving: 'Thoir wlifonns werc of every
variety of colour, the equillment and appointments of the most inferior
description. One could not but Illmcnt these dcfects, for the mcn were
remarkably fine, possessing all the essential qualities to make good
soldiers-courage, patience, and sobemes1!. Their officers, in general,
were the very reverse! The line infantry were in blue uniforms with
rod faciogs. The Provincial Corps, called "Volunteers," were mostly
dressed in the brown Spanish cloth of the country, with green or yellow
facings. Some had chakoes, others broad-brimmed hats with the rim
turoed np at ooe side: all had cap-plates of tin announcing their de6igna.
tion. Some had belts, others none. They had no pouclles, but a broad
halt of soft leather, in which were placed a row of tin tubes, each llOlding
D CDrtridgc, with a fold of leather to co\'cr them, fastened round the
waist. Thc cavalry were he.'L"Yand lig1Jt. dragoons, with &clllC regimcnt8
of Hussars. Some were tolerably well dressed, in blue or yellow uniforms
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they were deficient, particularly in shoes. It wall easy to per-
ceive, from the attitude in which they stood, and the manner
in which they handled their arms, that little or no discipline
prevailed among them: they could not but be regarded as raw
levies. Speaking of them in the aggregate they were little
better than bold peasantry, armed partially like soldiers, but
completely unacquainted with a soldier's duty. This remark
applied to the cavalry as much as to the infantry. Many of
the horses were good, but the riders manifestly knew nothing
of movement or of discipline: and they were on this account,
as also on that of miserable equipment, quite unfit for service.
The generals appeared to have been selected by onc rule alone
-that of seniority. They were almost all old men, and, except
O'Donoju and Zayas, evidently incapable of bearing the fatigues
or surmounting the difficulties of a. campaign, It was. not SO
with the colonels and battalion commandel'St who appeared to
be )'oung and active, and some of whom were, we had reason to
believe, leaming to become skilful officers. . . . Cuesta seemed
particularly unwilling that any of his generals should hold any
serious conversation with us. It is true that he presented them
one by one to Sir Arthur, but no words were exchanged on the
occasion, and each retired after he had made his bow,' Albu-
qucrque, of whom the Captain-General was particularly jealous,
had been relegated with his division to Arzobispo, and did not
appear on the scene. •
The all-important. plan of campaign was settled at a long
conference-it lasted for four hours-on the morning of the
following day. According to all uccounts the scene at the inter-
view must have been curious. Cuesta could not, or would nut,
speak French: Wellesley was not yet able to express himself
fluently in Spanish. Accordingly, O'Donoju, the chief of the
staff of the Anny of Estremadum, acted as interpreter between
them, rendering Welleslcy's views into Spanish and Cuesta's into .
English. The greater part of the discussion consisted in the
. bringing forward of plans by the British commander and their
rejection by the Captain-General. Cuesta was full of suspicion,
with red faciugs. Some had boots, bl1tmo1'(\ long leather leggings,coming
up above the knee. The horses were small, active, and hardy, of the Spanish
Barbary breed.'
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and saw a trap in every proposal that was made to him: he
imagined that Wellesley's main object was to edge him out of
the supreme command. He was almost silent throughout the
interview, only opening his lips to give emphatic negatives, for
which O'Donoju proceeded to nnd ingenious and elaborate
explanations.
It was not the principles on which the campaign was to be
conducted, but the details of the distribution of the troops on
which the trouble arose. The enemy's position and force 'was
fairly well known to both generals, ex<''ept in one all-important
particular. They were aware that Victor lay behind the
Alberche with not much more than !'i!2,OOO men, that Sebastiani
was at Madridejos with a somewhat smaller force 1, and that
King Joscph with his central reserve, which ~ey over-estimated
at 12,000 men, was able at any moment to join the Ist Corps.
Hence they expected to find some 34,000 :French troops at
Talavera, and rightly considered that with the 55,000 men of
their two armies they ought to give a. good account of them.
Seba'stiani, as they supposed, might be left out of the game, for
~upa.tion for him would be found by the army of La Mancha,
which was to be told off for this purpose and directed to cling
to the skirts of the 4th Corps and never to lose sight of it.
As Venegas would have, according to their ca.lculations, nearly
double the numbers of Sebnstiani, he would have no difficulty in
keeping him in check.
But it was not only on the French troops in New Castile that
watch had to be kept. It was necessary to take into account
the enemy beyond the mountains, in thc valley of the Douro.
The allied generals were aware that Mortier a.nd Soult must
both be considered. The former they knew to be at Valladolid,
and they had learnt that King Joseph was proposillg to bring
him down towards Madrid-as was indeed the fact. AccordiI.gly
they expected that he might turn up in !l. few days somewhere
in the direction of AvHa. Soult they knew to be at Zamora,
and from the dispatches captured with General Franceschi ten
days before, they had a good knOWledge' of' his force and
intentions. A study of these documents led them to conclude
I 11leyestimated him at only 10,000 mell, but he had really 20,000.
Wellcsley to Castler~h, July 1o, from Plasencia.
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that he could not move for many weeks, owing to the dilapi-
dated state of his corps-which he had. painted in the most
moving terms in his letters to King Joseph 1. They also
gathered that if he moved at all, he would be inclined to
threaten Northern Portugal or Ciudad Rodrigo: in the dis-
patches cs.ptured with Franceschi he had named llragan1.a as
a point at which he might strike. Accordingly they opined
that he need not be taken very seriously into consideration,
espedally as he was wholly destitute of artillery 2, Yet he
might be drawn into the field by the news that Madrid was in
danger, If he were induced to bring help to the Killg, he
would almost certainly work by making a diversion against the
communications of the Dritish army, and not by directly joining
himself to Joseph's army b)' the long and circuitous m8.reh from
Zamora to Madrid, To carry out such a diversion he would be
obliged to cross the lofty Sierra de Franda by one of the passes
which lead from the SalalllUllcLL region into the valley of the
1 Soult had written [from Puebla de Senabria, June 25]: <Je me propose
de reposer les troupea trois ou quatre jOUnl: pendant cc tcrnps clles se
prepareront des subsistances, on raceommotlera la chauss.ure, les chCI'auz
serout ferrEfs, et je menacerai de uouveau le Portugal: peut-etre memc
je ferai faire une incursion vetS Bragance, ann d'operer une dil'ersion qui
ne peut pas manquer de produire quelque effet. •.. Je me fais preceder
A Zamera (all je compte etre rendu le 2 juillet) par: l'ordonnateur
Le Noble, qui dait reclamer pres l'intendant-general de l'armee des
moyellB en tout genre qui me manqucnl- tol que l'habillement, chauElOIlre,
ambulance, offieicrs de s:mM, IIdministrntioll, transport lI\ilitaire, payeurs,
argent pour solde et d6llCnses extraonlinaires, postes etc. J'ai l'hollllellr
de supplier Votre MajesM de daigner donuer des ordrCll pour qll'i! wit
fait droit a ses demandes : mes belKlills IKInt tri:s grands..• , 11 Ya plus
de cinq mois que je n'ai refiu ni ordre, ni nouvelle, ni seCOUl'S, par conse-
quent je dois manquer de beaucoup de choses.'
~ Wellesley's views at this moment appear in his correspondence, e. g.
to Mr. Villiers, Julr 8: <J defy Soult to do Beresford or Portugal any
injury as long as his army is in its preseut situation-or any amelioration
of that situation which can be produced in a short period of time.' To
Bere8ford, July 9: 'I have no apprehellsioll tl13.t Soult will he ahle to
do allYthing with llis corps for some time, but I tl1iuk tl13t colwlln ought
to be waWhed.' To Beresfonl, .July 14 : 'I do IIOt believe that Noy has
quitted Galicia, at lea.st wo have not heard that he has. 80ult can do
nothing against l'ortugal, for he is in a most miserable state, without
arms, artillerr or ammunition, stores, &c.'
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Alagon-perhap!l by the defile of Perales, but much more
probably by the better known and more practicable pass of
BaTios. Wellesley took the possibility of this movement into
serious (:onsideratioll, but did not think that it would be likely
to cause him much danger jf it should occur, for he believed
that Soult would bring with him no more than the 15,000 or
18,000 men of his own !2nd Corps. That he ....·ould appear not
with such a small force, but with Ney and Mortier in his wake,
leading an army of 50,000 bayonets, did not enter into the mind
of the British commander. Mortier was thought to be moving
in the direction of AviIa: Ney was believed to be contending
with the Galician insurgents in the remote regions about Lugo
and Corunna. The news of his arrival at Astorga had not yet
reached the allied camps, and he was neglccted as a ftlCtor in
the situation. 'Wellesley and Cuesta had no conception that
any force save that of Soult was likely to menace their northenl
flank and their line of communications when they committed
themseh'es to their advance on Madrid. To provide against
a possible movement of the !!nd Corps into the valley of the
Tagus, therefore, all that was necessary was to hold the defiles
of Perales and Dallos. The former had already been seen to,
for e\'en before the meeting of WeUesley and Cuesta, Carlos
d'Espafia had blocked it with two or three battalions drawn
from the garrison of Ciudud Rodrigo. For the latter Wcllesley
hoped that Cuesta would provide n sufficient garrison 1. The
old Captain-General promised to do so, but only sent 600
men under the Marquis Del Reino, a wholly inadequate
detachment 2.
WeUesley's first proposal to hi!! Spanish 'colleague was Umt
the main bodies of both armies should advance against Victor,
while a detachment of 10,000 men should move out to the left,
in the direction of Avila, to look for Mortier, if he were to be
1 'Vellesley to lleredord, July 9: 'I have not forgotten either the
Puerto de Da60s or the Puerto de PeraJes, and have called UpOll Cuelrta lo
occupy both. The former is.already held, and the lalter will be so in a day
or two.' [This was unfortunately nol to be tIll" CallC.]
t I cauuot diliCover the names of the two very weak battalions, the
smallest in Cucsta's army, which were detached for this purpose under
Del lteino. 1110y are not the same as the two battaliolls which joiued
Wilson (Merida lIud 2rd of Seville).
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found in that direction, and if not to turn the enemy's right
and threaten Madrid. He hoped that Venegas and the army of
La l\Ianchn might at the Sllme time move forward against
Sebastiani, and keep him so fully employed that he would not
be able to spare a man to aid Victor and King Joseph.
Cuesta at once refused to make any detachment in the direc-
tion.of Avi]a from his own army, lmd suggested that Wellesley
should nnd the 10,000 men required for this diversion. The
English general objected that it would take exactly half his
force, and that he could not split lip such a small unit, while
the Spaniards could easily spare such a number of troops from
their total of 36,000 mell. This argument failed to move
Cuesta, and the project was dropped, Wellesley thinking that it
WaB not strictly necessary, though very advisable I.
The only flanking force which was finally set aside for opera-
tions on the left wing, for the observation of the French about
Avila and the feint at Madrid, consisted of Sir Robert "Vilson's
1,500 Portuguese, and a corresponding body of two battalions
and onc squadron from the Spanish army 2-al,xmt 3,500 men in
all. It played a part of some little importance in the campaign,
but it is hard to see that it would have e.'l:ercised any dominant
influence even if it had been raised to the full strength that
\VeUesley had desired. Mortier. as a matter .of fact, was not
near Avila, and so the 10,000 men sent in tlLis direction would
not have served the end that the British general expected. The
5th Corps had been called off by Soult, contrary to the wishes
of the Killg, and no body of troops was needed to contain it,
all this part of the theatre of war. It was ultimately to appear
at a very different point, where no provision bad been made for
ibl reception.
1 Wellesley to Frere, July 13: 'You will see, in the accompanying
letter, an aCcoUllt of my endeavour to prevail on General CU68ta to make
8 detaehment upon Avila. I agree with you that it would be 8 great
ad\·811~e from a military point of view .•. lIut J InuBt at the same time
inform you that 1 do oot consider the mo'·ement to be 7lUUMIry 118 a
military measure.' .I"rere and Wellesley had hoped that JUbuquerque
might be placed in command of this large detacbment, and might distinguish
himself at its head.
. I Battalions of Merida (1,170 bayonets) and 3rd of Seville (810
bayonets).
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Far more important were the arrangements which We11esley
and Cuesta made for the diversion on their other flank. It was
from the miscarriage of this operation, owing to the wilful
disobedience of the officer charged ,dth it, that the failure of
the whole campaign was to come about. They agreed that
Venegas with the 29,000 men of the army of La Mancha, was
to move up the high-road from his position at Santa Cruz de
.l\fudela, and drive Sebastiani before him. Having pushed back
the 4th Corps to the TaguSt VenegtlS was then to endeavour to
force the passage of that river either at Aranjuez or at Fuente-
duefias, and to threaten Madrid. It was calculated that
Sebastiani would be forced to keep between him and the
capital, and would be unable to spare a man to reinforce Victor
and King Joseph. Thus Wellesley and Cuesta with 56,000
men would close on the King and the Marshal, who could not.
have more than 35,000, and (as it was hoped) defeat them or at
least IDanomvre them out of Madrid. A glance at the map will
show one peculiarity of this plan: it would ba\'e been more
natural to bid Venegas march by the bridge of Toledo rather
than by those of Amnjuez and FuentedueJ1as; to use the latter he
would have to move towa.rch his right, and to separate himself
b.y a long gap from the main army of the allies. At Toledo he
would be within thirty-five miles of them-at Aranjuez seventy,
at Fuentedueiias 100 miles would lie between him and the
troops of Wellesley and Cuesta.. It would appear that the two
gencrals at their colloquy came to the conclusion that by ordering
Venegas to use the eastern passages of the Tagus they would
compel Sebastiani to remove eastward also, so that he would be
out of supporting distance of Victor. They recognized the bare
possibility that Sebastiani might refuse to devote himself to the
task of holding back the anny of -La Mancha, might leave
l\~adrid to its fate, and then hurry off to join the King and the
1st Corps in an-assault on the main Anglo-Spanish army. In
this case they settled that Venegas should march on the capital
and sei:r.e it, a mo~e which (as they supposed) would force Joseph
to turn back or to rc-divide his army 1. But it is clear that
1 All these details as to the joint plan are better expressed in Cuesta's
Apologetie Munifuto, published after his resignation, than in Wcllesley's
JNpatchu to Castlereagh and frere.
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they did not expect to have to 6ght Victor, the King, and
Sebastiani combined, as they were ultimately forced to do at
Talavera on July !itS. They supposed that Venegas would find
occupation for the 4th Corps, and that they might count on
finding only the Ist Corps and Joseph's Madrid reserves in front
of them.
'Vhen armies arc working in a joint operation from separate
bases it is all-important that they should time their mo\'cments
with the nicest exactitude. This 'Vellesley and Cuesta attempted
to secure, by sending to Veoegaa an elaborate time-table. He
was ordered to be at Mndridcjos on Jul)' 19, at Tembleque on the
twentieth, at Santa Cruz de la Zarza on the twenty-first, and
at the bridge of Fuentedueiias on the twenty~secondor twenty-
third. All this was on the supposition that Sebastiani would
have about 12,000 men and would give groWld whenever pressed.
If he turned out by some unlikely chance-presumably by having
rallied the King's reserves-to be much stronger, Venegas was
to manceuvre in the direction of Tarancoll, to avoid a general
action, and if ne(:essary to retreat towards the Passes from which
he had started. It would be rather an advantage than other~
wise if (contrary to all probability) the French had concentrated
their main force against the army of La Mancha, for this
would leave Victor helpless in front of the uuited hosts of
Wellesley and Cuesta, which would outnumber him by two
to Olle.
'Vhat the allied generals never expected was that Veuegas
would let Sebastiani slip away from his front, without any
attempt to hold him, and would then (instead of marching on
Madrid) wa.'lte the critical days of the campaign (July 24-29)
in miserable delays between Toledo and Aranjuez, whcn there
;was absolutely no French field-force between him and Madrid,
nor any hostile troops whatever in his neighbourhood save a weak
division of 3,000 men in garrison at Toledo. 'l'he failure of the
Talavera campaign is due even more to this wretched indecision
and disobedience to orderS on the part of Venegas than to the
eccentricities and errors of Cuesta-. If the army of La Mancha
had kept Sebastiani in check, and refused to allow him to
abscond, there would have been no battles on the Alberche on
July 27-28. for the l'rench would never have dared to face the
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Anglo.Sptlniards of the main host without the assistance of the
4th Corps.
But to retUnl to the joint plan of Wellesley and Cucsta: on
July ~3, the day on which Ven~rras was to reach Fuenteduei'ias
(or Aranjuez) the 56,000 men of the grand army were to be
assailing Victor behind the Alberche. The Ddtish were to cross
the Tietar at Bazagontl. on the eighteenth and follow the high-
road Navalmoral-Oropesa. The Estremadurans, passing the
Tagus at Almaraz and Arzobispo, were to move by the parallel
route along the river bank by La Calzada and Calera, which is
only five or six miles distant from the great chau88~e. Thus the
two armies would be in close touch with each other, and would
not be caught apart by the CIlCm}", On reaching Tala\'era they
were to force the fords of the Alberclie and fall upon Victor in
his cantonments behind that stream. Sir llobert Wilson and the
5,500 men of his mixed Spanish and Port~lguese detachment
were to mov·e up as the flank.guard of the allied host, and to
push by the head waters of the Tietar for Escalona on the side-
road to Madrid 1. -
Criticisms of the most acrimonious kind have been brought
to bear on this plan by English, French, and Spanish writers.
Many of them are undeserved; ill particular the tritest objec·
tiou of all, made e;c pod facto by those who only look at the
actual course of the campaign, that Wellesley was exposing his
communications to the united forces of Soull, Ney, and Mortier.
There was on July 10, when Cuesta and Wellesley met, no
reason whatever for apprehending the contingency of the march
of the three marshals upon Plasencia. Soull, as his own letters
of June 25 bore witness, was not in a condition to move-he
had not a single piece of artillery, and his troops were in dire
need of rest and re·equipment. Ney was believed to be at
COrllnua or Lugo-Sonlt's intercepted dispatches spoke of the
6th Corps us being destined to remain behind in Galicia, and he
(as the allied generals snpposed) ought best to have known what
his colleague was about to do. How could they have guesse<l
that., in wrath at his desertion by the Duke of Dalmatia, Ney
would e,'acuate the whole kingdom, abandon fortresses like
1 Cuesta's and Wellesley's accounts of their joiut plan on the whole
agree wonderfully well.
~ WELLESLEY AND CUESTA [Jmll
FerroI and Coronna, Md march for Astorga.? Without Ne)"s
corps to aid him, Soult could not possibly have marched on
Plasencia-to have done so with the flnd Corps alone would
have exposed him to being beset by Wellesley on one side and
by Beresford on the other. As to MOTtier and the 5th Corps,
Cuesta. and 'Wellesley undervalued their strength, being unaware
that Kellermann had sent buck from the Asturias the division
that had been lent him for his expedition to Oviedo. They
thought that the Duke of'l'reviso's force was more like 7',000
than 17,000 bayonets, and-such as it was-they had the best
of reasons for believing that it was more likely to march all
,Madrid by Avila than to join Soult, for they had before them
an intercepted dispatch from the King, bidding MOTtier to move
down to Villacastin in orde~ to be in supporting distance of the
capital and t~e 1st Corps.
On the whole, therefore, the two generals must be excused for
not foreseeing the descent of 50,000 men upon their communi-
cations, which took place three weeks after their meeting at the
bridge of Almaraz: the data in their possession on July 10 made
it appear most improbable.
A much more valid criticism is that which blames the method
of co-operation with VenegM which WM employed. 'Double
external lines of operations' against an enemy placed in a
central position are notoriously perilous, and the particular
movement on Fuenteduei\as, which the army of La Mancha was
ordered to execute, was one which took it tlS far as possible from
Wcllesley's and Cuesta's main body. Yet it may be urged ill
their defence that, if they had drawn in Venegas to join them,
they would have got little profit out of having !i!S,OOO more
Spaniards on the Alberche. Sebastiani on the other hand, who
could join Victor at the same moment that the corps from La
Manchll. joined the allies, would bring some 17,000 excellent
troops to Talavera. The benefit of drawing in Venegas would
be much less than the disadvantage of drawing in Sebastiani to
the main theatre of war. Hence came the idea that the army
from the Passes must be devoted to the sole purpose of keeping
the 4th Corps M far as possible from the Alberche. Even
knowing that Venegas was hostile to Cuesta, and that he was
a man of no mark or capacity, ·Wellesley could not have expected
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that he would disobe)' orders, waste time, and fail utterly in
keeping touch with Sebastiani or threatening Madrid.
The one inoeparable fault in the drawing up of the whole plan
of campaign was the fundamental one that Wellesley had under~
taken to co-operate with Spanish armies before he had gauged
the weak points of the generals and their men. If he had
held the post of commander·in-chief of the allied forces, and
could have issued orders that were obeyed without discussion, the
case would have been different. But he had to act in conjunc·
tion with two colleagues, one of whom was suspicious of his
intentions and jealous of his preponderant capacity, while the
other deliberately neglected to carry out clear and cogent orders
from his superior officer. Cuesl:a.'s impracticability and Venegas's
di!lObedience could not have bccn foreseen by onc who had no
previous experience of Spanish armies. Still less had Wcllcsley
realized all the defects of the Spanish rank and file when placed
in line of battle. That he did not hold an exaggerated opinion
of their merits when he started on the campaign is shown by
letters which he wrote nine months before 1. But he was still
Wider the impression that, if cautiously handled, and not exposed
to unnecessary dangers, they would do good service. He had
yet to witness the gratuitous panic of Port&go's division on the
eve of 'l'alavera, and the helplessness of the Spanish cavalry a.t
the combats of Gamonal and Arzobispo. After a month's
experience of Cuesta and his men, Wellesley vowed never again
to take part in grand operations with a Spanish general as
his equal and colleague. This was the teaching of expe-
rience-and on July 10 the experience was yet to come.
The interview at the bridge of Almaraz had not been very
satisfactory to 'Vellesley, but it was far from having undeceived
him as to the full extent of the difficulties that lay before him.
He wrote to }rere at SeviUe that he had been on the whole
well received, and that Cuesta had not displayed any jealousy
of him. As that sentiment was at this moment the predomi-
nant feeling in the old ffilUl'S breast, it ,is clear that he had
succeeded in hiding it. But the obstinate silence of Wellesley's
colleague bad worried him. O'Donoju had done all the talking,
and 'it was impossible to say what plans the general entertains.'
I SeE! Wellingt.on to Castlerea.gh, from Ramalha1, Sept. 1808.
O.J.N. II I i
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Hc was moreover somewhat perturbed by the rumours which
his staff had picked up from the Estremaduran officers, to the
effect that Cuest.a was so much the enemy oC the Centrlll.runta
that he wa.s plotting a prmlUllC'iamiento for its deposition 1. As
10 the fighting powers of the Spanish army, Wellcsley wrote to
Castlereagh that 'the troops were ill clothed but well armed,
and the officers appeared to take pains with their discipline.
Some of the corps of infantry were certainly good, and the
horses of the cavalry were in~ condition.' Only ten days
later he was to utter the very different opinion that' owing to
their miserable state of discipline and their want of officers
properly qualified, these troops are entirely incapable of per-
forming allY manCCllvre however simple 2,' and that 'whole
corps, officers and men, run off on the first appearance of
danger 3.'
The British Commander-iD-chief had indeed many moral and
mental experiences to go through between the interview al
Mirabete on July 10, and the retreat from Talavera on
August ~!
J <The general sentiment of the army appears to be contempt for the
Junta. and tho Ilreseot f()rll\ of g()vernment, great confidence in Cuesta,
Md a belief Umt he is too powerful for the Junta, and will overturn that
government. This sentiment appea1'!l to be so general that I conceive
that the Duke of Albuquerque must entertain it equally with bthe1'!l: hut
I hal'e Dol seeD him.' WellesJ.ey to l<'Tere from l'lasencia, July 13.
I WelIesley to Castlereagh, Talavera, Aug. 1.
, Wellesley to his brother the Marquis Wellesley, Deleytoaa, Aug. 8.
SECTION XVI: CHAPTER IV
THE MARCH TO TALAVERA: QUARREL OF WELLESLEY
AND CU.ESTA
HAVING returned to his II.rrny on July 12, Wcllesley gave
orders for the whole force to get rendy for n. general advance
on the morning of the eighteenth, the day which had been
chosen for the commencement of operations at the conference
of Alma.raY.. It would have been in every way desirable to
have moved out at once, and 1I0t to have waited for these six
days. If the march against Victor had been fixed for the
thirteenth or fourteenth, .the French would have been caught
'unprepared, for as late as the seventeenth King.Joseph and his
adviser Jourdan were under the impression that the force at
Plasencia consisted of nothing more than a Portuguese division
of ]0,000 men, and it was only on the twenty~secolld that they
received the definite information that the whole British army
was upon the Tietar 1, It is clear that, by advancing five da}'s
earlier than he actually did, 'Vellesley might have caught the
enemy in a state of complete dispersion-the 4th Corps being,
on July 20 still at 'Madridcjos in La. MnllchRt and the King
with his reserves at Madrid. If attacked on the seventeenth
or the eighteenth, as he might well have been, Victor would
have found it impossible to call up Sebastiani in time, and
must have fallen back in haste to the capital. The allies could
then have cut him off from the 4th Corps, which must have
retreated by a circuitous route, and could not have rejoined the
main body of the French army in time for a battle in front of
Madrid.
It would appear that Wellesley had fixed the date of his-
I See Jouroan's MimfJim, and his letter to Soult of July 17, in which
no sign whatever appears of the knowledge of the advance of the Britlsll
from Portugal.
I i 2
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advance so late as the eighteenth mainly because of the difficulty
as to the collection of provisions, which was now looming before
him in larger proportions than ever. But it is possible that
the necessity for allowing some days for the transmission of the
plan of campaign to Venegas also counted for something in
the drawing up of the time-table. It would have been rash
to start before the army of La Mnncha was prepared to take
its part in the joint plan of operations. So much depended
upon the diversion which Venegas was to execut~ that it would
have been a mistake to move before he could break lip from his
distant cantonments at Santa Cruz de Mudela. No word, how-
el'er. concerning this appears in 'Vellesley's correspondence.
I''rom July 13 to July 18 his dispatches show anxiety about
nothing save his food and bis transport, Every day that he
stayed at Plasencia made him feel more uncomfortable COil·
cerning the all-important question of supplies. The corn which
the Alcaldes of the Vera. had promised to secure for him had
begun to come in, though ill driblets and small consignments,
but there was no means of getting it forward: transport was
absolutely unprocurable I, 'We11esley sent officers to scour the
country.side as far as Dejar and Ciudad Rodrigo, but they
could procure bim neither mules nor carts. He also pressed the
Spanish commissary-general, Lozano de Torres, to hunt up every
animal that could be procured, but to small effect. The fact
was that Estremadura was not at any time rich in beasts
or vehicles, and that the peasantry had sent away most of those
they owned while the French lay at Almaraz, lest they should
be carried off by the enemy, Wellesley, who did not under-
stand the limited resources of this part of Spain, was inclined
to believe that the authoritie'l were hostile or even treacherous.
1 That food was coming in, hut no transport, is clearly proved by
Wellesley's letter to the Junta of Plasencia on July 18: (Upon entering
Spain 1 expected to derive that assistance in provisions and other meaM
[i, e, transport] which an army invariably receives from the country in
which it is stationed. more particularly when it has been sellt to aid the
people of that country, I have not been di.MppoinWl ill the expecrolum lkal
I hadformed qf rtcriving tuppliu qf JITOt"i8iom, alld I am much obliged 10 l!ul
JunlafO,.tM paint they hatlf' tuktn. I am convinced that thy did everything
in their power to procure us the other means we required [transport].
although I am sorry to say that we have not received them.'
1'09] THE QUESTION OF PROVISIONS 485
The Centml Junta. had promised him transport in order to
make sure of his starting on the campaign along the Tagus,
and when transport failed to appear, he attributed it to ill-will
rather than to poverty. No doubt he was fully justified in his
view that an army operating in a friendly country may ration-
ally expect to draw both food and the means to curry it. from
the regions through which it is passing. But sometimes the
provisions or the transport are not forthcoming merely because
the one or the other is not to be found. It is certain that
both EstTemadura. and the valley of the central Tagns were at
this moment harried absolutely bare: Victor's despairing letters
from Caceres in May and from La Calzada in June an:! sufficient
proof of the fact. In a district where the Marshal said that
•he could not collect five da)'s' provisions by any manner of
exertion,' and that' his men were dropping down dead from
actual starvation, so that he must retire or see his whole corps'
crumble away \' it is clear that the Central Junta could not
have created food for the British army. Cuesta's troops were
living from hand to mouth on supplies sent forward from Anda·
lusia, or they could not have continued to exist in the land.
The only district which was intact was that between Coria and
Plasencia, and this was actually at the moment feeding the
British army, and had done so now for ten days or more. But
unfortunately the Vera could give corn but no draught animals.
If 'Wellesley bad known this, he must either have exerted himself
to procure more transport before leaving Abrantes-a difficult
task, for he hud already drained Portugal of carts and mules-
or have refused to march till the Spaniards scnt him wagon
trains from Andalusia.. It would have taken months for the
Junta to cOllect and send forward such trains: they had dis-
ps.rehed all that the>' could procure to Cuesta. The campaign
on the Tagus, in short, would never have !Jeen fought if
Wellesley had understoOO. the state of affairs that he was to
encounter.
The causes, therefore, of the deadlock that was about to
occur were partly the light-hearted incompetence of the Central
Junta in promising the British anny the use of resources which
did not exist, partly 'Vellesley's natural ignorance of the
1 See pp. 443 and 459.
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miserable state of Central Spain. He had never entered the
country before, /lnd 'could not know of its poverty. He bad
trusted to the usual military theory that the cowltry.side ought
to provide for a friendly army on the march: but in Spain all
military theories failed to act. Napoleon committed precisely
similar errors, when he directOO his anny corps to move about
in Ca.!ltile as if they were in Germany or Lombardy, and found
exactly the same hindrances as did the British general. In
later years 'Vellcslcy never moved without fL heavy train, nnd
a vast pro\;sion of sumpter-beasts and camp-followers. In July
1809 he had still to learn the art of conducting a Spanish
campalgn.
Meanwhile he was beginning to feel most uncomfortable
about the question of provisions. His anxiety is shown by his
letters to Frere and Beresford; 'it is impossibl~' he wrote, 't~
express the inconvenience and risk that we incur from the want
of means of conveyance, which I cannot believe the country
could not furnish, if there exitted allY irWlillation to furnish them.
The officers complain, and I believe not without reason, that
the country gives unwillingly the supplies of provisions that we
have required ... and we have not procured a cart or a mule for
the ser\'ice of the anny 1.' But to O'Donoju, the chief of the
staff of the Estremadurnn army, he wrote in even more drastic
terms, employing phrase:l that were certain to provoke resent·
ment. He had, he said, scoured the whole region as far as
Ciudad ltodrigo for transport, and to no effect. •If the people
of Spain are uuable or unwilling to supply what the army
requires, I am afraid that they must do without its services.'
He had been forced to cOllie to a painful decision, and' in order
to be fair and candid to General Cuesta' he must' proceed to
inform him that he would execute the plan for falling upon
Victor behind the Alberche, but that when this had been done he
would stir no step further, and 'begin no new operation till
he had been supplied with the means of transport which the
army requires 2.'
After dispatching this ultimatum, whose terms and tone
leave something to be desired-for surely CuestA was the last
1 'VellMley to Frere, Plaseflcia, July 16.
t \l'ellesloy to O'Douoju, P1aseucia, July 16.
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person to be saddled with the responsibility for the pledges
made by'his enemies of the Central Junta-Wellesley issued
orders for the army to march. He had been joined at Plasencia
by the last of the regiments from Lisbon) which reached him in
time for Talavera 1, but had been forced to leave 400 sick behind
him) for the army was still in a bad condition as regardS health.
It was therefore with little over 21,000 men that he began his
advance to the Alberche. It was executed with punctual
observance of the dates that had been settled at the interview
at Almara7A On July 18 the army crossed the Tietar on
a flying bridge built at Bau&gona, and lay at Miajadas. On
the next night the bead qUaltel's were ut Centincllo; on the
twentieth the British entered Oropesa. Here Cuesta joined
them with his whole army) save the two battalions lent to'Vilson,
and the two others under the Marquis Del Reino which had been
sent to the Puerto de Banos. Deducting these 2,600 bayonets
and his .sick, he brought o"er 6,000 horse nnd 27,000 foot to the
rendezvous. The junction having taken place on the twcnty-
first, the advance to Talavera was to begin next morning.
Oropesa lies only nineteen miles from that town) and as Victor's
cavalry vedettes were in sight) it was clear that COl1tact with
the enemy would be established during the course of the day.
Accordingly the allied armies marched with cautioll) the
Spaniards along the high-road, the British following u parallel
path on the left, across the slopes of the hills which divide the
valley of the Tietar from that of the TRo<7U!l.
About midday the Spaniards fell in with the whole of the
cavalry division of Lntour.Maubourg, which Victor had thrown
out as a screen iD front of Talavem. He had ascertained on
the evening of the preceding day that Cuesta was about to move
forward, and was anxious to compel him to display his entire
force. Ab9ve all he desired to ascertain whether the rumours
concerning the presence of British troops in his front were
correct. Accordingly he had left. two battalions of infantry in
the town of Talavera, and thro",,-n out the six regiments of
dragoons in front of it) near the village of Gamonal. The
Spaniards were advancing with Albuquerque's cavalry division
as an advanced guard. Dut ~ing Lntour-Maubourg in his
I The 1/6ht Foot and 23rd Light Dragoons.
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front the Duke refused to attack, and sent back for infantry
and guns. Cuesta pushed forward the division of Zayas to
support him, but even when it arrived the Spaniards made no
headway. They continued skirmishing for four hours 1 till the
British light cavalry began to appear on their left. 'Though
much more numerous than the enemy,' wrote an eye-witness,
'they made no attempt to drive him in, but contented themselves
with deploying into sC\'erallong lines, making a very formidable
appearance. We had. expected to see them closely and success-
fully engaged, baving heard that they were peculiarly adapted
for petty warfare, but we found them utterly incapable of
coping with the enemy's tirailleurs, who were driving them
almost into a circle.'
On the appearance, however, of Anson's covalry upon their
flank the French went hastily to the rear, skirted the suburbs
of Talavera, and rode off along the great l\1adrid chaU8See
to the east, followed by the British light dragoons. As they
passed the town two small columns of infantry came out of it
and followed in their rear. Albuquerque sent one of his regiments
against them, but could not get his men to charge home. On
three separate oceasions they came OD, but, after receiving the
fire of the French, pulled up and fell into' confusion. The
impression made by the Spanish cavalry on the numerous British
observers was very bad. 'No mcn could ha\'c more carefully
avoided coming to close quarters than did the Spaniards this
day 2,' wrote one eye-witness. 'They showed a total lack not
only of discipline but of resolution ~,' observes another.
After crossing the plain to the north of Talavcra the French,
both cavalry and infantry', forded the Alberche and halted on
the further bank. On arriving at the line of underwood which
masks the river the pursuers found the whole of Victor's corps
in position. The thickets on the further side were swanning with
tirailleurJl, and two batteries opened on Anson's brigade as it
drew near to the water, and sent balls whizzing among 'Ve1lesley's
staff when he pushed forward to reconnoitre the position.
1 (And,' adds Lord Munster, from whom this quotation is taken (p. 199),
'it is my belief that they would have continued tiU now if we had not aided
them,'
t Londonderry, i. 302. I Lord iUullllte.r, p. 200.
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It was soon seen that Victor bad selected very fa"ourable
fighting-ground: indeed he had been staying at 'l'alavera
long enough to enable him to get a perfect kno~ledge of the
military features of the neighbourhood. The 1st Corps was
drawn up on a range of heights, about 800 Jards behind the
Alberche, with its left resting on the impassable Tagus, and
its right on a wooded hill, behind which the smaller river mak~
a sharp tunl to the east, so as to cov'er that flank. The
position was fonnidable, but rather too long for the ~2,OOO
men who formed the French army. Having learnt from the
people of Talo.vera that the enemy had received no reinforc~.
ments up to that morning, from Madrid or any other quarter,
,:vellesley was anxious to close with them at once. The after-
noon was too far spent for any attempt to force the passage on
the twellt)'-second, but on the next day (July !t3) the British
general hoped to fight. The Alberehe was crossed by a wooden
bridge which the enemy Imd not destroyed, and was fordable in
many places: there seemed to.be no reason why the lines behind
it might not be forced by a resolute attack delivered with numbers
which were as two to one to those of the French.
Accordingly Wellesley left the Srd dh;sion and Anson's
light horse in front of the right wing of Victor's position,
and encamped the rest of his army sOllle miles to the rear, in
the plain between Talavera and the Alberche. In the same
way Albuquerque and ZayRS halted for the night opposite
the bridge on the French left, while the main body of the
Spaniards occupied the town in their rear. In the e"ening
hours Wcllesley endCllvourcd. to urge upon Cucsta"the necessity
for delivering an attack at dawn: "he undertook to force the
northern fords and to turn the enemy's right, if his colleague
would attack the southern fords and the bridge. The Captain-
General <reeeived the suggestion with dry civility,' and asked
for time to think it over. After a conference with his subord-
inates, he at last sent word at midnight that he would accept
the proposed plan of operations.
At 3 o'clock therefore on the morning of the twenty-third,
\\7ellesley brought down Sherbrooke's Md Mackenzie's divisions
to the ground opposite the fords, and waited for the arrival of
the Spanish <..'Olumns on his right. They did not appear, Md
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after long waiting the British general rode to seek his colleague.
He found him opposite the bridge of the Alherehe, 'seated on
the cushions taken out of his carriage, for he had driven to the
outposts in a coach drawn by nine mules, the picture of mental
and physical inability.' The old man murmured that the
enemy's position had not been sufficiently reconnoitred, that
it would take time to get his army drawn out opposite the
points which it was to attack, that he was not sure of the fords,
that the bridge over which his right-hand column would have
to advance looked too weak to bear artillery, and many other
things to the same effect-finally urging that the forcing
o'r the Alberche must be put off to the next day. A10 he had
not got his troops into battle' order, it was clear that the
morning would be wasted, but We11esley tried to bargain
for an attack in the afternoon. The Captain-General asked
for more time, and would listen to no arguments in favour
of fighting on that day. After a heated discussion Wellesley
had to yield: he CQuld not venture to assail the French with
his own army alone, and without any assistance from the
Spaniards. Accordingly it was agreed that the advance should
not be made till the dawn of the twenty-fourth.
In the afternoon the pickets sent back information that Victor
seemed to be on the move, and that his line was growing thin.
Cuesta was then persuaded to go forward to the outposts; he
was hoisted on to his horse by two grenadiers, while an aide-de·
camp stood on the other side to conduct his right leg over the
croup and place it in the stirrup. Then, hunched up on liis
saddle, he rode down to the river, observed t~at the greater
part of the enemy were still in position, and refused to attack
till next morning.
Atdll.Wll, therefore, on thetwcnty·fourth thc allied army moved
forward to the Alberche in three columns, and found, as might
have been expected, that the French had disappeared. On
seeing the masses of redeoats opposite his right upon the
previous day, Victor had realized at last that be had before
him the whole British army. He bad sent his train to the rear
in the afternoon, and drawn off his entire force after dusk.
By dawn he was more than ten miles away, on the road to
Santa Ollala and Madrid. It was useless to pursue him with ally
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hope of foreing him to a battle.' The chance of crushing him
before he should receive any further reinforcements ~ad disap-
peared.. It is not at all to his credit as a general that he had
held his gronnd so long; if he had been attacked 011 the twenty-
thin.!, as \Vclleslcy hud desired, he must eertainly huve suffered
a disaster. He had but 22,000 men; and it is clear that, while
the Spaniards were attacking his left and centre, he could not
have set aside men enqugh to hold back the assault of the soljd
mass of ~O.OOO British troops upon his right. He should have
vunishedoIl tile twenty-second, the moment that Latour-Maubourg
reported that WelIesley's army was in the field. By staying
for another day on the Alber<:he he risked the direst disaster.
The British general would have been more than human if
he had not manifested his anger and disgust at the way in
which his colleague had Binchcd from the agreement to attack,
and sacrificed the certainty of victory. He showed his resent·
ment by acting up to the terms of his letter written from
Pllllleneia five days before, i.e. by announcing to Cllesta that,
having carried out his pledge to drive the Fre;'ch from behind the
Alberche, he should now refuse to move forward, unless he were
furnished with transport sufficient to make it certain that the
army could reach Madrid without any privations. He was able
to state with perfect truth that he had. already been forced to
place his troops on ball-rations that verY" morning: to the
]0,000 men of Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's divisions and of
Anson's light cavalry, he ha~ only been able to issue 5,000
rations of bread 1. Nothing, of cotrrSe, could be found at
Talavera, where the French had been quartered for many days.
Victor had only been maintaining his troops by the aid of
biscuit sent down from M04rid, and by seizing and threshing
for himself the small amount of corn which had bc<!n sown·
in the neighbourhood that spring. ",rellesley was wrong in
supposing that the 1st Corps had been supporting itself with
ease from the country-side 2. He was equally at fault when he
asserted that the 'Spanish army has plenty to eat.' Cuesta
was at this moment complaining to the Junta that he was short
of provisions, and that the food which he had brought forward
1 Welleslc)' to Sherbrooke, Talavera, Jul)" 24.
, Wellesley to Castlereagb, July 24.
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from the Guadiana was almost exhausted. Meanwhile e\'ery
exertion was being made to collect flour and transport from the
rear: 'Wellesley wrote to O'Donoju that he had at last hopes
of securing some wagons from the Plasencia district within
three days, and that' in the meantime he might get something
to eat,' He had some da)'$ before sent orders hack even so far
.as Abrantes, to order up 200 Portuguese carts which had been
collected there, and the Central Junta had informed him that
a train for his use had already started from Andalusia. But
'there was no very early prospect of relieving the present
distress 1:
Cuesta was, as might ha"e been expected, as angry with
Welleslcy for refusing to move forward from Talavera, as
Wellesley was with Cuesta for missing the great opportWlity of
July 25. 'When informed that the British army was not about
to advance any further, he announced that he for his part should
go on, that Victor was in full flight, and that he would pursue
him to Madrid. 'In that case' dryly observed Wellesley, 'Cuesta
will get himself into a scrape; but any mO\'ement by me to his
tlSsistance is quite out of the question. If the enemy discover
that we tU"C not with him, he will be beaten, or must return.
The enemy Viill make this discovery to~day, if he should risk any
attempt upon their rearguard at Santa Ollala. 'I.,' In reply to
the Captain-General's declaration that he should press Victor
hard, his colleague only warned him that he would be wiser 'to
Secure the course of the Tagus and open communication with
Venegas, while the measures should be taken to supply the
British army with means of transport a.' The Spaniard would not
listen to any such advice, and hurried forward.; though he had
been for many weeks refusing to fight the 1st Corps when it lay
in Estremadura, he was now determined to risk a second
Medellin. Apparently he was obsessed by the idea that Victor
was in full retreat for Madrid, and would not make a serious
stand. Underlying his sudden energy there was also some idea
that he would disconcert his masters of the Central Junta by
recovering the capital: he had discovered, it would seem, that
1 Wellesley to Beresford, from Plasencia., July 14.
I Wellesley to Ji'rere, Tala\'era, July 26.
I Ibid.; and also Welles1ey to O'Donoju, July 2t1.
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the Junta had sent secret orders to Venegas, directing him to
take charge of the city on its reoonquest, and giving him
authority to nominate the civil and military officers for its
administration. If the Army of Estremadura seized Madrid,
while the Army of La Mancha was still lingering on the way
thither, all these plans would be frustrated '.
• Accordingly Cuesta pushed on very boldly on the aftemoon of
the twenty-fourth, dividing his llrmy into two columns, of which
one marched on Santa Ollala by the high.road to the capital,
while the other moved by Cevolla and Torrijos on the side-road
to Toledo. He was uncertain whether Victor had retired by
one or by both of these routes: if all his corps had taken the
former path, the natural deduction was that he was thinking only
of Madrid: if the Toledo road had also been used, there was
reason for concluding that the Marshal must be intending to
join Sebastiani and the 4th Corps, who might be looked for in
that direction. Late in the day the Spanish general ascertained
that the main body of Victor's army had taken the latter route:
be proceeded to follow it, placing his head quarters that night
at Torrijos, only fifteen miles fmlll Toledo. Next morning
he leamt to his surprise and dismay that he had in front of him
tlOt only the Ist Corps, but also Sebastiani and the King's
reserves from Madrid: for just at this moment the whole
French force in New Castile had been successfully concentrated,
and nearly 50,000 men were gathered in front of the 89,000
troops of the Army of Estremadura. Vencgas's diversion had
utterly failed to draw off' the 4th Corps to the East; the King
had come down in haste from Madrid, and thus the whole plan
of campaign which the allied generals had drawn up had been
foiled-partly by the sloth of Vellegus, partly by Cuesta's in·
explicable and perverse refusal to fight on July ~3 upon the line
of the .A.lberche.
1 Cf. Arteche, vi. ~a, wiUI Welle81eY'8 remarks on the inexplicable
engerneas of CUellla to be in Madrid 011 an early day.
SECTION XVI: CHAPTER V
CONC'&TIRATION OF THE FRENCH ARMIES: THE KING
TAKES THE OFFENSIVE: COMBATS OF TORRIJOS AND
CA8A DE SAUNAS
IT is now necessary to bun to the French camp, in order to
reali7.e the course of events which had led to the concentration
of such It formidable force in the environs of Toledo. Down to
the twenty-second of July Joseph and his adviser Jourdan had
remained in complete ignorance of the advance of Wellesley
upon Plasencia, and seem to have been perfectly free from any
apprehension that Madrid was in danger. Since their return
from their fruitless pursuit of the army' of La Mancha, they
had been spending most of their energy in a contro\'ersy with
Soult. The Duke of Dalmatia, not content with the command
of the three army corps which Napoleon had put at his diy
, pow, bad been penning elaborate dispatches to the King to .
demand that the greater part of the remaining French troops'
in Spain sh.ouId be used to co-operate in his projected campaign
ngainst the English in Portugal. He wrote on July 13 to urge
on Joseph the necessity (1) of drawing large deta.chments from
the armies of Aragon and Catalonia, in order to form a corps
of observation in the kingdo~ of Lean to support his own rear;
(2) of placing another strong detachment at Plasencia to cover
his flank; (3) of transferring every regiment that could be spared
from Madrid and New Castile to Salvatierra on the Tormes, jl1st
south of Salamanca, in order to fonn a reserve close ill his rear,
which he might call up, if necessary, to strengthen the 60,000
men whom he already had in hand. He also demanded that
Joseph should send him at once !!OO,OOO francs to spend on the
fortifiCation of Zamora, Toro, and other places on the Douro,
as also 500,000 francs more for the present expenses of the 2nd,
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5th, and 6th Corps. If this were granted him, together with
2,000,000 rations of flour, and a battering-train of at least forty·
eight heavy guns for the sieges, of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida,
he thought that he should be in a position to deliver a serioW';
attack on Northern Portugal, and L,l1timutcly to drive the British
army into the sea I. .
On the day upon which the Duke of Dalmatia made these
comprehensive demands upon King Joseph, the British army
had been fOT ten days in Spain, and was preparing to advance
from Plasencia on Madrid. It was therefore Wl c-"{quisitely
inappropriate moment at which to demand that the greater part
of the King's central reserve should be sent off frolD the capital
to the neighbourhood of Salamanca. There were other parts
of Sonlt's lists of requisitions which were equally impracticable.
It is clear that Suchet could not have spared a man fmlll
Aragon, and that St. Cyr, with the siege of Gcrona on ,his
hands, would have found it absolutely impossible to make larJ:,te
detachments from Catalonia. Even if he and Suchet had been
able to send off troops to Loon, they would have taken months
to reach the Galleinn frontier. The demand for 700,000 francs
in hard cash was also most unpalatable: King Joseph was at
this moment in the direst straits for money: his brother could
send him nothing while the Austrian war was in progress, and
as he was not in proper military poSsession of any large district
of Spain, he was at this moment in a condition of hopeless
bankruptcy. He confessed to Soult that he was living from hand
to mouth, by the pitiful expedient of melting down and coining
the silver plate in the royal palace at Madrid.
Jouroan therefore replied, in the King's behalf, to Soult that he
must do his best with tre 60,000 men already at his disposition,
that no troops from Catalonia,Arngoll, or Madrid could be spared,
and that money could not be found. All that could be given
was the battering-train that had been demanded, 600,000
rations of biscuit, and an authorization to raise forced con-
tributions in Old Castile. For the protection of his flanks
and his communications the Marshal must utilize Kellermann's
dragoons and the other unattached troops in the valley of the
I Soult to JOl:lCpll, July 13. Compare with this JOUrdllU to 80ult of
July 17, the reply to tllC6C modest dClllllUds.
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Douro, 8. force which if raised to 12,000 men by detachments
from the 5th or 6th Corps could keep La Romana. and the
Galicians in check 1.
It is curious to note how entirely ignorant both Soult and
the King were as to the real dangers of the moment. Soult
had drawn up, and Joseph acceded to 2, a plan for the siege
of Ciudad Rodrigo, and an invasion of Northcm Portugal-
operations which would take IOllg weeks of preparation-at the
time when Madrid was in imminent danger from the combined
armies of Wellesley, Cuesta, and Venega!l. The Marshal's plan
was perfectly correct from the point of "iew of the higher
strategy-the main objective of the French was certainly the
British army. and it would have been highly advisable to
invade Northern Portugal with 60,000 men in the front line,
and 40,000 in support, if the circumstances of the moment had
permitted it. But these circumstances were hidden alike from
Soult and the King, owing to the impossibility of obtaining
accurate information of the movements of the allies. The
fundamental difficulty of all Frencb operations in the Peninsula
was that the commanders could never discover the whereabouts
of the enemy till he actually came in contact with their out-
posts. Hence it chanced that Soult was planning, and Joseph
approving, a campaign on the borders of Northern Portugal,
at the precise moment when the British were on the march for
Talavera.
It was actually not until July ~2 that the King's eyes were
at last unsealed. Victor having come into collision with the
cavalry of Wellesley's advanced guard, sent news to Madrid that
the British army had joined Cuesta, and had reached the
Alberche. On the same day, by a fortu.nate chance, there also
arrived in the capital another emissar}' of Soull, with a message
much less impracticable thun that which had last been sent.
This was General Foy, whom the Duke of Dalmatia had
dispatched on July 19, after receiving very definite Tumours
that the British were moving in the valley of the Tngus, and
I Jourdan to Soult, July 17,1809, from Madrid.
, 'Le roi pensc, comme vous, qu'il est important de s'ernparer de Ciudad
·Rodrigo; cettc place servira de place d'annea aux troupes qui getOut dans
!e C35 d'entrcr en Portugal.'-Ibid.
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not approaching Old Castile I, The Marshal sent word that in
this case he must of course concert a common plan of opera·
tion~ with the King, and abandon any immediate action against
Portugal. Hc suggested that his best plan would be to con·
centrate his three corps at Salamanca, and to march against the
flank and rear of the English by way of Bejar Rnd the Puerto
de Batios. If the King could cover Madrid for a time with the
1st and 4th Corps, he would undertake to present himself in,
force upo'n 'Vcllcsley's line of communications, a move which
must infallibly stop the advance of the allies towards the
capital. If they hesitated a moment after his arrival at PIa·
sencia, they would be caught between two fires, and might be
not merely checked bnt surrounded and destroyed. Soult
added, however, that he could not monO! till the 2nd Corps
had recei\·ed the long-promised provision ofartillery which was 011
its way from Madrid, and till he had rA.llied Ney's troops, who were
still at Astorga, close to the foot of the Galicill.o mountains.
Napolcon, at fl. later date, criticized this plan severely, de~
elaring that Soult ought to have marched on Madrid to join
the King, and not on Pla.sencia. He grounded his objections
to the scheme on the strategical principle that combined opera-
tions on external lines should be avoided. 'The march Qf
Marshal Soult,' he wrote, 'was both dangerous and useless--
danb'Crous, because the other army might be beaten (as happened
at Talavera) before he could succour it, so that the sufety of all
my annies in Spain was compromised: useless, because the
English had nothing to fear; they could get behind the Tagus
in three hours; and whether they crossed at Talavera or at
Almaraz, or anywhere else, 'they {.'ould secure a safe line of
retreat on Badajoz.' Against this criticism the defence made
by both Soult and King Joseph was that it would Ii.ave required
a much longer time to bring the three corps from the Domo to
Madrid than to Plasencia; that it would have taken them
at least ten days to reach Madrid, and that during those days
the King and his army might have been beatcn and driven
out of the capital by the united forces of Wcllesley, Cuesta,
and Venegas. It was, of course, impossible to foresee on
1 Compare Le Noble's account o( SOUlt"9 pl'oposals (pp. 312-3) witll
Jouroan'a MtmrJiru, and with the Vie MilUairt du General Fog, p. 63.
{JM.... l'f. JI K k
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July ~~ that Wcllesley would l-efuse to pursue Victor beyond
Tulavera, or that Vcnegas would let Scbastiani slip away from
him. Accordingly King Joseph and Jourdan fell in with
SouIt's suggestion, because they thought that he would come
sooner into the field if he marched 011 Plascncin, and would
remove the pressure of the British army from them at a
comparatively early date. As a matter of fact, he took a much
longer time to reach Plasencia than they had c.."pected: they
had hoped that he might be there on July 27, while his
"anguard only reached the place on August 1, and his main
body 011 the second and third 1. But it seems clear that the
expectation tlmt he would interveue 011 the earlier date was far
too sanguine. Soult dared Dot move till his three corps were
well closed up, and since Ney had to come all the way from
Astorga, it would have been impossible in any ca.se to mass
the army at Plasencia mu~h earlier than was actually done.
Napoleon's remark that Soult could not hope to catch or
surround the British army seems more convincing than hi~
criticism of the march on Plasencia. If the passes of the Sierra
de Gata had been properly held, aud prompt news had been
transmitted to TalM'era that the French were on the move from
the valley of the Douro, Wellesley would. have had ample time
to cover himself, by crossing the Tagus and transferring his
arm}' to the line of operations, Truxillo-Badajoz. The British
gencral always defended himself by this plea: and complained
that those who spoke of him as being 'cut off from Portugal,'
by the arrival of Soult at Plasellcia, forgot that he had as good
a base at EI¥as and Badajoz as at Abrantes.
But we must not look too far forward into the later stages of
the campaign. It is enough to say that Jourdan and Joseph
sent back Fay to rejoill Soult, on the same day that he had
reached Madrid, bearing the orders that the Marshal was to
L'QIleet his three corps with the greatest possible haste, and to
march by Salamanca on Plasencia, where they trusted that he
might present himself on the twenty-seventh or twenty-eighth
of the L'ut'rent month, Meanwhile it was ncce~ary to hold
1 }<'or the controversy about the expected date of Soult's arrival at
J'lasencia, see Josepli's and Jourdan's letter to Napoleon, in Ducasse'!
JIimoiru du Roi Jweph, and on the other side Le Noble's Campagne de 1809.
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back Cuests. and "reHesley ,till the Duke of Dalmatia's opera-
tions in their rear began to produce their effect. The only
possible way of doing this was to concentrate in all haste every
available mall in N~w Castile, and to cover Madrid as long as
·possible. TIlis massing of the French forces turned out to be
perfectly feasible, since Venegas had neglected to press in upon
Sebastiani, so that it was possible to withdraw the whole 4th
Corps from in front of him, and to send it to reinforce Victor,
without any immediate danger. Accordingly, the 1st Corps was
directed to fall back from its perilous advanced position on
the Alberche, and to draw near to Toledo: Sebastiani was toJd.
to abandon :Madridcjos and La :Mancha, and to hnsten by·
forced marches toward the same point: while the King himself
resolved to leave Madrid with the slenderest of garrisons, and
to carry the rest of the central reserve to the general rendezvous.
Accordingly, he left only one brigade of Dessolles' division,. with
a few of his Wltrustworthy Spauish levies, to hold the-capital~.
the total did not amount to much over 4,000 men, and General
Bel1ia.rd, the governor of the city, was warned that he.must be
prepnred to retreat into the Retiro forts, with his troops and
the whole body of the AfrancalUkJa and their families, if any-
thing Ulltowanl should occur. For it was possible that ap.
insurrection might break out, or that Venegas might succeed in
slipping into Madrid by the roads from t~ El.ast, or again, that
Wilson (whose column had. been hea,rd of at Escalona and was
bclic\'ed to be much larger than was. actually the case), might
attempt a coup de main from the- west. Leaving Belliard in
this dangerous and responsible position, the King marched out
upon the twenty-third with the remaining brigade of Dessolles's
division, the infantry and ClLvalry of his French Guard, two
.squadrons of chasseurs and fourteen guus, a force of some 5,800
men 1. He had reached Naval Camera, with the intention of
joining Victor on the Alberche, when he received the news that
, TIle whole consisted of:
Infantry of the Guard • •
(Jfw'Vtlt«&-Ugerlf of the GUll.rd
Godino~'8 Brigade of Des-
SOllCS'1l Divi~ion
500 THE FRENCH ARMIES CONCENTRATE [JUI.V 26
the Marshal had retired towards Toledo, and WAS lying at Bargas
behind the Guadararna river. Here Joseph joined ·him on the
morning of July fl.5.
On ,their concentration a force of 46,000 men was collected,
. Victor having brought up ~3,OOO, the King 5,800, and Sebas-
tiani 17,000. The latter had placed four of the 'Six Polish
battalions of Valcnce's di·vision in Toledo, Ilud was therefore
short by 3,000 bayonets of the total force of his corps. With
such a mass.of good troops attheir disposition, Joseph, Jourdan,
and Victor were all agreed that it was right to fall upon the
Spaniards v.rithout delay. They were astonished to find that
the British anny was not in their front, but only Cuesta's
troops. They had expected to see the whole allied host before
them, and were overjoyed to discover that the Estrcmaduruns
alone had pushed forward to Torrijes and Santa Ollala.
[nstead, therefore, of being obliged to flght a. defensive battle
behind the river Gundaramu, it was in their power to take the
offensive.
. This was done without delay: on the morning ·of July 26 the
French army Mhllnecd on Torri}os, with the 1st Corps ut the
head of the column. But Cuesta, when once he had discovered
the strength of the force in his front, had resolved to retreat.
Victor found opposed to him only the division of Zayas and
twu cavalry regiments, which had been told off to cover the
withdrawal of the Estremaduran army. The ):larshal sent out
against this rearguard the chasseurs of Merlin and the dragoons
of Latou!'-)'faubourg, who drove in the Spanish horse, almost
extermiuating the unfortunate regiment of Villaviciosu, which,
in retiring, chanced to blunder Uf:,rainst the high stone walls of
some enclosures from which exit was difficult 1. Zayas then
went to the rear, and retired towards the cavalry division of
Albuquerque, ''I'hich Cllesta ,hastily sent to his assistance.
The French cavalry took some time to re-fonn for a second
attack, and their infantry was still far off. The Spanish rearw
I 'The cavalrr regiment of VillM'iciosa) drawn up in an enclosure with
but one exit, was penned in by the enemy and cut to pieces without
a possibility of escape. A Britisb officer of engineers) present with them)
saved himsolf by his English horse t.\king at a leap the barrier which the
Spanish horses·wero incapable of clearing.' Lord Munster, p. 208.
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guard therefore, covered by Albuquerque's horse, had time
enough to fall back. 011 the. main body, which was already in
full retreat. Their cavalry then followed, and being not very
strenuously pursued by Merlin and Latour~:Maubourg,got off in
safety. The whole anny. marching-at the best of its speed, and
in considerable disorder; linully rCtlched the Albel'che without
being caught up by the enemy. Cucsta. found the British
divisions of Sherbrooke and Mackenzie guarding the river:
Wellesley had sent them forward when he heard of the approach
of the French, and had placed the former on the hills above the
further side of the bridge, to (:over the passage. and the latter
in reserve. He rode out himself to meet· the Spunish general,
and begged him to carry his anny beyond the Alberche, as it
would be extremely dangerous to be caught with such an
obstacle behind him, and no means of retreat save a 10l,lg bridge
alld three fords. But Cuesta tempted providcnce by declaring
that he should encamp on the further bank, as his troops were
too exhausted to risk the long defile across the bridge after
dark. His sullen anger againstWellesley for refusing to follow
him on the twenty-fourth \l'US still smouldering in his breast,
and the English were convinced that hc remained on the wrollg
side of the river out of pure perversity, merely because his
colleague pressed him to put himself in safety, He consented,
however, to retreat next morning to the position which Wellesley
had selected in. front of Talavera.
The French made no Appearance that night, though they might
well have done so, and the Spanish army, bivouacing confusedly
in the narrow slip of flat ground betwe€n the heights and the
Alberche, enjoyed undisturbed rest during the hours of dark-
ness. It is impossible not to manel at the slackness with
which Victor collducted the pursuit: he. had twelve regiments
of splendid cavalry to the front " and could undoubtedly ha\'e
pressed the Estremadurans hard if he had chosen to do so.
Cuesta's retreating columns were in such a state of confusion
and disorder that a vigorous IlSsault on their rear might have
caused a general debmulade. :But after driving in Zayas in the
, He bad siI' regiments of La.tour-Mau.bourg'$ dragoons, 3,200 sabres, four
regiments of Merlin's Division, 1,007 eabres, two regiments of DeauUJont's
(ecwpe-eavalry of 1st Corps) 980-a total of 4wer 5/l00 mell.
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early morning, Victor moved very slowly, and did not even
attempt to roll np Albuquerqne's cavalry rearguard, though he
could have iL"Sailed it with very superior numbers. When
taxed with sloth by Marshal JOUl-dan, he merely defended
himself by saying that the horses were tired, and that the
infantry was still too far to the rear to make it right for him
to begin a combat which might develop into a general engage-
ment. But it is hard to see that he would have risked anything
by pressing in upon Albuquerque, for if Cuesta had halted his
whole army in ol-der to support his rearguard, there was
nothing to prevent the French cavalry from drawing off, and
refusing to close till the main body of the Ist Corps should
come up.
Thanks to Victor's slo.ckness the Spaniards secured an Ulh
molested retreat across the Alberche on the following morning.
It is said that Cuesta, in sheer perversity and reluctance to
listen to any lldvicc proffered him by Wcllcslcy, delayed for some
hours before he would retreat, and that when at last he yielded
to the pressing solicitations of his colleague he remarked to his
stafl:' , that he had made the Englishman go down on his knees'
before consenting.
All through the morning hours of the twenty·seventh the
Army of Estremadura was pouring across the bridge and the
fords, not in the best order. They Ill,d almost all passed, when
about noon the French cavalry began to appear in their frOllt.
Wben the enemy at last began to press forward in strength,
Wellcsley directed Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's divisions to
prepare to evacuate their positions on the eastem bank, which
they did as soon as the last of thc Spaniards had got into sofety.
The first division passed at the bridge, the third at the fords
near the village of Cazalegas: then Sherbrooke marched by the
high-road towards Talavera, while Mackenzie,'who had been told
off' as the rearguard, remained with Anson's light h~rsc uem' the
ruined Casa de SaUnas, a mile to the west of the Albel'che.
It may seem strange that 'Wellesley made no attempt to
dispute the pas.'iB.ge of the river, but the ground was hopelessly
indefensible. The left bank (Victor's old position of July 22)
completely commands the right, the one being high, the other
both low and entirely destitute of artillery 'positions. More-
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over, a great part of the terraj,~ was thickly strewn with woods
and olive plantations, which made it impossible to obtain any
general view of the country-side. They would have given splendid
cover for an army advancing to storn; the heights on the French
bank, but were anything but an advantage to an army on the
defensive. For, unable to hold the actual river bank because of
the co.mmanding hills on the further side, such an army would
have been forced to fOI'Ill its line some way from the water, and
the tangled cover down b)' the brink of the stream would have
given the enemy every facility for pushing troops across, and for
pressing them into the midst of the defender's position without
exposing them to his fire. Wellington had examined the line
of the Alberche upon the twenty~fonrth and twenty-fifth, and
had pronounced it absolutely untenable; 'no position could be
worse,' he wrote to O'Donoju \ but he had discovered one of u
very different kind a little to the rear, and had already settled
the way in which it was to be occupied. It presented so Illany
advantages that even Cuesta had consented to accept it AA a good
fighting-ground, and the Estremaduran army was at this very
moment occupied in arraying itself along that part of the line
which had been allotted to it. Sherbrooke's division was
retiring across the plain to fall hlto the section which Wellcsley
had chosen for it, and Hill's und Campbe1l's troops were moving
to their designated ground. Only l\Iackenzie and the light
cavalry had yet to be established in their post.
In the act of withdrawing, this division became involved in an
unfortunate combat, which bid fair for a moment to develop
into a disaster. Its two brigades had been halted close to the
ruined house called the Casa de Salinas, in ground cOl'em partly
with underwood and partly with olive groves. The cavalry had
been v..ithdrawn to the rear, 1\8 it WEL'> impossible to use it for
\'cdettcs in such a. locality. The infallhy was supposed to have
a chain of picket.'! thrown out in its front, but it would appear
that they must ha\'e been badly placed: as one eye-witness
confesses, 'we were by no means such good soldiers in thosedaJlt
as succeeding campaigns made us, and sufficient precautions had
not been taken to ascertain what was passing in the wood 2,' and
I Wellesley to O'Donoju, from Caulegas, July 25.
S Lord Munster, p. 210.
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between it and the fortI b<:low Cazalc/:,ras. FJ:ench cavalry alone
had hitherto been seen, and from cavalry Mackenzie's troops were
eel"tainly safe in the tangled ground where they were now lyiug.
But alrcady Victor's iufuntry had reached the front, and its
leading division, that of Lapisse, had forded the Alberche far
to the north, and had entered the woods without being observed
by the outlying pickets of Mackenzie's left. brigadc 1. It had
cven escaped the notice of Wellesley himself, who had just
mounted the roof of the· ruined Casa de Salinas, the only point
in the neighbourhood from which anything like a general view
of the coulltry-side could be sccww. ",Yhilc he was inte.nt on
watching the heights above the Alberche in his front, and the
cavalry vedettes descending from them, the enemy's infantry was
stealing in upon his left.
Lapisse had promptly discovered the line of British outposts,
and had succeeded in drawing out his division in battle order
before it was observed. He had deployed one regiment, the
16th Uger, as a front line, while the rest of his twelve battalions
were coming on in support.
While, therefore, \Vellesley was still unconscious that the
enemy was close upon him, a brisk fire of .musketry broke out
upon his left front, It was th£: French advance driving in the
pickets of Donkin's brigade, The divisiQn had barely time to
stand to its anus-some ffif:jl are said to have been killed before
they had risen from the grouud-and the Comlllalldcr~in~chicf
had hardly descended from the. roof and mouu!OO his charger.
when the enemy was upon them, The assault fell upon the whole
front of Donkin's brigade, and on the left regiment (the 2/3lst)
of that of Mackcm:ie himself. So furious and unexpected was
it, that the 87th, 88th, and 31st wc-re all broken, nnd driven
some way to the rear, losing about eighty prisoners. It was
1 SevC1ll1 eye-witnesses declare that LapisBe's division escaped notice
owing to a curious chance. Before abmJdouiug tho further blink of the
Alberehe, Mack-:nzic's troops had set fire to the huts which Victor's corps
had constructed on the Cazalegas heights}. during their long star in that
position. llie EDloke from the burning was driven along the slopes and
the river bottom by the wind, and screened one of the fords from the
British obscners ill the woods; over this ford came Lapisse's unsuspected
advance.
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fortunate that the French advance did not strike the whole line,
but only its left and centre. Th~ lj45th, which wusjust outside
the }jmit of Lapisse's attack, stood firm, and on it Wellesley
reforrMed the 31st, while, a little further to the north, the half-
battalion of the 5j60th aloo held its ground and served as·a
rallying-point for the 87th and 88th. The sten.diness of the
l/45th and 5/60th saved the situation; covered by them the
division retired from the woods and formed up in the plain,
where Anson's lig}}t horsemen came to their aid and guarded
their flanks. The French still pressed furiously forward, sending
out two batteries of horse artillery to gall the retreating columns,
but they had done thei.r worst, and during the hours of the late
afternoon Mackcozi.e'g iufttntry fell back slowly and in oluer to
the points of the position which had been assigned to them.
Donkin's brigade took post in the second line behind the'German
Legion, while Mackem;ie's own three regiment~ passed through
the Guards und formed up in their rear. Their tot;al loss in
the combat of Cusu. de Salinas had been 440 men-the French
casualties must have been comparatively insib>'11ificant-probably
not 100 in aliI.
From the moment when the fra,Y had begun in the woods till
d!-isk, the noise of battle never stopped, for on arriving in front
of the allied position, the Frevch artiller}' drew up and com-
menced a hot, but not vcr)' effective, fire against those of the
troops who held the most ad\'anced stations. As the cannonade
continued, the different regiments were seen hurrying to their
battle-posts, for, although the arrangements hOO all been made.
some brigades, not expecting a fight till the morrow, had still
to take up their allotted. ground.
, The men, as they formed and faced the enemy, looked pale,
but the officers riding along their line., only two deep, 011 which
all our hopes depended, obset:~ed that. they appeared not less
tranquil than determined, In the lllCNl-while the departing sun
showed by his mys the inum::nSQ masses, moving towards us, und
the last glimmering of the light proved their direction to be
across our froIlt, toward the left. The darkness, only broken
I Unfortwlately the French returns do not separate the losses of the
twcnly-sevenlll from those ofthe twelllr-eigbtJl ofJuly, Onlythe IGtllIAiger
cau have suffered any appreciable damage.
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in upon by the bursting shells and the flashes of the French
guns, closed quickly upon us, and it was tbe opinion of many
that the enemy would rest till the morning 1.'
Such, however, ",-as not to be the case: there was to be hard.
fighting in front of TulavCl'Il before the hour of midnight had
arrived.
I Lord Munster, p. 212.
SECTION XVI: CHAPTER VI
THE BATTLE 010' TALAVERA: THE PREWIlNARY COMBATS
(JULY 27-22)
TIu: position which Vlellesley had selected as offering far
better ground for a defensive battle than any which could be
found on the banks of the Alberche, extends for nearly three
miles to the north of the town of Talavera. It was not a very
obvious line to take up, since only at it~ northern end does it
pres<!ut any well marked featuI'C5. Two-thirds of the position
He in tha plain, and arc only marked Qut by the stony bed of
the Porlii'ia, a brook almost dried up in the summer, which runs
from north to south and falls into the Tagus at Talavera. In
the northern part of its course this stream flows at the bottom
of a wen~marked ravine, but as it descends towards the town
its bed grows broad and sho.llowJ and ceases to be of any tneticul
or topographical impor1:.um:e. Indeed, in tltis part of the field
the fighting·lin:e of the allies lay across it, and their extreme
right wing was posted upon its further bank.
The town of Talavera, a place of 10,000 souls, which had
been a flourishing industrial ccntre in the sixteenth century, but
had long sunk into decay,lics in R<:ompact situation on the 1l0rtll
bank of the Tagus. It possesses a dilapidated bridge of forty·
five arches, the only passage across the river between Arzobispo
and Toledo. Its site is perfectly flat, save for a low knoll
erowned by the chapel of Nuestra Senom del Prado, just outside
the eastem, or Madrid, gate, and overlooking the A lameda (public
promenade) and the neighbouring gardens. The place had no
suburbs, but was surrounded by a bl'Olld belt of olive grO\"cs and
enclosures, which extend for a full mile to the north and eMt.
and hide the houses and walls from the traveller approaching
from either of those directions. When the allies entered
Talavera they found it deserted by most of its inhabitanl!i,
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who had fled up into the villages of the Sierra de Toledo
during the French. occupu.tion. Many, however, descended to
reoccupy their homes when the enemy departed. Victor's men
ha.d plundered most of the houses, and turned ma.ny of the
churehes into barracks or stables: hence the to'o\1l presented
.a picture of abject desolation 1.
For a mile and a half beyond the northern wall of Tala"era
the ground covered by gardens and olive groves is perfectly flat;
it then COllllllcnccs to rise, and swells uP' into a long hill, the
Cerro de Medellin. This height rWlS from east to west, so that
its front, and not the full length of its side, overhangs the
Portilia ravine. Its loftiest point and its steepest face arc
presented to UlB.t declivity, while tu> the west and south it has
gentle and easily accessible slopes, sinkillg gradually down into
the plain. This hill, the most commanding ground in the
neighbourhood of Talavera, had been chosen by W'dleslcy as
the position of his left "'ring. It formed, including its lower
slopes, about one-third of the line which he had determined
to occupy, the rest of the front lying in the low ground among
the olives and gardens. North of the Cerea de Medellin is
a narrow lateral valley, only half n mile broad, separating this
hill from the main chain of the Sierra de Segurill~ the.mountaius
which form the!watershed between the basin of the 'l'~"llS and
that of the Tietar. The British general had intended at first
that his position should eA.iend no fw-thcl' llor~h than the hill,
but in the course of the action he was compelled to lengthen his
front, and 00 post troops both in the "alley and on the mountain
spurs beyond il
By the ugreement made with Cuesta, at the conference near
the bridge of thc Alberche on the evening of the twenty-sixth,
it was settled that the Spanish army should hold the town of
1 < lbe French hoops during tlleir stay had been guilty of great e;<cesses:
a Ilumber of houses were COlllllletely uestruyoo, and the furniture burnt
for fuel. In every quarter were to be seen marks of the de\fllStatiou they
lllld committed. TIle Cathedral, a handsome modern building, was
uninjured, the enemy having contented hilllSelf with carrying off all
the splendid omament'! used in the ceremonies of religion. But in the
cllllrch of San Antonio the French had destrored everything, and con·
verted it into a barrack,' &C. Stothert's Narrative of the (Jamp<Ji!JII' of
1809-11, pp. 81-2.
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Talu\'era and the wooded imd enclosed ground for a mile beyond
it. The British had their right among the olive groves, but
their centre and left on the open slopes of the Cerro de Medellin.
This order of battle \vas the only onc which it was possible to
adopt. Wellesley had already discovered that the nrmy of
Estremndu~a could not manreuyrc, and would be much safer
behind wall~ and enclosures than in the open, and Cuesta had
gladly accepted the proposal that he should occupy this part of
the position. Having only a little more than a mile of front
to defend, he was able to provide a double and triple line with
his 32,000 men 1. His Vanguard and Ist division, under Zayns,
occupied the eastern oublkirts of the town, with a buttery placed
upon the knoll crowned by the chapel of Nuestra Seiiora del
Pmdo. A brigade of cavalry (four regiments) was deployed in the
open ground of the })rado, close to the bank of the Tagus. The
2nd divisioll, that of Iglesias, held Talavera, whose ancient
walls, though imperfect in many places, were still quite defensible.
The 3rd and 4th divisions (Manglano and Portago) were
ranged in a double line among the gardens and enclosures to the
north of the town, as far as a low hillock called the Pajar de .
Vergara, where they touched Welles.1ey's le£1.' Behind them wereI~1;
thc rest of Cue&ta's cavalry (ten regimcnts) aud thc 5th division
(Bn.ssecourl) forming the reserves.
The Spanish position was immensely strong. Thc front was
completely screened by groves and enclosures occiIpied by skir~
mishers; the first line was drawn up along the slightly sunken
road leadiug from TaJa.vera to the north. which provided the
men with all excellent parapet and good cover 2• The second
line was equally well placed behind the Portitla rivulet, which
was bordered by trees along its whole front. The only good
artillery position was that outside the Madrid gate, in front of
Zayas' division, hut three other batteries were planted in the
least defective emplacemcnts that could be found in the front
line. The rest of the Spanish guns were in reserve. in line with
Bassecourl and the cm·aIry.
The northern half of the position had its 5trong points, but
1 The Spaniards had lost 1,000 men, mainly by dispersion, in the retreat
from Torrijos on the twenty-sixth.
~ Cf. Londonderry, i. 403; and Arteche, vi. 293.
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also its defects. For the first half mile beyond the Spanish left
it was still covered by groves and gardens, and had 011 its right
front the little eminence of the Pajar de Vergara. On this knoll
a redoubt had been commenced, but no more had been done
than to level a space, eighty yards long and twenty feet broad,
on its summit, and to throw up the excavated earth in front,
thus fanning a bank three or four feet high. In this work,
indifferently well protected', lay Lawson's battery of S-pounders,
the lightest guns of Wellesley's artillery. Beside and behind
them were the five battalions of the 4th division, Campbell's
brigade in the front line, Kemmis's in the second, to the rear
of the Portiiia..
On the left of the 4th division the enclosed ground ended, and
cover ceased. Here, fonning the British centre, were dra.wn up
the eight battalions of Sherbrooke's dhision, in a single
line. The Guards' brigade, under Henry Campbell, was
in perfectly flat level ground, without shade or cover. Next
to them, where there is a gentle ascent towards the foot of
tlle Cerro de Medellin, were Cameron's two battalions; while
the two weak brib"8.des of the King's German Legion, under
Langwerth and Low, continued the front on to the actual hill,
with the Portifia, nov,' flowing in a well-marked ravine, at their
feet I. The whole of this part of the British line was bare
rolling ground covered with long dry grass and scattered shrubs
of thyme. There was no cover, and before the Guards' and
Camcron's brigades the front was 1I0t defined by any strong
natural feature. On the other hand, the terrain on the opposite
side of the Portina was equally bare, and gave no advantage to
an enemy about to attack.
It was otherwise in the portion of the front where the fonT
German battalions of Langwerth and Low were placed. They
had a steep ravine in front of them, but on the opposite side,
as a compensating disadvantage, the rolling upland swells into
a. hill 'called the Cerro de Cascajal, which, though much less
lofty than the Cerro de l\Ied~llin, yet afforded good artillery
positions from which the English slopes could be battered.
I Thus, counting from right to left, the front of Sherbrooke's brigade
was composed as follo"'s: 19t Coldstream Guards, 1st Scota .Fusilier
Guards, GIst, 83rd, Ist.Line K. G. 1." 2nd ditto,. 5th ditto, 7th ditto.
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:Behind Sherbrooke's troops, as the second line of his centre,
Wcllcsley had drawn up his Srd di\'ision and all his cavalry.
Cotton's light dragoons were in the rear of Kemmis's brigade of
the 4th division. Mackenzie's three battalions supported the
Guards; then came Anson's light and Fane's heavy cavalry,
massed on the rising slope in th4 rear of CBmeron. Lastly
Donkin's brigade, which had suffered. so severely in the combat
of Casa de SalillRS, lay high up the hill, directly in the rear of
Low's brigade of the King's German Legion.
It only remains to speak of the British left, on the highest
part of the Cerro de Medellin. This section of the front was
entrusted to Hill's division, which was already enCllmped upon
its reverse slope. Here lay the strongest point of the position,
for the hill is steep, and well covered in its front by the Portiila,
which now flows in a deep stony ravine, But it was also the
part of'the British fighting-ground which was most likely to be
assailed, since a quick-eyed enemy could not help noting that it
was the key of thc whole-that if the upper lc\'cls of the Cerro
de Medellin were lost, the rest of the allied line could not
possibly be maintained. It was therefore the part of the
position which would require the most careful watching, and
Wellesley had told oft'to it his most capable and experienced
di;isional general. But by some miscalculation, 011 thc evening
of the twenty-seventh Hill's two brigades were nut lying on
their destined battle-line, but had halted half a mile behind it-
Richard Stewart's battalions on the left, Tilson's on the right
flank of the reverse slope. It is difficult to see with whom the
responsibility lay, for \Vcllesley was far to the right, engaged
ill planting Mackenzie's troops ill their new position behind the
centre, while Hill had ridden over towards Talavera to search
for his Commander~ill-chief and question him about details, and
returned rather late to give his brigadiers the exact instruction
as to the line they .were to take up at nightfall l . There
1 lt would seem, on the whole, that the responsibility for the absence of
the division from its destined fighting-ground lay with Hill, generally the
most caUtiOWl and reliable of subordinates. He says, in a memorandum
drawn up in 1827, in answer to an inquiry about Talavera, that he had
gone to dine in Talavera, and tben saw Mackenzie's division come back
into the line. lteturning to bis own troops, be found them moving out of
512 THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA [J"" 27
were piquets on the crest, and the greater part of the front
slopes were CQvered by Low's two battalions of the King's
Gerlllan Legion, but the actual summit of the Cerro WM not
occupied by 'any solid force, though the brigades that were
intended to hold it lay only 800 yards to the rear. It was
supposed that they would l1ave 'Rmple time to take up their
ground in the morning, aud no onc dreamt; of the possibility of
a night attack.
Of the very small force of artillery which accompanied
the British army. wc have already $CCn that Lawsou'ls light
$~pounder battery had been placed in the Pa.jar de Vergara
entrenchment. Elliott's and Herse's were in the centre of the
line; the former placed ill front of'tbc Guards, the latter before
Langwerth's brigade of the German Legion. Rettberg's heavy
6~pollnders were on the Cerro'de l\1edellin, with Hill's division:
nt dusk they had bc..>ell brought back to its rear slope and were
parked near Richard Stewart's brigade. Finally Sillery1s battery
was in reserve, between the two lines, somewhere behind Cameron's
brigade of Sherbrooke's division '. This single unit wns the only
artillery resCf\'C of which Wellesley could dispose.
The precise number of British troops in line was 20,194,
after deducting the losses at Casa de SalilltlS; that of the
Spaniards was within a few hundreds of 32,000. The Fren~h,
as we have already seen, had brought a little more than 46,000
men to the field, so that the allies had a superiority of some
6,000 in lUcre numbers. If Wcllesky could have exchanged
the Army of Estremadura for half their strength of British
bayonets, he might htH'C felt quite 'COmfortable in his strong
position, Dut his confidence in the value of his allies, even
"",hen firml.y planted among walls and groves, 'l'.'as just about to
re<:eivc a rude shock.
It was about seven o'clock when the heads of Victor';; columns,
tbeir bivouac, but not on their fighting-gronnd. He was getting them into
line, when the firing suddenly began ill his frout,
These details I give from the valuable (unpublished) map by Lieut.
Unger of tI,e K, G. L. artillery, which Colonel Whiuyatell has been good.
enough to place at lily disposition. It carefully marks tlle emplacement
of -every British battery. Elliott was at this moment in eommand of
the battery whieh had been under llaynes during the 0l'0rto campaign,
while Sillel)' had that which had been undor Lanc.
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following in the wake of the horse artillery which had been
galling Mackenzie's retreat, emerged from the woods 011 to the
rolling plateau facing the allied position. Ruffin appeared On
the right, and oceupied the Cascajal hill, opposite the Cerra de
Medellin. Villatte followed, and halted in its rear. More to
the left Lapisse, adopting the SlLme line that had been taken
by Mackenzie, halted in front of the British centre: the corps·
cavalry, under Bcaumont, wos drawn up in support of him.
Latour-Maubourg's six regiments of dragoons, further to the
SQuth, took ground in frout of the Spaniards. The King and
Sebnstiani were still far to the rear: their infantry was only
just passing the Alberchc, though their advanced cavalry under
Merlin was already pushhlg forward in the direction of Talavera
down the high·road from Madrid I.
If Napoleon, or any other general who knew how to make
himself obeyed, had been present with the French army, there
would have been no fighting 011 the evening of July 27. Dut
King Joscph counted for little in the eyes of his nominal sub-
ordinates, and hence it came to ptulS that the impetuous Victor
took upon himself the responsibility of attacking the allies
when only half the King's army had come upon the field. With
no more object, as it would seem, than that of hamssing the
enem~', he se.llt to the front the batteries belonging to Rumn,
Lapisse, and Latonr.Maubourg, to join in the cannonade which
his horse artillery had already begun. At the same time-
Merlin's light horse pressed forward in the direction of Tala"cro,
to feel for. the front of the Spnniards, whose exact position was
hidden by the olive groves. The British artillery replied, but
no great harm was done to either side. Yet in the Spani:;h part
of the line a dreadful disaster was on the point of occurring.:
When the artillery fire began, and the French light horse were
seen advancing, the Estremadumn troops betwecn Tnlnvera and
the Pajnr de Vcrgara delivered a tremendous salvo of infantry
fire along the whole line, though the enemy was too far ofI' to
take any damage. But, immediately after, four battalions of
Portago's division, which formed pnrt of the left of Cuesta's
line and touched Campbell's right, suddenly shouted' treason!'
I All these details are from tbe :report drawn up by SimoiMJ the chief of
the staff of the 1st Corps, at Talavera on Aug. IQ.
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broke, and went off to the rear in complete disorder. Wellesle)'.
who, as it ehllDccd, was behind Campbell's troop~ /lnd witnessed
the whole rout, declared that he could l.'Ollccive no reason for
their behaviour except that they must have been frightened by
the crash of their own tremendous volley 1. Two of these four
battalions were troops who had never been in action before: the
other two had been badly cut up at Mcdellin, and brought up
to strength by the incorporation of a great mass of recruits 2.
This might have excused a momen,tary misconduct, but not a
prolonged rush to the rear when the enemy was still half a mile
off, still less the casting 8wa,y of their arms and the plundering
of the British camp, through which the multitude fled, Cuesta
sent cavalry to hunt them up, and succeeded in hounding back
the majority to their ranks, but many hundreds were still
missing on the following morning, They fled in small bands
all down the valley of the Tagus, dispersing dismal information
on all sides, It is sad to have to acknowledge that in their
rush through the British camp they carried aWIl), with them
some commiSSllries and a. few of the baggage guard, who did
not halt till they got to Oropesa, twenty miles from the field 3.
Strange to say, this panic had 110 appreciable ill effects: the
I Wellesley to Castlereagh, Aug. 2.'f: 'Two thousand of them ran ofi'
on the e\'ening of the twenty-seventh, not 100 yards from where I was
Iltanding, who were neither attacked, nor thNatened with an attack, and
who wcro only friglltelled by the noise of their own fire, TIley left their
Ilnns and accoutremcnts on the ground, their officers wcnt with them, and
they pIlllldcred the baggago of tllO British army, which had been sent to
the rear. Many others "'ent, whom 1 did not sce:
I The panic-stricken regiments were Leu.les de Fernando VII, which had
heen garrisoning Ba.dajoz when Mede1lin was fought, Badajoz (two batts.)
which had beeu in the battle, and Toledo.
I , I wish I could assert with truth that this ret;r(lgression was confined
to our Spanish allies. But the truth must be told, and I regret to say
that stragglen from the British army were among them, taking a similar
direction to the rear. As they passed, they circulated reports of a most
disheartening nature: Cot Leach's Rough Sketchu, p. 81. He "'as with
Craufurd'lJ brigade, then comillK up br forced marches from Plasencia,
which met the fugitives near Oropesa on tIle morning of the t""ellty~
eighth. <The road was crowded with fugitives, Svauianls inllumerable,
Rnd lots of Ellglisl\ commissary clerks, paymasten alid slltlera, to say
nothing of a. few soldiers who said tbey were 8ick.' AutobiO!Jraphy of
l5ir George Napier, p, lOS,
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French were not in a position to take advanta.,ge of it, hfl.\'ing
no troops, save a few light horse, in front of the spot where it
occurred. The Spaniards to the right and rear of the absconding
regiments did not flinch, lUld as the second line held firm, there
was no actual gap produced in ~e allied position. But.'Vellesley
noted the scene, and never forgot it: of all that he bad witnessed
during the campaign, this was the sight that struek him most,
and most influenced his future couduct. euesta also took
account of it in his o.wn fashion, and- at the end of the battle of
the next day proposed' to decimate in the old Roman fashion, the
battalions that had fled! He actually chose by lot some 200
men from the fugitives, and after trying them by court~martial
prepared to shoot them. His British colleague begged off the
majority, but the old Captain-General insisted on executing
some twenty~five- or thirty who were duly put to death on the
morning of the twenty-ninth I.
After the panic had dit.(l down, Victor gradually withdrew
his batteries 2, but it was with no intention of bringing the
combat to a real termination. He had resolved to deliver
a night attack on the key of the British position, when the
whole of llis corps should have reaehed the front, Having
reconnoitred the allied lines, and noted the distributioll of their
defenders, he had determined to storm the Cerro de Medellin in
the dark, During his long stay at Talaverll> he had acquired a
very thorough knowledge of its eJnirons, and understood the
dominating importance of that height, Ifhe could seize and hold
it during the night, he saw that the battle of the next day would
be already half won, Accordingly, still without obtaining King
I 'Early in the morning some t~cnty-five. Spauish soldiers, dressed ill
white. atwnded hy several Popish priests, weremarthed np to the front of
our regiment and shot. One, a young lad of nineteen or twenty years,
dropped before the party fired, but to no use. For after the volley at ten
paces, the firing party rau forward aud ebooting them in the head or breast
completed their horrid Nork. These unfortunates belonged to regimeuts
that had given way in the late battle.' Diary of Cooper(ofthe 7th Fusiliers),
pp. 25-6.
3 TIlat the panic took place at dusk, and not during the night attack.
is cOlllI.letely proved by the JQUnlul of Gencml SCmeU, where it is notetl
as occurring ill cOllsequcnce of Victor's earliest demOllstration; as also iJy
We1lcaley's DOW.
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Joseph's leave, he determined to assail the Cerro. He told off
for the storm his choicest division, that of Ruffin, whose nine
battalions were already ranged on the front of the Cascajal
heights. At the same time Lapissc's didsion was to distract
the attention of the British centre by a. noisy demonstration
against its front.
Night attacks are proverbially ha1Ardolls and hard to conduct,
and it cannot be disputed that Victor showed an excessive
temerity in endeavouring to deliver such a blow at the steady
British troops, at an honr when it was impossible to guarantee
proper co-operation among the attacking columns. But for aq
initial stroke of luck he ought not to have secured even the
small measure of success that fell to his lot.
At about nine o'clock, however, Ruffin moved down to the
attAck. Each of his three regiments was formed in battalion
columns, the 9th LCger in the centre, the 96th on its left, the
24th on its right. The first-named regiment was to deliver
a frontal attack, the other two to turn the Banks of the hill
and attack o\'er its side.slopes. At the appointed mo'ment the
three regiments desccnded simultaneously into the ravine of
the Portii'ia, and endea"oured to carry out their respective
sections of the programme. The 9th, chancing on the place
. where the ravine was most easily negotiable, crossed it v.ithout
much difficulty, and began lo climb the opposite slope. On
mounting half way to the crest, it suddenly came on Low's
brigade of the German Legion, lying down in line, with its
pickets only a very small distance in advance of the main body.
It'is said that the brigadier was labouring under' the delusion
that some of Hill's outposts were in his front, and that he was
screened by them. It is at allY rate cleaf that he was laken
wholly unprepared by the midnight attack of the French. His
sentries were trampled down in a moment, and the 9th Uger
ran in upon the Germans, firing into them point blank and seizing
many of them as prisoners almost ere they were awake. The
7th K. G. L. was completely broken, and lost 150 men-half of
them prisoners-in five minutes. The 5th, the right-hand
battalion of Low's brigade, came off better, as it was not in
the direct path of the French; but it was flung sideways along
the southern slope of the bill, and conld not be re-formed for:
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some time. Meanwhile the three French columns, somewhat
separated from each other in this first clash of arms, went
straight on up the Ccrro, and in a few minutes were nearing its
crest, The two leading battalions actually reached and crowned
it, without meeting with any opposition save from the outlying
picket of Richard Stewart's brigade, The third WllS not flU'
behind, and it seemed almost o;:rtain that the position might be
won, At this moment General Hill, who was occupied in draw·
illg out his di\'ision on the rear slope, but had not yet con-
ducted it to its fighting-ground, interfered in the fight. He had
sccn and heard the sudden outbreak of musketry on the frontal
slopes, as the French broke through Low's brigade. But when
it died down, he WtlS far from imagining that the CD.use was the
complete success of the enemy. Nevertheless, he directed his
nearest brigade, that of Richard Stewart, to prepare to support
the GermaiJ.s if necessary. He was issuing his ordCI'!l to the
colonel of the 48th, when he observed some men on the hill top
fire a few shots in his direction. '~ot having an idea.,' he
writes, 'that the enemy were so nCD.r, I said to mysclf that
I was sure jt was the old Buffs, as usual, making some blunder.'
Accordingly he galloped up the hill, with his brigade-major
Fordyce, shouting to the men to cease firing. He rode right in
among the French before he reali7.ed his mistake, and a voltigeur
seized him by the arm aud b~e him surrender. Hill spurred
his horse, which sprang forward and got clear of the Frenchman,
who lost his hold but immediately raised his musket and fired
at three paccs' distance, missing the General but hitting his
charger. Hill escaped in the midst of a scattering volley, which
killed his companion Fordyce, and got back as fast as he could
to Hichard Stewarl's brigade. l,.Vithout delaying for a moment,
even to change his wounded horse, he led on the nearest regi-
meuu; to recover the hill top. So great was the confusion,
owing to the sudden attack in the dark, that Stewart's men
moved forward, not in their proper order, but with the 1st
llattulion of Detachments on the right, the ~9th in the centre,
and the 1/48 on the left. This arrangement brought the first-
named unit first into touch with the enemy. TheDetaehments
came into immediate collision with the leading battalions of the
French, who were now somewhat in disorder, and trying. to
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re-form on the ground they had won. The two forces opened
a furious lire upon each other, and both came to n standstill l .
But Hill, coming up a moment later at the head of his centre
regiment, cleared the hill top by a desperate charge~: passing
through the Detachments, the 29th delivered a volley at point-
blank l'8J'Jge &ld closed. The enemy broke and fled down the
slope that they had ascended. The 29th wheeled into line and
followoo them, pouring in regular vollcp at short intervals.
But before they had gone far, they became dimly conscious of
another column to their left, pushing up the hill in the dark·
ness. This ,,'"us the renr battalion of the 9th LCgcr, which had
fallen somewhat behind ,its fellows. It was moving up dingoll'
ally across the front of the British regiment, witb drums beating
and loud shouts of vive l'Emptreur. Taken in flank by the fire
of the right companies of the 29th, it could make no effective
resistance, and ere long broke and rolled back in disorder into
the bed of the Portifia, where it met with the wrecks 'Of the rest
of the regiment, imd retired in company 'witll them up the
slopes of the Cerro de·Cascajal.
The ·remainder of Ruffin's di''lsion took little or no part in
the fighting. The three bn.ttalions.ofthe 24th, which ought to
have mormted the hill on the right, lost their way ill the dark-
ness and wandered up .the valley between the Cerro de Medellin
and the northern mountains; they never came into action. The
96th, on the left of the at't.ack, chanced upon a part of the
Portit1a. ravine which was \'ery precipitous: they found it
difficult to descend, were very late in reaching the other side,
and then fell into a futile bickering fight with th~ 5th and
2nd battalions of the King's German Legion, which tenninated
-with small damage to either party-when the main attack in
the centre was seen to hlwe failed.
The loss of the French in this night battle was about 300
men, almost all in the 9th Legcr. It included sixty-five
prisoners, among whom was the colonel of the regiment; who
1 The Battalion of Detachments WR!I decidedly checked. They got
somewhat into I;onfusion, and halted. 'The soldiers seemed much vexed;
writes Leslie of the 2!)th, 'we could hear them bra,·ely callillg out" There
is nobody to command us! Only te1l. us what to do, and we are ready
to dare anyth.illg." There was a fault somewhere,' Leslie, p. 144.
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was left on the ground desperately wounded. The British
casualties were somewhat heavier, entirely owing to the disaster
to the 5th and 7th battalioll!! of the K. G. L, which suffered
when surprised, a loss of 188 men, eighty~seven of whom were
made captives. Richard Swwnrt's brigade, which bore the
brunt of the fighting and decided the affair, had only U5
killed and wounded I.
Thus ended, in well-deserved failure., Victor's night attack, of
which it may suffice to say that even its initial sucees!I was
only due to the gross carelessnetlS of Low's brigade in failing to
cover their front with a proper screen of outlying pickets. To
attack in the dark across rugged and difficult ground was to
court disaster. The wonder is not that two-thirds of the
division went astray, but that the! other third almost succeeded
ill the hazardous enterprise to which it was committed. Great
credit is due to the 9th Leger for all that it did, and no blame
whatever rests upon the regiment for its ultimate failure. The
Marshal must take all the responsibility.
The wrecks of the French attacking columns having rolled
back beyond the ravine, and the flanking regiments having
abandoned their futile demonstrations, the Cerro de :\:ledell.in
was once more safe. The troops occupying it were reaTl"Ilnged,
as far as was possible, in thc dark. The front linc on its left
and highest part was now formed by Richard Stewart's brigade,
ranged, not in its proper order of seniority, but with the fl9th
on the left, the Ist Battalion of Detachments in the centre, and
the 1/48 on the right. Tilson's brigade, the other half of
Hill's division, was to the souU. of Stewnrt, continuing his line
along the crest, Low's battalions of the King's German Legion
were drawn off'somewhat to the right, closing in towards Lang.
werth's brigllde, so a.~ to leave the central slopes of tile CeITo de
1\fcdcllin entirel)" tu Hill's men. Donkin's brigade of Mac-
kenzie's division lay close behind them. After the warning that
had been given by Victor's first assault, the greatest care was
1 TIlOugh the French official reports of casualties do not give any officers
of the 9th Uger as prisonel'S, it is certain that Colonel Meunier was
taken. See Leslie, p. 143. Being reco\'ered, along with the other
wounded prisonel'S, when Talavera was evacuated, his name did not get
dowll among the list ofmissiug, which was only drawn up 011 .o\ug. 10.
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taken to make tL second surprise impossible. Stewart'lI and
Low's brigades threw forward their pickets to the brink of
the Portina ravine, so close to the enemy that all night they
could hear the Qui vivc of the sentries chnllengillg the visiting
rounds, only two or three hundred yards above them. On
several occasions the outposts opened tire on eaeh other, and the
word' stand to your arms,' ran along the whole line. In front
of Sherbrooke's dh-isioll, about midnight, there WM a false
alarm, which led to a whole brigade delivering a volley at an
imaginary column of assault, while their 0 ....11 pickets were still
out in front, with the result that two oHicers and several men
were killed or wounded 1. A similar outbreak of tire, lasting for
several minutes, ran along the front of the Spanish lines an hour
later. It seems to have been caused by French foragers, in
search of fuel, blundering against the Estremaduffin pickets all
the edge of the olive groves.
Altogether the night was not a peaceful one, and the troops
were much harassed by the perpetual and unnecessary calls to
stand to their arms. Many of them got little sleep, and se\-cral
British diarists have left interesting impressions on record of
their long vigil. There was much to keep them awake: not
only the repented blaze of tire l'lUlning along parts of "the allied
line, but the constant sib'1ls of movement on the French side of
the Portiiia. Some time after midnight long lines of torches
were seen advancing across and to the right of the Cerro de
Cascajal; these were markers with flambeaux, sent out to fix
the points on whieh Victor's artillery were to take up their
positions, as was soon shown by the rattling of gun-carriages,
the noise of wheels, and the cracking oh-hips, which \\'ere plainly
heard in the intervals of stillness, when the hostile pickets
ceased their bickering musketry fire. The French were pushing
up their guns into the very front of their line, and when the
dawn began to break they were visible only 600 or 800 yards
away from the British lines. A few deserters came over during
the night, mainly from Le\·al's German division; allagrero that
the enemy was about to deliver a second attack in the early
morning.
I See the Diary of Boothby of the R. E.} one of the victims of this
ullhappy fusilade, p. .5.
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The dawn was an anxious moment: with the growing light
it was ·possible to make out broad black patches dotting the
whole of the rolling ground in front of the British army. Every
instant rendered them more visible, and soon they took shape as
French regiments in 'battalion columns, ranged on a front of
nearly two miles, from the right end of the Cerro de Cascajal to
the edge of the woods facing the Pajllr de Vergarll. The object
which drew most attention was an immense solid colulllll at the
extreme right of the hostile line, on the lower slopes aboye the
Portina, with a thick screen of tirailleurs already thrown out in its
front, and evidently ready to advance at the word of command.
The otllcr rnvisiollS lay further back: ill frout of them artillery
was everywhere ,·jsible: there were four batteries on the mid-
slope of the Cascajal hill, and six more on the rolling ground to
the south. ]n the far distance, behind the infantry, were long
lines of cavalry dressed in all the colours of the l'tUllOOw-
fifteen or sixteen regiments could be <:<lUnted-and ftu' to the
rear of them more black masses were slowly rolling inlo view.
It was easily to be seen that little or nothing lay in front of the
Spaniards, Rlld that at least five-sixths of the French army was
disposed for an att::a.ck on the British front. There were 40,000
men visible, ready for the advance Ilgainst the 20,000 sabres and
bayonets of Wellesley's long red line 1.
An attack was imminent, yet there were many things which
might have induced the rrench generals to hold back. WftS it
worth while to assail the allics in the admirable position which
they now held, when it was possible to drive them out of it
without risking a battle? Orders had been sent to Soult, six
days before, to bid him fall on WellesJey's communications by
way of Plasencia. It was believed that he must, have started
ere now, and that the news of his approach would reach tne
enemy within the next forty-eight hours. This intelligence
would compel them to go behind the Tagns, and to nbandoll the
Talavcm position. Both JOW-dUll and King Joseph were doubt-
ful of the policy of risking a general action. But the initiative
w~s taken out of their hands by Victor. He had already placed
his corps so close to the British lines that it would have been
I TIlere are admirable uarrath'es of the night.-I,jgil and the dawn of
Talavera, in the narratives of Leslie, Leith-Ha)', and Lord Munster.
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hard to withdraw it without an engagement. He had also, during
the night, sent a dispatch to the King, stating that he should
storm the Cerro de l\fcdellin at dawn unless he received counter~
orders. He appeared so confident of success that JO:leph and
his adviser Jourdan did not venture to bid him desist. They
were, as the latter confessed, largely influeneoo by the knowledge
that if they refused, Victor would delate them to the Emperor
for culpable timidity in letting the British army escape 1.
'!'he Duke of Be1111110 was still persisting in his idoo that it
might be possible to seize the key of ·Wellesley's position by
a partial attack, without cllb11\ging the rest of his corps till it
had already been won. Accordingly he gave orders to his sub~
ordinate:; Lapisse and ViIlatte that they were not to move till
Ruffin, with the first di\'ision, should havc gained the Cerro
de l\fedcllin. In a similar way the King made the advance of
the 4th Corps conditional on the preliminary success of Victor's
right. This seems to have been bad policy, llS it left WeUesley
free to devote tile whole of his attention to the point wbere the
first attack was to be delivered. It was clear that the threaten-
ing column on the lower slopes of the Cerro de Cascajal would
start the game. Victor had drawn up his troops "in the follow-
iug order. Ruffin on the extreme left, and considerably in
advance, was to attack the Cerro on its north-eastern and eastern
frouts. Behind him on the summit of the Cascnjal Hill, were
Villatte's twelve battalions, tlnd in rear of all the two regiments
of Beaumont, the Marshal's corps-cavalry. To Villatte's left,
but on lower ground opposite Sherbrooke's line, lay Lapisse's
division, ."dtb Latour-Maubourg's six regiments of dragoons in
support. This completed the array of the ]st Corps: on their left
stood Scbastiani and his 4th Corps, facing the Guards, Cllrupbcll,
and the northernmost b6ttalions of the Spanish army, opposite
I (l.e due uo &4.IUllC rendit compte au roi du ~l!ultat de sa premiero
attallllC, et le p;rcvint qu'illa rellouvcllerait au point du jou:r. j)eut-etre
aurait on dfi lui donuer l'ordre d'attelldre. .•• Mats ca marecbal, etant
reste longternps aux euvirons de Talavera, de\'IDt couoaitro parfaitement
son terrain, et il paraissait si sU:r du succlls, que le roi le laissait libre
d'agir comrne i1le desirait. ... 11 sentait que s'il adopterait l'avis du
Marecbal Jourdan le duede lleUlIne ooIUanqucrait pasd'ecrireal'empereur
"qU'Oll 1ui M'Sit fait perdre l'occasion d'UIlO brillante victoire sur lea
Auglais ".' Jourdan's M/moires, pp. 250 sud 259.
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the Pajar de Vergnra. Sebastiani's French division ..ras on his
right, his German division on his left, while the stray Polish
brigade (the only part of Valence's division that was on the
field) supported the Germans. In second line was Merlin's
light horse, while Milhaud's six regiments of dragoons layout
on the extreme left, observing the town of Talayera. King
Joseph and his reserve - the Guards and the brigade of
Dessolles-w.ere far to the rear, just outside the woodS round
the Casa de SaUnas.
At about five in the morning the watchers on the Cerro de
~lede1lill saw "the smoke of n gUll curl up into the air from the
central battery in front of Villattc's di'o·ision. TIle ensuing
report was the signal for the whole of Victor's artillery to open.
and twenty-four guns spoke at once from the Cascajal heights,
and thirty more from the Jower ground to their right. The
cannonade W88 tremendous, and the reply wholly inadequate, as
WelIesley could only put four batteries in line, Rettberg's on
the summit of the Cerro, Sillery's from the Jower slope near
DOllkin's position, and those of Heyse and EUiott from the
front of 5hel·brooke'8 di.vision. The French fire was both
accurate and effediw, 'they served their guns in an infinitely
better style than at Vimeiro: their shells were thrown with
precision, and did considerable execution I.' Wellesley, who stood
in rear of Hill's line on the commanding height, at once ordered
Richard SleWnrt'8 and Tilsoll's brigades to go buck from the
sky-line, and to lie down. But 110 such device was practicable
in Sherbrooke's division, where the formation of the ground
presented no possibility of cover, and here much damage was
done. After a few minutc5 the Euglish position was obscured,
for the damp of the morning air prevented the smoke from
rising, and a strong east wind blew it across the PortiJ1a, and
drove it along the slopes of the Cerro 2. Stl thick was the
atmosphere that the .defenders heard rather than saw the start
of Ruffin's division on its advance, and only realized its Ileal'
approach when they saw their own skirmishers retiring up the
slope towards the main line. The light companies of Hill's
division came in so slowly and unwillingly, turning back often
1 Eliott's Narrative, i.u his JJiferu:e 0/Porlllfl«l, p. 238.
~ Lord MUllster, 1'- 226.
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to fire, and keeping their order with the regularity of n field-
day. The general, wishing to get his front clear, bade the
bugles llOund to bring them in more quickly, Rnd as they filed
to the rear in a leisurely way was het\l'd to shout (it was one of
the only two occasions on which he wus known to swear), 'D-ll
their filing, let them come in anyhow 1.'
"Vhep; the light companies had fallen back, the French were
at last visible through the smoke. They had mounted the
lower slopes of the Cerm without nuy loss, covered by their
artillery, which only ceased firing at this moment. They showed
nine battalions, in three solid columns: Victor had arranged the
divisions with the ~4th in the centre, the 96th on the left, and
the 9th Leger, which had suffered so severely in the Ilight-
battle, upon the right. This arrangement brought the last-
named regiment opposite their old enemies of the 29th, and
the Battalion of Detachments, while the Ij48th and ~/48th had
to deal with the French centre, and the Buffs and 66th with
their left. When lluffill's columns had got within a hundred
yards of the sky-line, Hill bade his six battalions stand to their
feet and advance. As they lined the crest they delivered a
splendid volley, whose report was as sharp and precise as that
of a field-day. The effect was of course murderous, as was
always the case when line met colmnn. The Frcnch hnd a
marked superiority in numbers; they were nearly 5,000 strong,
Hill's two brigades had less than 4,000 2• But there was the
usual advantage tha.t every British soldier could use his weapon,
whiie the French, in column of divisions, had the normal mass
of useless muskets in the real' ranks. The first ....·olley brought
thcm to a standstill-their wholc front had gone dowll at the
discharge-they lost the impetus of advance, halted, and kept
up a furious fire for some lI1i~utes. But when it came to a
standing fight of musketry, there was never a doubt in any
Peninsular battle ho~' the game would end. The French fire
began ere long to slacken. the front of the <..'Olumns shook alld
I Leslie, p. 147. The other occasiou on which Hill ust'ld strong 13u-
guage was at the battle of St. Pierre in 1314, when Wellington remarked:
~ U Hill is beginning to swear we had better get out of the way:
t RI/ffiu IHill 5,200 men, minus about 300 lort on the previous uight,
while Hill had 3,853, minus 138 lost ill that same battle in the dark.
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wavered. Just at this moment Sherbrooke, who had noted that
the divisions in his own front showed no signs of closing, took
the 5th battalion of the King's Gennan Legion out of his left
brigade 1, and sent it against the flank and renr of Ruffin's
nearest regiment-the 96th of the line. 'Vhcll the noise of
battle broke out in this new quarter, the French lost heart and
began to give ground. Hichard Stewart., at the northern end
of the British line, gave the signal to his brigade to charge, and
-as a participator in this fra)' writeg, 'on we went, a wall of
stout ,hearts and bri$tling steel. The enemy did not fancy such
close quarters, and the moment our rush began they went to
the right-about. The principal portion broke and fled, though
some brave fellows occasionally faced about and gave us an.
irregula.r fire.' Nothing, however, could stop Hill's division,
and the whole sLx battalions rushed like a torrent down the
slope, bayonetting and sweeping back the enemy to the line of
black alld mudd.y pools that marked the l'OUrse of the Portiiio..
l\Iany of the pursuers even crossed the ravine and chased the
flying French divisions right into the arms of Villatte's troops,
on the Cascajal Hill. \\rhen these reserves opened fire, Hill'f;.,
men re-formed on the lower slope of the Cerro, and retired to
their old position without being seriously molested, for Victor
made no cowlter-attack.
Ruffin's three regiments had been terribly punished: they.
had lost, in forty minutes' fighting, 1,300 killed and wounded.
much more than a fourth of their strength. Hill's brigades had
ahout 750 cl\Sualties~, including their gnllnnt leader, WllO received
a wound in the head, and had to go to the rear, leaving the
command of his division to Tilson. The loss of the German
battalion which had struck in 1Ip<:!1l the French rear WQl; insigni-
ficant, as the enemy never stood to meet it,
I This operation is described in tbe narrative of the K. G. L. officer,
printed by Beamish (p. 212). The narrator, however, mistakes the French
regiment's number, and says twenty-aix for ninety-six.
• These losses can be accurately ascertained. Ruffin's whole loss in the
two days of fighting was 1,6a2, of whom 300 of the 9th Uger had fallen
on the night of July 27. lIe was not seriously engaged during tbe
rest of the day, so must hal'e lost 1,300 in t11is fight. Hill'! total lOl!ll
on July 28 was 835, bnt much of it was suffered in the afternoon, when
(though llOt attacked b)' infantry) Ills division was under a heavy slleU fire.
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'I'hus was Victor's second attempt to storm the Cerro de
Medellin rebuked. It WlLS a rash and unscientific operation,
and received a merited chastisement. The Marshal should have
sent in all his corps, and attacked the whole British line, if he
wished to give his men a fair chance. He obviously underrated
the troops with which he had to deal-he. had never sC(!n them
before the combat of Casa de Salinas on the previous day-and
had no conception of the power of the line against the column.
Even now bafiled rage seems to have been his· main feeling, and
his only desire was to make the attempt again with larger
forces.
The whole engagement had taken about an hour and a half,
and the morning was still young when the Marshal re-formed
his line, and reported his ill-~uC(:ess to the King. After the
cannonade died down he bade his men take their morning meal,
and the British on the CeITo could see the whole 1st Corps tUnl
to cooking, behind their strong line of pickets. A sort of
informal armistice was established in a short time; both parties
wished to use the stagnant water of the PortiJla, and after
a little signalling hundreds of men came down with their
canteens from either side, and filled them with the muddy fluid,
In spite of the heavy fighting which had just ended, all parties
agree that a. very friendly spirit was shown. The men conversed
as best they CQuld, and were even seen to shake hands across the
pools. Many of the officers came down a little later, and after
a short colloquy agreed that either party might take off its
wounded without molestation. As there were hundreds of
French lying on the west bank of the Portinll, and a good many
Ellglish on its further side, there was a complete confusion of
uniforms as the bearers passed and repasseU each other at the
bottom of the ravine. Dut no difficulties of any sort arose, and
for more than two hours the two parties were completely
mixed. This was the first example of' that amicable spirit
which reigned between the hostile armies all through the war,
and which i~ its later years developed into that curious code of
signals (often described by contemporaries), by which French
and English gave each oth~r notice whenever serious work was
intended, refraining on all other occasions from unnecessary
outpost bickering or sentry-shooting.
SECTION XVI: CHAPTER VII
THE BA'ITLE OF TALAVERA: TIIE MAIN ENGAG:DIENT
(JULY 23)
Tm: informal armistk'C which had followed the combat of
the early morning had drawn to an end, when at about 10 o'clock
the British observers on the Cerro de Medellin saw 0. large and
brilliant staff riding along the French line from right to left.
It finally halted, and took post on the most commanding point
of the Cascajal heights. This was the entourage of King Joseph
and Marshal Jourdan, who had determined to make a careful
examination of the nlljed lines before committing themselves to
any further action. Wllell they halted on the swnmit of the
hill, from which the best b1'€'lleraI view was obtainable, Victor
came to meet them, snd a council of waT was held.
It soon developed into a lengthy and animated dispute;
Instillg for more than an hour. JOlUuan was of opinion that,
considering the strength of the hostile position, and the deeisive
way in which the 1st Corps had been repulsed, it would be
unwise to proceed with another attack. He pointed out that
Wdlcsley would now be perfectly aWllre that his left was the
point which must be assailed, and that movements visible behind
the British line showed that it was already being reinforced.
The onlJ' good move now ft.milable was to endeavour to turn
the Cerro by the little valley to its north-east, which scparntcs
it from the Sierra de Segurilla: but it was dear that the enemy
realized this as well as themselves. A considerable body of
cavalry was already appearing at its southern end. If the Duke
of Belluno, instead of delivering two frontal assaults, hurl been
prudent enough to push men dOWII this valley under cover of
the darkness, so 8S to have a lateral attack ready at dawn,
something might have been done. But now the imperial troops
would have to win the valley by hard fighting, before they could
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use it as a starting-point for the assault on the hill. Jr
a general attack were delivered, and the arm)' were ol1~e more
repulsed, it risked its line of communication and its J'ctreut on
l\Iadrid. For the whole Spanish host might come out of the
woods and fall upon its flank, while it was engaged with the
llritish, and in thl\t case the Madrid road would be cut, and the
King would have to retreat on Avila, sacrificing his capital and
his arsenals. On the whole Jouroan held that it would be wise
and prudent to assume El. defensive posture, and either to hold
the present position or to retire to the more favoumble ground
behind the Alberche, four miles to the rear. In a few day!! the
enemy would hear of Soult's operations upon their line of com-
munication, and would be forced to break up and retire.
Very different, as might have been expected, were Victor's
views. He declared that the British position Wall far from
impregnable, and that the prestige of the l"rench army would be
destroyed if it retired, after two partial checks, from in front
of an enemy who had lIOt OCen sedollsly attacked. The only
fault in the preceding operations had been that the whole army
had not joined in, at the moment when the Cerro had been
stormed. If the King would undertake to use the 4th Corps
against the allied <:cntre, he pledged himself to break their right
with his own three divisions of infantry. He would not only
assail the Cerro from in front, but would turn it from both
flanks. If such an attack did not succeed ilfalldmit 'reIlOr/l;er
afaire la gu4-Trc. This phrase hc dinned into Joseph's alld
Jourdan's ears· so repeatedly that they both saved it up fOf
future use, and taunted him with it in the acrimonious corre-·
spondence which followed the battle.
King Joseph would have preferred to follow Jourdau's cautious
plan, and to hold back. Sebastiani, whose opinion he asked,
agreed with him. But both seem to have been terrorized by
the Marshal's stormy tirades, and still more by the thought of
what the Emperor would say, if he heard that battle had been
refused, contrary to Victor's advice. The ultimate decision wa..
still in the balance, whcn two pic(:t.>s of news were reccived: the
first was a dispatch from General Valence, the Governor of
Toledo, to effect that the army of Venegas, whose position had
hitherto been unknown-for nothing had been heard of him
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since Sebastiani had escaped from his front-had at last come
on the scene. His advanced guard had presented itself before
the bridges of Toledo, and was already skirmishing there. The
second item of intelligence was a dispatch from Soult, ac-
knowledging the receipt of the orders which had been sent to
him upon the twenty-second, andstnting his intention ofcarrying
them out at the earliest possible moment. But he complained
that the promised train of artillery had not yet reached the
Qnd Corps, and declared that he could not move till it had come
to hand, and till he had brought down the 6th Corps from
Astorga. He was therefore of opinion that he could not possibly
reach Plasencia till August 3, perhaps not till two days later.
This news was decisive: it wns now clear that the Duke of
Dalmatia would not be able to bring pressure to bear upon the
rear of the allies for some six or seven days. Meanwhile Venegas
was within two marches of Madrid, and had nothing in front of
him save the fOlU' Polish battalions at Toledo, If the King
refused to fight, and took up a defensive position on the
Albcrchc, he would have to detach 15,000 men to hold back the
army of La Mancha from the capital. This would leave him
with only 30,000 men to resist Wellesley and Cuesta, and, it
was clear that sueh a force would be overmatched by the allies.
If he kept a larger number in their front, Venegas would be
able to capture Madrid, the thing of all others which Joseph
was resolved to prevent. Accordingly the King and Jourdan
reluctantly fell in with Victor's plans, and consented to fight in
the afternoon. If they defeated the British and the Estre·
madurans on the twenty.eighth, the army of Lu Mancha could
easily be disposed of upon the twenty-ninth or thirtieth.
'This decision once made, it only remained to settle the details
of the attack. The King determined to assail the British ccntre
and right with the infantry of Sebastia.lli's corps-twenty-three
battalions in all, or some 14,000 men. Victor with the three
infantry divisions of the Ist Corps-thirty-three battalions, still
over 16,000 strong in spite of their losses-undertook to fall
upon the English left, to storm the Cen'o de Medcllin and also
to turn it on its northern side, 80 fIS to envelop Wcllesle>"s
flank. The Spaniards were to be left alone behind their walls
and orchards-only Milhaud's dragoons were told off to watch
OMAN, U Mm
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the exits from Talavera. Of the rest of the cavalry a few could
be utilized in Victor's turning movement iu the valley below the
Sierra de Segurilla: but the main body-all Beanmont's and
Latour-Mnubourg's eight regiments-were ranged in n. second
line, to act as a reserve for the frontal attack of the infantry, and
to aid it if it were checked. The King's Guards and the brigade
of Dessolles were to be kept back, and only utilized to clinch the
victory or to retrieve a repulse.
The 30,000 men who were to deliver the grand assault on the
allied position were drawn up as follows. Leval's Germans
advtUlced 011 the lef-t, taking as their objective the battery on
the Pajar de Vergara. They faced CampheU's British division,
and slightly overlapped it, so as to cover the three or four
battalions on the extreme northern wing of Cuesta's line. III
their rear as supports followed the two Polish battalions from
Valence's division. On Leval's right, Sebnstiani's four l?rench
regiments continued the line: this was the strongest division on
the field and counted over 8,000 bayonets. It fEU.-ed the Guards
and the right battalion of Cameron's brigade. Here ended the
troops of the 4th Corps: beyond them Victor's ~nd division,
that of Lapisse, was about to assail the German Legion and
Camcron's left-hand regiment, the 83rd. Still further north
Villatte's division lay opposite the steepest slopes of the Cerro
de ),fedellin. This position looked more formidable in the eyes
of the Duke of Bc1lullO since he had seen his first two assaults
upon it fail. It was now heavily manned: Tilsoll's, Richard
Stewart's, and Donkin's brigades were all visible upon its crest.
After some hesitation the Marshal resolved to leave it alone for
the present, and not to at~k it till some impression should
have been made upon other parts of Vvellesley's line. Accord·
ingl)' he left in front of it only ~illatte's second brigade-the six
battalions of the 94th and 95th regiments. The other brigade
-the f<!7th and 6:3rd-was directed to join in the flanking
movement to the north of the Cerro. which was to encompass
\Vellesley's extreme left. But the main force told off' for this
advance consisted of the much-tried remnants of Ruffin's division,
now not more than 3,700 strong. The employment of these
troops for such a critical operation seems to have been a
mistake-they had already received two bloody checks, and had
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lost more than 1\ third of their officers and 1,500 men in the
late flghting. Though good regiments, they could now be con~
sidered as little more than' a spent force.' This fact sufficiently
explains the feebleness of the French advance upon this part of
the field during the ufternoon hour,;.
Behind the French infantry of the 4th and Ist Corps were
deployed no less than twelve regiments of horse: Latour-
l\faubourg's three brigades of dragoons were drawn Hp in the
rear of Lapisse and Sebastiani: BeaullIout supported VilIatte,
and lastly the four regiments of Merlin's (late 1&a11e's) di\':ision
followed Ruffin in his turning mo\'ement. Far to the rear
Dessolles and Joseph's Guards took lip a position facing the
British centre, from which they could support the right or
the left of their own front line as might- l)c necessary.
The drawing up of this line of battle took time, and while
the French were shif'titlg their positions and establishing their
new front, Wellcsley had ample leisure to provide against the
oncoming storm. He had established himself upon the crest of
the Cerro, and from thence could overlook every movement of
the enemy. Of the new dispositions the only one which struck
him as likely to cause trouble wns the extension of Rutlin and
Villatte to the northward. It was clear tlmt tllcy were intend-
ing to advance up the valley that separates the Sierra de
Segurilla from the Cerro de Mede1lin, in order to take the hill
in the flank, and assail the 2nd Division from the side. It was
therefore necessary to make arrangements for checking this
manreuvre. 'Velles1ey's first order was that Fane'g and Anson's
cavalry should move round the back of the Cerro, and take up
new ground at the head of the valley. From this position they
would be able to charge in the Bank any force that might push
up the trough of the. depression, in order to get behind Hill's
line. He also withdrew half Rettberg's battery from the front
of the height, and placed it on a projecting lateral spur from
which it could enfilade the valley. Nor were these his only
precautions; he sent a hasty mesSilge to Cnesta, pointing out
that the greater part of the Spanish line was not threatened,
!lnd asking if he could spare reinforcements for the left wing.
The Spanish general behaved in a more liberal fashion than
might have been expected from hi~ pre,'ious conduct. He con-
Mm2
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sented to lend W"ellesley his reserve division, that of Basserourt,
about 5,000 strong, and also put at his disposition a battery
of twelve-pounders, heavier guns than any which the British
army possessed. The French were so slow in moving that there
was ample time, before the battle grew hot, to send Dassecourt's
division round the rear of the British line, and to place it on
the lower slopes of the Sierra de Segurilla, so as to continue to
the northward the front formed by the British cavalry. Of the
Spanish guns placed at Wellesley's disposition, fOUf were put
into the Pajar de Vergara redoubt, by the side of Lawson's
battery: the other two accompanied BasseCQurt's infantry, and
were placed on the nodhern spur of the Cerro de Medellin,
near Rettberg's six-pounders. Somewhat later the Duke of
Albuquerque brought round the whole of his cavalry division
-six regiments and a horse~artillery battery-to the same
quarter, and drew them up in two lines to thc rca.r of Anson's
and Fane's brigades. But before hc arrived the battle Had
already begun.
When the whole of the French infantry was ready, at about
two o'clock in the afternoon, the King ga\'c orders for the
artillery to open, and eighty guns of the 1st and 4th Corps
began to play upon the British line. In some places the troops
were only some 600 yards from the enemy's batteries, and the
loss in mlmy regiments was very appreciable before a J!inglc
musket had been fired. Only thirty British and six Spanish
pieces could repl)': they were overwhelmed from the first by the
superior number of the French guns. It was therefore with joy
that Wellesley's infantry saw that the artillery engagement was
not to last for long. All along the hostile line the battalioll-
columns of Ruffin, Lapisse, Sebastiani, and Leval were moving
up to the attack, and when they reached the front, and threw
out their screen of tirailleurs, the guns grew silent, Only from
the Cerro de Cascajal, where Villatte was hanging back in
obedience to Victor's orders, did the cannonade against Hill's
brigades continue.
Thc first troops to come into collision with the allies were
.Leval's Germans, upon the extreme left of the French line.
'l'his, it is said, was contrary to the King's orders; he had
intended to hold this division somewhat back, as it was in
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danger of being outRanked by the Spaniards if it made a
premature advance 1. But Leval had a tangled terrain of
vines and olive groves in his front: when once he had entered
it he lost sight of the troops on his right, and fearing to be
late on account of the obstacles in his front, committed the
opposite fault. He came rushing in upon Campbell's outpost
line half all hour before the other divisions hAIl closed with
the British centre, the time being then 2.30 in the o.fternoon.
The nine battalions of the German division were arrayed in
a single line of battalion columns~, with a thick screen of
tirailleurs in their frOllt. But their order had been so much
broken up by the walls and thickets that the ~500 bayonets
appeared to the British like Olle confused mass of skirmishers.
They came on fast and furiously, chasiug the pickets of the 7th
and 53rd before them, till they emerged into the comparatively
open ground in front of the Pajar de Vergam 3, Here the
1 See Jouroan's MlmrJiru, 1). 260.
i Their order from left to right was as follows: Fraukforl-Hesse
(two batts')J Dadeu (two batts.), Holland (two batts.), Na...~'lu (two battis.).
! There is a legend which occurs iu all French narratives of Talavera-
starting with the contemporary accounts, and including Desprez's and
Jourdan's Mlmoiru. It is to the effect that Le\'al's divisiou, ill its first
ad\'ance, came upon an Engli.sh battalion, which several writers call the
46th, lying in front of the rest of the allied line. It;8 alleged that
tIle Nassau regiment surrouuded. and almost captured it-that tlley would
have taken it prisoner indeed en mall8/!, if the troops on tlleir left (Holland
!Lull Badcn) had held firm. But at lCII.St' on Iui prit Ulle celltaine d'hommcs,
le major, le lieutellaut-coloncl, et le colonel-cc deruier mourut de scs
blessures' (Jourdan). No such incident can 113\'e occurred, for (1) ·no
English regiment lost more than twenty-one 'mis!ling' on this side of the
field. (2) No English officer of higher rank than a captain was taken
prisoner in the battle. (3) Only one officer was killed in the whole of
Campbell's dh'ision, and he was a lieutenant of the 7th Fusiliers. (4) The
46th was not engaged with Leval's men, but lay to the left and supported
the Guards in resisting Sebastiani: it 1000t one officer (a captain) and twelve
men missing, but this WlUl in the great 1Il{filJ in the centre, at the end of the
day's fighting: it had no officer killed. I am driven to conclude that the
whole is 80me gross exaggeration of the surprise of Campbell's picke1:8 in
tIlo \'ineyanls, and that inetead of a <battalion' we should read the light
companies of the division.' Cooper of the 7th Fusiliers, who W3.ll in the
s.kirmishing lillll, says that tlle GermanB got clO!le among tllem by calling
out' Espaiiolcs' and pretending to be Spaniards. A few prisoners
(twcnty--six in all) were lost in this way.
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defence was standing ready for them: Campbell had brought
up one battalion of his rear brigade into his front line, so that
the 40th, as well as the SSI'd and 7th, were facing the attack.
On his right lay the redoubt with its ten guns: further to the
south the two left-hand units of the French division were
opposed to troops of Cuesta's anny. Hence it came that
while the Nassau and Dutch regiments faced the British
infantry, the Baden regiment WlL'! in front of the guns, while
the Hessians and the Frankfort battalion had. to do with
the Spaniar<k
VVhcn the Germans surged out from among the olive groves
into the comparatively open b>TOund in front of the Pajar de
Vergara, the musketry opened along 'both lines at a distance
of about 200 yards, the assailants delivering a rolling fire, while
the defenders of the position answered with regular batt.u.lion
volleys. Several times Leval's men advanced a few score
paces, and the distance between the two divisions was growing
gradually less. But the attacking force was evidently suffering
more than the allies: in the centre especially, where the ten
guns of the redoubt were firing canister into the disordered
mass, the casualties of the lladen battalions were terrible:
they could not bear up against the blasts of mitrailk, and
after their colonel, von Porbeck, had fallen, they broke and
began to recoil. Seeing part of the enemy's line falling into
disorder, General Campbe11 ordered his front line to charge.
Then Colonel Myers of the 7th, seizing the King's colour of
his regiment, ran out in front of the line and t.-alling , Come on,
Fusiliers,' led the advance 1. His own battalion, the 40th and
the 53rd, at once closed with the Nassau and Dutch regiments,
who shrank back into the thickets and melted away from the
front. The victors pw'Sued them fol' some distance, captUl'illg
in their oIlward career a whole battery of six guns, which was
being brought forward to reply to the artillery of the redoubt,
bl}.t had failed to reach the clearing before the line in front of
them gave way. The three bp.ttnlions on Lcval's extreme left,
which had the Spaniards in front of them, had been exchanging
volleys with their opponents without notable advantage on
I This was the :Myers who fell ill stormillg the famoll8 hill or Albuera ill
1811. See Cooper (or the 7th), p. 22.
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either side, when the rest of the division broke. When their
companions retired they also wefC forced to draw baek, in
order to prevent themsches from being turned all both flanks.
Campbell was cautious enough to stop his men before they had
gone far forward among the thicket8, and brought them back
to their old position: he spiked the guns that he had taken,
and left them in the clearing in front of the redoubt. His
losses had been very small, owing to his admirable self-restraint
in calling back his charging regiments before they got out of hand.
Leval therefore was able to rally his division at leisure, upon
the two Polish battalions which formed its supports. He had
lost in the thn.oe-quarters of nn hour during which he was
engaged some six or seven hundred men. The battle was
raging by now all down the line, and when·the Germans were
re-formed, they received orders to advance for So second time, to
cover the flank of Sebastiani's division, now hotly engaged with
Sherbrooke's right brigades_ Neglecting chronological con-
siderations, in order to finish the narrative of the action in this
quarter, it may suffice to say that Leval's second attack was
made at about 4 o'clock ill the aftemoon: it was not delivered
with so much energy as had been shown in his first. It
encountered the same obstacles, and could not surmount them.
Once more the advam:e rolled up through the olh'e groves, and
reached the clearing in front of the batter)'. Again the head
of the attacking masses withered away under the musketry fire
and the salvos from the Ellglish and Spanish guns, und the
whole finally went to the rear in disorder. Campbcll, ill
repelling this attack, used. his second brigade as well as his
first, and pushed the enemy further back than he had done
during the earlier lighting: the Spaniards also Clime out of
their line and continued to Rank the retreating enemy with two
or three battalions and a half-battery I, As the Hessians and
Fmnkforters in their front began to give way, they were assailed
I < Another lull in the storm, alld fresh formation. «Here they come
again" !l3id many voices: so they did, but we were ready IInd gave them
such a warm reception that they speedily went to the right-8.bout. As in
their first attack they now left behind several pieces 0.( cannon, which we
secured as before. After these two attacks and sharp repulses we were not
troubled with their company any more,' Cooper, p. M.
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by one of Henestrosa's cavalry regiments, the llegimiento delllcy~'
which charged with great spirit, and cut up mltny men before
they could form square. The bulk of the two battalions,
however, clubbed together in a mass and retired into the woods,
defending themselves as best they could. The victorious Spanish
hOI'$cmcn while following them, came upon a second French
battery which (like that captured by the British brigade on their
left) was being brought forward b)" EL narrow lane between two
olive groves. 'Illey cut down the gunller1; and took four pieces,
which were dragged back into the redoubt. This was by far
the best piece of work done by Spanish cavalry during the whole
of the first )'001'$ of the war, and did much to atone for the
panic of the previous night in the eyes of the British observers
upon the right wing.
The repulse of Leval's division was oomplete, and its wrecks,
oncc more rallied upon the two Polish battalions in their
rear, ·drew back into the plain, and were completely put out of
action, In this attack they lost not only the four guns taken
by the Spaniards, but seven more pieces of artillery. Con-
vinced that he could not carry the Pajar de Vergara position
unless he could bring guns to bear upon the redoubt, and check
the ravages of its salvos of canister, Leval had tried to push
his remaining two batteries into the firing line, Again, t\S in
the first attack, they were left helpless when the infantry broke,
and became the prey of the pursuers, It would seem that he
lost on this day seventeen guns in all 1, The total of the
} Thcrc can be no rntional lloubt that the total num\>el' of gUlls taken
was seventeen.. as set forth ill Charles Stewllrt's report to Wellell1ey, as
Adjutant-general, \'i.z. 'four eight-pounders, four six-pounders.. one four-
pounder, one six-inch howi1:2er, taken by Brigadicr-gencrnl A. Campbell's
brigade.. with oue liix-inch ho\viher and six other guns left by the eneD;ly
and found in the woods' of which four were in the hands of the Spaniards.
Welleslcy, in his dispatch, made the error of stating that twenty guns had
heen taken, being under the imprcs:;ion that the Spaniards had captured
se\'en pieces.. while they themsell'es only claim four-a Captain l'iilero was
mentioned in Eguia's dispatch for causing them to be brought back to the
Spanish line. The British took thirteen guns: three day!! after the battle
Wellesley made tllem Ol'er to his allies. He writes to O'Donoju [Talavera.
Aug. 1]: 'We have got thirteen pieces of French artillery.. which I wish
to give ol'er to tllC.SpnnisIJ army-thc oUlcr sevell [fonr] you have already
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casualties in his division were 1,007, nearly a quarter of its
force: the colonels of the Bnden and Fl'ankfort regiments and
the major commanding the Dutch battery had been left on the
got. I shall he obliged if you will urge General Cuesta to desire the
commanding officer of his artillery to receive charge of them from the
officer commanding the British artillery.' This is surely conclusive as to
the numbers.
Jourdun in 11is Mbncire: acknowledges tlle loss of appnrently aY Leval's
gUlls-tllree blltteries. 'L'arlillerie dn general lAml.1, qu'on limit
imprudemment engagee au milieu des bois, des l'igtlCll et des fosses.. ayant
eu la plupart de ses chevaux tues, ne put pas etre retiree; evenement
filcheux qu'on eut le tort impardonnable de cacher au roi' [po 261]. Desprez
says that 8i.t' pieces onl)' were lost: Thiers allows eight.
But the most interesting point of the controversy comes out in
Napoleon's correspondence with his brother Josepb. On Aug. 26.. the
Emperor writes in llot anger to say that he sees from the English newg.
p:"pcrs that Josellll llnu lost twenty guns.. a fact concealed in the King's
disI)II.tuh. Ho uesires to be told at olleo IlIO names of the batteries that
were cnptured and the divisions to which they belonged. Jourdan replies
in the King's behalf on Sept. Hi, that 110 guns have been lost-four pieces
of Leval's artillery had been fo"t a moment in the hands of the .British, but
they were recaptured. Joseph himself writes to the same effect oext day:
• \Vellesley n'a pris aucuue aigle, il n'en montrera pas plus que de canolls.'
On the nineteenth, Jourdan write~ to Clarke, the Minister of \lrar, to say
that l"e has just found out that /W() guus bad been lost by Leval. Senar-
mont, the artillery chief of the 4th Corps, oxplains to Jourdan, in a letter
of September 27, that ten pieces had been lost in the olive groves, but that
all were recovered sal'e /W(), olle Dutch six-pounder, and one French eight-
pouuullr. TIu;l truth comes out in Desprez's narrativo. He sal's that the
King, hearing that Leval h:u11eft gUlls abllllUolleU jlJ front of tlle Pajar de
Vergara,ordered Sebastiaoi to bave tllem brought in: <Le g(!ueraI Rssura que
deja elles rwaient eU reprises. Cette assertion etait ineJ:Rcte. Le gemJrll.l
Sehastiani etait-il lui-meme en erreur? Ou les ordres dounes lui parais.
saient-ils inexecutables? Je u'ai jamaiseu le mot de !"enigme: quoi qu'il
en soit, les pieces tomberent le lendemaill au poul'oir de l'enllemi. Le
General Senarmopt, qui commandait I'artillerie, ne Tendit pas compte
de ceUe perte. Le general Sebastiani I'avait prie al"ec instance de la
cncller. Aussi dans son rapport sur la bataille Josepll declara-t-il
positivement qu'on n'avait pas perUu un canon. Plus tard les journaux
anglais firent cOllnaitre la v~rite. L'Elllporeur, qui 8avait apprecier leur
cX8Ctituue, reproclla a son frere tie l'avoir ttOmpC. Josepll eut assez de
de!ica.tem pour accepter Cell reproches ct ne llOillt uechLrer de queUe
manicre les chases s'etaient pa...~es' [po 491].
In Sllort, Sebastiani and 8enarmont conspired to 11ide Ule truth, and
Joscllh, who liked them both (see his letters in Ducasse, especially vi. 466,
,538 THE 'DA'ITLE OF TALAVERA [hLY 28
field I. Campbell had suffered on a very different scale-he had
only lost 236 men, and it is improbable that the Spaniards on
his right had more than 150 or ISO casualties, sinCe they only
fought with one wing of the attacking force. Wellesley, not
without reason, gave the highest praise in his dispatch to
Campbell, for the admirable and cautious defence which he had
made. The management of thc 4tll Division, illdccd, contrasted
strongly with that of the troops to its left, where Sherhrooke's
brigades-as we shall see-risked the loss of the battle by their
rash pursuit of the cnemy, far beyond the limits of the position
which had been giyen them to defend.
,"Ve must now turn to their doings-the most desperate fight-
ing that- occlln'ed during the day. Sherbrooke's eight battalions
had to endure the preliminary cannonade for more than half all
hour after Campbell's men were closely engaged with the enemy.
It WM not till three o'clock that the two }~rench dh'isions
opposed to them began to descend towards the Portifia, in all
orderly and imposing army. Each of the French generals had
drawn up his twelve battalions in two lines-the front line
deployed in colnmn of divisions, the supporting line in solid
colwnn of battalions. But there was this difference in their
arrangements, that Lapisse had placed his brigades one behind
the other, while SebMtialli had preferred to work his brigades
sidc by sidc, each with one regimcnt in first fUld one ·in second
line. The former therefore had Laplannes' brigade (16th Uget'
and 45th Line) opposed to Low's and Langwerth's regimcnts of
wllere on Sept, 30 lIe scnds 8euarmont a gold box as a sort of 'consolation
prize '), hushed t1le matter up ill Uleir interetlts. 111e most curious part of
the matter is that QII Sept. 27, 8erumnont was aLle to say "'ith liteml
eXllcbless that onl)" two pieces were mi8Siug, for fiftcclI of tIle lost gullS
had been retaken on August ~, behind the bridge of Arzobispo, during
the retreat of Cuesta!g army. 'lbey had been given bA<;k to their owners
long before September, so were no longer missing. But this eau hardly
be called' the whole truth and nothing but the truth.'
I The losses were killed: officers six, men ninet)'.-seven; wounded,
officers twenty-four, men 003; prisoners, seventY-/:leven men. Campbell
lost killed: officen one, men thirty-two: wounded, officers six, mell 171:
missing, officers one, men twenty-live-a total of 230. TIlll Spaniards
mar have had MO casualties-it is difficult to see that they cau hl1l'''
su.lfered much more, as the)" had ouly two hostile regiments in front of
them,
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the German Legion and Cnmcrou's 2/SS1"d. The latter had the
S!8th of Rey's and the 58th of Liger~Be11air's brigades ranged
over against the 1/6Ist and the British Foot·Guards. When
the cannonade of the French batteries ceased, the twelve
battalions of their first lin~ preceded by the usual swarm of
tirailleurs, moved down toward the Portifla, They crossed the
brook and pressed on towards the red line that stood awaiting
their approach, driving before them with ease the comparatively
insignificant screen of light troops that lay in front of the British
centre. Shcrbrookc, who was responsible for the whole line of
the defence, since his dhision exactly covered the ground on
which the French attack was delivered, had issued orders that
the troops were not to fire till the enemy came within .fifty
yards of them, and that they were then to deliver a single
volley and chargt!. This programme was executed with precise
obedience: though suffering severely from the enemy's musketry,
the division held in its fire till the hostile columns were close
upon them, and then opened with one tremendous discharge
which crashed out simultaneously along the whole eight bnt~
tuliolls. '111e leading milks of Lapisse's and Sebastiani's front
line went down in swathes,-one French witness says that the
infantry of the regiments of the 4th Corps lost a third of
their numbers in less than ten minutes. When the charge
which Sherbrookc hud ordered followed close upon the blasting
musketry fire, the enemy retired in disorder and fell back
beyond the Portil1a.
The divisional geneml had apparently forgotten to caution
his colonels against the dUIl~r of carrying their advance too
far. Instead of contenting themselves with chnsing the broken
enemy as far as the brook, and then returning to their positions,
the four brigades of the 1st division all crossed the water and
pursued the French into their own ground; the German Legion
011 the left actually begun to push them up the lower slopes
of the Ccrro de Cascajal, while the Guards on the right went
forward far into the rolling plain in front of them. Cameroll
halted his two battalions not far beyond the Portina; but 011
each side of him the pursuit was pressed with reckless energy,
and without any remembrance of the fact that the enemy had
strong reserves.
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Thus it came to pass that a disaster followed the first success
of Sherbrooke's division. Both the Germans on the left and the
Guards on the right fOllnd themselves in face of intad troops,
behind whom the broken front line of the enemy took refuge.
'Iney were in no condition to begin a new combat, for they
were in complete disorder, and there was a. broad gap on the
inner flank of each brigade, owing to the fact that Cameron had
halted and refused to push forward into danger. Hence came
a perilous cl"isis: the French reserves moved forward, the guns
Oil the Cascajal height enfiladed the German Legion, while two
regiments of Latour-Maubourg's dragoons moved in upon the
right flank of the Guards. The whole of the six battalions that
had joined in the reckless advance were forced to recoil, fighting
desperately hut losing ground every moment, and pressed into
clumps and masses that presented no trace of their fanner line
of battle. ·When they fell back to the point where Cameron
had stopped, the 61st and 83rd became involved in their
retreat, and were forced to repass the Portifia in their corn·
pany. The French followed with shouts of victory, pushing
their advantage to the utmost and slaughtering the disordered
battalions by hundreds. The disaster was worst on the left,
where half the strength of the 2nd Line Battalion of the Gennan
Legion--387 men-was destroyed in twenty minutes, and the 5th
battalion of that same corps lost over 100 prisoners. TIle Guu.rds
suffered almost as heavily: ant of their 2,000 men 611 went
down killed or wounded: but they left no prisoners behind.
It sttmed that the day might well be lost, for 'Vellcsle>"s
reserves were small. Such as they were, however, they were at
once put into action. Mackenzie brought forward his brigade
to the ground which the Guards had originally covered, and
drew them up to withstand the rush of Sebastiani's division-
the 2~4th on the right, the 2j3lst on the left, with the l/45th
between them. The disordered household troops passed through
their intervals, and rallied behind them with splendid prompt·
lless: 'their good humour and determination after such dreadful
losses' says an eye.witness, 'was shown by their giving El. loud
hun-ah as they took up their new ground 1.' At the same time
Cotton brought up the single bri~e of light cavalry which
'1 Lord Munster, p. 231.
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was in reserve, and drew them up Oil Mackenzie's right, so as tu
cover his flank. Sebastiani came up with great boldness against
the fresh front thus presented to him, and for twenty minutes
there was a furious musketry battle in the British right centre.
Mackenzie himself fell, and his three battalions'lost 69~ men out
of about 2,000: but they held their own, and finally the enemy
recoiled. They were helped somewhat in their inclination to
retreat by a charge of the Light Dragoons upon the flank of their
left-hand regiment, the 75th, which had about 150 men sabred 1.
Thus on this point the battle WIIS saved: the main credit must go
to Mackenzie's bribrrulc, which has never received the praise that
was its due, for its general was killed, and thus no report from
the 3n:1 dh;sion was sent in to \Vellesley, who omitted all
mention of its doings in his Talavera dispatch 2. It is never too
late to do homage to forgotten valour, and to call attent.ion to
a neglected feat. of arms. The services of the !:24th, 31st., and
45th saved the day for Britain 3,
Sebast.iani therefore drew back tenibly mauled: his division
had lost. all its four colonels, seven of its t.welve battalion-chiefs,
seventy other officers and 2,100 rank and file---including some
sixty prisoners. There was no morc nght. left in them, They
recoiled int.o t.he plain, and drew up at last not far from the
wrecks of Leval's division, a full mile beyond the Porth1a,
Meanwhile, however great. may have been the danger in the
Brit.ish right-centre, that in the left-centre was even greater.
Co.meron's, Low's, and Lnl1gwerth's brigades were all in t.he
most desperate posit.ion: the former, not having pushed so
far to the front as the four German battalions; had suffered
least of. the three-though it. had lost 500 men, out. of 1,400,
1 General DesprezJ relating the doings of Sebastiani's division, says
that the 75th were cut up by Spaniah light horse: but there were no
cavalry of that nation' ill this part of tlle field, aud it would seem that
the Freudl were misled by the blue unifOrn1!l of tl16 Light DrngoolUJ,
, E.xcept that he moutioned the c:oloucls of the 31st and 45th among tho
officers who had done well in the battle,
, The only place where a good account of the doings of i\Iackenzie'll
brigndQ is te be fouud is ill the excellent regimeut...l hii3Wr)' of tlle 24tll.
I fully shsre the indignation expressed by its Buthor at the unmerited
oblivien in which its splendid doiug9 have been lying for 80 many
years. [See !'aton's Annah of the 24th Regiment.]
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But the Legionnry troops were in far worse case-Langwerth
had been killed, and his brigade was reduced from 1,000 to
650 bayonets-just fifty per cent. of the men had been lost.
Low had gone into action with only 950 rank and file, owing
to the heavy casuulty·list of the preceding night. Of these
he now lost 350, including 150 made prisoners in the disorderly
retreat down the slope of the Cerro de Cascajal. That these
troops ever rallied and made head at all, when they had
recrossed the Portifta, is much to their credit.
The situation was saved by Wellesley's own prescience. The
moment that he saw the rash attack on the French line to which
Sherbrooke had committed himself, he looked round for supports
which might be utili7.oo to stAy the inevitable reaction that must
follow. MlWkcnzie's brigade was available on the right-centre,
and was used as we have seen. But there were no infantry
reserves behind the left-centre: it WfIS necessary to send down
troops from the Cerro de MedclliJl. "ilIatte was thCli threaten-
ing its front, Ruffin was marching to turn its northern flank,
and Wellesle)' did not dare to detach a whole brigade from
the key of the position, He took, however, Richard Stcwltrt's
strongest battalioll, the lj48th under Colonel Donnenan (~hich
had still over 700 bayonets in line even at'l:er its losses in the
morning) and sent it at full speed down the southern slope of
the Cerro. It arrived in time to take position 011 the old
ground of the British line, at the moment that the retreating
masses came rolling back across the Portiiia. If the 48th bad
been carried away in the gencral backward movemcnt, thc day
would have been lost: but the regiment stood firm, and allowed
Cameron's and Langwerth's troops to pass by its flanks and
form up in its rear. While it was holding back Lapisse's
central advance, the defeated brigades rnllied and re-formed
with admirable celerity, and the battle was restored. Here,
as further to the right, the fighting now resolved itself into
a furious musketry-combat between enemies both of whom were
now spent and weakened by their previous exertions 1. III such
I In most modem English narratives of Talavera it is lltated t1lat the
Ij48th supported the Guards. TIlis must be a mimke, caused by a mis-
reading of Wellesley'1! dispatch. It is certain that the Guards fell bad::
on Matkcuzie's brigade. Contemporary accounts br officers of the 2j24th
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a duel the line had always the advantage over the column ill
the end. The French, when once brought to a standstill by
the lj48th, lost their I:!an, and stood heaped together ill
disorderly masses, keeping up a rolling fire but gaining no
ground. Howorth turned upon them the batteries on the Cerro
de Medellin, which enfiladed their flank and added to their
confusion. General Lapisse himself was killed at this moment,
as he was h:ying to urge on his men to a final advance, It
was probably, however, not his death--QJl which all the French
accounts lay great stress-but rather the defeat of Sebastiani's
division on their immediate right which finally shook the morale
of the French regiments, and induced them to move back, frrst
at a slow pace, then in undisguised retreat. The shattered
remnants of the German Legion and of the l/48th, l;\3lst;
and 2J83rd were in no condition to follow. Seldom have two
combatants so thoroughly mauled eaeh other as had the twelve
French and the seven allied battalions which fought in this
part of the field. Of the 6,800 men of Lapisse's division, the
general, sixty-nine other officers, and 1,700 men were hors de
c&mbat. Of 4,800 I British tmd German troops opposed to
them almost exactly the same number hud been lost-a general
(Langwerth), seventy-seven officers, and 1,616 men. That the
smaller force should ever have held its ground after losing
more than a third of its number is almost miraculous. There
was no such a victory as this during the whole war, save AJbuera.
'~lhile the main stress of the batHe hnd been rolling across
the ,lower slopes, above the middle course of the Portiiia, matters
speak of tlle Coldstreams passing tbroug11 them to re-form: the Scots
Fusiliers therefore must have had the 2(31st and 1(46t11 behind them,
DonncUan and Um 1/48th raally supported r.."mgwertll's German ltatt..,lions,
as Lord Londonderry (the only historian WllO 1Ia1l got the fat-1B rigilt)
clearly shows (i. p. 410). It is curious that the historians of the battle
h8\'e not seen that the Germans, in their dreadfully mauled condition,
could not have been rall~d without C3:ternal aid: this aid was given by
J)Ollnellan, while Mackenzie was sa"in~ the Guards.
I The figures are (after deducting the losses of the earlier combats) :
Low's briA"ade 964, Langwerth's .1,31.5, Cameroll's 1,306, 1(48th 700,
a total of 4,2lJ5. The losses were: Low 326, Langwerth 721, Cameron
&47,'I/48th about lOO, a total of 1,694, including officers. (See tables ill
Appendix.)
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hud been comparatively quiet on the Ccrro de Medellin, Victor,
it will be remembered, had ordered that Villatte was to make
no serious attack on the height until the divisions to his left
had. made some impression upon the DI'itish centre. But
Lapisse and Sebastiani, in spite of their temporary successes,
had never broken into 'WeUesley's position. The assault on the
Ccrro therefore was never made, though a furious artillery fire
was kept up against its garrison throughout the afternoon.
The handful of British guns upon the crest could make no
adequate reply: hence the three brigades of Tilson, ll.ichard
Stewart, and Donkin were suffering very serious losses from the
long cannonade, ''''eHesley had made them shelter themselves,
as far as was possible, behind the sky-line. Nevertheless the
storm of shot and shell that beat upon the position was not
without effect. In Donkin's brigade no one, save the light
companies skirmishing along the lower slopes, discharged a
musket that afternoon, yct the casualties ill its ranks wcre no less
than 195 I. Hill's two brigades, though better covered, had
still man)' killed and wounded. That the return-fire of the
British artillery and skirmishers was not altogether ineffective
is shown by the fact that the two regiments of Villatte's second
brigade, which heid the opposite slope, lost 185 men, and e"en
the squadrons of Bcaumont in its rear had. a few troopers dis-
abled 2. Nevertheless the fighting in this part of the field was
not only indecisive but compara.tivel)' innocuous to both sides,
when COlUpltrcd with the awful slaughter that was going 011 to
their right.
It only remains to tell of the combat to the north of the
Cerro, ill the narrow "alley that separated the Dritish position
from the Sierra dc Scgur.illa.. Here the cngagement began at
a much later hour than in the centre. All the observers on the
hill speak of the first contest of Campbell and Leval as being
concluded, and of that of Sherbrooke and Sebastiani as being at
its height, before the French right wing began to move.
The French troops in this direction, it will be remembered,
. I For a description of the suif'erings of the 88th, whos& battalion
companies did not fire a single shot, durillg the cannonade of the afternoon,
see Grattao's OW!1IuugM Rangers, vo1. iii. p. 91.
I For these losses, see the Talavera. Appendix.
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were the three regiments of Ruffin, now mere wrecks of their
former selves, and the first brigade of ViUatte's division, that of
Cassagne. The six bnttnliolls of the latter force were near the
eerro de Medellin, while Ruffin's men stood further to the north,
under the Sierra de Segurilla. In support of them both lay
Merlin's division of light cavalry.
At the moment when Victor had received permission to tUMl
the Rank ofthe Ccrro, it had appeared that he would meet little
opposition. But long ere the French were ready to advance,
they had seen allied troops arrivi~g in haste and taking up
their position at the SQuthem cnd of the vaUey. First Fane's
and Anson's cavalry had drawn up Oil the level ground, then
Bassecourt's Spanish infantry had appeared on the rocky slopes of
the Sierra, and had thrown out a long skirmishing line opposite
Ruffin's right. Lastly Albuquerque's whole cavalry division
had ridden round from the rear of the centre, and taken post
behind Anson and Fanc. Thcre wcrc now ovcr 5,000 bayonets
and 5,000 sabres in face of the French brigades.
It was clear tha.t a.ny attempt to storm the northern face of
the Cerro would expose the troops that attempted it to a flank
attack from the- allied troops in the valley. It was this that
made Rllffin Md ViUll.tte (who was prcscnt in person with
Cassugnc's brigade) very chary of moll<sting Hill's position.
On the other hand if the French advanced up the: valley to
attack the cavalry at its southern end, they would expose
themselves to a flanking fire from the guns on the Cerro and
from Hill's right~hand infantry brigade.
Neyertheless, when the roar of the invisible battle on the
other side of the Cascajal height was at its loudest, the two
French generals began a cautious advance towards the front.
, They at once came under a tiresome flanking artillery fire from
the Cerro: half Rettbel'g's battery of the German Legion had
been placed all a spur from which it ellfiladL'<1 VillaUe's nearest
l"Cbriment. Two heavy Spanish twelve-pounders opened from
another parl of the slope \ and Albuquerque had also placed
I Hartmann of the K.G.L. artillery has a note on these pieces: they
were useful because of their heavy calibre, none of the British guns being
heavier than eix-poundel'!l. They were bright new brass caonon from tho
arsenal at Seville: their machinery for Bighting and elevation was of
Olf.\N. II 11" n
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his horse-artilleryguns in a position from which they bore up the
valley. The pieCes that accompanied the French advance, being
in the trough of the depression, could do little hann in return.
After ad\'ancing as far as the po.th which leads from Tnhl.\'eIa
to Segurilla,Ruffin deployed his right regiment,the much depleted
9th Uger, and sent it up the Sierra to fonn a screen opposite
.Ba.ssecourt's infantry', The other six battalions, the ~4th and
96th, advanced in column along the valley, with the 27th from
Cassagne's brigade on their left; presently the whole came level
with the northern slope of the Cel'TO, just reaching the farm of .
Valdefuentes at its foot.
At this moment Lapisse's attack had already been beaten off',
and Wellesley was able to turn his attention from the centre to
the flank of his line 1. Crossing the crest of the Cerro, he studied
for a moment the situation of the French regiments, and then
sent down orders for Anson's brigade of light dragoons to
charge them, with I<'ane's heavy cavalry in support. The
moment that the British horsemen were seen to be advancing
the enemy hastily formed squares-the ~4th and 96th" slightly
to the west of the Segurilla road, the 27th in a more advanced
position just under the walls of the farm of ValdefucnteS. A
battalion of grenadiers r~unis, and the 63rd of the Line, which
formed Villatte's supports, also fell into square far to the rear.
The concentration of the French regiments in vast masses of
a most primitive type-a ccutury out of date. The lieutenant in command
seemed unable to hit anythiug ,vith them, w]lcreup<lIl Hartmalln got
ofi' his horse, himself laid I\. gUll, alld had the luck to dismount AFrench
piece in the "alley. After this the Spaniards fired" better and did very
good service.
1 That the charge of Anson's light dragoons came after victory had
been secured in the centre is clear from several ere-witnesses, e. g. Leith-
Hay of the 29th, who was on top of the Cerro, and clOlle to Wellesley,
writes: 'The fa"ourable tennination of the battle in tIle centre created
great excitement: the cheer, which had been re-echoed from tile height
Juw hardly died 1~way, wllen a scene ofanother character Wllll in preparation.
The movemonla of the divisions Ruffin and Villatte had during the late
contest been \'acillating and uncertain. Formed to uH appearnllco to
attack the height, they had even ad'·anced some distance towards its base.
Sir Arthur crossed with rapid steps from the right of the 29th to the part
of the hill looking down on An80Il'S brigade. It was immediately known
that a charge would take place' (i. p. 158).
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three battalions each gave a great opportunity to the allied
artillery, which fOWld easy targets in the square blocks.of men
at their feet.
.Ai; Anson's brigade advanced, the right regiment, the 2Srd
Light Dragoons, found itself opposite the large square of the
i7th Leger, while the 1st Light Dragoons of the Gilrman Legion
faced the smaller masses of the Mth and 96th. The ground
seemed favourable for a char~ and though an attack on
,unbroken infantry is always hazardous, the squadrons came on
with great confidence and were soon closing in at headlong
speed upon the .hostile line.
An unforeseen chance of war, however, wrecked the whol~plan.
'fhe long dry wa"ing grass of the valley seemed to show a level
surfo.cc, but the appearance W£15 deceitful. About a hundred and
fifty yards in front of the French sq1lll.reS was a narrow but deep
ravine, the bed of a small winter-torrent which discharges its
waters into the Porlii\a during the rainy season. It was about
fifteen feet broad and ten feet deep in the northern part of the
field, a little narrower in its southern course. There were many
places at which it could be crossed with ease by a horsemlUl
moving alone and at a moderate pace. But for squadrons
riding knee to knee at headlong speed it was a dangerous
obstacle, and indeed a trap of the most deadly sort. It was
wholly invisible to the horsemen till th~y came upon it. Colonel
Elley, the second in command of the 9l3rd, who rode two lengths
ahead of the front line of his regiment, mounted on a grey horse,
and conspicuous to every observer on the Cerro de Medellin,
was the first man to discover the peril 1. His charger cleared it
at a bound; but knowing that the inferior mounts of the rank
and file would certainly come to grief, he wheeled round on the
further bank, threw up his hand and tried to wave back his
followers. It was too late: the two squadrons of the front line
were on the brink of the ravine before they could understand
his action. Some of the troopers cleared the obstacle in their
stride; some swerved in time and refused to take the leap;
others scrambled into and ~ver the less difficult points of the
ditch: but many fell horse and man into the trap, and were
then crushed by the rear rank falling in on top of them. There
I Leith-Hay, p. Hi9.
l'i"n2
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were several. broken necks, and scores of broken arms and legs
in the leading squadrons. The second line got warning of the
obstacle by seeing the inexplicable disorder into which their
fellows had fallen. They slackened their pace, but were borne into
the confused mass at the ravine before they could entirely bring
themselves to a stand. Mea.llwhile the front face of the square
formed by the 27th LCger opened fire on the unhappy regiment.
The German light dragoons, on the northern side of the valley,
came upon the fatal clltting at a point where it was somewhat
shallower and broader than in front 'of the ~3rd-one of their
officers estimates it in his narra.tive at eighteen feet in width
and six or eight in depth 1. Their disaster therefore was not so
complete as that or their British comrades. But many troopers
of the first line were unhorsed, anu others, though keeping their
saddles, could not manage to scramble up the further side of the
ravine. The rear squadrons came up in time to add to the
confl1!ion, and reined up among the survivors of the front I.
The bm regiments were now in utter confusion, and had
already suttered severe loss both by the fnU into the ravine and
by the French musketry which had opened upon them. Their
colonels would h-ave been wise to give up the attempt to
advance and to fall back in their old position. How could
squadrons in such a disordered state hope to break into French
squares? But both Seymour of the 23rd and Arentschildt were
officers of high mettle, and throwing prudence to the winds they
collected such oC their men as had leaped or scrambled over the
ravine, and led them against the hostile infantry. Probably
little more than .half of either corps took part in the final charge.
I Napier, H. 176, has a story that Col. Arentschildt of the Denrum
dragoons discovered the :ravine in time, and cheeked his line, crying,
'1 will not kill my young mans'-thereby saving his regiment and takiug
no part in the charge. This is entirely disproved by the narrati\·cs oftbe
officers of the 1st K.G.L. Dragoons, quoted in Beamish's HUitbry of the
King, German Legion. The evidence of Colonel vou der Decken alone
suffices to show that the r~iment fell into the traIl, suffered severe looseil
therein, and then executed a disorderly and ineffecth'e charge on Ruffill's
squares, after which it returnoo to its old l,ositioll, with a loos of ne..~rly
forty men. Napier seems to 113l'e been misled by the statement of
Major POllsonby of the 23rd, to the effect tlll~t the Germans turned back
. at the ravine. He ,,190 9llYs that Seymou.., Colonel of tile 23rd, was
wounded, but that officer's llll11le does not appear in the caslUllty list.
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Be this as it may, both the ~rd and the Lcgiona:ry dragoons
made an attempt to gallop in upon the squares in their front.
The Germans rode at that of the ~4th regiment, received its
fire, and were repulsed, though a fe ..... men fell close in- upon
the bayonets. They then galloped off alld fell back up the
valley. Far more disastrous was the fate of the English regiment.
'The survivors' of the two left squadrons charged the square of
the 27th lAger, were repulsed with heavy loss, l'ecrossed the
ravine, and struggled back to the British lines. Dut Colonel
Ellcy and the right squadrons,· buving no enemy immediately
in their front, rode furiously between the French square and the
farm of Valdefuentes, and charged a line of cavalry which was
visible a few hundred· yards to the rear 1. This was the leading
brigade ~loth and 26th Chasseurs] of Merlin's division, which
WtLS acting in support of Villatte and Ruffin. The squadrons in
front of the 23rd swerved to the side when charged 3, but on
passing them the British dragoons found another regiment of
Merlin's second line opposed to them 8. They dashed at. it,
whereupon the regiment that had eva.ded them swung round and
fell upon their rear; Encircled by fivefold numbers the remnant
of Drake's and Allen's squadrons of the 23rd were tlllnihiln.tcd.
Only tl few well-mounted officers 4, including their leader Elley,
1 In this charge they carried awa.y with tltem" and almost captured,
Gcncmls ViIlatte and Cassagne, wllo Imd failed to take refuge in the
Ilqusrc of the 27tlt, and were callgllt outside it. [SCmelfs Report.]
I In the French official reports it is said that Gellcml Strolz, tlle
brigadier, drew aside tlio 10th ClUlSseurs, in order' to full npon tlle
British dragoons from the flank. Rooca.(p. 104) sa}'9 that the regiment
was charged and broke, but rallied again. Victoim et Oonqultu has :
'le 10"'& de chasseurs ne pouvait soutenir cette charge, ouvrit ses tangS,
rnais bieuoot rallie il charjJ(!a sea adversaues en queue: As the regiment
only lost five killed it does not seem likely that it was broken. 'The
French records do not give the uumber of its wounded.
3 This was the Westphalian chevall.D-ligcr8 regiment.
• Among the other officers who cut their way through Wall Lord George
William llussell, desperately wounded by a cut on the shoulder. Onl}"
tJuee officers (two wonnded) were taken prisoners from these two squadroll8:
two olllers were killed: it would seem therefore that out of twelve present
with the two right squadroll8, Beveral succeeded in getting out of the trap.
Elley says that.t11e whole body tbat followed him did not l»;ceed 170 sabres,
alld Utat Beveu or eight only cut their way through the enemy.
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and two or three troopers cut their way through the enemy, rode
off to the northward, and ultimately escaped to Bassecourt's
Spanish line on the Sierra de Scgurilla. The toW loss of the
regiment was ~07 killed, wounded and missing out of 450 sabres
who took 'the field in the morning. Of these, three officers and
105 men were prisoners-most 9f them wounded.
It was late in the afternoon when tfue survivors of the !:!3rd
found their way back to the western end of 'the valley, and the
battle in (he centre had long died down to a cannonade. Ruffin
and Villatte now had it in their power to advance again, but
did not do so. If tbey had gone further forward the)' would
have lent their flank still more- to Hill's troops upon the Cerro,
llnd would nave had to deploy, a movement which would have
exposed them, when no longer protected by formation in square,
to charges from the mass of allied cavalry still ,;sible in their
front-Fane's brigade and Albuquerque's strongdiW:siOll. Dasse-
court's Spaniards were holding their ground against tIle flank·
guard which had been sent up on to the Sierra de Segurilla, and
to drive them back Ruffin would have had to detach more
.battalions from his main column. News had been receh'ed that
the central attack bad completely failed. It \I'M natural, there·
fore, that after some hesitation the French right wing retired,
"and fell back up the valley of the Portiiia. Villatte's two
regiments had lost'about ~OO men while standing in square under
the fire of the guns on the Cerro. 111ey could no longer be
regarded as &csh troops fit for a. prolonged advance, while the
wrecks{)f Ruffin's battalions, having now been under fire three
separate times in eighteen hours, were utterly exhausted. It is
clear that Victor could not have dared to risk a serious attack
upon the British left ....ith these forces.
The battle had now come to a standstill: of the five French
infantry divisions in 'the front line those of Leval, Sebastiani, and
Lapisse were reforming their diminished rMks ill the plain, far
to the east of the Porliiia, while Villatte and Ruffin had fallen
back on to the slopes of the CeITO de Cascajal. The only
intact ,infantry still remaining at the disposition of the King
were his own 1,800 Guards, Md the 3,800 bayonets of DessoUcs.
With these and with Villatte's two brigades, which had only lost
400 men, it would have been possible to prepare one more
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nssa.u1t upon the British position. Victor, raging with anger at
his third repulse, was an.'cious to continue the ac~on, though he
had lost nearly one man in fo~r of his infantry, and had not
won an. inch of ground. The King was less hopeful: the
frightful slaughter had subdued his spirits, and he asked him·
self whether the 5,000 men of his reserve would suffice to break
the thin red line against which the whole of the 1st and 4th
Corps had hurled themselves in vain. For a moment he seemed
inclined to risk his last stake, and the Guards and Dessolle.'l
were ordered to move forward. Bnt they had not gone far
when a counter-order was sent to check them ~ l\filhaud, whose
dragoons had spent the whole day in observing the Spanish lines,
had sent in a message to the effect that Cuesta wa.·r at last
showing signs of life, and that he could see numerous troops
pushing to the front among the olive groves in front of the
town. The news WtlS not true, for nothing more thall vedettes
and small exploring parties had been sent out by the Spanish
general. But the very suspicion that the Army of Estremadura
might at last be preparing to take the initiative was enough to
damp the very moderate ardour ofKing.roseph. Ifhe committed
himself to one final dash at the English, and engaged both his
reserve and the rallied divisions of his front line, in an attack
upon their allied centre and left, what could he do in the event
of the sudden appearance of the whole Spanish army in the act
of turning his southern flank? Twenty-five thousand men, or
more, might suddenly sally out from the screen of groves, and
fling themselves uPon the left flank of Sebastiani's corps. To
hold them back nothing would be available but the 5,000 sabres
of Milhaud and Latour-Maubourg; of infantry not one man
would be left to parry such a stroke. The King could not
flatter himself that anything but a disaster could ensue. Even
if it were not tme that the Spaniards were already in motion,
there was every reason to believe that they might deliver an
attack when they saw the last French resen'es put into action
against the British. Few generals would have resisted such
a tempting 0pp0rlunity. It was to be remembered also that
some of the Spaniards had actually come out of their lin~, and
fallen upon Leval's flank, when the last assault had been pressed
against the Pajar de Vergara. A third advance in this quarter
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might yet rouse the whole Estremaduran army out of its apathy,
and induce it to charge home upon Sebastialli's" left wing.
JOurU8n und most of the members of Joseph's stuff were COIl-
vinced that it would be mad to deliver a last attack on the
British line, in face of the possible consequences of an .advance
by the Spaniards. The Marshal declared that I it was impossible
to proceed with any furtl!er scheme of advance, and that the
only safe course was to draw back the whole anny towards the
Alberche. His master was relieved to find a good reason for
ending a battle which had been begun without his permission,
and continued under his very reluctant sanction. Orders were
sent along the whole line, directing both the 1st and the 4th
Corps to abandon their fighting-groWld and full back to their old
position of the twenty-seventh. The cavalry divisions of :l\Ierlin.
LatoUl'~Maubourg, and Milhaud were to cover the retreat.
Victol' was furious at receiving these directions. He averred
to the officer who bore the King's dispatch that from his point
of vantage OD the Cascajal he could command a view of the
whole Spanish army, and that he was positive that not a
Spaniard bad moved. He e"en pretended to observe signs
of a retreat in W"cllesley's lines. and persisted that the mere
demonstration of a fourth attack would induce the allies to
abandon their position. How he came to form any such
conclusion it is hard to see, for the whole British army was
still preserving it<> old ground. and no one from the Commander-
in-chief down to the youngest private was dreaming of a move-
ment to the rear. ~t would indeed have been insane to desert
a strong position, in order to retreat across the open in face
of an army posse:mng 7,000 cxeellcnt cavalry! But Victor,
still 10th to withdraw and to own himself beaten, sent word to
the King that "he took it UPOll himself to remain on the slopes
of the Cascajal till he should receive further orders, and that
he yet hoped that the reserve might be sent forward and the
battle renewed.
Wnen Victor's message reached the King, it had already been
discovered that all the rumours concerning the ad"ance of the
Spaninrds were false. Dut the hour was now late, and' (as
1 1'110 best accollntof all U,is comes from the JJUlIlm ofGcllcrnl Dcspr~,
,who was riding with the IIcad-ql1arters staff at this moment.
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Jourdan observed) if the army were to gain 1\ 6nol succcss-
a most problematical occurrence-there would be no duylig.ht
left in which to push it to its legitimate elld. He thought it
better to take the prudent course, to refuse to risk the reserve,
whose defeat would have the most fatal consequences, and to
prepare for a retreat. The orders were accordingly issued that
the army should fall back to it..<; old camping-ground of the
morning, deferring the passage of the Alberche till the next
day 1.
'Vhile the French commanders were in controversy concerning
their movements, the battle had died down into u· cannonade,
kept up with great vehemence by the batteries on the Cerro
de Cascajal. l11e British and German guns never ceased their
reply, but-as had been the case during the whole day-they
were far too few to sulxlue the enemy's fire: considering how
they were overmatched, it is wonderful that there was but one
piece disabled, alld that only sb.-ty-six gunners were put hors de
combat. The opposing batteries were hit almost as hard, for
the artillery of the 1st Corps htl.d si..xty-four casualties.
A distressing accident took place during this final strife
between the hostile batteries: a large area of dry grass on
the lower slopes of the fuTO de Mcdcllin took 11re, froUl
smouldering wadding fanned by the wind. Many of the
severely wounded of both sides were scorched, and some burnt
to death, by the short but devouring confl80l7fation that ran
along the hillside 2.
By dusk the whole of the 4th Corps was rolling to the rear,
and the last rays of daylight showed Wellesley the welcome
view of a general retreat opposite his right and centre. Victor
clung obstinately to the CeITO de Cascajal till far into the hours
of darkness. But at IllSt the cold fit supervened, his spirits
sank, and he withdrew at S A.M. full of resentment, and well
stocked with grievances for the acrimonious correspondence
with Joseph and Jourdan in which he indulged for the next
six weeks.
TIlcre can be little doubt that Jouroan was right in refusing
I All this is again derived from Desprez, who both carried the King's
ordere to Victor, aud bore back Victor's remonstrances to the King.
~ Lord Munster, p. 236; .Lcith-HlI}", p. 162.
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to fall in with the younger marshal's plans for a fourth tlSsault
on the British. 'Wellesley was well settled into his fighting.
ground: at the southern end of his line Campbell was perfectly
safe at the Pajnr de Vergara redoubt. Hc had lost no more
than 236 men, so that his whole division was practically intact.
Hill's brigades on the Cerro were also in perfe<..'tly good oroer-
they had not been attacked since the morning, and would ha"e
been quite competent to defend themsehes at five o'clock in
the afternoon. The cannonade which they had been enduring
had done some harm, but there were sull 3,000 men in line,
to hold a most formidable position. The only point of the
British front 011 which the French could have hoped to make
any impression was the centre. Here the Guards and Cameron's
brigade had suffered heavily, and the four battalions of the
German Legion even worse-they had lost a full fifty per cent.
of thcir numbers. But :Mackenzie's division was now in line
with Sherbrooke's, its first brigade supporting the Guards, its
second (Donkin's) linked to the Germans. Considering the way
in which the British centre had dealt with the 15,000 hayonets
of Sebastiani and Lapisse during the main en~"ement, the
French critics who hold that they would have given way before
the 5,000 men of Dessolles and the lwyal Guard, even when
backed by the rallied divisions, show a very optimistic spirit.
Moreover when the battle had Wal:ed hot in this quarter,
the French would have had no certainty that Campbell and
the Spaniards might not ha\'e fa.llen upon their flank. For
Leval's much depleted division was no longer in front of the
British right-it bRd been withdrawn behind Sebastialli 1, and
there was nothing to prevent the reserve~brigade of the
4th division from going to the aid of'Sherbrooke's men. The
chances of war are incalculable, but there seems no reason to
believe that Victor's judgement as to the proba.bility of success
was any better at five o'clock in the afternoon than it had
been at five o'clock in the morning. Jouman was the wiser
man.
. Thus ended the battle of Talavera, in which 16,000 British
supported and repulsed the attack of 26,000 French infalltry-
omitting from the total of the assailants-the division of Villattc,'
I Sce Jourdau's J[!mmm, p. 262.
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which was only slightly englLocred. The Cerra de Medellin wus
strong ground, but not so strong as to counterbalance a
superiority of 10,000 men. The real fighting power of
"'" cHesley's foot-soldiery was shown in the lower parts of
the field, where Sherbrooke's nnd' Mackenzie's 8,000 bayonets
achieved their marvellous success over' the 15,000 men of
Lapisse and Scbastialli. Doomed to apparent ruin by their
own rash valour ;n pursuing the enemy across the Portina,
they yet recovered their line, re-established the battle, and
finally won 'an almost incredible victory. The 'First PiV1Sioll'
of the Peninsular [ll'llly,-thc Guards and the German Legion
who fought Side by side throughout the whole wnr,-had many
proud days between 1809 and 1814, but surely Talavera was
the most honourable of them all. Yet probably l\'lnckenzie's
brigade and Donnelan's 48th must claim an even higher merit-
it WM their prompt and steady help which gave their comrades
time to reform, and warded off the possibility of diS&Ster at the
critical moment.
The Spania.rds had little, to do upon July 28, but what little
they had to do was well done. The charge of the cavalry
regiment Rey was well timed and gallantly delivered. The
few ba,ttalions engaged near the Pajar de Vergara and in
Bassecourt's division behaved steadily. The artillery sent to
aid the British was manfully worked and did good service. But
if only the Spanish army had been able to manreuvre, what
a difference there must have been in the battle! When LentI,
Sebastiani, and Lapisse fell back in disorder at 4 P.M., what
would have been the fate of the "French if Cuesta could have
'led out 25,000 men upon their flank and rear? Hc did not
attempt to do so, and probably he was right. Yet it was h.ard
for a British army to have to fight in line with allies who were
perfectly useless for any large offensive movement.
'l'he losses of Talavern, as we have already shown. were
tremendous on both sides. Adding together the casualties
of the twenty-seventh and the twenty-eighth, the British lost
5,365 men, 801 killed, 3915 wounded, and 649 missing. Of
the last-named 108 belonged to the unfortunate 23rd Dragoons,
and nearly 300 to the German Legion. Two geneluls, Mackenzie
and Langwcrth, had been killed, and three colonels} Ross of
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the Coldstream Gua.rds, Donnclan of the 48th, and Gordon
of the 83rd.
The French losses were decidedly heavier, though the per-
centage in the regiments was in most cases far lower than that
in the victorious British force. The toW was 7,268, of whom
761 were killed, 6,301 'wounded, and ~06 missing l • General
Lapisse and van Porbeck of the Baden regiment, one bf Leval's
brigadiers, were the only officers of distinction slain. But the
number of field-officers wounded was enonnous-in Sebastiani's
division all the colonels, and seveu out of twelve of the battalion
commanders were disabled.
Cuesta never issued any proper return of his casualtil,'S. He
stated in one 'Of his dispatches that they tJ.lllOWlted to 1.~OI
men. This figure cannot possiWy represent killed and wounded
alone. Only one cavalry regiment, five or six battalions,
and three batteries were engaged, none of them heavily. The
British troops which fought in their neighbourhood had '-cry
modest losses, which made it incredible that the eomrades in
line with them should have suffered to the extent of more than
400 or 500 men. The balance must represent the missing from"
the stampede of Portago's division upon the night of the twcnty-
seventh. Major-General Manglano, who commanded one of the
divisions near the Pajar de Vergara, and de Lastra, the gallant
colonel of the regimiento del lley, were wounded.
The only trophies taken on either sidc werc thc !ICve.llteen
guns of Leval's division' captured by Campbell and the Spanish
cavalry.
I These <missing' do not include the French wounded taken on the
field, and recovered when Victor came back to Talavera on Aug. 6 and
captured the Dritish hospitals. The l1rench return was drawn up ouly
after Aug. 18, when these men had been released.
N.ll.-I have used of Hritigh sources mainly Lord Londonderry,
Lord Munster, Lea:lie and Leith-Hay of the 29th) 8tothert of the Guards,
Cooper of the 2/7th, Hawker of the 14th Light Dragoons, and lettel'8 of
Elley and Ponsonby of the 23rd Light Dragoons. Of French sources
I ha'-e found Jourdan's Mlmoire8, Victor's dispatches and contro'"ersial
letters with King Joseph) 8emele's journal of the 1st Corps, and Desprez's
narrative the lIIost UIleful. .Prom Colonel 'Vhinyates I have received
I'D un)mblisllllu map, drawlI 011 the llpOt by Ullger of the K.G.L., whicll
tixeo; all the artillery position wltJl adInirnble necuracy.
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NOTES 0)/ THE TOPOGRAPHY OF TALAVERA
I LOOKKI) oyer the proofs of the last thUe chapters, seated 011 the small
square stone that marks the highest point of the earro de Medellin, after
having carefully walked over the whole field froID end to cud, on A'Pril U,
1903. The ground is little changed iu Illlpcct, but tho lower slopes of the
Cerro, and U1C whole of iw opposite neighbour the Ca.scajnl hill, ore now
under cultivation. The former was covered with barley nine inches high,
and the rough vegetation of thyme and dry grass, which the narratives of
1809 describe, was only to be seen upon the higher and steeper parts of the
hill, and on the sides of the ravine below. The latter is steep hut neither
very broad nor particularly difficult to negotiate. E\"en in April the
Portifia Imd shrunk to a chain of pools of uninviting black water. The
ditch fatal to the 23nl Ligllt Dragoonll, in tho northern valley, is still
visible. In its upper part, where the German regimcnt met it, the obstacle
is practically wlehanged. But nearer to the farm OfValdefuentes it haa
almost disappeared, owing to the extension of cultivation. There is only
a four-foot drop from a field into a piece of rough ground full of reeds and
bent-grass, where the soil is a little marshy in April. I presume that when
the field was made, the hollow was partly filled up, aud the watercourse,
instead of flowing in a well-defined narrow ditch, has dilfused itself over
the whole trough of the ground.
In the central parts of the field the Portina forms a boundary, but not
all obstacle. 'Vhere Cameron and the Guarda fought Sebasthmi's 8,000
men, the ground is almost all exact level on both sides of the little stream.
Thore is no (position' whatever on tIle Englisl1 bank, which is, if anything,
a little lower tItan tho French. Tile Pajar de Vcrgara is a low knoll twenty
feet high, lIOW crowlled by a large fl\J'mhouse, wIticl1 occupies the site,of
the old battery. The ground in front of it is still covoroo:l with olive
groves, and troops placed here could see nothing of IIn advancing enemy
till he emerges from the trees a hundred yards or so to the front. On the
other hand an observer on the summit of the Cerro de l\ledellin gets a
perfect bird's-ere view of this part of the ground, and could make ont the
euemy all through Ilia progress alllong the olives. \Velleelcy must have
IICOII able to mark exactly l;lvcry movement of Leval's division, t1lOugh
CampbeU could certainly not 'have (lone!lO. In the Spa,nish part of the
lino thl;l grOVel> have evidently been thinned, as there aro now many houses,
fonning a straggling suburb, pushed up to and along the railWlLy, which
now crosses this section of the line. In 1809 Tala\'era was still self~
contained within its walls, which it has uow overstepped. The Cascajal is
practicall)' of the same height as the main eastern level of the CelTO de
Medelliu : but the triple summit of the latter is much loftier ground;
amI standing on it one commands tl\e whole of the Cascajal-every one of
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Villatte's battalions mm have been counted by Welleldey, who could also
mark (wery man along the whole French front, even into and among the
olive grlWe8 occnpied by Leval's Germans. VictQr on the Ca&cajal could
get no such a general view of the British position, but could Bee very well
into Sherbrooke'sline. Hill', troops, behind the first crest of the Carro
de Medellin, Md Campbell's in the groves mUllt have been much lea risible
to him. There is a ruined hou.;e, apparently a mill, in the ra.,ine between
the two cerros. Aa it is not mentioned in lUly report of the "tUe,
J conclude that it was not in existence in 1800. The Pajar dll Vergara
farm is also modern, and the ouly building on the actual fighting-ground
Wllidl existed on the battle-da)" was evidently the farm of Valde(uentes,
wJlich is Il,lludt.'tl to by several narrarors, French and English.
SECTION XVI: CHAPTER VIII
THE RETREAT FROM TALAVERA
WHEN the dawn of July 29 had arrived, the plain and the
rolling hills in front of the allied position were seen to be
absolutely deserted. No trace of the I"rench army was visible
save the heaps of dead UpO;D the further side of the Porliiia:
the wounded had been carried olT, with the exception of those
who had fallen within the British lines, and so become prisoners
of war. It was soon discovered that the enemy had left
a screen of cavalry along the western bank of the Albcrche:
but whether his main body lay close bellind the stream, or had
retired towards Madrid, could not be ascertained without
making a re<:onnai$sance in force. Such an operation was
beyond Vle1lesle,Y's power on the moming after the battle. He
was neither able nor willing to send out a large detachment to
beat lip the enemy's camps, with the object of ascertaining his
situation and intentions. The British army was utterly
exhausted: on the preceding day the men had fought upon
half~ration~: when the contest was over they had found that
only a third of a ration had been issued: this scanty pittance
was sent up to the regiments in the evening, as they still lay in
battle-order on the ground that they had held during the day.
""ater was almost equally deficient: it was difficult to procure:
nothing but tlle wells of the few houses in the rear of the posi~
tion being available. Only on the morning of the twenty·llinth,
when the departure of the enemy had become c.ertain, were the
troops allowed to return to their old bivouacs in the rear, and
there to seck repose. Even then it was only a minority of the
men who could be spared from duty. The gathering in of the
"ast numbers wounded-French as well as English-and their
remt)\'al into Talavera demanded such enormous fatigue·parties
that the larger llum~ of the survi\'Ol's had to be told off to
560 THE RETREAT FROM TALAVERA [J,"v 29
this work and were denied the rest that they had so well
earned.
It is certain that the British anny could have done nothing
upon the twenty-ninth even if their commander had desired to
push forward against the enemy. The men were not only tired
out by two days of battle, but half-starved in addition. But
WeIlesley was far from feeling any wish to pursue the French.
His infantry had suffered so dreadfully that he could not dream
of exposing them to the ordeal of another eng~"ement till they
had been granted a respite for the refreshment of body alld
spirit. Of his divisions only that of A. Campbell-the smallest
of the four-was practically intact. The others had suffered
paralysing losses-ill Hill's ranks onc man out of every four
had been stricken down, in Mackenzie's one man in every three,
while Sherbrooke'$ frightful casualty-list showed that nearly two
men out of five were missing from the ranks. Never, save at
Albuem, was such slaughter on the side of the victors seen
~noain during the whole course of the Peninsular War. 'The
extreme fatigue of the troops,' wrote Wellesley. 'the want of
provisions, and the number of wounded to be taken care of. have
prevented me from moving from my position I.'
On the morning of the twenty-ninth the.depleted strengthofthe
army was partly compensated ·by the arrival of the first of those·
reinforcements from Lisbon which VI'ellesley had been anxiously
cXp<X-'ting. At about six o'clock Robcrl Crnufurd came upon
the scene with the three regiments of his Light Bril,"flde-all old
ba.ttalions who had shared in Moore'g Corunna campaign. He
was accompanied by a battery of horse artillery (A troop), the
first unit of that arm which came under 'Vellesley's command.
But the Light Bri/:,"flde were almost as weary as their comrades
who had fought in the battle: they had only reached Talavera
by a forced march of unexampled severity. Hearing at Naval
:Moral that the two armies were in presence, Robed Crallfurd
had hurried forward with nlmo~t incredible swiftness. Droppillg
his bag/:,"flge and a few weakly men at Oropesa h~ had marched
forty-three miles in twenty-two hours, though the day was. hot
and every soldier carried some fift)' pounds' weight upon his back.
All day long the cannon was heard growling in the distance,
1 Wellesley Ut Castlereaglt, Aug. 1, Wellingtun Pi8pGtchu, iv. p. 55a.
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and at short inter\"als the brigade kept meeting parties of
Spanish fugitiv~, interspersed with British sutlers and com·
missaries, who gave the most dismal accounts of the progress of
the fight. In spite of his ·desperllt.c clforts to get up in time
Craufurd reached the field thirteen hours too late, and heard to
his intense chagrin that the battle had been won without his
aid 1. 'Vear)' though his men were, they were at once hurried
to the front, to relieve A. Campbell's division on the line of
advanced posts. There the)' found plent)' of employment in
burying the dead, and in gathering up the French wounded,
whom it was necessary to protect from the fury of the Spanish
peasnntry.
The arrival of Croufurd's brigade did something towards
filling up the ~errible gap in the ranks of the British infantry,
but was far from enabling WeIIesley to assume the offensi ....e.
Indeed the advent of fresh troops only accentuated the difficulty
of fceding the army. COM) was still almost unobtainable; the
supplies from the Vel'a de Plasellcin showed no signs of
appearing, and even oxen for the meat-ration, which had hitherto
been obtainable in fair quantities, were beginning to run short.
Nothing was to 1Xl had from Talavera itself, where Victor
had exhausted all the available food many weeks before, nor
could any assistance be got from tlle Spanish army, who were
themselves commcncing to feel the pinch of starvation.
AIl WeIlesley's hopes at this juncture were founded on the
idea that the diversion of Venegas upon the Upper T~"Us
would force the French host in his front to break up, in order
to save Madrid from all attack in the rear. The army of La
:Mancha had failed to keep Sebastiani in check, and to prevent
him from appearing on the field of Talavera. But sinee the
enemy had concentrated every available man for the battle, it
was certain that Venegns had now no hostile force in his front,
and that the way to the eapital was open to him. If he had
1 .For excellent accounts of this forced march see Col. Leach (91ith),
IWugh Skttch# of the Life of an Old Soldier (pp. 81-2), and Sir Goorge
Napier's Autobiography, pp, 100-10. 'Ibe distance was forty-three miles,
not as W. Napier states sixt)'-two. That all the stragglers met on the way
were not Spaniards is unfortunately evident from both narratives. "Nor
were all the British stragglers nou-{;ombatants.
OlllJ.lf. 11 0 0
562 THE RETREAT FROM TALAVERA [J",Y 29
pushed on either by Aranjuez or by Toledo, he must now be
close to the capital, and King Joseph would he obliged to
detach u large force against hi~n. That detach~nentonce made,
the anny behind the Alberche would be so much weakened that
it would be unable to face the British and Cuesta. If it offered
fight, it must be beaten: if it retired, the allies would follow it
up llnd drive it away in II dil"ectioll which would prevent it from
rejoining the troops that had been sent against Venegas. On the
twenty-ninth Wellesley was under the imp~ion that the army
of Ln. Mancha. had already brought pressure to bear upon the
Frellch, for a false report had reached him that on the previous
day it had captured Toledo. His dispatches written after the
arrival of this rumour indicate an intention of moving forward
on the thirtieth or thirty-first. The IGl% he $a>'s, must now
detach troopsagaillstVellcgas. This being so,itwill be necessuryto
induce Cuesta to advance, supporting him with the British army
'as soon as it shall be a little rested and refreshed after two
days of the hardest fighting that I have ever been a party to.
We shall I.tttainly move towtlrds Madrid, if not interrupted by
some accident on our Bank 1.'
The last words of this sentence are of great importance, since
they show that already upon the day after Talavera ·Wellcsley
was beginning to beuneasy about his left flank. Some time before
the battle he had received news from the north, to the effect
that both Ney and Kcllermann had retumed to the vallcy of
the Douro, after evacuating Galida and the Asturias 2. He
hud therefore to take into <,:ollSidcrutioll the chance that the
enemy might move southward, and fall upon his line of COIII*
rnunication with Portugal, not only with the corps of Soult, but
with a large additional force. Unfortunately the information
that had reached him from the plains of Leon had been to the
I ·Wellington to Bcresfonl, Tnlll.vora, July 29, 1800.
IOn July 14 Wellesley write<; to .Beresford that he does not beliel'e
that Ney hllS quitted GaJicia (Weltingllm Digpatchu, iI'. 010J, ~ausc
of the tenoUT of the captured dispatches of Soult to King Joseph. These,
of course, had been written under the idea that the 6th Corps was still
holding on to Coruuna and Lugo: it WaB not till somc da}'s later that
Soult learned of his colleagues' unexpected move. liut Wellesley knew
of Ney's move before the battle of TaJal'era, as is showu by lVeftillgtcm
DispatdlU, iv. 04li.
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effect that ~ey's and Kellermann's troops were much reduced in
numbers and efficiency, so that even when they had joined Sonlt
the total of the French field army upon the Douro would not
much exceed ~O,OOO men 1. This misconception afl'cctcd all his
plans: for if the hostile force about Salamanca, Zamora, and
Benavente was no g~ter than was reported, it followed that
any expedition sent against his own communications could not
be more than 12,000 or 15,000 strong, since Soult would be
forced to leave a containing force in front of Bercsforo and Del
Parque, who now lay in the direction of Almeida and Ciudad
Rodrigo. Any :French advance against Bejar and Plasencia,
therefore, would, as \VeUesley supposed, be a mere raid, executed
by a comparatively small force. He doubted whether SonIt
dared undertake such an operation: 'the enemy,' he wrote,
•would not like to "enture through the pllSSCS iuto Estrema-
dura, having me on one side of him, and you [Beresford] and
Romana upon the other~.' He was therefore not much
disturbed in mind about the movements of the French in the
valley of the Doum. If he had but known that not ~O,OOO
men but 50,000 men were uow concentrating at Salamanca, his
feelings would have been· far different. But it was not till
some ~ys later that it began to dawn upon him that Soult was
far stronger than he had supposed, and that there might be
serious danger to be feared from this quarter. Meanwhile he
hoped to prevent any advance of the French in the direction of
Plasencia, by causing a strong demOllstrntioll to be made in the
valley of the Douro. He wrote to Bercsford that he must
contrive to arrange for joint action with La. Romana and the
Army of Galicin.. It' they appeared. in strength in the direction
of Ciudad Rodrigo, the Duke of Dalmatia might be deterred
from making any movcment to the south. If, howe\'cr, the
Spaniards proved helpless or impracticable, the Portuguese
army would have to confine itself to .the defence of its owu
frontier.
O!l the morning of July 80 Wcllcs1ey received the first
1 'The enemy have on the Douro Bnd in the neighbourhood oot less
thau 20,000 men, being the remains of the Corps of Soult, Nay, and
Kcl1ermao.' To Frere, July 30.
S To Beresford, from Tala\>era, July 29, 1809.
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definite information which led him to conclude that the French
forces from the north were actually contemplating the raid
upon his communications which on the preceding day he had
regarded as doubtful. The Marquis Del Reino, whom, as it
will be remembered, Cucsta bad sent to the Puerto de Bafios
with two weak battalions, reported that troops from the Douro
valley were threatening his front. At the same time messages
were received from the Alcaldes of Fueute Roble and Los Salltos,
places on the road betw~n Salamanca and Bejar, to the effect
that they had received orders from Soult to prepare HWOO and
24,000 rations respectively, for troops due to arrive on July ~.
The numbers given counted for little in Wellesley's estima.tion,
since it is the commonest thing in the world fOf generals to
requisition food for a far larger force than they actually bring
with them. But at least it seemed clear that some considerable
detachment from Salamanca. was on its way towards the Puerto
de Banos. In consequence of this fact WeUesley wrote to the
Spanish government, and also informed Cuesta., that in the
event Qf '(l. serious attempt of the enemy to cut his communica-
tions, he should' move so as to take care of himself,' and do
his best to preserve Portugal I_in other words, that he should
abandon the projected march on Madrid which had been his
main purpose on the preceding day, He was still, however,
under the impression that Soult had no very large foree with
him, as is sufficiently shown by the fact that on the thirty-first
he suggested to Cucsta. that it would be well to detach onc of
his divisions-say 5,000 men-to strengthen the insignificant
force which was already in position at the Puerto de Bai1os,
'I still think,' he wrote, 'that the movements of General
Deresford with the Portuguese army 011 the frontier, and that
of the Duque del Purque from Ciudad Rodrigo, combined
with the natural difficulties of the country, and the defence
by the Marqllis Del Reino, may delay the enemy's advance
till the arrival of your division 2,' It is clear that when he
1 Wellesley to Frc~e, July 30. 'My first duty is to attend to tho
safety of Portugal: at llll event!! if my flank and communication with
Portugal are not secured fo~ me, while J am operating in the general cause,
I must move to take care of myself, and theu the general cause will suffer.'
t Wellesley to Q'Donoju, July 31, 1009,
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wrote in these terms Vlellesley was still labouring under the
delusion that Sault's advance was a mere raid executed by
one or two divisions, and DOt a serious operation carried out
by a large army.
'''hile Wellesley was spending the three days-which followed
the battle of the twenty-€ighth in resting his men and pondering
over his next move, the enemies whom he had defeated at
Talavem were in a. state of C\'en greater uncertainty and
indecision. By dll.ylight on July 29, as we have already seen,
the whole French army had retired behind the Alberche, leaving
anI)' a screen of cavalry upon its western bank. The King was
under the impression that Wellesley and Cuesta would probably
follow him up ere the day had passed, and drew lip his whole
force along that same line of heights which Victor hud occupied
upon the twenty·second and twenty-third of the month. But
when nothing appeared in his front during the morning hours
sa....e a. few vedettes, he realized that he might count upon
a short respite, and took new measnres. After sending off
to his brother the Emperor a most ~agrantly mendacious
account of the battle of Talavera 1, he p:roreeded to divide up
his army. As \Vellington had foreseen, he detached a large
force to hold back Venegas and the army of La l\-w.ncha,
who were at last coming into the field UpOl~ his flank. He
was bound to do so, under pain of impel'illing the safety of
MaW-;d.
It is time to cast a glance at the operations of the incom-
petent general 'I\:hose sloth /lod disobedience- had wrecked the
plan that 'Vcllcsley and Cuesta hOO dmwn out at their con-
1 A few lines. of this astounding document may be worth quoting-
f Sire, hier l'armee anglaise a eM forcee dans Bes positions. Oum
les 25 a 30 milie Anglais de Wellesley, nons avons eu affaire a l'armee
de Cuesta, qui s'elevait de 35 a 40 milie hommes. Le champ de bataille
.tUr Jequel ?lOut 801nme8 ltah/i$ (!) est jonche. de leurs marts.... Je
me mets en marche pour secoul'ir Madrid, qui est menace par un
corps de Portugais arrives it. Na\'alcarllero, et par l'armee de Venegas,
tjui tent.e de peuetrer par AranjuBZ.... .rai un regret, sire, c'est celui
de n'uvoir pus fait llrisollllicre toute l'annee anglaise.' Mltrwi:ru de
J08eph, vi. 284. Napoleoll, not deceived for a moment by tbis rhodo-
montade, liellt back a·scatbing rebuke to his brother for endeavouring
t() bide the truth from him. (Napoleon to Jourda0 l Aug. 21.)
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ference DctU' Alma.ra.z. On July 16 Vcncgas had begun to move
forward from El Moral, Valdepeiias, and Santa Crnz de Mudels,
in accordance with the directions that had been sent him. He
occupied Man7,anares and Daimiel, and thcu came into collision
with Sebastialli's cavalry at Villahurta and Hcrcnciu., for the
4th Corps had not yet begun to withdraw towards Mao/id.
.owing to the profound ignorance in which the enemy still lay
as to the advance of Wcllesley and Cues~ Sebastiani had not,
on the nineteenth, received any order to fall buck or to join
Victor and the King. Thus, when pressed by the advanced
troops of Venegas, he did not retire, but held his ground, and
showed every intention of accepting battle. Learning from the
peasantry that he had the whole of the 4th Corps in front of
him, and might have to deal with nearly 20,000 men, the
Spanish general halted, and refused to advance further. In so
doing he was fulfilling the spirit of the instructions that had
been sent him, for Cuesta and 'Vellesle)' had wished him to
detain Sebastiani and keep in touch with him-not to attack
him oc to fight a pitched battle. TIley hud tak~n it for
granted that the Frenchman would receive early news of their
own advance, and would already be in retreat before Venegas
came up with him. But it was not till July ~~, as we have
already seen, that Victor and King Joseph obtained certain
intelligence of :the march of the allies upon Talavera. Until
the orders for a retreat arrived from Madrid, the 4th Corps
was kept in its old position at 1\.1adridejos, and courted
rather than avoided an eIlf,ragemellt with the amty of La
Mancha 1•
Venegas, after summoning his divisional generals to a council
of war, refused to attack ,sebastiani, and wisely, for his 23,000
men would certainly have been beaten by the ilO,OOO Frenchmcn
who still lay in front of liim. From the nineteenth to the
twenty-second the two armies faced each other across the upper
GuadianB., each waiting for the other to move. Late on the
twenty-third, however, Sebastiani received his orders to evacuate
La Mancha, and to hasten to Toledo in order to join Victor
I For these operations r am relyiug on General Arteche's e..:cerpt$
{rOIU the Villdieaeiotl fk /01 AgraviOl, published by Vcuegas in his owu
defeuce.
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alld the King, in a combined assault upon Wellesley and
Cuesta.
It was 011 the next day that Venegas committed the ruinous
error which W/l.<; to wreck the fate of the whole campaign. On
the lllonling of the twenty-fourth the 4th Corps had disuppeared
from his front; instead of following closely ill the rear of
Sebastialli with all speed, and molesting his retreat, as his orders
prescribed, he made no attempt to prevent the 4th Corps
from moving oft~ nor did he execute that rapid flanking march
on Aranjucz or Fuenteduenns which his instructions prescribed.
Hc moved forward at a snail's pace, having first sent off to
Cuesta an argumentative letter, in which he begged for leave
to direct his advance on Toledo instead of on the points which
had been named in his orders. On the twenty-sixth he received
an answer, ill which his <Amlllander-in-chief authorized him to
make his own choice between the route by Aro.njuez o.nd tho.t
by Toledo.
. Venegas had already committed. the fatal error of letting
Sebastiani slip away unmolested; he now hesitated between
the idea of carrying out his own plan, and that of obeying
Cuesta's origiual orders, and after much hesitation sent his
first division under General Lacy towards Toledo, while he
himself, with the other four, marched by Tembleque upon
Aranjl1ez. So slow an,d cautious was their advance that Lacy
only an·ivcd in front of Toledo on July 28-thc day that the
battle of Tnlnvcra was fought, while Venegas himself occupied
Aranjuez twenty-four hours later, on the morning of the twenty-
ninth. He had taken six days to cross the sixty miles of open
rolling plain whi.ch lie between the Guadiana and the Tagus,
though he had been absolutely unopposed by the enemy whom
he had allowed to slip away from his front. Sebastiani had
mo.rched at the rate of twenty miles a day when he retired.
from Madridejos to Toledo, Venegas and Lacy followed at
the rate of .ten and tweh'e miles a day respectively. Yet the
special duty imposed on the army of La Mancha had been
to keep in touch with the 4th Corps. Further comment is
hardly necessary.
On the morning of the day when Wellesley was assailed by
the forces of Victor and King Joseph, General Lacy appeared
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in front of Toledo. The town was held by 8,000 men of
Valence's Polish division: it is practically impregnable against
llny attack 'from the south, presenting to that side a front of
sheer cliff', overhanging the river, and accessible only by two
fortified bridges. To make any impression on the place Lacy
would have had to cross the Tagus at SODle other point, and
then might have beset the compal'ative1y weak northern fl"Ollt
with considerable chances of success. But he contented himself
with demonstrating against the bridges, and discharging some
fruitless cannon-shot ilCross the river. General Valence, the.
Goyernor of Toledo, reported to Jourdan that he was attacked,
and his message, reaching the battlefield of Talavera after
Victor's second repulse, had a certain amount of influence on
the action of King Joseph. The place was never for a moment
in danger, 8.8 Lacy made no attempt to pass the Tagus in order
to press his attack home.
On the following morning (July 29) Venegas reached the
other great passage of the Tagus, at Aranjuez, with two of his
divisions, and occupied the place after driving out a few French
vedettes. He pressed his cavalry forward to the line of the
Tajuna, and ere nightfull some of them had penetrated almost
as far as Valdemoro, the village half way between Aranjuez
and Madrid. No signs of any serious hostile force could be
discovered, and lK'Cret friends in the capital sent notice' that
they were being held down by a very weak garrison, consisting
of no more than a single French brigade and a handful of the
King's Spanish levies. There wa.~ everything to tempt Venegas
to execute t!utt rapid march upon the capital which had been
prescribed in his original orders, but instcn.d of doing so this
wretched officer halted for eight whole days at Aranjuez [July
29 to August 5].
On the day after Talavera Jourdan and Joseph had not yet
discovered the whereabouts of the main body of the army of La
Mancha: but Lacy had made such a noisy demonstration in
front of Toledo that they were inclined to believe that his
chief must be close behind him, Accordingly the garrison of
Toledo was reinforced by the missing brigade of ValelH.:e's
Polish division, and raised to the strength of 4,700 men. The
King, with the rest of Sebastiani's corps and his own Guards and
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reserves, marched to Santa OUala, and on the next day [July SO]
placed himself at Bargas, a few miles in rear of Toledo. In this
position he would have been wholly 11Ilable to protect Madrid,
if Vcnegns hud pres.'!C.>d forward 011 that same momillg from
Aranjuez, for that place is actually nearer to the capital than
the village at which Joseph had fixed his head quarters. The
sloth displayed by the Spanish general was the only thing which
preserved Madrid from captnre. On Augnst l, apprised ofthe fact
that the main body of the urmy of La Mllllcha was at Aranjucz
and not before Toledo, Joseph transferred his army to IIlescas,
a point from which he would be able to attack Venegas in flank,
if the latter should move forward. Only Milhaud's division of
dragoons was thrown forward to Valdemoro, on the direct road
from Amnjucz to Madrid: it drove out of the vill~"'Ca regiment
of Spanish horse, which reported to Vcnegns that U1Crc was now
a heavy force in his front. For the next four days the King's
troops and the army of Venegas retained their respective
positions, each waiting for the other to move. The Spaniard had
realh·.ed that his chance of capturing Madrid had gone by, and
remained in a. state of indecision at Aronjuez. Joseph was
waiting for definite news of the movements of 'WeUesley and
Cuesta, before risking an attack on the army of La l\fancha.
He saw that it had abandoned the offensive, and did not wish to
move off' from his central position at lIlescas till he was sure that
Victor was not in need or any help, Yet he WM so disturbed I\S
to the. general state of affllirs that hc scut orders to GCllernl
Belliard at Madrid to e\'acuate alluon-eombatants and civilians
on to Valladolid, and to prepare to shut himself up in the
Retiro,
The doings of Victor, during the 6\·c days after he had
s~parated from the King, require a more lenJ;,rl:hy consideration,
Left behind upon the Alberche with the 1st Corps, which the
Cll5ualties of the battle had reduced to no more than 18,000
men, he felt himself in a perilous position: if the allies should
advance, he could do DO more than endeavour to retard their
march on Madrid, Whether he could count on any further aid
from the Kiilg and Sebastiani would depend all the wholly
problematical movemcnts of VCllegaS. Somewhat to his sur·
prise "'ellel31ey and Cuesta remained quicsccnt not only OIl, the
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twenty-ninth hut on the thirtieth of July. But an alann now
came from another quarter: it will be remembered that the
enterprisins Sir Robert Wilson with 4,000 men, partly Spaniards,
partly Portuguese of the Lusitanian Legion, had moved parallel
with Wellesley's northern flank during the advance to Talavera.
On the day of the battle he had 'marched. to the canllon'
as a good officer should, and had actmilly approached
Ca7..alegas, at the back of the :French army, in the course of the
afternoon. Learning of the results of the fight, he had turned
back to his old path upon the twenty-ninth, and had entered
Escalona on the upper Alberche. At this place he was behind
Victor's flank, and lay only thirty-eight miles from Madrid.
There was no French force between him and the capital, and if
only his division had been a little stronger he would have been
justified in making a raid upon the city, relying for aid upon;
the insurrection that would indubitably have broken out thc
moment that he presented himsel~ before its gates.
It was reported to Victor on the thirtieth not only that Wilson
WI\.S at Escalona, but also that he was at the head of a strong
Portuguese division, estimated at 8,000 or 10,000 men. The
Marshal determined that he could not venture to leave such
a force upon his rear while the armies of \Vellesley and Cnesta
were in his front, and fell buck ten miles to Maqueda on the
high road to Madrid. On the following day, still uneasy as to
his position, he retired still further, to Santa Cruz, and wrote
to King Joseph that he might he forced to continue his retreat
as far as Mostolcs, almost ill the submbs of Madrid [Aug. !l]'
He was so badly informed as to the movements of the allies,
that he not only warned the King that "'jlson was threatening
Madrid, but assured him that the British army from Talaverll.
had broken up from its cantonments and was advancing alollg the
Alherche towards the capil:8.1 1• Joseph, better instructed as to
the act~al situation of affairs, replied by assuring him that
'WeUesleyand Cuesta were far more likely to be retreating on
Almnrnz than marching on Madrid, as they must have heard
ere now of Soult's advance 011 Plascncia.. He ordered the
I Jourdan to Belliard, Aug. 3, from lllescas: <Le due de BelIuno dit
que toute l'armee auglaise marehe sur la rh'e droite de l'Alberehe, et
qu'hi~r elle etait a uue lieue d'Escalona.'
1809] VICTOR AJ,D ROBERT WILSON 571
Marshal to fall back no further, and to send a division to feel
for Wilson at Esca.lona. On detaching Villatte to execute this
reconnaissance [Aug." 5] Victor was surprised to find that Sir
Robert's little force had already evacuated its advanced position,
and had retreated into the mountains. For the last four days
inda'<1 Victor had been fighting with shadows-for the British
and Estremaduran armies had never passed the Alberche, while
'Vilson had absconded from Escalona on recei\'ing from
Wellesley the news that Soult had been heard of at the Puerto
de BanDs. In consequence of the needless march of the 1st
Corps to Maqucdu und Santa Cruz, the allied generals were
able to withdraw unmolested, and even unobserved, from
'I'alavers, and were far upon their way down the Tagus before
their absence was suspected. The erratic movements of Victor
"may be excused in part by the uniform difficulty in obtaining
n.ccw·llte information which the French always experienced in
Spain. But even when this allowance is made, it mUllt be con~
fessed that his operations do not tend to give us any very high
idea of his strategical ability. He was clearly one of those
generals, of the class denounced by Napoleon, qui 8e font da
tabkau.v, who argue on insulT)Ciellt data, and take 1\ long time
to be cominced of the error of their original hypothesis. ~
Neither Victor nor King Joseph, therefore, exercised any
influence over the doings of 'Wellesley and Cuesta at Talavera
between the 29th of July and the Srd of August. The allies
worked out their plans undisturbed by any interference on the
part of the old enemies whom they had beaten on the tmttJe
da),. Down to August 1 the British general had been uncon-
vinced by the rumours of SouIt's approach, at the head of
a lUI'g<l army, which wcre persistently arriving from the secret
agents in the direction of Salamanca 1. It was only on the
evening of that day that he received news so precise, and so
threatening, that he found himself forced to abandon for the
moment any intention of pushing 011 towards Madrid, in conse~
quence of the impending attack Oil the line of his communications
1 There are two letters of Wellington to Castlereagh, written on Aug. I ;
both indicate that \Vellesley was still unconvillced as to Soult's intention,
and the S(l(:ood states that he does not believe that the .Frellch will pass
tile Puuto de &608. The definite news came at night.
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with Portugal. It was announced to him that the vanguard of
the French army from the north had actually entered Bejar on
the twenty-ninth und W/lS drh;llg in the trifling force under the
Marquis Del Reino, which Cuesta had sent to the Puerto de Banos.
Whatever might be the force at Soult's disposal-and
\Vellesley wa.~ still under the delusion that it amounted Ilt
most to a single corps of 12,000 or 15,000 men~it was im-
possible to allow the French to establish themselves between
the British army and Portugal. If they were at Bejar on the
twenty-ninth they might easily reach Plasencia on the thirty-first.
On receiving the news Cuesta,who had hitherto shown the greatest
reluctance to divide his army, detached his 5th division under
Bassecourt, with orders to set Qut at the greatest possible speed,
llnd join the Marquis Del Rcino. This move was tardy and
useless, for it is four long marches from Talavcra to Plasencia,
so that Bassccourt must nrrive too late 1;0 hold the defiles. If
he found the French nIrcttdy established on the river Alngon,
his 5,000 men would be utterly inadequate to •contain' double
or triple that number of SOllIt's troops. As a matter of fact
the enemy had entered Plasencia on the afternoon of August 1,
before the Spanish division had even commenced its movement
to the west I.
On the morning of August 2 WeUesley and Cuesta held
a long and stormy conference. The Captain-General proposed
that Wellesley should detach half his force to assist Bassecourt,
and sta}' with the remainder at Talavera, in order to Sllpport
the Army of Estremadura against any renewed attack by Victor
and King Joseph 2. The English commander refused to dh~de
1 Napier seems to have the dates wrong here: he says that the 6th COI'p8
seized Plasencia OD July 31 [vo1. ii. p. 184]. But Soult's official report to
the .Minister of War, dllted Aug. 13, 8Il.ys that his vanguard forced the
Puerto de Bafios on tlle tweuty-niiItll, but ouly captured Plaseucia 011
Aug. 1. If Plasencia had fallen on the tllirty-first, Wellesley alld Cut.'.sta
lI'ould have known Ule fact 011 the second: but as it was captured on tlle
first only, they were still in ignorance when their conference took place.
2 Wellesley's letters in these critical da}'s are full of complaints as
to his colleagu~'s impracticability: 'I certainly should get the better
of everything; he writes to Castlereagh, 'if I could manage General Cuesta:
but his romper and disposition are 80 ba.d that. this is irnJKl3S;ible.' JVeUillgl1J»
J)j~1c1uJ8, iv. p. 653.
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his force-he had only 18,000 effeeti\'es e\'en after Craufurd had
joined him, and such a small body would not bear dh·ision.
But he offered either to march against Soult with his entire
host, or to remain at Talavera if his colleague preferred to set
out for Plasencia with his main body. Cuesta chose the
fonner alternative, and on the morning of the third Wellesley
moved out with every available man, intending to attack the
enemy at the earliest opportunity. He Wall still under the
impression that he would have to deal with no more than
a single French corps, and was confident of the result. His
only fcur was that Victor migbl descend upon Talavcrn in his
absence, tuld that Cuesta might evacuate the plucc on being
attacked. If this should happen, the English hospitals, in
which there lay nearly 5,000 wounded, might fall into the
hands of the enemy. On halting at Oropesa he sent back
a note to O'Donoju, the chief of the staff of the Estremaduran
anny, begging him to send off westward all the British wounded
who were in a condition to travel. He asked that countrr
cart<; might be requisitioned for their assistance, if no transport
could be spared by the Spanish troops 1.
Wellesley was setting out with 18,000 men to attack not the
mere 15,000 men that he believed to be in his front, but three
whole corps d'armee, with a strength of 50,000 sabres and
bayonets. In his long career there were many dangerous crises,
but this was perhaps the most perilous of all. If he had
remained for a little longer in ignorance of the real situation,
he might have found himself involved in a contest in which
defeat was certain and destruction highly probable.
The real situation in his front was as follows. On receiving
the dispatch from Madrid which permitted him to execute his
projected march upon Plasencia, Soult had begun to concentrate
his army [July ~4]. Mortier and the 5th Corps were already in
march for Salamanca in pursuance of earlier orders: they
arrived in it<! neighbourhood the same day on which Foy
brought the King's orders to his chief. The ~nd Corps was
already massed upon thc Tonn~, and ready to mO\'c the
moment thl\t it should receive the supply of artillery which
had been so long upon its way from Madrid. Ney and the
I Wellesley to O'Donoju, from Oropesa, afternoon of Aug. 3.
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6th Corps from Denavente and Astorga had far to come: they
only reached Salamanca on July 31; if we remember that
the distance from Astorga to the concentration point was no
less than ninety miles we cease to wonder at their tardy ani·;ral.
Soult had strict orders from the Emperor to march with his
troops well closed up, and not to risk the danger of being caught
with his corps strung out at distances which would pennit of
their being met and defeated in detail l . He was therefore
cntirely justified in refusing- to move until the 6th Corps should
be in supporting distuncc of the rest of his army, and the 2nd
COl'PS should ha.\'e rccci\'l~d thc cannon which were needed
to replace tlle pieces that they had lost in Portugal. FOJ:
this reason we must regard as unfollllded all the vehement
reproaches heaped upon him by Joseph and Jourdan during the
acrimonious correspondence that followed upon the end of the
campaign. It would have been wrong to start the 5th Corps
upon its way to Plasencia till the 2nd Corps was ready ,to
follow, and the much needed guns only came into Salamanca 011
the twenty-ninth, though their approach bad been reported
011 the preceding day.
We cannot therefore blame Soult for sloth or slackness
when we find that he started Mortier upon his way on July
27, and followed him with his o\\'n corps upon July 30, the
day after the gUlls arrived, and the day before Ney and his
troops were due to reach Salamanca from the north.
The order of march WllS as follows: the vangunrd was com-
posed of the whole corps of Mortier, nearly 17,000 strong 2,
reinforced by three brigades of dragoons under Lahoussaye ,and
Lo'rges with a strength of 2,000 sabres. The ~nd Corps fol-
lowed; though it started three days later than the 5th it was
gradually gaining ground on the vanguard all through the
march, as it bad no fighting to do or reconnaissances to execute.
I Orders of Napoleon from Schonbrunn, June 12: 'Les trois corps
doivcnt fournir 00 it. 60 mille hommcs. Si cctte reunion a. lieu prompl.c.
ment lea Anglais doiveut etre detruits; mnis it faut se reunir, et 7UJ pas
1/lf.JTCMr par petU8 paquet8. Cela est le principe general pour tous lell
gucrrefl. mnis surtout pour un pays ala 1'on ne peut pas lIvoir dll communi-
cation:
, By the return of July 15. the 5th C<Jrps had 10.016 men, the attached
brigades of dmgoons. 1.863: the 2nd Corps had 18,i40 (W;ducti.ng Lorges
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Hence it was only twenty-four hours behind Morlicr in arriving
at Plascncia. Its strength was ]8,000 men, even after it had
detached the brigades of dragoons to strengthen the vanguard,
and plu.ced five batu\lions at the disposal ofGeneral Kellermalln 1,
During its stay at Zamora and Toro it had picked up a mas."
of COllvalescents and details, who had not taken part in its
Galician cmnpaign. The renr was formed by Ney's troops,
which started from Salamanca only one day behind the 2nd
Corps. The infantry was not complete, as a brigade of 3,000
men was left behind on the Douro, to assist KeUermann in
holding down the kingdom of Lean. Hence, even including
a brigade of Lorges' dragoons, the 6th Corps had only some
12,500 men on the march. The whole army, therefore, as it
will be seen, was about 50,000 strong.
Just before he marched from Salamanca Soult had heard
that Beresford's Portuguese were commencing to show them~
selves in force in the direction of AJmeida, while Del Parque's
small division at Ciudad Rodrigo was beginning to be reinforced
by troops descending from the mountains of Galicia. Trusting
that the dan&fCr from this quarter might not prove imminent,
the Marshal left in observation uf the allies only the remains of
the for{,~ that KclJcrmanD had brought back from the Asturias
-the 5Ul division of dragoons and a few battalions of infantry,
strengthened by the five battalions from the 2nd Corps and the
onc brignde detached from Ney. The whole did not amount
to more than 9,000 or 10,000 men, scattered along the whole
front from Astorga to Salamanca. It was clear that much was
risked in this direction, fol' Deresford and Del Parque could
concentrate over ::!O,OOO troops for an attack on any point
that they might select. But Soult was prepared to accept the
chances of war in the Douro valley, rightly thinking that if he
could crush 1VeUesley's army 011 the Tagus any losses in the
north could easily be repaired. It would matter little if the
and Lahoussaye): the 6th Corps 15,700, of,whom one brigade of iufantry
(3,200 bayonets) was left behind. '11Ie total then was 50,000.
I The .Marshal had dissolmd one of his four divisions, that of .Mcrmet,
rnakiug over tbe 122nd of tile lino, reduced to twu battalions, aud the Swis.!l
units to I{ellermanll. and distributing the other regiments between Merle,
Delaborde, and Heudelet.
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Spaniards and Portuguese occupied Salamanca, or even Vlllla·
dolid, after the British had been destroyed.
Mortier, starting on July ~7', on the road by Fuente IWble
and Los Santos, made two marches without coming in touch
with any enemy. It was only on the third day that he met at
La Calzada the vedettes of the trifling force under the Marquis
,Del Reino which Cuesta had sent to hold the Puerto de Bai'ios.
After chasing them through Bejar, the Marshal Ctlme upon
their supports drawn up in the pass [July 30]. Del Reino
thought himself obliged to fight, though he had but four
battalions with a total of 2,500 or 3,000 bayonets l , He was
of course dislodged with casc by the overwhelming numbers
which l\Iorticr turned against him-the first division of the 5th
Corps alone sufficed to drive him through the pass. There-
upon he retired down the Alagon, and after sending news of
his defeat to Cucsta fell back to Almarnz, where he took up the
bridge of boa~ and removed it to the southern bank of the
Tagus.
Having cleared the passes upon the thirtieth, the 5th Corps
advanced to Candelaria and Bafios de llejar upon the thirty-
'first, and entered Plaseneia. on the first of August. Here
Mortier captured 334 of Wellesley's sick, who had been left
behind as being incapable of removal. On the preceding day
the town had been full of British detachments: the place was
the half-way house between Portugal and Talavera, and many
commissaries, isolated officers going to or from the front, and
details marching to join their corps, had been collected there.
Captain Pattison, the senior offi<..'er present, withdrew to Zarza,
with every man that could march, when he heard of Mortier's
1 Cuesta, in a dispatch in the DepoBito de la GUfm'tl, which seems un-
published, !l3oyll that Del Iwino fought with four battaliOllS. He had
started with no more than two,60 must have rallied two others. I can
find no trace ef wha.t they were, but conclude that they must have been
SOlUe of those battalions of the Army of Estremadura whieh·are not named
in the Ordre de Ba/aWe of the divisions present at Talavera. As I have
shown in my Talavera Appendix, there were eight regiments which had
belonged to CuesUt.'s anny in March but do not appear ill the divisional
return of July. Most of these were ill garrison at Ba.dajO'~: bllt two or
three may well have been sent to guard the passes when the annyadvanced
from the Guadiana in the cud of June.
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approach, taking with him a convoy which had recently arrived
from Abrantes. Dut he was obliged to leave behind him a con-
siderable amount of corn, just collected from the Ver~ which
had been 'destined for Wellesley's army. The whole civil
population of Plasencia fled to the hills, in obedience to an
order of the local Junta, and the British soldiers in the
hospital were the only living beings whom the French vanguard
found in the city. 'l'he men of the 5th Corps plundered the
deserted houses, as wllS:. but natural, but behaved with much
humanity to the captured invalids 1.
After seizing ])!Il.sencia Morlier halted for a day, in obedience
to Soult's orders, that he might allow the 2nd CArpS to close up
before he pressed in any further towards Wellesley. The Duke
of Dalmatia was determined to run no risks, when dealing with
an adversary so enterprising as his old enemy of Oporto. On
August 2 he himself and the leading di visions of his corps
reached Plasencia: the rest were close behind. On the same
afternoon, therefore, the advance could be resumed, and .Mortier
set out on the high road towards Almaraz and Talavera, having
eight regiments of horse-S,OOO men-in his front. He slept
that night at Malpartidn, seven milQ;; in advance of Plasencia,
and moved on next 1Il0rniilg to tile liue of the Tieta.l' and the
villitoU'C of Tod!. Onc of his re<:olllloitring patties approached
the bridge of Almaraz and found it brokcn: anothcr reached
Naval Moral. He wus now drnwing very close to ,",Vcllesley,
who had enCllm~ that day at Oropesu, and wus only thirty
milcs away: indeed the British and the French cavalry came in
<:ont.act timt evening in front of Naval Moral.
On August 3, by rt curious coincidence, eacl} Commander.in-
chief was at last informed of his adversary's strength and
intentions by a captured dispatch. A Spanish messenger was
arrested by Soult's cavalry, while bearing II letter from
"Vellesley to Gelleral Erskine dated August 1. In this docu-
ment there was an account of the battle of Tala\'era, which had
I ,,'or details of Mortier's march see the memoir of Naylics, of Uihoulr
saye's Dl"oigOOlIS, who was with the va.nguard. According to the J)iary of
Fantin des Odoards, Soult puslled his kindness to the British ulwl.lids so
fa.r all to leave with them a mnall supply of muskets, with which to defend
themsehes against guerrillas.
OMAN. 1I l' P
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hitherto been unknown to SoUll. But the moot important
clause of it \\'as a request to Erskine to find out whether the
rumours reporting the advance of l~OOO French towards the
Puerto de Baflo~ were correct. The Duke of Dalmatia thus
discovered that his adversary, only two da.ys before, was grossly
underrating the numbers of the army that WAS marching against
his rear. He was led on to hope that Wellesley would presently
advance against him with inferior numbers, and court destruc-
tion by attacking the united j!nd and 5th Corps 1.
This indeed might have come to pass had not the allies on
the same day become possessed of a French dispatch which
revealed to them the real situation of affairs. Some guerrillas
in the neighbourhood of AviIa intercepted a friar, who was an
~<Jent of King Joseph, and was bearing a letter from him to
Soult, They brought the paper to Cuesta on August 3: it
contained not only an account of the King's plans and projects,
but orders for the :Marshal, which mentioned Ney and the 6th
Corps, and showed that the force ~arching on Plasencia was at
least double the strength that We1lesley had expected 2. This
letter Cuc:.-ta sellt on to his colleague with laudable promptness;
it reached the British commander in time to save him from
taking the irreparable step of marching from Oropesa. to Naval
Moral, where the vanguard of Morticr's Clt\'alr), had just been
mel by the "ooettes of Coloon's light horse. Wellesley had
actually written to Dasseeourl to bid him halt at Centinello till
he himself should arrive, and then to join him in an attack on
the French~, when he was handed the intercepted letter which
showed that Soult had at least 30,000 men in hand.
1 oc-e Le Noble, 11. 320.
I See Arteche, vi. 342, aud Weliington Di8patchef, iv, 001; the letter
itself is not published br Gurwood, but Lord Londonderry, then on
Wellesley's r;taff, gives an analysis of it. It contained, according to him,
orders to Soult UJ hasten his march, and to bring up Ney's corps with all
speed, while the king himself undertook UJ tbruten Talavera again with
Vk-tor's forces [Londonderry, i. p. 416].
S 'Velle;;ley to Dassecourt, f.rom Orupesa, August 3. So confident was
the British commander at thi.s moment, that he wrote UJ Deresford OD the
6ame morning, telling him that Soult when assailed would probably retire
at once, either by the pass of Perales or that of Ba.i'ios. He wished his
lieutenant UJ send Portuguese troops to the outlets of those defiles, UJ
intercept the retreating enemy.
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This unpalatable news changed the whole prospect of affairs :
it would be mad to assail such an enemy with a force consisting
of no morc than 18,000 British troops and Bassccourl's 5,000
Spaniards. Wellesley had therefore to reconsider the wbole
situation, and to dict.ate a new plan of campaign at very short
notke, since his C!\valry were actually in touch with the enemy
at the distance of a single day's march from Oropesa. On the
morrow he must either fight or fly. The situation was made
more complicated" by the fact that CllCStB., when forwarding the
French dispatch, had sent information to the effect that he con·
sidcred his own situation at Talavern so much compromised
that he was about to retreat at once, with the design of crossing
the Tugus at Almara.z, and of taking up DUce more his old line
of communications, which ran by Truxillo to Dadajoz. It may
be asked why the Captain-Genernl did not adopt the simpler
course of crossing the Tagtls at Talaverll, and moving under
cover of the river, instead of executing the long flank march by
Oropesa to Almaraz on the exposed bank, where the French
were known to be in movement. The answer, however, is simple
and conclusive: the paths which lead southward from Talavera
are impracticable for artillery and wheeled vehicles. Infantry
alone could have retreated by the route which climbs up to the
Puerto de San Vincente, the main pass of this section of the
Sierra de Guadalupe: nor was the track along the edge of the
river from Talavera to Arzobispo any better fitted for the
transport of a large anny. It is this want of any adequate
communication with the south which makes Talavero such
a dangeroUs position: no retreat from it is possible 88.\·e that
by the road to Oropesa., unless the retiring army is prepared to
sacrifice all its impedimenta.
Cl'lesta hus been criticized in the most savage style by many
English writers, from Lord Londonderry and Napicr down-
wards, for his hasty departure from Talavera. It is fair to
state in his defence the fact that if he had tarried aDy longer in
his present position he might have been cut off not merely from
Almaraz-that passage was already impracticable-but also
from the bridge of Arzobispo, the only other crossing of the
Tagus by which artillery and heavy wagons can pass south-
ward. If he had started on the fourth instead of the third he
pp 2
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might have found Mortier and Soult interposed between-him
and this last line of retreat. He would then have been forced
to abandon all his'matn-kt, and to hUlTy back to '1'alavera, in
order to take the breakneck track to the Puerto de San
Vincente. But there was every reason to believe that Victor
might arrive in front of '.ralavera on the evening of the fourth
or the morning of the fifth, so that this last road to safety
might have been already blocked. Thus the Spanish army, if
it had started on the fourth for Oropesa, might have fouml
itself caught between the two French corps, and vowed to
inc·...itable destruction. ...\.5 a matter of fact Victor moved
slowly and cautiously, and only reached TalavCl'o. 011 the sixth-
but this could not possibly have been foresccn. 'Vc canllot
therefore blame Cuesta'8 precipitate departure upon the night
of August 3.
His main body marched under cover of the darkness to
Oropcsa, where they arrived, much wearied and in SOllle disorder,
on the following morning. He left Zayns's division and Albu.
querque's horse ns a rcurguanl, to hold Talavera till midday 011
the fourth, with orders to make a semblance of resistallec and
to detain Victor for a few hams jf he should appear. Dut no
hostile force showed itself: b)" his unwise retreat to Santa Crm;
the Marshal had drawn back so far from the enemy that he
could not take advantage of their retrograde movement when
it beeR.me known to him. Villatte's division and J3eaumont's
cavalry only reached Talavera on the morning of the sixth.
The departure of the Estremaduran army had one deplorable
result. It exposed the English hospitals at Talavera, with
their 4,000 wounded, to capture by the enemy. Vlellesley,
before he had marched off, had given orders that all the men
capable of being moved should be sent oil' towards Plasencia
and Portugal ns soon as possible. But he had no transport
that (.·(mld cope with the task of transferring such a mass oC
invalids towards his base. He wrote from Oropesu. begging
Cucsto. to requisition carts fmm the country-side for this pur4
pose 1. But it was notorious that carts were not to be had-all
"'ellesley's letters for the last three weeks were full of COID4
plaints to the effect that he could not procure them by money
" I Wellcsl!l)' to O'Donoju, Aug. 3, 180!).
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or by force. \Vhen the Spaniards were themseh-es departing,
bug and baggage, it was an inopportune moment at which to
ask them to provide transport; yet since the llritish wounded
had been left to their care they were bound in honour to do all
'that could be done to save them. It is said that Cucsta made
over 1 no more thllll &even ox-carts and n few mules to Colonel
MackinnolJ, the officer charged with the task of evacuating the
hospitals. These and about forty vehicles of various kinds
belonging to the British themselves were all that could be
procured for the use of the wounded. They could only accom~
modate a tithe of the serious cases: the men with hurts of less
consequence were forced to set out upon their feet. 'The rand
to Oropesa,' writes one of their fcllow sufferers, 'wall covered
with our poor limping bloodless soldiers. On crutches or sticks,
with blankets thrown over them, they hobbled wofully along.
:For the moment panic terror lent them a force inconsistent with
their debility and their fresh wounds. Some died by the road,
others., unable to get further than Oropesa, afterwards fell into
the hands of the enemy 2,' The rest trailed onward to the
bridge of Arzobispo, where Wcllcsley provided transport for
many of them by unloading bagga~.wagons, and ultimately
.reached Truxillo, at which pl8.l..'e the new hospitals were estab-
lished. or the whole 4,000 about 1,500 had been left at
Tnlavcrn as hopeless or dungerous roses, und these became thc
capti\-es of the French; 2,000 drifted in, at various times, to
Trnxillo: the remaining 500 expired by the wayside or were
takcn by the French in the villages where they had dropped
downS.
Long before Cnesm and his host had arrh-ed at Otopesa,
1 I am hound to say tllat after reading tllll Spanisb lUl.rratives, I doubt
Wllether Cucsta had at his disposal tbe large amount of spare vehicles oC
which Londonderrr and Napier speak_
I Boothby, .A Priumer of France, p_ 40. For tbe adl'entures of two
wounded officers on their wearr wa.y to 'frwdllo see the Dim1l of Hawker,
ami tho narratil'e of Colonel u..'Il1io. 'nlO latter made a personal appe.'11
to Cuesta, whose carriage he llad met by the roadside. TIle old general
sent for the Alcalde, and made him provide a mule-though it tumed out
to be a I'ery bad one-Cor the wounded officer, This small fact to his
credit needs recording, after the copious abuse heaped on him.
5 The invalids were admirably cared Cor by the enemy. See Boothbr.
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'Vellesley had made up his mind that the only course open to
him was to abandon the march towards Naval Moral and
Almara.7., and to turn aside to the ,bridge of Arl.Obispo. As the
French were known to be at Naval MOrAl, it would have been
impossible to force a passage to Almnmz without a battle. If
the enemy were to be estimated at two corps, or 30,000 men,
according to the indications of the intercepted letter. they
would probably be able to detain the Anglo-Spanish army till
Victor should arrive from the rear. For, without accepting
a pitched battle, they would be strong enough to hara.~ and
check the allies, and to prevent them from reaching Almaraz
till the 1st Corps should come upon the scene. 'I was not
certain,' wrote \Vellesley to Beresford two days later, 'that Ney
was not with Soult, and I was certain that, if not with him,
he was at no great distance. We should therefore have had
a battle to fight in order to gain the road to Almaraz-Plasen·
cia was then out of the question-and if Victor had followed
Cuesta, as he ought to have done, another battle, probably,
before the bridge could be re·establishecP. Then it was to be
considered that, Cuesm h,!-ving left Talavera, the bridge of
Arzobispo would have been open to the enemy's enterprise: if
they had destroyed it, while we hnd failed in forcing Soult at
Naval Moral. we were gone.'
It is impossible not to bow before Wellcsley's reasoning. The
French critics object that only Mortier was at Naval Moral Oil
August 4. Soult being twenty miles behind him at Buzagoua on
thc Tietar, so that it would have becn possible for the British
army to have driven back the 19,000 men of the Duke of
Treviso. and to have forced its way to Almarllz 2. But even
if Wellesley had fought a successful action with Mortier on
August 4, Soult would certainly have joined his colleague on
the fifth, before the bridge could have been repaired, or at any
rate before the whole Allglo·Spanish army and all its impedi-
menta could have crossed the Tagus. If attacked during their
passage by the 37,000 men of the fend and 5th Corps they
I The Marquis del Reino (it "'iIl be remembered) bad broken the
boat-bridge of Almaru on August 2, after abandoning the l}uerto de
Banos.
t St..-e for example, Le Noble, pp. 339--40.
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would have fared badly. ''''ellesley was perfectly correct in his
decision; indeed the only point in which he was deceh'ed was
that he belie\·ed the enemy in his front to be Soult's and Ney's
Corps, whereas they were in reaIlty those of Soult and M:ortier.
Ney only reached lllasencia on August 4, and did lIot join the
main body of the army till two da)'s later.
When \Vellesley and Guesta met at Oropestlt early on the
morning of August 4, they found themselves as usual engaged
in a heated controversy. The British general had directed his
divisions to hold themselves ready to march on the bridge of
Arzobispo without further delay. Cuesta 011 the other hand
had been attacked by a recrudescence of his old disease, the
mania for fighting pitched battles I. He proposed that the
allied armies should remain on the north bank of the Tagus,
adopt a good defensive position, and defy Soult to attack them.
\Vellesley would not listen for a moment to this project, and
finally declared that in spite of all arguments to the <:olltrary, he
should cross the Tagus that day at the head of his army. The
two generals parted in wrath, and at six o'clock the British
commenced their march to Ar'.lObispo, only niue miles diswpt;
the whole force crossed its bridge before evening, and established
ib>elf in bivouac all the south side of the river:
Cuesta remained at Oropesa for the whole day of August 4,
and was there joined both by Bassecourt, who had fallen back
from CentinelIo, and by Zayas and Albuquerque, who had
evacuated Talavera at noon and made a forced march to join
their chief. He appeared disposed fo fight even though his
ally had abandoned him. In the afternoon Mortier's cavalry
pressed in against him. He turned fiercely upon them, deployed
a whole division of infantry and 1,200 horse in their front, and
drove them back towards their supports. This vigorous action
had it result that could not have been foreseen: MoItier' jumped
to the conclusion that he was himself about to be attacked
by the whole Spanish army-perhaps by '1Vellesley also 2. He
•
1 'As usual, General Cuesta wanted to fight general a'ctions; writes
Weilesley to Beresford, from Arzobispo, on tile afternoon of this same day.
~ < l\L le Mareehal duc de Tn!vise crot qu'ill!erait attaque; says Soult
in his report of August 13. He t1\erefore held back, and sent for the
2nd Corps. Hence came Cuesta's salvation.
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halted the 5th Corps in ad,·ftnce of Naval Moral, and wrote to
implore Soult to come up to his aid without delay. The Duke
of Dalmatia hurried up with all speed, and on August 5 brought'
the 2nd Corps to Casatejada, only six miles in the rear of his
colleague. Ney, following with a like promptness, advanced
that day to Malpartida, a march behind the position of Soull.
On the sixth, therefore, the whole army from the Douro was
practically concentrated, and Soult and Mortier advanced ~"'ilinst
Cuesta with Ney close in their rear. They found that they were
too late: after remaining in battle order in front of the bridge
of Arzobispo during the whole of the fifth, courting the attack
which Mortier had been too cautious to deliver, the Captain-
General had crossed the Tflh'US that night, and had occupied its
further bank. He had left in front of the bridge only a small
rearguard, which retired after a skirmish with the advanced
cavalry of the 5th Corps. For once Cuesta had found luck
upon his side; if Mortier had ventured to assail him on the
fifth, and had forced him to an engagement, in a position from
which retreat was difficult, and with the Tagus at his back, his
situation would have been most perilous. For even if he had
kept the 5th Corps at bay, he could not easily have withdrawn
in face of it, and Soult would have been upon him on the next
morni.ng. In escaping llCI'OSS the narrow bridge of Arzobispo
his losses must have been terrible: indeed the greater part of
his army might have been dcstro)'L.J.
Finding, on the evening of August 6, that both the British
and the EstremadUI'Wl armies were now covered by lhe Tagus,
whose line they appeared detcrminoo to defend, Soult was foreed
to think out a new plan of campaign. His odgino.l design of
taking the allies in the rear and cutting off their retreat had
miscarried: he must now either halt and recoglli?,c that his march
had failed in its main purpose, or eL'le deliver a frontal attack
'upon the line of the Tagus. The bridge ofAlmaraz was broken,
and troops (the detachment of the Marquis Del Reino) were
visible behind it. The bridge of Ar7.0bispo was not destroyed,
but the Spaniards were obviously ready to defend it. It wa.,<;
barricaded, the mediaeval towers in its midst were manned by
a detachment of infantry, and a battery for twelve guns had
been placed in an earthwork erected on a knoll thilty yards in
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its rear, so as to sweep 011 the approaches. Considerable forces
. both of cavalry and of infantry were visible on the hillsides lmd
in the villugcs of the sonthern bank. Cuesta, in fact, while
proposing to tl\1l back with his main body to Me1.11 de 1001' and
Deleytosa, in order to recover his communication with his base at
Uadajo7" had left behind a strong rearguard, consisting of Basse-
court's infantry division and Albuquerque's six regiments of
cavalry, a force of 5,000 bayonets and nearly 8,000 sabres.
They were ordered to defend the bridge and the neighbouring
ford of Azutan till further orders should reach them. The
ground was ·very strong; indeed the ford was the one perilous
point, and as that passaelttl was narrow and hard to find, Cuesta
trusted that it might be maintained even against very superior
numbers. 80 formidable did the defence appear that Soult
halted Juring the whole Jay of August 7, while he took stock
of the Spanish positions, and sought up-stream and down~strcam
for means of passage other than the bridge. He was not at first
aware of the existence of the ford: it was only revcaled to him
by the imprudence of the Spunish cavalry, who rode their
horses far into the stream whcn watering them, thus ShOWiJlg
that there were long shallows projecting from the southern·
bank. Dy & careful search at night the French intelligence-
officers discovered that the river was only deep for a few yards
under their own bank 1: for the rest of it." breadth there were
only two or three feet of water. Having found the point, not
far from the brirle.noe. where the more dangerous part of the
channel was fordable, they ad"ised the Marshal that the
passage of the river would present no insurmountable diffi.
culties. Soult resolved to deliver an assault both on the bridge
and on the ford upon the morning of August 8. Nor was it
only at Mlobispo that he determined ! 0 force the line of the
Tagus. He directed Ney, who was bringing up his rear at the
head of the 6th Corps, to turn aside to the broken bridge of
I General Arteche, who has examined the ford, notes that the main
clI81\nel, narrow but with a rocky IJottom, is close under the lIortllcnl,
i. Co the FreUdl, blink. ·nH~ remaining two-tllirds of tho hreadUI of tile
ril"er has a llard sandy bottom and is in August extremely shallow. If
once, therefore, the deep water nnder the nearer bank Vias crossed, tlle
French had no difficulties before them.
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Almaraz, and to endeavour to cross the river by aid of a ford
which was said to e..xist in that neighbourhood. Sketch-maps
were sent. to the Marshal in order to enable him to locate the
exact. point of passage-it would seem that they must have
been very faulty.
Meanwhile Wellesley had passed the Tagus four days and
Cuesta. three clap before the Marshal's attack was ready, and
both had been granted time to proceed far upon their way. It
was fortunate that they were not. hurried, for the road from
Arzobispo to Meza de IbaI' and thence to Deleytosa and
Jaraicejo, though passable for guns and wheeled vehicles, was
steep and in a deplorable condition of disrepair. It took
1Vellesley two days to march from the bridge to Meza de lhor,
s. distance of only seventeen miles, because of the endless
trouble caused by his artillery. There were places where he
had practically to remake the roadway, and others where whole
companies of infantry had to be turned on to haul the canllon
up slopes where the half~stanedhorses could make no hcadwa,Y,
These exertions were all the more exhausting because the men
were falling into a state of great bodily weakness from
insufficient supplies, Even at Tala"era they had on many
days recei "cd. no more than half rations: but after passing
Oropesa regular distributions of food L'CiLsed altogether for
some time: there were still a few slaughter-oxen with the army,
but bread. or biscuit was unobtainable, and the troops had to
maintain themselves on' what they could scrape up from the
thinly peopled and rugged country~side. A diet of overripe
garbanzo8, parched to the hardness of bullets, was all that
many could obtain. Better foragers eked them out with honey-
comb stolen from the peasants' hives, and pork got by shooting
the half~wild pigs which roam in tro~s among the woods on
the mountain side. Many, in the ravenous eagerness of hunger,
ate the meat warm and raw, and contracted choleraic complaints
from their unwholesome feeding I.
Divining that SOlut would probably make a dash at Almaraz
as well as at Arzobispo, Wellesley sent on ahead of his main body
the brigade of Robert Craufurd, to which he attached DOllkin's
I For details of these privations sce the diary of Leach of the 96th,
p.92.
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much depleted regiments, in order to make up a small division.
As they were unhampered by guns or baggage this detachment
reached Almaraz on the sixth, after a fifteen hours' forocd
march on the preceding day. They took O\'er charge of the
broken bridge and the ford from the Spanish troops of
the Mtl}'quis Del Reino, and proceeded to entrench themselves
ill the excellent positioD5 overlooking the point where the river
was pnssuble. Thus Ne)', when he reached Almnrnz on the
following day, found the enemy already established opposite
him, and ready to dispute the crossing. About 4,000 British
troops ano ] ,500 Spanish troops were holding the ri \'CX bank:
immediately at their backs was the narrow and eminently
defensible defile of l\1irabete, which completely commands the
road to Truxillo: it was an even stronger position than that
which covered the ford and the ruined bridge.
On August 7 therefore Wellesley considered himself in a
comparatively satisfactory situation. The passage at Almaraz
was held by a vanguard consisting of the best troops in the
army. Two divisions, the cavalry, and all the guns had
traversed the worst part of the road, and had reached Deleytosa,
only nine miles behind Craufurd's position. If the :French
should attack on the following day, the main hod)' could rein-
fOl'ce the light brigade in a few hours. One division, in the
rear, was holding the position ofMeza de IOOr, which Wellesley
did not wish to evacuate until the Spanish army was ready to
occupy it. He had discovered tllat there were points between
Arzobispo and Almaraz where the passage of the Tagus was not
wholly impracticable for small bodies of infantry t, and dreaded
that the enemy might throw a detachment across the stream to
make a dash for the Mew.. IT this position bad been lost
the communication between the two armies would have been
broken.
Cuesta, meanwhile, was engaged in the steep and stony
mountain road over whieh Wellesley bad toiled on the 5th and
the 6th of August. His vanguard was now close to Mmr.ade lhor:
the rest of the army was strung out between that point and Val
de la Casa: the Captain-General himself had his head quarters
on the night of the seventh at Peraleda de Garbin, ten miles
1 Wel1es1ey to O'Donoju, from Deleytosa, Aug. 7.
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west of Ar.wbispo. Bassecourt and Albnquerque were still
covering the ret\r, with MOltiel"s corps now plainly visible in
their front. On their steadiness depended the safety of the
whole army, fOT Cuesta had more baggage and more guns 1 than
"relIesle)', Ilnd therefore the road over the hills was even morc
trying to him than to his colleague. There was a congestion
of wheeled transport at certAin spots on the road which created
hopeless confusion, and barred the march of the cavalry and
even of the infantry divisions. It was only removed by setting
whole battalions to work to drag the wagons Qut of the way.
Cuesta's ultimate destination was the Meza de 1001', a position of
unparalleled strength, which could be held even after the enemy
had crossed the Tagus. That they would ultimately win their
way over the river was celtain, for already news had arrived
that Victor, after reaching 'l'alavera all Aug. 6, had pushed
infantry over its bridge on the road to Herencia and Aldea
Nueva. Troops coming from this direction would outflank the
Ar7.obispo positioll, and compel Albuquerque to abandon it.
Even without cavalry or guns this detachment of the 1st Corps
would be strong enough to dislodge the guard of the bridge, by
falling upon its rear, while Mortier was attacking it in front.
As the cavalry of Victor and Soult had met, half way between
Oropesa and Talavera, upon the afternoon ·of the seventh, the
two marshals were now in fuU communication, and able to
concert any plans that they might please for joint operations.
The Duke of Dalmatia, however, preferred to win all the
credit for himself, and attacked without allowing his colle~<nle's
troops time to approach the Spanish position. It was fortunate
for Albuquerque that the rivalry of the two hostile commanders
saved him from the joint assault, which would have been far
more ruinous to him than thc actual comba.t of Aug. 8 was
dcstined to prove. .
Having full knowledge of the c.ustence and the loculity of
the ford of AZUUUl, Soult had resolved to launch his main
a.ttack upon this point, while directing only a subsidiary attack
upon the fortified bridge. This last wl!'! only to be pushed
I Beside his own thirty guns be Imd the scvcnteen captured :Fl'ench pieces
whicll bad been won at Talavera. Wellesley, it will be remembered (p. 543),
had handed them over to him.
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home in Cl\.SC the troops sent ~01lillSt the ford should succeed in
making good their footing upon the further bank. A careful
observation of the Spanish.lincs showed that both Albuquerquc
a.nd Bussecoll.rt were hold.ing back the main bod), of their
divisions at some distance from the water's edge, in the groves
LLround the three villages ofPedrosa, Burgillo, and Azutall. There
WiIS only a single regiment of Cltvalry watching the river bank,
and two or three battalions of infantry manning the towers of
the bridge of AlY..obispo and the redoubt in its rear. The
Spaniards showe? every sign of a blind confidence in the
strength of their position behind the broad but shallow T6glls.
Knowing their habits, Soult selected for the moment of his
attack the hOur of the siesta. It was between one and two
o'clock in the afternoon when he bade his columns, which had
been drawn up under cove.', and at some distance from the
water's edge, to advance to force the passage. For the assault
upon the ford he had collected the whole of his cavalry, no less
than twelve regiments. Lahollssa}'e's dragoons formed tl).e van,
then came Lorges' brigade, thel1 the division of light horse
belonging to the ~nd· Corps, ill the rear the 'corps-cavalry of
Mortier. This mass of 4,000 horsemen was to be followed by
the first brigade of Girllro's infantry division of the 5th Corps,
while its second brigndc was to assault the bridge, when
Lahollssaye nnd Lorges should have won the passage of the
ford and have established themselves. on the flank of the Spanish
defences. GIl7.an's division, the second of the 5th Corps, was to
snpport Girard, while the masses of the infantry of the 2nd
Corps remained in reserve. All the light artillery of the army
was to gallop down to the water's edge at various selected
points, when the attacking columns were first put in movement,
and to distract the attention of the enemy's guns so far as lay
i.n their power.
At about 1.30 p.~r. Caulaincourt's brigade of Lahollssa}'e's
dragoons, a for{.'C of about 600 sabres, sallied out from its
cover behind the \'illage of Al"wbispo, and moved down to the
ford at a sharp trot. It plunbred into the water, had passed
the deeper part of the' chtulllel ulmost before the Spaniards
had guessed its intention, and soon reached the' shallows on
the opposite buuk. '11.c only hostile force reudy to mcct it
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was a single regiment (the 1st Estremaduran Hussars) which was
watching the ford, and a battalion of infantry which Bassecourt .
sent down in haste from the redoubt behind the bridge. A
fierce charge of Caulaincourt's dragoons dispersed and routed
the Spanish horse; after they had been driven off the victors
turned upon the battalion, which tried to form sq~are on their
approach, but was late in finishing its manreuvre. It was
assailed before the rear side had been formed, broken up, and
cut to pit'Ccs.
Soull had thus gained a pn.'Cious ho.lf~hour, during which the
remainder of his cavalry, squadron after squadron, came pouring
over the ford, and began to form up on the southern bank.
When several regiments had passed he also let loose the
infantry brigade which WiUl to attack the bridge. So narrow
was the approach that only a single battalion (the lst of the
40th of the tine) could deliver the assault. But the ttraUJeur
colllptulies of several other buttulions, and two batteries of
horse artillery, opened a lateral flIC from various points of the
northern bnnk, to distract the Spaniards from the frontal
attack. The fraction of Bassceourt's division which was in
position at the bridge and the redoubt had already been com-
pletely cowed by seeing L1.housSftye's cavalry forming up in
their flank and rear. If they waited to resist the infantry
attack, it was clear that they would be cut off from their sole
line of retreat by the dragoons. They a~.ndoned their
positions after firing a couple of scattering volle)'s, and fled
eastward along the river bank towards the village of Azutan.
'l11e heavy guns in the redoubt were left behind, and fell into
the hands of Caulaincourt. Girard's infantry was therefore
able to cross the river almost without loss, two regiments at
the bridge, two at the ford which the cavalry had already
utilized. A few men were drowned in the second column,
having strayed into deep water by swerving to the right or left
of the proper route.
Meanwhile Albuquerque's horse and Bassecourt's second
brigade, roused from their ill-timed siesta, were pouring out of
the Villil{,TCS which had sheltered them from the noontide heat.
The infantry-four battalions apparently-drew up beside a
wood, on the slope a mile above the bridge, aUd, waited to be
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attacked. The cavalry, however, came on in one great mas.<;,
and charged down upon Lahoussaye's division, which was
covering th.e deployment of the rest of the French horic,
Albuquerque's only thought was to engage the enemy before he
had succeeded in passing the whole of his squadrons over the
ford. Vainly hoping to atone for his previous slackness by
haste that came too late, he had hurried his five regiments
forward as soon as the men could saddle and bridle their horses.
Fractions of the different corps were mixed together, and no
proper first or seeond line had been formed. The whole mass
-some ~,500 sabres-in h'Tcat disorder, galloped down upon
the two brigades of Lahoussaye, and engaged them for a short
time. But Lorgcs' dragoons and part of Soult's light horse
were now at hand to aid the leading division; the Spaniard!:!
were beset in flank as well as in front, and broke after the first
shock. Albuquerquc, who showed plenty of useless personal
courage, tried in vain to rally thcm on the 2nd Estrcmo.duron
Hussars, the only rc{,>1ment which remained intact. It was
borne away by the btu:krush of the rest, and scattering over the
hillsides the whole body fled westward and northward, some
towards Peraleda de Garbin, others towards Pedrosa. Basse-
COUlt's infantry went oft' to the rear as soon as they saw their
comrades routed, and took to the hills. By keeping to rocky
ground they suffered comparatively little loss.
The lirench urged the pursuit of Albuquerque's fugitive
horsemen for many miles, chasing them as far as the defile of
La Estrella in the Sierra de Guadalupe in one direction, and
beyond Val de la Casa in the other. On the latter road the
ehase only ceased when the dragoons came upon the divisions of
Henestrosa and Zayas, from Cuesta's main army, drawn up
across their path. 'l"be losses of the Spaniards were very con-
siderable-600 men and 400 horses were captured, and over
800 killed and wounded. Oue flag was taken, that of the
regiment cut to pieces by Lahou!>Sfiye's dragoons at the COlll-
tllClwcmcnt of thc fighting. The pieces in the redoubt, dud thc
divisional battel'y of Albuqucrque, 16 gUlls ill all, were lost.
B)' an additional mischanCe the French also recovered fourteen
of their own scventeen guns that had been taken at Tll.lavera.
Cuesta had not been able to Utili7.e the:;e pieces for want of
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gUllners: they were trailing along in the rear of his army, very
indifferently horsed, when the French dragoons swept along the
road to Peraleda. On the approach of the pursuers they were
abandolled by the wayside. This capture enabled Soult to
assert that he had taken in all 30 cannon, aud emboldened
Sebastiani, a few weeks later, to declare that h~ had never lost
his guns at Talavera1, Havillg recovered them he could exhibit
them-all save two or three-in evidence of his mendacious
statement.
Soult declared in his official report that his cavalry had lost
only ~8 killed and 83 wounded, his artillery 4 wounded, his
infantry hardl)' a man, save some few drowned at the ford.
The rout of the Spanish rearguard and the capture of the
bridge of Al".lObispo gave Soult a foothold on the southern bank
of the 'l'agus, but little more. The road by which he could
now Mmnce against the allies was detestable-we have already
seen how its cliffs and ravines had tried the British and the
Estrcmaduran annies. To reach Cuesta's new position on the
Meza de lOOr the Duke of Dalmatia would have had to make
a two days' march through these defiles, dragging his gUlls with
him. His cavalry he would have been forced to leave behind
him, as there would ha\'e been no means of employing it in the
mountains, Meanwhile Wcllcsley had established himself in
the ground which he had selected behind the broken bridge of
Almaruz, and Cuesta. hud got the whole of his infantry and half
his artillery over the lOOr strea~ and arrayed them on the
Meza, where the rocky slopes are impref,flluble uf,'Uinst a frontal
attack, if the defending army shows ordinary dctcnnination 2.
I The fact that these guns were actually French e:tplains Le Noble's
statement tllat the captured pieces were largely' de modele fran~is.'
Napier has a strange statement, whose S()urce I cannot discover, to the
effect that 'Cuesta on his march to Mczu u'lbor left fifteen guns upon the
roau, whiell AlllU'Iuorque's night uucovercd. A trumpeter Ilttendillg'
an Englisll flag of trnce trcacllcrously or foolishly made kllow)) tllO
fact to tlle French, who immediateI}' sent cavalry to foldl lhclll off.'
Napier, ii. 189.
t It will be remembered that on March 17, Victor turned Del Parque's
division ou.t of the Meza de }bor positiou. But th~ latter had oul)' 5,000
men, not enough to man the whole line, while the Duke of BelluDo had
two divisions for the frontal attack, and turned the MCZli with allother,
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All through the ninth and the m(lrning of the tenth the Spaniards
were dragging the rest of their guns and their baggage up the
steep zigzag path between the river and the' summit of- the
plateau, and it was not till the end' of the latter day that every·
thing was in position. It is probable therefore that if Soult had
pressed his pursuit with all possible speed, he might have
captured some of the Spanish !mpedimen:ta on the morning of
the tenth. But there were defiles between Peraleda and the
1001' river where Cuesta's rearguard might possibly have detained
him till the guns and baggage were in safety 1,
The Duke of Dalmatia, however, paused at the bridge of
ArlObispo before committing himself to a second advance against
the allies. He was averse to making an isolated attack upon
the admirnbl~ position now ()C(upied by the Estremaduran
army, and wished to t'ombine it with a simultaneous. assault
upon the British. It will be remembered that he had:dctacbed
Ncy's corps from the rear of his line of march, and' ordered' it to
attempt the pa.ssageof the Tagus at Almaraz, by the ford which
he knew to exist close to the ruined bridge. He also wrote to
Victor to desire him to push forward the two infantry divi~ions
which had crossed' the river at TaIavera, and to direct them on
l\:lohedas and Alia, so as to tUn! Cuesta.'s flank by a long
circuitous march among the rugged summits of the Sierra; de
Guadalupe.
Neither of these subsidiary movements was carried out. One
division of Ney's corps, and FOl1rnier'~ brigade of dragoons
reached Almaraz on Aug. 8: the other division and the light
cavalry had followed the ~nd Corps so closely that it had passed
Naval Moral on its way eastward, and had to make a long
countennarch. It was not till the ninth or tenth therefore that
thAt of VillAtte. Cuesta had 30,000 men and more,' quite sufficient to
llOld the entire position.
I 'Wellesley went 10 visit his allies on tlJe l\feza Upoll the morning of
Aug. W, and found that half the gUllS and~ hd been dragged
up on the ninth, but that there was still a great accumulation at the foot
of the steep slope, between the lOOr rh'er and the lo",e~ edge of the
plateau. He was in great distress at the notion that the French might
come up at any mument, drive ill the rearguard, /lud capture tllC rear
sections of thc Sllanisn tl'tlin; llOO lYC/fil'l/lotl ./JiItpalchu, v. 22, to Lord
Wellesley, from DclcytOOl, Aug, 10.
O}l<\i'I. 11 Q q
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the Duke of Elchingen would have been ill a position to
attempt the passage of the Tagus. Cmufunl's detachment had
been established a.t l\fimbete, behind the broken brid~ since
Aug, 6, and two da)'s later the main body of the British army
had reached Deleytosa, where it was within a few hours' march
of the vanguard, and perfectly ready to support it. If Ney
had endeavoured to pass the Tagus on the ninth or tenth with
his Hl,500 men, it is clear that the head of his column must
hwc been destroyed, for the ford was nnrrow nnd difficult., and
indeed barely passable for infantry even in the middle of
August I, But'the Marshal did not even attempt the passage,
for the simple reason that his intelligence OffiC€fS failed to dis.
cover "the ford, and reported to him that nOlle existed. He sent
word to Soult that the scheme was impracticable, and drawing
back from the water's edge concentrated his whole corps at
Naval Moral [Aug. 9].
Victor, at the other end of the French line, showed no desire
'to adventure his infantry among the defiles of the Sierm de
Guadalupe, without guns or cavalry, and refused to move up
into the mountains in order to turn Cuesta's right flank. Thus
the whole plan concerted by the Duke of Dalmatia for a general
attack on the allies came to an ignominious conclusion.
It would appear, indeed, that his chance of inflicting a serious
blow on the enemy had passed away long ere he brought the 2nd
'and 5th Corps down to the bridge of Al7.obispo. It was on the
fifth, when Mortier refused to close with Cuesta and allowed
him to withdraw across the Tagus, that Soult had lost his best
opportunity. On that day the Spaniards were still on the
I From Soult's dispatch of Aug. 13, it appea1"8 that a Colonel Ornano,
with a regiment of dragoons, was detailed to examine the banks of the
Tagus in search of the ford, but failed to find it. The cause is not hard
to llL'ek, for it crosses the river diagolltllly on a narrow shelf of rock with
deep water Oil either side. It is not less than four feot deep, ami Leach
of the 95th, who was on guard at its southern end, describell it as 'not
e:t:a.ctly practicable for infantry even at the driest season of the year'
(po 94). The English, knowing its exact course, were established in
positions from which they could concentrate upon it in a few mlnute9.
. 'Ve may rationally suppose, therefore, that Ney would have found tile
Tagus not less difficult to pass on AUK. 9, thall the Oitabcn had boon on
June 8.
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wrong side of the river, and the British vanguard had not yet
reached the broken bridge of Almaraz. If Mortier had e~·
gaged the army of Cuesta., and Ney had. found and attacked the
ford at Almaraz before Craufurd's arrival, the position of the
nllies would have been forlorn indeed. Dut on the fit};h Soult
bad not yet discovered the real position of affairs; and the head
of Ney's COIPS was only just debouching from Plasencia, two
long marches from Almaraz. In short 'the fog of war,' as
a modern writer has happily called it, was still lying thick about
the combatants, ,and Soult's best chance was gone before he was
even aware of it.
On August 9, matters looked far less promising, even though
.the bridge of Arzobispo had been won. Since Ney sent word
that he could not cross at Almaraz, while Victor declined
to ,:ommit himself to any schemes for an advance into the
eastern mountains, SOlut saw that he must construct another
scheme of operations. His own preference was for a march into
Portugal by way of Coria and Castello Broneo. Such an attack
upon Wellcslcy'!:l base, ~ade by the 50,000 men of the 2nd, 5th,
and 6th Corps, would compel the British to abandon Almaraz,
to give up their t.'Onnexion with Cucsta, and to march in hMte
by Truxillo, Qu;ercs, and Portnlcgrc on Abrantcs, in order to
cover Lisbon. It was even possible that, if the invading army
made great hMte, .it might rench Abmntes before the British:
in that case 'Vellesley would be forced to keep to the southern
bank of the Taglls and cross it at Santarem, comparativel)' close
to the capital. Thus all Central Portugal might be won without
a battle, and Lisbon itself might fall ere the campaign ended,
since the J!O,OOO men of the British general, even when aided
by the local levies, could not (as Soult supposed) hold back
three French corps (farmee 1• There was another alternative
I Soult to Joseph, Aug. 9, from Arzobispo: 'Je semi di~ soit
il. marcher sur Lisbonno pour detruire les etnhlissoments anglais aVBnt quo
Jour armee ne puisse y arrivor, et alui rendre son embarquement difficile,
soit amarcher sur Ciudad Rodrigo pour en faire le siege.•.. Dans l~
cas du premier mouvement (qui produirn infailliblement de grands resultats)
j'aurai l'honneur de prier V. M. d'avoir la bollte de faire connaitre la.
MM. les marecbaux dues de Trevise et d'Elchingell que telle est sou'
intention, afin que toute observation soit ainsi privenue, et qu'on ne pui.sse
m'attribuer aucun sentiment d'amour-proprc.'
Qq~
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possible-to mnrch not on Lisbon but on Cilldad Rodrigo and
Almeida, and to invade Portugal by the northenl road. But this
plan would take a longer time to execute, and promised less
decisive results.
But even before the combat of Arwbispo had taken plaL"C,
Joseph and Jourdan had determined that they would not
permit Soult to carry out any schemes of advance against
Portugal. They could show 'very good grounds for their decision.
If the Duke of Dalmatia marched off' to attack Lisbon, he
would leave the 1st and 4th Corps and the King's reserve,-Iess
than 50,000 men in all, after the losses of Talavera, -opposed
to Cuesta, Wellesley, and Venega.s. who between them would.
have at least 75,000 1, If the British army should refuse
to be drawn away towards Portugal. and should recross the
Tagus at ALllaraz with Cuesta in its wake, the situation
would be deplorable. Victor would be exposed, just as he
had been on July ~! and flS, to a joint attack from the
two armies. And on this occasion Scb&stiani and the King
wonld 1I0t be able to bring him help, for they were now
clo~ely engaged with Venegas noor Aranjuez. If they moved
away from the front of the army of La Mancha, Madrid would
be lost in two days. If they did not so move, Wellesley and
Cuesta might cnJsh Victor, or drive him away on some eccentric
line of retreat which would uncover the capital. Jourdan
therefore, writing in the name of Joseph, had informed Soult in
a dispatch dated Aug. 8, that it was impossible to permit him
to march on Portugal, as his departure would uncover Madrid
and probably bring about a fatal disaster. He also urged thll.t
the exhaustion of the troops rendered a halt necessary, and that
it would be impossible to feed them, if they advanced into the
stony wilderness 011 the borders of Portugal before they had
collected magazines. For the .present the King would be con-
tented to keep the allies in check, without seeking to attack or
disperse them, until the weather began to grow cooler and the
troops had rested from their fatigues. .
As if intending to put it out of Soult's power to undertake
his projected expedition into Portugal, Jourdan and Joseph
1 Joseph, exaggerating the enemy's force, was under the imp~ion
that they hud flllly 100,000 men: see his letter to Nupoleon of July 31.
THE CAMPAIGN OF
TALAVERA
JULY·AuausT 1809
'Scale of Miles
'? ~,O "fI &!'
7b cu:epage .596
ENVIRONS
,.
Pm
deGarbin
The Dxf'ord Gt!og. fnst;iuu.
1809] NEY RETUllNS TO SALAMANCA 597
now proceeded to depl;ve him of the control of one of his three
anny corps. They authorized Ney to reeross the mountains
a.nd to return to Salamanca, in order to protect the plains of
Leon from the incursions of the Spaniards of Galiein. Deprived
of such a large section of his army, Soult would be unable to
march against Abrantes, as he so much desired to do. There
were good military reasons, too, for sending off Ney in this
direction: Kellermann kept reporting that La Romana was on
the move, and that unless promptly succoured he should find
himself oblib't.U to abandon Bcnnvclltc and Zamora and to fall
back 011 Vulladolid. The Spaniards from Ciudud Rodrigo had
already taken the offensive, and Del Pnrquc's advanced guard
had even seized SalamanClL.
Ney ncccpted with alacrity the cllance of withdrawing himself
from the immediate control of his old enemy Solllt; he ret.'eived
his permission to return to Leon on Aug. 9: on the tenth his
whole corps was on the move, and on the eleventh he had
retired to Plasencia. On the following day he plunged into
the passes and made for Sala.manca with all possible speed I.
While the 6th Corps was dispatched to the north, the King
directed Soult to take up, with the rest of his troops, a defen-
sive position opposite the allied armies on the central Tagus.
The ~nd Corps was to occupy P1asencia, the 5th to watch the
PIlSSllf,"Cs at Almaraz and Ar~obispo, while keeping a detaeh~
ment at Talavera. Thus all Soult's plans for an aeti\'e cam~
paign were shattered, and he was told off to act as a 'containing
force.' :MCiUlwhile Joseph drew Victor and the 1st Corps away
from TaJavera, townrds Toledo and La Mancha, with the inten-
tion of bringing them into play against Venegas, For just as
I Ney has been accused of deserting Soult, and retiring from Almaraz
und Na.val Moml Oil his "own responsibility, and contra.ry to the orders
of his immediate superior. But Jounluu's dispatch of Aug. 9 to thu
Minister of \Yar shows Umt UJe Duke of Elchingcn was obeying directions
sent to him from the royal head quarters. • Le roi a peIlS~" he writes,
•qu'on ne devait pas, quaqt apresent, chereher a~netrer ni en Andalousie
ni ell Portugal. ... Le due de Dalmatie reUl'erm promptemeut le
611le eo~ sur Salamanqne pour en ehasser Ies ennemis, et couvrir la
Vieille Castille conjointement avee le Genernl Kellermll.llll.· 'Ney tllen
was Htrictly correct in stating in his dispatch of Aug. 18, that be had acted
ill obedience to llis orders.
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Soult had always' an eye on Portugal,' so Joseph had always
'an eye on Madrid.' He could not feel secure so long as a.
Spanish army lay near Toledo or Aranjuez, only two marches
from the gates of his capital, and was determined to d.islod~
it from this threatening position before taking any other opera-
tion in hand. He had accepted as true rumoUTIl to the effect
that part of Cuesta.'s troops had retired in the direction of Ocafin1
to join the army of La Mancha, and even that 6,000 British 2
had been detached in this SRme direction. Thus be had persuaded
himself that Vencgas bad 40,000 men, and was desirous of draw-
ing in Victor to his bead quarters before delivering his attack,
thinking that Sebastialli and the central reserve would be too
weak for the task. .
I Joseph to Napoleon, from Valdemoro, August 7.
, Jourdan to .Belliard, from.Ba.rgasJ August a.
•
•
SECTION XVI: CHAPTER IX
THE END OF THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN
WUlI.E King Joseph's orders were being carried out, Wellesley
and Cuesta found themselves, to their great surprise, unmolested
by any hostile force. The army which had been" in their front
at Almaraz and Arzobispo disappeared on August 10, leaving
only small detachments to watch the northern bank of the
Tagus. It was soon reported to ,"Vellesley that View!:' had
pass~ away towards Toledo, and that another corps-or per-
haps two I-had retired to proscllcia. The object of this move
however had to be detcnnined, before the British general could
take corresponding measures. Was Soult about to invadl}
p.ortugal by way of Coria and; Castcllo Branco, or was he merely
taking up cantonments, from which he could observe the. Dritish
and Estremaduran armies, while the King Md Victor moved off
against Ven-egos ~ On the. whole 'Velleiley was inclined to
beLic\'c that the latter hypothesis was the cortect one, and that
the enemy was about to 'refuse' his right wing, and to use his left
for offensive action against the army of La Mancha. As was,
generally the case, his prescience was not at fault, and he had
exactly divined th~ King's intentions 2. He had neverlhele.ss to
guard against the possibility that the other alternative miRht
1 See Wellesley's Letter of Aug. 14 to Beresford, con~~ning the
departure of the Fren,ch. Robert Craufurd estimated the <Ot<:e the.t had
marched 0»- Plasencia at lli,OOO men, Donkin at 2li,OOO. j£ t]le latter
badjndged the numbers e<orreclly,.Wellesley supposed that bpth Noy and
80ult must luwo gone by this road; this WlUl actually the case.
i 'Vellesley tu Villiel'!l, Aug. 12: (11le French ha:viQg boon moving
sinoo the ninth towards Plasencia ... I can form 110 decided opinion
respecting their intentions. I think, however, that if they meditated
a serious attack on Portugal they would not h~ve moved off in daylight,
in full sight of our troops. I suspect these mOVeDlI:Ilt8 are intended, only
as a feint, to induce us to separate ourselves from the SpaniaJ'lls, in order
to co\'er Portugal.'
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prove to be correct, and that Central Portugal was in danger_
as indeed it would have beeu if Joseph had allowed Soult to
carry out ~ll8 originsl plan.
'Wellesley resolved therefore to maintain his present position
at Jamiccjo and l\iirahete till he should be certain as to the
intentions of the French. If they were 1'ooUy about to invade
Portugal, he would march at once for Abrantcs. If not, he
would keep his growld, for by holding the passage a€ Almaraz
he was threatening the French centre, and .detaining in his frOlit
troops who would otherwise be free to attack -the Spaniards
either in La Manchu,or in Lean.
Meanwhile meas'urcs had to be taken to pro"idc a detaining
{oct:e ill front of Soult, lest an attack on Portugal should turn
out to .be ,ill progress. This force was provided by brillging
down Beresford and the Portuguese field army to Zarza. and
Alcallmra, and sending up to their aid the British reinforce~
ments which had landed at Lisbon during the month of July.
Beresford, it will be remembered, had received orders at the
commencement of the campaign directing him to concentrate
his.army behind Almeida., to link his operations with those of
Del Parque and the Spanish force at Ciudad Rodrigo, but at
the same time to be ready to transfer.himself.either northward'
or southward if his presence should be required on .the Dom:o or
the Tagus. In accordance with these instructions Beresford had
collected thirty-two battalions of regular infantry, with one
more from the Lusitanian Legion, and the Universil;y Volunteers
of Coimbra, .as also .five squadrons from various cavalry regi·
ments, and four batteries of atiilleq-a force of 18,000 men in
all 1. On July 31 he had crossed the Spanish frontier, and lay
at·San Felices and Villa de Cen'o, near·Ciudad Rodrigo. There
he heard of Soult's march from Salllmanca towards P~nci'h
and very properly made up his miud to bri'1g his army down to
Estremadura by a line parallel to that which the French had
taken. He, crossed the Sierra de Gata by the rough pass of
Pernles, and on August 1!2 fixed his head quarters at Momlejo.,
t TIlese regiments were, 'Line infabtry, nO$. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, ll, 13,
14,16,18,19,28, all (save no. 15) two battalions iItrong, and the ht, 2nd,
3rd, 4th and 13th Cazadore8, with no. 2 of the Lusitanian Legion, and
the <Voluntarios Academicos • of Coimbra.
near Coria, on the southern slope of the mountains. His
cavalry held Coria, while his right wing was in touch with the
English brigades from Lisbon, which had just reached ZaI"'la~la.­
Major. These were the se'"en battalions of Lightburne and
Catlill Craufurd I, which "Wellesley had vainly hoped to receive
in time fur Talavem. They numbered 4,500 ooyonets, a.nd had
with them one battery of British artillery.
Thus even before Soult reached Plasencia, there was an army
of 18,000 Portuguese and 4,500 British on the lower Tietar,
ready ,to a.et as a detaining force and to retard the Marshal's
advance, if he should make a serious attempt to invade Portugal.
On Aug. 15, by Wellesley's orders, Beresford left Mornleja and
transferred his whole army to Zal'7.a, in Oi"der to be able to faU
back with perfect security on Castello Branco should circum-
stances so require. If he had remained at Moraleja he might
have been cut oft' from the high-road to Abrantes by a sudden
movement of the enemy on Coria 2.
Wellesley now felt comparatively safe, so far as matters
strategical were concerned. If the enemy, contrary to his
expectation, should march into Portugal, he could join Beres-
ford at Abrantes, and stand at bay with some !t4,OOO British
and 18,000 Portuguese regulars, a force sufficient to check the
30,000 .men who was the utmost force that Soult could bring
against him after Ney's departure. Meanwhile, till the Marshal
should move, be retained his old position at Mirabete and
Jaraicejo. Though the French showed no signs of activity in
his front, the weary fortnight during which the British army lay
in position behind the Tag-us were perhaps the most trying time
that Yvellesley spent during his first campajgn in Spain. It was
a period of aboolute stllrvation for mUll and beast, .and the
army was going to pit:res under his eyes. Ever since the
British had arrived in front of Talavem Oil July 2~ rations
AA wc ltlwe ulrcady sccn had been scanty llnd inegular. But
the fourteen days spent at Deleytosa and Jaraicejo were even
worse than those which had preceded them. The stores col~
lected at Plasencia had been captured by the French: those
gathered at Abrantes were so far distant that they could not be
1 Viz. 2/fith, 2/11th, 2/2Bth, 2/34th, 2/42nd, 2/3Oth, 2/88tb.
~ See Welle81ey to Beresford, Aug. 14.
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drawn upon, now that the high-road north of the Tagus had
been cut by the enemy. The army had to live miserably on
what it could wring out of the country-side, which Victor two
months before had stripped to the very bones. Wellesley had
hoped to be fed by the Spanish Government, when he threw up
his line of communication with Abrantes, and took up that with
Dadajos. Dut the Spanish Government WM a broken reed on
which to lean: if it fed its own armies most imperfectly, it was
hardly to be expected that it would deal more liberally with its
allies. The tritting stores brought from TalavEra had long been
ex.hausted: the country-side had been eaten bare: from the
South very little could be procured. The Spanish Commissary-
General 1.07.8.00 de Torres1 occasionally sent up a small consign-
ment of flour from ~res and 'l'ruxillo, but it did not suffice
to give the army even balf-rations. It was to no purpose that
at Abrantes provisions abounded at this moment, for there was
no means of getting them forward from Portugal ll• The enemy
lay between the army a,nd its base depOt, and there was no trans-
port available to bring up the food by the circuitous route of
Villa Velha and Portalegre. Even so earl~' as August 8
Wcllesley began to write that •a starving army is actually
worse thllll none, The soldiers lose their discipline and their
spirit. 'They plunder in the very presence of their officers. The
officers are discontented, and almost as bad as the men. W'"ith
the army that a fortnight ago beat double their numbers,
I should now hesitate to illl.'Ct a French oorps of half tbat
strength.' On the eleventh he wrote to warn Cuesta that unless
he wa.,> provided with food of some sort he should remain no
longer in his advanced position, but fall back towards Badajoz,
whatever might be the consequences. 'It is impossible,' he
1 That U.is afficial did something, if not so mud. aB \Vellesley required,
is shown by the letter to Cuerta of Aug. 11, in which it is ~d that t the
British army has re<:eived no provisiooSllillce it Wall at Deleytosa, excepting
some llentfrom 'l'ruxillo by Seiior Lomno de Tones,' while age.in 00 Aug. 8,
WellesIey says that' we have had nothing sillce the third, save 4,000 lbs.
of biscuit, and that was divided am.ovg 30,000 [SI\Y 23,OOOJ mouths.'
~ 011 Aug. 12, Wellcsley writes from JlLl'Ilicejo to S1Ly tliat the d(lpO~ at
Abrantes is much too large, and tllat some of the flour ought to be sent
back to Sautarem, or even to Lisbon, till only 300,000 rations should /:le
loft.
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stated, ' for me to remain any longer in a country in which no
arrangement has been made for the supply of provisions to the
troops, and in which all the provisions that are either found in
the country or are sent from Seville (as I have been informed
for the use of the British army) are applied solely and exclusively
to the use of the Spanish troops 1.'
The Junta sent Wellesley a letter of high·flown praise for his
doings at. Talavera, a present of horses, and a commission tl:S
Captain-Gencml in their army. But food they did not send in
any sufficient quantities. All the convoys that came up from
Andalusia were made over to Cucsta's army. and the Estrcmu.-
duraIl districts which were supposed to be allotted for the
sustenance of the Dritish had little or nothing to giv:e. 'When
we remember tho.t in June Victor had described this same region
as absolutely exhausted and incapable of furnishing the lst
Corps with even five days' supplies, we shall not wOllder that
Wellesley's troops starved there in August. It was impossible
however to convince the British general that the suffering of
his men were the result of Spanish ~mlr}' rather 'than of
Spanish negligen~ and bad faith. There was much just founda~
tion for his complaints, for the Junta, after so many promises,
had sent him no train from Andalusia. Moreover detachments
and marauding bands from Cuesta's army frequentl}' intercepted
the small supplies of food which British foraging parties were
able to procure 2. When taxed with their misdoings, Cuesta
replied that We1lesley's men had not unfrequently seized and
plundered his own convoys, which was undoubtedly true 3, and that
the British soldiers were enjoying such abundance that he had
been told that some of th.em were actually selling their bread~
ration to the Spaniards because they had no need of it-which
WI\S most (:ertainly false·.
That Wellesley was using no ~xa~ated tenns, when he
I Wellesley to his brother Lord Wellesley, at Seville, Aug. 8.
i See Wellesley to Cuesta from Jaraicejo, Aug. 11.
• Lord MUllIiter (p. 2li1) confesses that' so pre8!ling were our wants that
one of our commissaries took from them (the Spaniards) by force a hundred
bullocks and a hundred mule loads of bread.' Cuesta needs 110 further
justification, But it is clear that his own men wel'6 doing things jlreciscly
'Ilimilar.
• See the above-quoted dispatch to Cuesta of Aug. 11.
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declared that his army was liternlly perishing for want of food,
is proved by the nalTatives of a score of British officers who
were present in the Tala"era campaign 1. That his ultimate
retreat was caused by nothing but the necessity of saving his
men is perfectly clear. The strategical advantage of maintain·
iug the position behind the Almaraz passage was so evident.
and the political disadvantages of withdrawing were so obvious,
that a milD of 'Wellesley's keen insight into the facts of war
must have desired to hold on as long as was possible. Unless
Soult were a<:tually attacking Portugal, Mirabete and Jaraicejo
afforded the best ground that could be se1.ccted for' containing'
and imposing upon the enemy. So long as the British army lay
there it was practically unassailable from the front, while it was
admirably placed for the purpose of making Illl irruptioll into
the midst of the enemy's lines, if he should disperse his corps in
search of food, or detach large forces towards La MUlIcha or
!.wn. 'If I could only have fed,' wrote 'Yellcsley, '1 could,
after some time, have stmck a brilliant blow either upon Soult
at Plasencia, or upon Mortier in the centre 2• It is clear that
by a dash across the Almaraz passage he could have fallen upon
either of these forces, and assailed it with good. hope of success
before it could be succoured by the other. But such a venture
was impossible to an army which had lost one-third of its
cavalry horses from starvation within three weeks, and whose
battalions were brought so low by physical exhaustion that few
of them could be relied upon to march ten miles in a day.
Wellesley declared tha~ having once linked his fortunes to
those of the Spanish army of Estremadura, he had considered
himself bound to co-operate with it as long as was humanly
speaking possible, llnd implicit cn.'<1it may be given to his asser-
tion s. The limit of physical endurance, however, '.I'M reached
1 See especially the remarks of Leach, Goorge Napier, Leith-Hay,
Stothert, and Cooper.
s Wellesl~y to Castlereagh, from Truxillo, Aug. 21, 1609_
I In his dispateh to the Marquis Wellesley, from ilIerida, Aug, 24, he
obserl'es that he had cOllsidered himself in honour bound to continue his
clHllleratiOn unless (1) Soult should invade Portugal, or (2) the Spaniards
should mo,'e off towa.rds another theatre of war, i. e. La l\1aneha, or (3) he
should himself be starved out, as actually happened.
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Oil August 20, the dlly on which he was {inally compelled
to commence his retreat ill the direction of Truxillo and
Dadajoz.
Before that day arrived one event occurred whk-h seemed to
make useful co-operation between the two allied armies more
fensible than it had been at any date since the campaign began.
On the night of August 12-13 Cuesta, whose health had been
steadily growing worse since the injuries that he had receh'oo at
Medellin, was disabled by a paral>,tic stroke which deprived him
of the use of one of his legs: He resigned on the following day,
and was succeeded by his second-ill-command Eguia, an officer
whose conciliatory manners and mild disposition promised to
make communication between the head quarters of the two
allied armies comparatively friendly. Cuesta, after receiving
from the Central Junta a letter of recall couched ill the most
flattering terms, retired to the baths of Alhama. 'When he had
somewhat recovered his strength, he turned his energies to writ~
iug a long vindication of his whole conduct in 1809, and then
eng8.0rJed in a furious controversy with Venegas, concerning the
latter's disobedience of orders in July. Engaged in these harm-
less pursuits he ceased to be a sourec of danger to his eountry.
Unfortunately his removttl from the theatre of war- was not of
such bencfit to the common cause as might have been hoped.
The Junta found ere long a general just as rash and incapable,
if not quite 60 old, to whom to entrust the command of its
largest army. Juan Carlos Arcizaga, the vanquished of Ocnfla,
was entirely worthy to be the spiritual heir of Cuesta's policy.
Eut for the present General Eguia was for some weeks in
charge of the Army of Estremadura. His nrst idea was to
persuade Wellesley to postpone his departure, and to retain his
udvanced position. He urged this request upon his colleague
with morc 7m than tact, and to no good effect. Ey using il~
one of bis dispatches the phrase that other considerations besides .
the want of food must be determining the movements of the
British army 1, he roused Wellesley's wralh. The famine was
I Eguia's unhappy pbr.MlC was ' If notwitllstanding this answer [to tlle
effect tl,at tlle Tru.xillQ lll:lgaZines should be placed ill charge of a Britisll
.«lIumisury] your Excellency should persist in marching your troops into
Portugal,] shall be convinced that other causes, and not only tllewant of
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so real that any insinuation that it was a mere pretext for re-
treat was certainly calculated to wound the general whose troops
were perishing before his eyes. Expressing deep indignation t
Wellesley refused to listen to a proposal that he should divide
with the Estremadurans the stores of food at Truxillo-which·
indeed were hopelessly inadequate for the sustenance of two
arIDICS. Nor would he e\'cn accept an offer made him on
August 20 by Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas, who Cflmc in haste from
the Central Junta, to the effed that he might appropriate the
whole of the maj',>'azine at Truxillo, leaving the Spanish anny
to provide for itself from other resources. The proposal was
probably honest and genuine, but 1IVellesley knew the dilatory
habits of the Junta so well that he was convinced that the
depot made over to him would never be properly replenished,.
alld would soon run dry 2.
Marching thcre(ore by shorl stages, for the exhaustion of his
troops made rapid progress impossible 3, be started from Jaraicejo
011 August 20, and moved by Truxillo and Miajadas to the
valley of the Guadiana, where he cantoncd the army about
subsistence, have iuduccd your ExcelleDc}' to decide on taking such a step.'
[From DeieytoS3, Aug. 19.]
1 'I have had the IlOnour of receiving your Excellency's letter of this
day's date, and I feel much coucerned tllat anything should Itave occurred
to induce your Excellency _to express a doubt of the truth of what I have
written to you. As however your Excellency entertains that doubt, any
further cornspondence between us appears unnecessary. and accordingly
this is the last letter which I shall have the honeur of addressing to you.'
WclleslQy to Eguia, Aug. HI.
S 'It is snid that Don L. de Cah·o promised and enga,lred to supply the
British army, npon Wllicb I bve only to obeerve that I bad already trusted
too long to tlle prolllises of Spanish ageuts, and I had particular reason for
lYant of confidence in Don L. de Calvo. At the moment when be was
assuring me that the British anny should have all the food the CQuntry
could afford, I had in my possession an order from him directing' the
magistrates of Guaualupe to send to the SIl3.lIish Ilead quurters IJro\'isions
which'llo British commiB8l'lry hud llrell3.roo for the magazine at Truxillo:
Oct. 30, to i\larquis Wellealey.
a < I bave no provisions, no horses, no means of transport, I am Ol-erloaded
with sick; the horsei of the cavalry are scarcely able to march, or those
of the artillery to draw their guns. The officers and soldiers alike are
worn down by want of food and privations of every description.' WelIeslcy
to Martjuis WclJesley, Miajadas, Aug. 22.
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Meridn., MOlltijo, and BadajOl:. The British head quarters were
fixed at the last·named place from September 3 till Decem-
ber 27,"1809, and, excepting for some small changes in detail,
the army retained t.he position which it had now tnken up for
IlCllrly four months. In the fertile region along the Guadillna
the troops were fed without much trouble: but they did not
recover the health that they had lost in the time of starvation
among the barren hills behind Arwbispo and Mirabete. In
spite of the junction of reinforcements and the return.of con-
valescents to the ranks. the army could never show more than
from 23,000 to 25,000 men under arms during the autumn
month.s. When the rainy se&SOll began, the intermittent ague
which was known to the British as 'Guadiana fever' was never
absent: it did not often kill, but it disabled men by the thou-
sand, and it was not till Wellesley moved back into Portugal
at midwinter that the regiments recovered their nonnal health.
If he had been free to follow his personal inclination, it is
probable that Wellesley would have moved back into Portugal
in September. But strategical and political reasons made this
impossible. While based on Badajoz he still threatened the
French hold on the valley of the Tagus, and compelled the
King to keep two army corps at least in his front. Since
it was always possible that he might return to Almaraz and
threaten Madrid, a containing force had to be told off against
him. He was also in a position from which he could easily sally
out to check raids upon Portugal: from Badnjoz he could either
join Beresford in a few marches, or fall by Alcantara upon the
flank of any detachment that Soult might lead forward in the
direction of Castello Branco and Abrantcs. He was convinced
that no such raids would be made, but their possibility had to
be taken into consideration, and while lying· in his present
cantonments he was well placed for frustrating them. But
political considerations were even more powerful than military
collsiderations in chaining him to Badajoz. The Junta at Seville
were most anxious to keep the British anny in their front:
they were COlwinced that, if it retired on PorlugaJ, Joseph Ilnd
Soult would at once organize an invasion of Andalusia, and
they were well aware that Eguia and Venegas would not suffice
to hold back the 70,000 men who might then be directed aga.i~lst
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them. In the dispatches which the Marquis '''cHesley (who
had superseded Frere at Seville on August 11) kept sending to
his brother, the main fact conveyed was the absolute despair
with which the Spanish Government vie-wed the prospect of the
removal of their allies towards Portugal. 'Don, Martin de
Gamy [the secretary to the Junta] decla.rt.>d to me with ex·
pressiolis of the deepest sorrow and terror '-wrote the Marquis
on August 22-' that if your army should quit Spain, at this
critical.moment, inevitable and immediate ruin must ensue to
hisgovcrnmellt., to whatever provim.'Csremain unde-rits authority,
to the cause of Spain itself, and to every interest connected with
the alliance so happily established between Great Britain and
the Spanish nation.... No argument produced the effect of
diminishing the urgeney of his entreaties, and I have ascertained
that his scnS/l.tions are in no degree more powerful than those
of the Government and of every description of people \\;thin
this city and its vicinity.... Viewing the painful consequences
that would follow )'our retreat into Portugal, 1 feel it my duty
to submit to your consideration the possibility of adopting some
intermediate plan, which may have some of the advantages of
retreat into Portugal, without occasioning alarm in Spain, and
so endangering the foundations of the alliance between that
country and Great Britain I.'
A stay at Badajoz was obviously the only' intermediate plan'
that was worth taking into consideration; and considering the
urgency of his brother's representatiolls \Vellesley could not
refuse to halt within the Spanish border. The military admn-
tages of the position that he had now taken up were uot incon·
siderable, and no profit that could have been got by returning
into Portugal .could have countcrbalanced the loss of the
Spanish alliance. In the valley of the Central Guadialla, there-
fore, the British army remained cantoned. But no argutllcllt,c;
that the Junta could producc Rvailcd to persuade Wellcslcy to
engage in another campaign with a Spanish colleague at his
side. Not even when the tempting offer was made that Albll-
qllerque should be given command of half of the Estremaduran
army, and pluccd under his orders, would he conscnt to pledge
himself to off'ensi ve operations.
I Lord Wellesley to Sir Arthur Wellesley, Seville, Aug. 22.
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Meanwhile, dispatches had arrived from England, containing
the official news that the Austrian War was at an cnd: rumours
to that effect had already ~ached the British camps from French
!Wurccs Wore 'Vellcsley left Oropcsa t. The whole character
of the contincnW struggle was changed by the fact that the
Emperor had once more the power to send reinforcements to
Spain, or even to go there himself. The situation required
further consideration, and the British Government resolved to
place upon Wellesley's shoulders the all-important tusk of
deciding whether the stmggle in the Peninsula could still be
maintAined, and how (in the event of his giving an affirmative
answer) it could best be carried on '. He replied that in the
existing slate of affairs, and considering the bad state of the
Spanish armies, neither 30,000 nor even 40,000 British troops
would suffice to maintain' Andalusia against the unlimited
numbers of French whom the Emperor could now send across
the Pyrenees. But he held that Portugal might be defended
with success, if the Portuguese army and militia could be com-
1 Tbe Armistice of Znaim Wall signed July 12. The Falmoutb packet
with the news reached Lisbon only on Aug. 9. Yet Welles1ey had heard
rumours ofpeaee as early as Aug." [WelJ. Dilp. iv. 560].
, Canning to Lord Wellesley, London, Aug. 12: 'The question which
first arises is whether the state of thingg in Spain be such as that a British
anny of 30,000 men, acting in co-operation with the Spanish a.rmies, could
be reasonably expected either to effect the delivcrnnee of the whole
Peninsula, or to make he&d against tIle augmented foree whieh Th:mapnrll:!
may now be enabled to direct agaillilt that country. Upon this qUestiOll
your Excellency will re«ive the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley, to whom a
copy of this dispatch is transmitted. If the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley
shall be that, with 80 limited a force as 30,000 men, offensive operatiolls in
Spain could not prudently be attempted, and if he shall conceive that the
utmost object to which such an army would be adequate is the defence of
Portugal, your Excellency will thCIl only have to state to thc Spo.nish
GO\'cmmCllt the llature of the instructions uuder Wllich Sir A. \i'clles1ey
now acts...•. If on the other hand Sir A. Wellesley 8110.11 entertain the
opinion that with an effective British army of 30,000, combined with the
Spanish and Portuguese anniefl, it might be possible either to expel the
French from Spain, or to resist even their augmellted force ",ith a reason-
able prospect of success •.. your Excellency will then also recei\'e the
opinion of Sir A. Welles1eyas to the conditions necessary to be obtained
from the Spanil;h Govemment, all a preliminary to entering on any con-
certeil system of joint military operations.'
01lAN. II JI r
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pleted to their full strength, and the country well organized for
resistance. It was probable that th~ borders of Portugal could
not be maintained; •the whole country is frontier, and it would
be difficult to pre\'ent the enemy fr0!Yl penetrating by some
point or other.' He would have therefore 'to confine himself
to preserving what is most important,-the capital: But this
he was prepared to undertake, and strongly advised the ministry
to make no attempt to defend both Andalusia and Portugal,
but to leave the Junta to their O\~ vain devices, and to make
sure of Lisbon 1.
Thus, in September ]809 Wellesley enunciated with great
clearness the polic)' that he was about to employ in the next
year. The lines of Ton-es Vedras are already hovering before
his imagination, and after a flying visit to Lisbon in October
they took definite shape in his 'Memorandum for Colonel
1'1etcher' of the b'entieth of that month, In that document
the whole project for defending the Portuguese capital by a series
of concentric fortifications is set forth, and the modifications
which it afterwards suffered were ouly in matters of detail. In
short the Lines which were to cheek Massena had been thought
out in the British general's provident mind exactly twelve
months before the French army appeared in front of them.
In following the fortunes of ""Vellesley we have now got far
beyond the point to which we have conducted the general history
'oftheTala\;era campaign. It is time to turn back to the move-
ments of Soult and King Josepb, and to explain the reasons which
made it possible for the British army to remain unmolested at
JaraicE;jo and Mirabete till August 20, and then to retire to
Merida and Badajoz without imperilling tIle safety of their
EsLremadul1ln allies.
The King, as we have already seen, had made up his mind
that the all-important point, at this stage of the campaign, was
to make an end of the anny of Venegas, and to relieve Madrid
, I For Wellesley's answer to Canning see bis reply to bis brother on
8ept. 5, containing his < Observation on Mr. Secretary Canning'8 Dispatch
of Aug. 12,' combined with tbe reference to his own dispatch of Aug, 24,
wbich (118 110 writes to Castlcreagll on Sept. 4) (gin:s the g01'cnJUlont II\}'
opinion upon all the points referred to in Mr. Canning'8 dispatches.' The
quotation above comes from thiB.last-named document of Ang, 24.
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from danger. Hc had therefore called Victor towards Toledo, and
directed Mortier to relicyc the divisions of the Ist Corps which
lay at Tala....era with troops from the 5th Corps. The result of
this movement was to leave Soult too weak to undertake allY
important operations against Portugal. For Morlicr's men,
being strung Qut on the long line from Talavera to Naval Moral,
with both "Vclleslev's and Cucsta.'s armies in their front, could
not be relied upon to lend aid for an advance on cMtello Branco
or Abrantes. The Duke of Dalmatia therefore, wben he had
reached Plasencia, could dispose of nothing but his own 2nd Corp~
and Lahoussaye's four regiments ofdragoons. He dared not march
on Portugal with no more than !i!O,OOO men, when the allies had.
it in their power to fall upon Mortier the moment that his back
was turned. ACl.'ordingly he waited at Plasencia, sending out
cavalry to Coria and Torejoncillo, but did nothing more. Mean-
while Beresford and the two British brigades from Lisbon were
drawing ncar him, and on August 16 the Portuguese cavalry,
advancing from the pass of Pe'rales and Moraleja, drove out the
two French squadrons which were occupying Coria, and thus
wttrncU Soult that a new army was coming into play 8{,'1linst
him. Two days later Bcresford had tmnsfcrred himself to the
Castcllo Brnnco road, and a force of 923,000 lllcn had been thrown
bcbl'l,'Cn the 92nd Corps und thc Portuguese fl"Untier.
Meanwhile the King had met with unexpected good fortulle
in his attack on Vcnegas. On August 5 he had set out from
Valdcmoro with the inrention ofattncking the army ofLa Mancha
in iLs position at Aranjuez. It seemed unlikely that he would find
it there, for Vcnegas had displayed such excessive Cl\ution ill his
advance from the Sierra Morena to the Tagus, and had so tamely
refused to tnke his opportuni'ty of pouncing upon Madrid, that
it seemed probable that he would retreat at the first sign of the
King's approoch. But rushing to the opposite extreme of con-
duct, the Spanish general was now ready to court destruction.
He had received on the preceding night, that of Augnst 4,
Cuesta's disputeh of the third, informing him that Soult had
crossed the mountains and that both the British and the Estrema-
dUTlln armies were quitting Talavera. The Captain-General
warned him that he might expect an attack from the King's
army, and ordered him to avoid an action, and to fall back
nr2
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towards the Despena Perms if he were pressed. Serenely putting
aside the orders of ClICSto., Venegas refused to retreat, and an-
nounced that he should not copy the conduct of a superior who
had fled even before the enemy was in sight. He announced
his intention of fighting, and directed his army to concentrate
in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez. Of his five divisions, three
were holding that town when the Frcncll came in sight; the
other two were Llchcloned between Amnjucz and Tcmbleque,
appllrcntIy in order to wl1tch the roads from Toledo and Afiover.
The enemy might, as Vencf,J'tUl saw, turn his flank either by
crossing the bridges of the former place, or by passing the easy
ford at the latter. A detachment of 800 men had been left to
watch the debouches from Toledo, and a couple of battalions
observed the ford of Afiover.
King Joseph meanwhile, marching with a force composed of
Scbastiani's corps, the Central Reserve, und MiIhaud's division
of dragoons, arrivt.>d in front of Arnlljuez all AugUilt 5. Scbas-
tiani, whose troop~ led the advance, drove in the Spanish out-
posts, who retired across the T~fJ'llS and broke the town bridge
behind them. But beyond the river the greater part of the
army of Lu. ManCM was visible in battle order, prepared to
receive the attack: Venegns himself, however, chanct.'<1 to be
absent at the moment, as he had ridden over that moruing
to visit his left wing, and General Giron was in temporary
charge of the defence. Sebastiaui risked an attack on the
Spanish position, which WI\S accessible by means of two fords.
But finding that the enemy was in great force and stood I1rm,
he drew off his men after a sharp skirmish.
King J oseph now determined pot to press the attack on
Aranjuez and its fords, but to cross the Tagus at points where
he could secure a less difficult passage. He countermarched
Sebastiani's corps to the bridge of Toledo, and gave Milhaud
orders to force the ford of Anover. This manceune cost him
three days; it was only on the evening of August 8 that he
succeeded in concentrating his main body at Toledo. On the
following morning Sebastiani passed the bridges and dro\'e off
the Spanish detachment that was observing them: it fell back
on a larger force, and the 4th Corps pressing its advance, came
into contact with a whole hostile division.
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Venegas had not failed to guess the plan which the King
would adopt, and had moved off from Aranjue7. towards Toledo.,
by roads parallel to those which the French had employed.
His 5th division, 4,000 bayonets, under Major-General Zerain,
was in front, and thus was the first to meet. Sebastiani's attack.
It was driven in after a sharp skirmish, and retired a few miles
to the small town of Almonacid, on the high-road to Mora and
Madridejos. On the same evening Milhaud's dragoons assailed
the ford of Aflover, drove off the small force that was guarding
it, and fell into line on Sebastiani's left Rank. On the next
morning Venegas camc up with his remaining four divisions,
those of Lacy, Vigodet, Giron, and Castejon, and joined Zerain
at Almonacid. Thus boU:. sides were concentrated for battle,
save that Joseph and his reserves, owing to the delay caused
by a defile over the naITO~' bridge of Toledo, were some ten
miles to the rear of Sebastiani. The Spanish army, after the
deduction of men in hospital or detached, amounted to about
23,000 men, of whom ncarly 3,000 wcre horse: it had forty
guns. The King and Scbustiani had some ~l,OOO sabres and
bayonets, but of these nearly 4,000 were cavalry, so t.hat the
French army enjoyed its usual prepondel'llnce ill that arm, in
numbers 110 less than in efficiency, Two of its infantry divisions,
those of Leval and Sebastiani, had suffered heavily at Tlllavcra:
the rest of the illfantry-Valence's Poles and the King's guards
and reserves-had not been engaged in that battle; all the
cavalry WIiS equally intact I,
Both armies were prepared to fight: King J oseph had rcsol ved
that. Madrid would never be safe till the army of La Mancha.
had been beaten. Venegas was eager to meet him: he had
persuaded himself that the French troops which had passed the
bridge of Toledo did not amount to more than 14,000 men, and
hoped for an easy victory. He held n council of war on the
night of the tenth, and found llis subordinates M ready to fight
as himself, They determined to attack Sebastilllli on the dawn
I The French forceat Almonacid stood 38follows :--4thCorps; Sebastiani's
division 6,000 men, Valence's 4,000, Leval's 3,000, and corps-cavalry
(Merlin) 1,000. lIIilhaud's dragoons had 2,200men present; the King had
brouglit up 600 horse and about 4,800 foot of his gllill'ds and of Dessolles'
division. The total therefore was about 3,800 cavalry and 17,800 foot.
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of August 12, and the Comnumdcr-in-chief· exclaimed with
exultation that, whatever other Spanish officers might do, he at
least would never carn the nicknil.lne of El General RetiradaH 1•
The French, however, anticipated Venegas, for on the morn-
ing of August 11, at half-past five o'clock, Sebastiani presented
himself in front of the Spanish position and opened a furious
attack, without waiting for the arrivnl of King Joseph and the
reserve. The army of La l\1ancba had therefore to fight
a defensive engagemcnt, and ncver got the chance of carrying
out the ambitious designs of its chief.
The battlefield of Almonacid bears astrong resemblance to
that of Udes, where Venegas six months before had made such
a deplomble debut ill the character of a 'fighting general.' As
at Ucles, the Spanish army wtU! arrayed on Il series of cmillCllces
on each side of a small town, with t\ long nrmy of infantry and
b'Uns in its (,,'elltre, and thc (,,·tl\'ahy on the wings. As if to
emphasize the resemblance, Venegas committed his old fault of
keeping no adequate reserve in hand, and distributed his whole
force in one thin line, with no more than four battalions and
two cavalry regiments drawn up in support to the rear of the
centre! The only points in which there was a marked difference
between Udes and Almonacid was that on the latter field the
eminence on the Spanish left-a hill called Los Cerrojones-
was so much higher than the rest of the ground that it formed
the key of the position, just as the Cerro de Medellin had done
at Talavera. Moreover, there was a long hill behind Almonacid
-the Cerro del CastiUo-which gave an admirable rallying-
point for the army if it should be forced out of its first fighting-
ground.
The main line of the Spanish order of battle was formed,
counting from right to left; by the divisions of Vigodet (no. 2),
Castejon (no. 4), Zerain (no. ~), and Lacy (no. n with a brigade
of the division of Giron (no. S) continuing the arrn.y 011 to the
Ccrrojones. 'l'he second brigade of Giron formed the sole
I This remark I find in theuarrati\'eofGeneralBouligni, the commanding
officer of engineers in the Armyof La Mancha [Arteche, vi. 370]. Vellegas
was aiming his sueer at Castaiios aud at La Romans, who had got the
uickname of 'Marquis de la llomeria' from his perpetual strtJ.tegical
movements to the rear.
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resene; it was drawn up on the Cerro del Castillo, where the
ruins of the mediaeval fort that gave the hill its name were
turned to account as a place of strength. It had two cavalry
regiments in its rear: the rest of the troops of that arm were
distributed between the two flanks. .
When Sebastiani came upon the field he fell upon the Spanish
line without a moment's hesitation. ' Apparently he thought
that delay would only give the enemy time to rearrange his
troops and strengthen his weak points. At any rate he did not
wait for the arrival of the King and the reserve, but attacked at
once. It was the same fault that Victqr had committed at
'l'alavera, but Sebastiani was not destined to receive the condign
punishment that befell the Duke of Belluno. Noting that the
steep hill on the Spanish left was the key of the position,he resolved
to storm it before attacking the rest of the hostile line. Accord-
ingly he threw out Milhaud's dl'ao""Oons and his own French
division to •contain' the Spanish centre and right, while Leval'!!
Germans and Valence's Poles were directed to assail the
Cerrojones. The fonner division turned the flank of the hill,
while the latter attacked it in front.
The Spanish brigade on the hill made a stubborn resistance,
and even held back the Poles till its flank was turned by the
Germans. Venegas sent to its aid his miserably inadequate
reserve under Giron, and some battalions drawn from the first
division. But these troops came too late, the Cerrojones were
lost, and the reinforcements only succeeded in cheeking the
French advance behind the hill, on the slopes between it and
Almonacid. The key of the position was thus in Sebastiani's
hands, and, seeing the Spanish centre outflanked, he let loose
upon it his French division. which drove in Lacy and Zerain,
and captured the town of Almonacid and three guns. Venegas
was thus forced to draw hick his whole line, and re-formed it
all the Cerro del Castillo, which lay behind his original position.
The troops were much disordered by this retrograde movement,
yet made a very creditable effort to maintain their new ground.
But King Joseph and the reserve had now come on the field,
and Dessolles' troops were thrown into the front line to aid the
infantry of the 4th Corps. After a stubborn fight the Spanish
left and centre again broke, and Venegas was only able to save
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them from complete destruction by bringing up Vigodet's
division, which was almost intact, and throwing it in the way of
the advancing enemy. It held out long enough to allow the
main body to escap~ and then followed its comrades in retreat
down the high-road to Mora and Madridejos. The French
cavalry was let loose in pursuit, but does not seem to have been
so successful in its work as had been the CiL'le at Udes and
l\fedellin. At any rate the hulk of the Spaniards escaped in
more or less order, and only the stragglers were cut up.
The losses of Venegas's army would appear to have been about
800 killed and 2,500 wounded 1, besides a considerable number
of prisoners-perhaps ~,OOO in all, for Sebastiani's dispatch
gh'ing the figure of 4,000 cannot be trnsted. The army of
La Mancha had also lost twenty-one of its forty guns, all iUi
baggage and several standards. Still the defeat was far le611
crushing than Medellin had been, and the whole army wa.~
rallied at the passes with no great difficulty. It had fought
very creditably, as is sufficiently vouched for by the fact that
Sebastiani acknowledged a loss of 319 killed and ~,075 wounded.
The Polish division in especial had suffered very severely while
storming the Cerrojones at the opening of the combat.
Thus ended the part taken by the Army of La Mancha in the
Talavera campaign. No words are too strong to use in condemna-
tion of Venegas's conduct After wrecking the plan of campaign
drawn up by Wel1esley and Cuesta by his criminal slackness and
timidity in July, he then proceeded to the extreme of culpable
rashness. He had ample time to retire to the South, when his
position was compromised by the departure of the British and
Estremaduran armies from Talavera. Instead of doing so he
remained behind, and courted aD ullllecelSllry battle, in which
his unskilful dispositions secured the defeat of an army which
tried to do its dut), and defended itself far better than could
have been e.'l:pected. He should have been court-martialled and
shot for his repeated and impudent disobedience of Cuesta's
orders. But the Junta, conscious that they were themselves to
blame for giving him secret directions which clashed with those
of the Commander-in-chief, spared him, and only remove4 him
I But see General Arteche's calculation in vi. 302 of his GumYJ de
kJ bldependencia.
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from ~mmand some weeks later, in order to replace him by
Areizaga, an officer of exactly the same level of merit and
intelligence.
After his-or rather Sebastiani'5~victoryat Almonacid King
Joseph established the 4th Corps in cantonments around Toledo
and Aranjue'J''t and sent Victor and the 16t Corps into La Mancba
to observe the passes and to contain the wrecks of Venegas'sarmy.
He returned himself with his guards and the reserve to Madrid
on August 15, celebrated a Te.Deuln, and published an extraM
vagant account of his own achievemenbl, in which he claimed to
have discomfited the attempt of l~O,OOO enemies (there were
but BO,OOO at the most liberal estimate) with the aid of 40,000
invincible French troops. The co-operation of Soult's 50,000
men was consigned to oblivion in this ('},.-traordinary document.
The moment that he heard of the defeat of Venega.s, Soult
wrote to the King, renewing the demand which he had made
ten days before for permission to invade Portugal. Now that
the army of La Mancha had been disposed of, he considered
that Victor might come back to Talavera and Almaraz, so as to
set free Mortier and the 5th Corps for the attack on Portugal.
He alw suggested that Ney, having put things right at
Salamanca, might now be recalled to the valley of the Tagus, and
rejoin the fllld and 5th Corps. He supported his demands by
an unfounded assertion that WeUesley was on his march to
unite with Beresford by way of Alcantara, and asked for leave
to attack the latter before the main Britigh army should have
joined him. In a few days more, he said, it would be too late
to move, for Beresford and Wellesley would have concentrated
their forces, so that he would have 45,000 Anglo-Portuguese in
his front t.
Joseph refused to listen to these arguments, and had fair
reasons to show for his negative reply to the Marghal's requests.
Wellesley, as he truly remarked, was not marching for Alcantara
to join Bercsford: he was still at J araicejo in close touch with
the Estremaduran army. If Mortier were removed to the
Portuguese border, We1lesley and Eguia might descend upon
Victor and cmsh him. It was impossible to leave less than two
corps to defelld the Middle Tagus. As for Ne>', he could not
I Soult to Joseph, Aug. ID, from Plaseocia..
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quit Leon, for Del Parque and the Galicians were concentrating
in great force upon his front. Indeed, he had just written to
request that the 2nd Corps might be moved up to Salamanca
to support him 1. It was not now the time to engage in further
offensive operations either against llortugal or against Anda-
lusia. The troops were exhausted; the hospital of Madrid con-
tained at the moment 12,000 sick and wounded, the cavalry
was so distressed by incessant work that few regiments could
put 250 men in line. The transport was worn out, and new
horses and mules were impossible to procure, for the King had
no money with which to purchase them. Finally, and this was
the most conclusive point of all, orPers had been received from
the Emperor countermanding all active operations till the hot
season should be over 2. It was impossible to SAy what his in-
tentions might be, now that he was freed from the Austrian
War. He might come himself to Spain, or he might send large
reinforcements to the King. In any case it would be impossible
to move till his will was known and his mind made up 3.
These arguments were conclusive, and Soult was forced to
remain quiescent: all that he could do was to push small parties
to Zarza and Coria when Heresford had evacuated those places.
Thus the Talavera campaign came to an end. There was
now a long pause in the movements both of the allies and of
the French. The subsequent fighting in October ~Ol1gs to a
totally independent series of operations. The combatants who
had been engaged in July and August rested in September:
Soult was left at Plasencia, Mortier at Talavera. and Naval
Moral, Ney at Salamanca; Victor's head quarters were at Day-
mie! in La ~Iancha, Sebastiani lay along the Tagus from
Aranjuez to Toledo. Of the allied troops Wcllesley's army
was cantoncd about Badajoz and Merida. The Estremadurans
under Eguia CO\"Cl'ed the pllS&1ges of the Tugus from De1eytosn,
Jaraiccjo, and Truxillo: Venegas was reorganizing his depleted
corps at his old quarters in the passes by La. Carolina. Beres-
ford was observing Soult from Castello BmDco, and lastly, the
Galieians w~re moving down by divisions to join Del Parque's
t Noy to Jourdan, froOl Salamanca, Aug. 22.
I See JoseplJ to Clarke, Aug. 22, and Napoleon to Clarke, &pt. 7.
I Fora presentmentofJoseph's case seeChapter xii, ofJouroau'aMcmoim.
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forces at Ciudad Rodrigo, where a fonnidable army was now
beginning to be collected.
The Talavera campaign, in short, had settled nothing. The
attempt of the allies to capture Madrid had failed, but the
attempt of the French to surround Wellesley and Cuesta by
Soult's flank march had failed also, Looking to the net results
of all the fighting since May, it could be said that the balance
of loss stood against the French. They had abandoned Galicia
and the Asturias, as \vell as their precarious hold on Northern
Portugal. They had gained nothing, save that their forces
were concentrated in a good central position, instead of being
scattered from Corunna and Oporia as far as Merida and
Manzanares. The next move was in the hands of the Emperor:
it remained to be seen how he would deal with the situation in
the Peninsula, now that he, at last, had time to study it in detail.
Before passing on to the new series of .operations which took·
place in the late autumn, one minor side-issue of the Talavera
campaign remains to be narrated-the fate of the small roving
column of 4,000 Spaniards and Portuguese under Sil' Robert
Wilson, which had been threatening Madrid in the King's
absence, and which had caused so many misgivings in the mind
of Marshal Victor. ·Wilson's doings were to give one more
proof of his e.xtraordinary resourcefulness and vigour, if any
further evidence were needed after his masterly handling of
Lapisse in the spring. It will be remembered that on August 4
he had slipped away from Escalolla, on hearing from Wellesley
that Soult had descended upon Plasencia. He intended to join
the main army at Talavera, but on nearing that place discovered
that it had already been evacuated, and that both the British
and the Estremaduran armies had disappeared in the direction"
of Oropesa. Accordingly he directed his steps to the westward,
hoping to mertake Wellesley on his march. On his way, how·
ever, he was caught up by Villatte's division of Victor's corps,
which had been vainly hunting for him at Nombella and Esca-
Iona since the fifth. Thrown out of his path by this force,
Wilson turned up into the mou,n~ains, intending to escape by
the northern bank of the Tietar. He soon learnt, however, from
the peasantry that Soult had sent a brigade under Foy to look
for him in the Vera of Plasencia, and that Hugo, the governor
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of Avila, had come down to hold against him the passes of
Arenas and MOllbeltran. Thus ringed around with foes, he
did not lose his nerve, but tUl1ling up iuto the Sierra de Gredos,
by a mule-path that lends from Aldea Nueva to the upper
valley of the AlagOll, escaped in the direction of Bcjar. From
thence he intended to strike across towards Portugal. But
a new enemy now came upon him: he had evaded Villatte and
Fay only to run into the arms of Ney, who on this day [August
l~] was preparing to cross the Puerto de Bailos on his way
to Salamanca. There was still time to escape from the Mar-
shal's front and to retire to Ciudad Rodrigo unmolested. But
Wilson saw the rocky defile of the Puerto in front of him, and
could not resist the temptation of holding it against the enemy,
though he was well aware that with a force of less than 4,000
men, destitute of artillery, he could not seriously hope to repulse
a wbole army corps. Nevertheless he offered battle in the pass,
and fought a running fight for nine hours against Ney's van-
guard, defendillgtbree successive positions, from each of which he
had to be expelled. In his last stand he held on too long, and
allowed the enemy to close. His four battalions were all
broken, and fled over the hills to Miranda de Castanar, where
they rallied on the next day. The :Marshal acknowledged in
his dispatch to King Joseph a loss of five officers and thirty
men killed, and ten officers and 140 men wounded, which shows
that he had been forced to fight hard to clear the pass. He
claimed to have' destroyed' 'Vilson's detachment., and declared
that 1,~OO Spaniards and Portuguese had fallen. But Wilson's
returns show that his total loss, killed, wounded, and missing,
was under 400, among whom there was not a single field
officer or captain. Having assuHged his thirst for a fight by
this gallant, jf unnecessary, engagement, Wilson escaped to the
Pass of Pcrales, and finally reached Castello Branco on August
fl4, where he fell in with Beresford, und was ut last ill safety,
after his many wanderings among the summits of the Sierra de
Grcdos and the Sierra de Gata. This hazardous mtl.I'Ch was
his ltlSt achievement in the Peninsula; after a hitter quarrel
with Deresford concerning the status of his Lusitanian Legion
in the Portuguese army, he sailed for England in October, and
never returned to Portugal.
APPENDICES
I
THE 'ARMY OF THE CENTRE: JAN. 11, J809
[N.R-From the Tables in -t\rteche, '101. v.]
The Battalions which fought at Ucles are indicated by a star '.
Vanguard Division, Major-Gencral Duke of AlbUllllcrque :
(;oro03 (1st lInd 3rd OO11.!l.) 415, 'Murcia. 6,';2, 'Cautabria (1st
batt.) 315, "Provincial of Jaell 342, 'Prol"incial of Chinchilla
3<54, 'Voluntarioa CamIanes 499, 'Cazadores de Barbastro 221,
'Campo :Mayor 4.G5, Tiradores de Gastilla 6GG = 3,929
1st Division, Lieut.-General Marquis de Coupigny :
Reyna (1st and 3rd batts.) 494, ·Africa (1st and Ord batu.) 771,
".Burg08 (1st and 3rd batt!!.) .519, 1st of Seville 193, '3rd of
Seville 106, Provincial of Granada 176, Provincial of Bujalanee
101, .. Proviullial of Cuenca 626, Provincial of Ciudad Real 268,
Provincial of Plasencia 180, Voltmtarios do Valencia 327,
·Navas de Tolosa. 542, 'Tiradores de Cadiz B18 li,121
2nd Division, Major-General Conde de Orgaor; :
·Ordenes Militares (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.) 848, "4th of Seville
224, 6th of Seville 304, 1st Voluntarios de Madrid63ll, Provin-
cial de wn 4lH, Provincial de Logroi1o 26.5, ·Provincial de
Toro 265, PrO\i.ncial de VaUadolid 378, • BayIen 472, TIradores
de £Spafia 407, *Voluntario3 de Carmona 466, Voluntarios de
Ledesma 4!.l7 0= 6,288
Reserve, Lieut.-General La Pcfis :
Sllan;sh Guards (1st and 2nd batts.) 1,217, *Walloon Guards (1st
batt.) 420, "Granadcros Proviuciales de Andalucia 522, *Irlanda
(1st batt.) 377, Granaderos del General 324, Provincial de
Cordova 022, Provincial de Guadix 391, Provincial de
Lorca 417 . 4,295
CAVALRY.
~.Reyna 276, ·Principe 141, *Borbon 1W, *Espaiia 342, *Santiago
74, ·'rejas 131, ·Pavia 428, "Lusitania lIS8, *Drogoues de
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Castilla 1205, Farnesio?, Montesa?, Calatr3va?, Sagunto?,
Alcautara? . = 1,814
Estimating the 6 regiments withont returns at 1,000 sabres, we get
2,814 in all.
ARTILLERY 386. ·SAPPERS 383.
Total of the Army, 21,216.
Of these the following, with 0. strength of 11,.500 men, were present at
Ucles,
Of the Vanguard 21848 Brought forward 9,203
" Ist Division 2,804 Cavalry. 1,814
" 2nd ., 1,917 Sappers. 383
,J Reserve 1,634 Artillery 100
Carry forward '9,203 Total 1l,600
There is a discrepanc)' between this total and the numbers borne in the
battalions above. It is caused by the fact that Irlanda, Ordeues Militares,
and Tirad?res de Cadiz were not complete OD the battle-morning, but had
companies detached.
II
THE GARRISON OF SARAGOSSA
[From the return of Jan. 1, 1809, given by Ibieca, corrected by reference
to Arteche iI'. 550-1, and the Coude de Clonard, ii. 284-93.1
INFANTRY.
1st DIVISION, Brigadier-General F. BUTRON:
P.wmt Prtlftllt
. tA,,, WIder G"" ,wk,
Total. 01"1114. Total. ,_.
Walloon Guards. 630 450 Brought forward ',335 4,672
F.:stremadu~. '10 300 Batallon de 'J"orrero 720 ..5
: Granaderos d,
"
lie Ca.lat&--
l'alafox. 1,OM 752 YUlI • . . 00' 881
Fnsileros d,l 1st l..igero de Zam- .
Reyno . 1,571 1,291 goza . 680 stl6
Don CarIos 1,014 ,.. 2nd Ligero de Zam-
BatalloD del Car· goza . G66 64'
men. 771 .661 1st Cazadores Cab.-
Datallou d,l lanes 625, ...,
Po:rtillo. ... '04 2nd Voluntari09 de
Carry forward .,335 4,672 Aragon. ],200 1,060
--
Divisional. ToW 11,]93 8,675
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2nd DJ\'ISIONJ Drigadier-Gclleral D. FIIIAI.um:
Spanish Guards. 898 076 Brougllt forward . 3,03.') 2,372
2nd of Valencia . 954 726 CazailoresdeFernalldo
1st Volunteers of VU (AragOllese). . Ma 345
Aragon .. 1,183 970
Carry fonvanl 3,035 2,372
Divisional Total 3,680 2,717
3rd DIV1l\ION, Drigadier-Gcncral JOSE MANSO:
PClla8deSanPedro ,.. NI Brought forward 2,970 1,786
1st of Huesca . 1,2'74 973 1st of Murein 1,272 631
Florida Dlanca 36' 229 ',d 1,169 477
"1st Tiradores de 3,d 1,098 438
"Murein . 760 343 Sui'ws de Aragou 400 001
Carry forward 2,970 1,736
Divisional Total 6,006 3,6!)3
4th Dn'lSlol', Major-General F. ST. MARCH:
Voluu"tarios de Brought forward
Borboll . 436 317 Cazadores de Fern-
Vohwtarios de audo VU (Valen-
Castilla , 542 292 cians)..
Volulltarios de Segorbc . .
Chelva . 769 529 Soria [Militia]
Voluntarios de 1st of Alicaute
TlITia 903 483 5th of Murein
2nd Tiradores de
Carry forward 2,070 1,621 l\1uroia.,...
Divisional Total
RocA'S DIVISION of the t Army of the Centre':
1st of Savoia.. 347 105 Drought forward
Orihuela . .. 731 315 Muroia [Militia)
1st CM..adores de America • •
Valencia.. 605 275 A\'ila [Militia)
Carry forward 1,583 695
2,670 1,621
394 100
412 313
172 130
730 309
1,040 423
131 91
--5,459 3,077
1,583 696
633 426
, 148
, 277
Total 2,216 1,546
Details from RcgimenU! of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Divisions of the
<Army of the Centre': viz.:-
Ca:rmOlla, Guadix [!\Hlitia), VOIUIlt..riOS de Madrid, Oldelle8
Militares, Toro (Militia) Africa, Durgos (Militia) Kavas de
ToloSa, Darlell, 5th of Seville, Campo l\taror, Cadiz, Cuenca,
Tiradores lie Cartagena, 1st of Valencia-all small fragments
of regiments which had fought at Tudela in the left wing, but
had taken refuge in SaragOSSA: the uumbers vary from 200
to tell mell . Total, perhaps 1,200
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Iter, NUmllUcio., J.'ucnsauta, H usares de Pata-fox, Cazadores de
Feruando VII, H usarell de Aragon. Witll fragments of tlll~
followiug regimentil of the' Army of the Centre': Borbou,
Lusit.a.nia, Oliv811za, Pavia, Reyua, Santiago, 'rejas
. Gross Total sabres, alxllIt 2,000
ARTILLERY about 1,000
ENGINEERS.
Zapallores de Aragou, ditto de Valencia, ditto de Calatayud 800
TOTALS.
Ejfectivu
GI'<!U. Pre.tent.
27,227 18,162
2,000 1,600
1,800 1,000
BOO 700
4,191 2,146
36,010 24,808
It is impossible to state the
Infantry of the four Aragoneso Divisions.
Cavalry •
Artillery.
" ..ugmeers I'.' • •
Details of the :Army of the Centre
All these are regularly organized corps.
figures of the irregulars with any certainty.
N.ll.-Ibieca errs in including Do}'le, La Reunion, Fieles Zaragozanos
and 3rd of Valencia in the Garrison, they were detached in Aragon, the
tint at Jaca, the two next with the Marquis of Uuall. See tllC tables Oil
pp. 284--293 of vol. vi. of the COlld,e de ClOllaw's great work.
III
STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN,
FEBRUARY 1, 1809
N.B,-This return iucludes effective men, priStllU sOru tu aNlIU, only,
110t sick or detached.
lat Corps, Ma.rshal Vl(lTOR.:
1st Division, Rnffin [9th lAger, 24th and 96th Line (three
batts, each)] 6,429
2nd Dh'iaion, Lapisse [16th lAger, 8th, 46th, and 54th Line
(three batts. each)] 7,692
3rd Division, Villntte (27th Ugcr, 63rd, 94th, and 96th Line
(threo hatts. each)] 6,376
Corps-Cavalry, Beaumout (2nd Hussars, 6th Cb.asscurs] . 1,386
Westpha.liau Cbevaux-Ugers • 401
Artillery [with 48 guns] , 1,623
ttat ,Major , . . 33
Total 2·2,926
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2nd Corps, Marshal SoULT:
1st Division, MarIe [2nd and 4th Legel', llitll (four batts. each)
and 36th Line (three OOt1:8.)J 0,498
2nd Division, l\Iermet [31st Leger (four batts.), 47th Line (four
batts.), 1220d (four batts.), 2nd, Srd, 4th Swiss (one batt.
each)] . 5,459
3rd DiI'isioll, Dclaborde [17th, 7otll, 86th Line (throo batts.
eacll)] 4,954
4th Division, Heudelet [26th Line (two batts.), GGth Line (two
hatts.), 15th Ugcr (one batt.), 320d Uger (one OOtt.), 82nd
Line (one batt.), Legion du M«li (one batt.), Hanoverian
Legion (one hatt.), Gm-de de Paril (one batt.» 3,158
Corps-Cavalry, France~hi [lat HW!84rs, 8th Dragoons, 22nd
Chasseurs, Hanoverian Chevaux.Ugers] 1,340
Artillery (the men included under dh'isiol1ll1 totals), 64 guns .
Etat l\Iajor 43
Total 21,452
N.B.-Lahoussaye's Dragoons, and one brigade of Lorgeg' Dragoons,
were also present with the corps, with a strength of 2,000 sabres.
3rd Corps, General JtfflOT:
1st Division, Grandjean [14th Line (three batts.), 44th Line
(tbree batts.), 2nd and 3rd of the Vistula (two batts. eacb»).
2nd Division, Musnier[114th and 115th Line (three batts. eacb),
1st of the Vistnla (two batts.), 2nd Legion of Reserve]
3rd Division, Morlot [tith Uger (one hatt.), 116th and 117th
Line (foul' batts. each), 121st Line (four oo.tts.») .
Corps-Cavalry, Watllier [13th Cuirassicrs, 4th HUS8al'S, Polish
Lancers, PrO\'isional regiments) .
Engineers and Sappers (for siege of Saragossa)
Artillery (the men included under divisional totals), 40 guns.
Etat Major
5,ll66
3,544
2,637
1,6ti2
2,33B
36
Total 16,071
4th Corps, General SElU.SrU.NI :
1st Division, Sebastiani [28th, 32m], 58th, 75th Line (three
batts. each)] 6,660
2nd Division, Leval [Holland, Nassau, &.den, Besse (two ootts.
each), Fraukfort (one hatt.)] 3,127
3rd Division, Valence [4th, 7th, 9tll Polish (two batts. each)]. 3,915
Corps-Cavalry [5th Dragoons, 3ni Dutch IIussan, Polish
Lancers] 1,781
Artillery (with 30 guns) . 894
f:tat Major 22
Total 15,399
01llAl'. 11 ..
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tith Corps, Marshal MOII'l'H;Il.:
ht Division, Suchet [17th Uger, 40th, 64th, 88th Line (throo
batts. each), 34th Line (fOUf hatts.)] . 8,m
2nd Division, Ga.za.n [21st, 28th, tooth, l03rd Line (three hatts.
each)]. 7,110
Corpe-Ca.valry, Delaage [tOUI Hussars, 21st Chasseurs) 926
Artillery (with 30 gWlB) • 1,420
.ftat Major. . . 2ti
Total 17,96D
6th Corps, Marshal NEY:
1st Division, Marohand [6th, 3001, 69th, 76th Line (three batta.
each)]. 6,8.53
2nd Division, Mauriee Mathieu (2.5th Uger, 27th, 50th, 69th
(three hatts. each)] 6,917
Corps-Cavalry, Loroct (3rd Hussars, 16th Chasseurs] 840
Artillery (with 30 gullS) . . 1,634
Etat Major 32
Total 16,176
N.B.-One brigade of Lorges' DragOOU8 "'as also present with the corps.
3,980
li,321
3,941
6,220
8,008
1,633
1,730
1,862
2,0.'>0
""
'"Total 39,416
"
7th Corps, General GOUVlON Sr. CYR:
1st Division, Souham [1st Ugcr (three batts.), Srd Legcr (ODe
hatt.),7th Line (two batts.),42nd Line (three batts.), G7tl;l.
Line (ODe batt.)].
2nd D~vision, Chabran [2nd, 10th, 37th, 56th, 93rd Line, aIld
2nd SwiS!l (one batt. each)) ,
3rd Division, Chabot [Chasseurs des Montagnes (one batt.),
2nd Neapolitans (two batts.)]
4th Division, Reille [2nd Line (onc batt.), 32nd lAger (ono
hatt.), 113th Line (two batt&), 16th and 56th Line (one hatt.
each), Valais (one hatt.)]
6th Division, Pino [Italian 1st and 2nd Uger, 4th and 6ttl Line
(three batts. each), 7th Line (one hatt,)]
6th Division, I.ecchi [Italian 2nd, 4th, 5th Line, Velites (one
hatt. each), 18t Neapolitans (two hatts.)]
Gennan Division, Morio [2nd, 3rd, 4tll, and 18t Light of West-
phalia]
Cavalry, Frcllch [24th Drngoons, 3rd Prol'isional Cuirnssicrs,
3rd ditto CllII.sscurs] •
" Italian [Dragoons of Napoleon, Royal Cliasseu1'll,
Chasseurs of the Prince Royal, Neapolitan Chasseurs].
Artillery, French .
J> Italian.
German •
.'
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RIlSERVE CAVALRY.
18t Division of DragooDs, Latour-Maubourg:
1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th, 14th, 26th Dragoons
2nd Division of Dragoons, Milhaud:
12th, 16th; 20th, 21st Drago<lIUl .
3rd Division of Dragoons, Lahoussa)'e:
17th, 10th, 19th, 27th Dragoons.
4th Division of Dl'agQons, Lorges:
13th, 15th, 22nd, 26th Dragoons.
6th Division of Dragoons, Millet:
3rt!, 6th, 10th, 11th Dragoons
LightrCavalry Division of LasaUe:
10th, 26Ul Chasseun, 8th Dragoons
Artillery, batteriell attached to the Cavalry DivisioDs:
2,627
2,125
1,33.5
1,228\
1,470
1,49.5
7]2
Total 10,892
RalERYF. AT MADltlll :
Dh'ision Dessolles (12th Uger, 43rd, 61al, Mth Line (each
three battB.), 8,601; Royal Guards, 2,200; 27th Chasseura,
liOOJ • 11,207
GARRISONS OF mE NORTH (Marshal Br,:ss,Ea.ES):
In Biscay, Alav8,GuipMC08, Sant&nder,Old Castile, and Loon 19,002
GRAN!) P,utK OF AltTILLlill.Y • 2,679
GRAND TOT,I,L OF' Preaenu 801U tu a1'1TlU; 193,078,
At the same time there were Sick li6,404, Detached 36,326, Prisonors 1,843.
GROSS Twit. oftho whole army in Spain, 288,611L
IV
THE SPANISH ARMY AT MEDELLIN
Cuesta's army at Medellin was composed of tbe following regiments, It
is, unforlunately, impossible to say hOll' they were brilf<'ded at the moment,
as tbe only return available is that of April 4, when the original distribution
of the army had been broken up, and the Andalusian division distributed
among the other four. 'IlIe Estremaduran battalions were very strong,
some few of them ranging up to 1,100 and even 1,400 bayonets, though
others had but 600 or 700.
(1) Troops of Belvedere's old army of Estrernadura:
• Spanish Guards (4th batt.); • WaIllion Guards (4th batt.); ·2nd
of Majorca; ·2nd Light of Catalonia; t l'rovincial of &dajoz;
.. 2
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tProvincial Grenadiers; 1Badnjoz (two hatts.); tZo.fra;
tTnlxillo; tMcrida: :l:Plasencm; tLa Serena; :tLeales do
Feroinando VII (two La.tb:l.) Total. Fifteen hatts.
(2) Troops of San Juan's old' Army of Reserve of Madrid':
Walloon Guards (2nd batt.); "Jaen(two batts.); *Irlanda(two
batta.); +Provincial of Toledo; t Provincial of Burgo.s; :t2nd
Volunteers of Madrid; t3rd of Seville, Total. Nine batta.
(3) Troops under Albuquerquo, from the Army of the Contre :
"Campo Mayor; t Provincial ofGuadix; tProvincial of Cordova ;
tOsuna (two batts.); tGranaderos del General j ITiradores do
Cadiz . Total. Saven batt.a.
N.D.-Of these trooJ!S, Plasencia, Zafrn, Truxillo, and the' LeaIts de
Ferdinando VII' (two battB.) were in garrison at Badajo:/; and Dot present
in the field.
The probable strength of the infantry engaged at Medellin was abou~
20,000 bayonets.
CAVALRY.
(1) Old troops of the Army of Estremadilra:
·4th Hussars (I Volunteers of Spain '); "1st Hussars of .&tremadutll
[late Mw Luisa].
(2) Old troops of La IWmalla's anny, from Denmark;
.. Hey; -Infante; - Almanza,
(3) New Levies:
tCamdores de Llerena; tJrnperial de Toledo.
"There WIIS also present one regiment from Andalusia, which had joined
with Albllqucrquc, apparently" R.eyna.
Eight regiments in all, with an odd squadron of Carabill(lI'()S Reales
in addition. Effeetivcs very low. Total 300ut 3,000 or 3,200 sabres.
Several regiments had a s9,uadron detached in Andalusia, in search of
remounts.
ARTILLERY.
Thirty guns, about 650 men; Sappers, two companics, about 200 mell.
Total, about 24,000 men.
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v
ORGANIZATION OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMY
IN IB09
TIle numbers are from the fil'8t complete retufll available, that of Sept, 15
in the Record Office
INFANTRY OF THE LINE.
N. n. -Each regiment consisted oftwo battalions ofseven companies each,
which should have numbered 770 officers and men, the ngiment totalling
1,000, with staff.
Total 27,076
• Though named from Olivenza these ~iments were actually raised
in Northern Beira, with head quarters at lAmego, OIivenm having been
ceded to Spain in 1801 at tile treaty of Radajoz.
Strength.-
ht Regt. (ht of Lisbon or
La. Lippe) . 1,330
2nd Regt.. (tagos or Algarve) 1,301
3rd Reg!.. (1st of OliveulIa t) 079
4th Regt. (Freire) 1,477
5th Regt. (1st of Elvas) 759
6th Regt. (ls1o£ Oporto) 1,082
7th Rcgt. (Sctllool). 1,312
8tll Regt.. (EvorJ.) 369
9th Regt. (Viana) 1,611
10th Rcgt. (2nd of Lisbon). 1,370
11th Regt. (1st of Almeida) 1,498
12th Regt. (Chaves) . 1,491
Strength.
13th Regt. (Peniche) . . 1,361
14th Rcgt. (Tavira). . 1,239
16th Regt. (2nd ofOliveuza *). 677
16th Regt. (Viera. Telles). 096
17th Regt. (2nd of Elvas) . 1,218
18th fugt. (2nd ofOpoJ'to,) 1,371
19th Regt. (Cascaes) . 1,519
20th Regt. (Campomayor). 1,218
21st Regt. (Valenm) . Hl3
22nd Regt. (Serpa), 1,479
23rd Regt. (2nd of Almeida) 1,621
24th Regt. (Braganza) 005
CAZAnORE8.
N.D.-These were single-battalion corps with a proper effective of
770 men.
ht (Camllo de Viue)
2nd (MOllra.).
3rd (Villa Real) .
Strength.
620 4th (Vizeu) ,
42.5 6th (CampomayOl')
607 6th (Oporto)
Strength,
6]9
• 321
• 660
Total 3,162
The 7th, 8th, and 9th Cazadores were formed later, out' of the three
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5'h
6th
battalioDs of the Lusitanian .Legion. The 10th, 11th, and 12th were raised
in the year 1811.
'The brigading of the Portuguese regular infautry Wall Ilrnetically per_
manent, very few changes having been made after 1810, when the greater
part of the regiments.were attached in pairs to the British divisions. The
arrangement was as follows, 181-1-14:-
1st Brigade 1st (Lisbon) and 16th (Viera Tellcs)[attnched to 1st Dil'isioll].
2nd " 2nd (Uigos) alld Hth (favim).
3rd ., 3nl (hi of Oliveuza) and ].5th (2nd of Olil'enza) [attached
to .5th Division).
4th 1> 4th (Freire) aud 10th (2nd of Lisbon) [attached to 2nd
Division].
" 6th (1st of glvlI.'l) lLnd 17th (2nd of Elvas).
JJ 6th (Oporto) and 18th (2nd of Oporto).
7th " 7th (Setubal) and 19th (Cascaes) [attached to 7th DivisionJ.
'ath " Oth (Evora) and 12th (ChM'es) [attached to 6th Division).
9th " 9th (Viana) and 21st (Valenza) [attacheo:\. to 3rd Division].
10th." 11th (1st of Almeida) and 23rd (2nd of Almeida) [attached
to <j.tll Di\·isioll].
11th" 13th (Peniehe) and 24th (Braganza).
The 20th (Campomayor) aud 22ud (Serpa) were never brigaded.
The Ist and "3rd Cazadores were attached to the Light Dil'ision.
The 2nd was attached tu the 7th I'ortuguCliC Hrignde, in the 7th Diviiiou"
The 4th was attaclloo to the 1st Portuguese Brig-.w.e, ill the lit Division.
The 6th was attached to the 6th Portuguese Brigade.
'CAVALRY. I
N.B.-F.acll ~egiment should have had 594 men, "in four stroug
squadron!!.
Strellglh.
504
2117
572
415
482
689
Total 6,040
7th (Lisbon) .
8th (Elvas) .
9th (Clm.ves) .
10th (Sautarem)
11th (Almeida)
12th (Miranda)
.55'
581
578
Strength.
55'
400
...,
lat ~A1C11lltaraDragoons)
2nd (Mours).
3rd (OlivenUlo)
4th (Duke of Mocklenhurg,
Lisbon)
5th (Evora) •
6th (Brag:mro)
ARl1LLJi:RY.
Four regiments wit1\ head quarters respectively at (1) Lisbon, (2) Faro
ill Algarve, (3) Estremos in Alemrejo, (4) Oporto. The total strength
was 4,412 offieors aud men.
Thera ware also a few garrison compauies, largely comllOsed of invalids,
which were mainly statioued in the fom round Lisbon. TIlCir force is uot
given in Beresford's GeMral &.a~ of the Regular Army.
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THE LUSITANIAN LEGION.
TIlis nbnonnal force, under Sir Robcrt Wilson, comprehended in
1800-10 three battalions of infantry, witll an establishment of ten com-
panies and 1,000 men each, one regiment of cavalry of three squadrons,
which never seems to have been complete, 31ld one battery of field
artillery. Its total force was about 3,500 men. In 1011 the three
battalions were taken into the regular army as the 7th, Bth, and 9th
Cazadores.
Er'.'GlNEEHS.
There were a few officers of the old armyJ who were engaged in raising
new companies of sappers, wlLich were not yet ready when Beresford's
report was drawn up. No figures arc there given.
It would appenr UIClL that the total Regular force of Porlllgal in
1809 amounted to about 33,000 foot, 0,300 llorse, and 6,000 artillery.
MJLITIA.
The Portuguese Militia was raised by conscription, on a lQCll.! basis, the
kingdom being dil'idcd into forty-cight regions, each of Wllicll was to
supply a 'regime~t, TIu*:;e distri'c!.s were combined into three divisions,
called the North, SoutlL, and Centre, e..1ch of wllich gave sixteen regimcnts.
The unit IfllS a two-battalion corps, with nomiually 1,500 men in twelve
companies: this number was in practice seldom reached, It was usual to
keep the battalions under arms alternately, for periods of two, three, or
six months: it was seldom that the whole regiment was embodied at once.
In lOO!) the whole force wt\.!I but ill pro<:ess of organization, many corps
had not even boon oflicered or armed, and the majority had not com-
menced to rai!l6 their second battalion, 11Hl local distribution was as
follows :-
Isr DIVISIO~: <THE SOUTH.' Comprising Algarve, Alemtejo, and BeiI'B
AI".
Regiments of Lagos, Tavira, Bej"J P.VOI".l, Villaviciosa, Portalegrc,
Castello Bl'3oco, Manha, Vizeu, Guar\la, TrancosoJ ArouC3, Tondella,
Argaoil, Covilhiio, Lamego.
2:iD DlvlSlol<': 'THE C~TJt!:.' Comprising Estremadura and Beira Baixa,
Four Lisbon regiments, and one each from Torres Vedras, Santarem,
Thomar, LeyriaJ SonreJ Lousao, Alaw.ar 110 SuI, Sctuool, Coimbra,
Figueira, Aveiro, and Oliveira de Azemis.
3JlD DIVISION: ('Ill!" Nowr",: Comprising Tras-os-Montes and Entre-
DOlH'o-e-Minho.
Regimeuts of OportoJ Villa de Conlle, Braga, Viana, Barcell08,
Guimaraens, Peuafie1, Arcos, FeiraJ Darca, Baltar, Mayo, Chave6,
Villa Real, Miranda and Bragan~.
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THE INTRIGUES AT OPORTO
J. GENERAL RlCARD'S CIRCULAR.
U gtnlral llicard, chef {tita~maj(jr du 2" corp8 d'armie en EapagneJ <l
J1{, le gbll!roJ de diuUion QuuneJ.
Oporto, le 19 avril1800.
MOll general,
Son Exoollence M. 10 marecllal due de Dalmatia m's charge de VOll8
~rire pour VOIlS mire counaitre les dispositions que la graude ma,iorite
des habitauts de la province dn Minhe mauifeatent.
La. ville de Drags, qui une des premieres s'etait portie al'ill8urrecuon,
3 ete aussi la premiere a se prouoncer pour un chaogement de systeme,
qui assurit a l'avenir le repos et la tranquilliti des familles, et l'indf.
pendance dn Portugal. Le corregidor que sou Excellence lIo\7J,it nomme
s'etait retire n Oporto Iors dll Mparl des troupes fmn~i.ses,dnns la craintc
'11Ie lea llombreux emissair<l8 que Sylveira eUI'oyait u'excitasscllt de
DouveaUlI; troubles, et u'attentasscot a sa vie. Les habitants out alors
manueste le Vcell que co digue magistrat lour rut renvoye, et une depu-
tation de douze membres a ete aoot effet envoyee pres de Son Excellence.
l'endant ce tempsles emissa.ires de Sylveira ,Haient arretes et emprisonnes_
A Oporto, et u. Barcelos, les hnbitants ont aussi manifesti les mc-mes
sentiments, et tollS sentent la n~iti It'avoir un apllUi auquel1es citoyens
hien intentionnes puissent se rallier pour la det'euse et le saiut de la patrie,
et pour la o::onservation des proprietis. A o::e sujet de nouvelles depu-
tations se sont presentees aSon Excellence, pour la supplier d'approuver
que le peuple de la pro\'ino::e du l\Iinho manifelrtAt authentiquement le
VleU de decheance du wne de la maison de Bl"lIgl\no::e, et qu'en meme
temps S, )f. I'Empereur et roi £Ut sUPl,liee de d~sigller un prince de sa
maisoll, ou de SOli uJloix, pour regner ell Portugal, maia qu'en attendant
que I'Empereur ait pu fairo o::ounaitre a o::e sujet 8eB intentiolls, Son
Excelleno::e le due de Dalmatie serait prie de prendre les renes du
gouvern6ll'!ent, de repre&ellter le souverain, et de se revetir de toutes
les attributions de l'autoriti suprcme: le pellple promettAut et jurant de
lui etre filJe].C, de le soutenir et do le defCllllre aux d€pena de la vie et de
la fortune contre tout opposaut, et euvers meme lea inaurges des autres
prO\-inces, jusqu'a l'entiefC sonroission du royaume.
w marechal n ncccuilli ces propositions, et iI a lIlutorise les corregido1'8
des Comargul;lS a fdire assembler leg Chambres, it y appcler des deputes da
tous les oJ'lireg, dea corporations, et du peuplc daus 108 campag:IlC!l, (JOur
dresser l'acta qui doit etr6 fait, et yapposer 16l> signatures de l'universalite
des citoyons, 11 m'a ordollue de vona faire part de ces dispositions, pour
que, dans l'arrolldissement ou vous commalldcz, vous Cll tavorisiClll'execu-
tion, et lJu'ensuite VO!L9 en propagicz l'effct sur tous les poillU! du royaumc,
ou \-'ous pourr~ ell fairo parvellir la nouvelle,
SQULTS REGAL ASPIRATIONS 633
M. le l\far~cha.l ne s'est pas diesimule qU'UD evenement d'au8si grandB
importance etonnera beaucoup de monde et doit prod-uire des impressions
diverses; mais il o'a pas ern de\'oir s'arreter a ces oonsiderations: S()1l
ame est trop pure poUf qu'il puisse penser qU'OD lui attribue aucul) projet
ambitieux. Dans tout ce qu'it fait il ne voit que la gloire des armes de Sa
l\1ajesM, le suceCe de I'expedition qui Ini est coulice, et le bicn-etre d'uno
nation illteressante, qui, malgrc sea egarements, est toujours digne de
notre estimc. Illl{l sent fort do I'alfootion de rarmet, et il brille dn desir
de la presenter iI. l'EmpeI1lUf, gloricuse et triompbante, ayant rcmpli
I'engagement que Sa i\fajeste aell~meme pris,de planter I'aigle impiriale
sur les.forts de .Li.sbonne, apres nne cJ:pedition aussilifficile que pbilleuse.
oU. tons lea jonfll nous a.VOllil tU dans la necessit!! de vainere.
Son Excellcnce ne s'cllt pllS dissimule non plus que depuis Burgos
I'armee a Cll des combats continuels 11 souWllir; cUe n rcll€elii aur lcs
moyella d'tiviter a l'avenir les maux que cet tHat de gverre occa.sionneJ et
elIe n'en a pas trouvti de plulI propre que ceIui qui lill eGt offert par la
grande majorit\!! des habitants des principales \'illes du Minho, d'aut:l.llt
plus qu'elle a l'espoir de voir propager dans les autres provinces cet
~emple, et qu'ainsi ce beau pays sera preserv\!! de nouvelles calamites.
Les intentions de Sa l\Iajesti seront plus tOt et plus glorieusement remplieJ
et notre presence en l'ortugal, qui d'abord avait ete un sujet d'effroi pour
lea habitauts, y sera I'ue avec plaisir, en meme temps qll'elle contribuera a
neutraliser les efforts des Clluemill de l'Empereur sur cette partie du
continent..
La tache que 1\1. le i\fartichal a'impose lians cette eirconstanco est
immenseJ maia i1 11 le courage de l'cmbr'dsscr, et il croit la remplir meme
aveo succes, si \'OUS voulez hien l'aider dans son execution, Il desire
que vous propagie~ les idees queje viens de VOllS communiquer, que vous
fassiez protiger d'une maniere particuliere les autoriUs ou citoyens quel-
conques qui embrasseront le nouveau systeme, en mettallt,les UJlS et les
autres dans le cas de se prononcer et d'agir a l'a\'euir en co~quen(le,
VOllS veillere~ plus soigneusemcut que jamllis aIII conduite de votre troupe,
I'cmpecherez de commettre nueuu deg-.lt on immlto qui l)(lurrnit irriter IC8
iJubitants, et vous 1l11l'CZ In 1)(IlIte, monsieur 10 ~llcrnl,d'instl'uire frcquem-
ment Son K'(cellence Ilc l'e6prit des llahitallts et dn rCsultat que VOU8
aure~ obtcnu.
J'ai l'houneur de VOllS prier d'agr\!!er l'hommage de mon respect et lie
mon sincere attachement..
.Le gb/bal duif /le fltut-ffmjOI; grobal
Big/le; RICARD.
Pour eopie eonfonne it l'origiulI.I reaM daulI It'S mains du gen.crnJ do
division Quesnel.
Paris, le 11 juillet 1809.
Le mini.rt~ de la gU81"re
Comte d'Huuebourg,
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11. WELLESLEY'S ACCOUNT OF ARGENTON'S PLOT.
.(To Viscouni Castlereagh, Secretary of State.
'Villa Nova, 15th May, 1009.
( My Lord,
'In my secret dispatch, of the 27th ultimo, I apprised your Lordship
that I had had cerlain communications with an Officer of tho I<'wllch
armyJ in Tl:Spcd to the discoutent which prevailed ngnillst Marshal Soult.
I llave since hail further communications with t1l0 same Officer, with tile
details of which I proceed to acquaiut your Lordship.
{Captain Argentoll met me ",;tbin the po!lt!l of the British· army,
between Coirnbra and Aveiro on the uigh't of the 6th instant, accompanied
by Mons. Viana, in the presence of Lieut.-Colollelllatburst. He informed
me that the discontent hlld increased, and that there were a larger number
of Officcrs WllO were determined to seize their General than wllcn he had
last seen mc. He said, however, that tlley were dil'iueu into two parti~,
onc uiscontenwu with BUOlllll),'ll't3 himself, anu determined to carry
matters to extremities against him: the other, consisting of Loisoll,
Laborde, and others (whom he had before mentioned as attached to the
cause of the Emperor,) were dissatisfied with Soult's conduct, particularly
with au intention which he Wall supposed to entertain to declare himself
King of Portugal j and tilat they were detennined, if he should take that
step, to sci1.e him and to lead the army back into France, where it was
understood the Emperor wished to sce it.
{Calltain Argelltoll then urgoo me llotrllill to lose no time in pressing
upon Soult, as the mode most likely to induce the more violent of the two
parties to endeavour to accomplish their purpose. But be said that if my
attack was likely to be delayed, it wall desirahle that I should endeavour
to prevail upon some of the tolvllS over which I was supposed to llave
i1tfluence, SlIdl as Coimbra, .oh-eim, &e., to follow the example of Oporto,
find petition Boult to take upon himself the govemment of the kingdom,
as King j alld that I even should write to llim to urge the adOIM.ion of this
measure.
< III answer to this, I told him, that I certainly should make my attack
as soon as it was in my power, hut that 1 could not fix any day, nor lrtate
te him the plan of my operations; and that in respect to his propositions,
regarding the meas\lN:S to be adopted by me to induce 80ult to dcclare
himself Killg of Portugal, they were quite out of the question; that
1 could not risk the loss of the confidence of the people of Portugal by
doing what he deBired in respect to the people of Coimbra, Aveiro, &c.,
nor my own character by writing the letter whicb'~he proposed I should.
I told him at the same time thnt I considered that, notwithlrtanding all
t1l1lt had plt8tled between llim and me, I 1ulll" full rigllt to take what sleps
1 pleased, even if the Officers of tlle French anny should seize their
General.
'Hc tlicn went away, aud Mons. Viana returned with me to Coimbrn,
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JlIltI conflnnClJ all the Btateme}lts which Captain Argenton had made of
the tlisc(mtent of the Officers of the army.
l I heard 00 more of Captain Argentoll till the 13th, the day after
the capture of Oporto, on which day the original orders for the arrest
and secret detention of Captain Argentoll, Colonel !Alitie of the 18th
dragoons, and Colonel Donadieu of the 47th regiment of infuntry, were
found among some papers &ent to me by the police of the town; the order
for the arrest of the first bearing date the 9th, aud of the last tll'O th~
10th instant.
'In 11 few llOurs afterwards, on the same day, ClIptlliu Argentoli came
iuto 0IIOrto, and informed me tllat, 011 the night of tile day he had retllrneo.l
fmm his last interview with me, he had been arrested, ami his palJers 11a..-l
been seized, among which had been found the three passports which IIH~d
given llim. He said that be attributed his -arrest to the Generdl of
Division Lefevre, a man of weak intellect, to wllOm he had formerly 00c1l
aide de camp, and on whom he hlld endeavored to pl'evail, as he tlLOught
successfully, to join the party. General Lefenc had; llOwever, informed
Soult of all the cirtumstanccs, requiring only his promise that Argenton
should not be jDjured, and lIhould retain his commission and his military
pretensions.
'Soult examined him in presence of General LefeYTe respecting his
accomplices, but he declined topame any, and he was sent back to prison
in charge of a Captain of Gendarmerie. This person prerailed upon him,
with promises of pardon and indemnity to all conoerned, to consent to tell
Soult the llllmes of his IIccomplice,g, which he did on the following night,
lIotwithlltanding, as he says Ilimsc1f, similar promisCiI in his own fnvor,
made to General LefeHe, )uul not been performed, and Olat as soon liS
he had named Colonels Lafitte and Donadieu, immediate orders were sent
fer their arrest and secret detention. They marched, in confinement, with
the army from Oporto on the 12th, and on the 13th, at fh'e o'clock
in the morning, Captain Argenton made his escape, at the desire of
Colonel Lantte, from the party of Gendarmes in whose charge he was
detained. He now dedllres that the conspiracy still exists, and that
sooner or later it must burst forth and fall heavily upon the head of the
usurper; and he talked of the wllr in Spain lIS being odious to the army
and to the whole nation.
'Captain Argenton eXpresiied a desire to return secretly to France,
'1Il,1 to bring to Ellgluwl Ms wife Rnd family, she having, ILS he S;IYS, somll
property, to enable him to live in England till the arrival of butter times
in France,
<I told bim that I would send him to Englaud wben all opportunity
should offer to apply for permission to go to :Prtt.nce; and [shall have the
hOllor of addressing him to yanr Lordship when the opportunity shall
OCClIr of sending him. '
, 11Iav6 the hOllor to be, &0.,
'ART.lwa "rt:I.:r.J~sr .•;\'.
APPENDICES
Ill. R.~SmIE DE L'Al<'FAlRE ARGENTON.
(This anaJ)'sis of the documents tu the French archives relating to the
Oporto conspiracy has been placed at my disposal by the great kindJJess of
Commandant Balagny.) .
Le 0 mai 1809, dans la unit, le capitaine Argenton etait arret6a Oport.o
.par ordre dn ma.richal Soult. Son arrestation M'ait de provoquee par les
d€clarations que, dans eetw memo unit dn B, le general Lefebvre et son
aide de ClImp favre etaient venus Caire an mareehal. Argenton lour 8\'ait,
d.isellt.-ils, fait ii. rUIl et a l'autre, daus la jOllrnee dn 8, dM confideneee sur
l'objet de deux "oYage;l successifs a Lisboune et a Coi"mbre, prea des
gelleraux anglais, et leur avait developpe le plan d'uno vaste conspiration
militaire, dont les ramifications s'etendaient dans tontos les armies
imperiales et dam plusieurs departements de la France. MaJgre la pro-
messe fonnelle qu'jlg 3vaient {site it Argenton de garder un secret absolu,
apres s'itre concertis a ltichuza, iJs vinrent, dans .la nuit, aOporto, et,
apr~ avoir obtt;>llU du marllchal une audience secrete (A 10 hcures etdcmie
tlu soir), lui tlevoilcrent co quo leur aVllit confiC Argcl\toll. Aux term8l!
tic Icun ueclaratiolls, il aurait tlit, il l'UD et a. l'autre ~pa.rement, qu'iJ
etait l'agent d'un comite, compose des generaux Laborde, Loison, Merle,
Lorgeg, Lahoussaye, Debelle, et des colonels Donadieu, Mejean, Lafitte,
Girardin, Corsin, et dont le but etait de renverser l'Empereur pour mettre
fin au regime de guerres continuelles et de perpetuelles conscriptions, que
la Frauce l1tait las.% de supporter pour senir l'ambition de Napoleon,
Pour realiscr cc projct, lc comite dm'ait par son interrnediaire passer uue
com'eotioll IWOO l'o.rmec angluiso cn l)ortllgal. Aux teMnCS (le cette
convention, l'armee fran"aise evacuemit le p:ortugal, suivie de l'armee
anglaise, qui I'esrorterait jusqu'aux Pyrenees, DU cette derniere resterait en
observation pour l'appuyer et pour determiner les de"partemeul:8 du Midi
a se declarer pour le uouvel etat de choses. A la faveur de trois paS!!e-
ports, delivrl1s par lea genera1.LJ,; anglaisJ trois officiel'!! fran«&is l , dont.lui,
Argcntoll, devaiellt se rendrll, l'uII aux armces tI'F--sp3glle, I'autre a
l'armee d'Autriche, 1111 lroisieme en France, pour rallier a la cause de
l'entreprise Its mecontenl:8 de l'iuterieur et des armees. L'Angletorre
promettait d'appuyer de son argent le sueces de l'entreprise, et Well~ler
aurait promis a Argenton 6O/)()0 fr. pour lea Mbul:8. Le generall\Ioreau
devait ctre ramen!! d' Ameriqllc par un lIa\ire 8.lIglai$, et prendre, sous un
titre non encore designe, III place tie Napohioll deehu. 4l marechal 80ult
serait invite ase mettre a la wle dn nlOuvement. Si le mankhal refusait,
on devait s'emparer de sa personne, de flfCn ace que !lOn opposition ne
nuisit en rien 11 la reussite de l'entreprise,
1 Ccs passe-ports dev8.ient H~ dclivr&! 8.UJ: noms S\lpposes de Dupont et
Oari8, d'apr~s Its declarations d'Argentotl lW-Dl@me, du m.-I Soult, du
~ Ricard, &0, L'un de ees passe-ports devait Hre utilise par le cap· Favre,
e.ide de camp du g"l Lefebvre, qui voulait rentrer en France pour d~m\ssionner,
L'uut.re den.it servir Q un officier 8uplrieur gu'Argfmlon. M rwm7M pIU, qui
devait lIl!er relldrt: compte de la sihl1l.tion II.I'Empereur,
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En pl'l!"senooYde pueillcs revEflations, le marl!chal Soult fit arrHer sur·le..
champ et conduire che~ lui le capitaine ArgcotonJ qui, devant le ~mfral
Lefeb\'re et FaVT'O, refit, dnus lea ml!mea termes, la narration dn plan du
ComiM. insisto.nt, parait-il, ndh'cJ:'Scs reprises, pour renter de t1Ccidcr le
mar~chal a elltrer dans BCS vues, 611 lui dCl'eignant, 80US des eouloul'll
sMuisnlltes,lllo grandeur et la noblcsso do !'clllropriscJ dont le but principal
ctaitdo rell(lrc a la France et a l'Europe entiere une pab:: quo tout le momlc
8OuhlLitll,it artlemment, et que la folIe ambition de l'EmpcrcuT relldait scule
impossible. Mais nc llOuv&.nl ohtcllir un mareclml la premesse farmella
qu'aucull des officiers dOllt iI citerait lea noms ne serait inquiete, il 86
refusn if. designer lea membres liu Comiti qui l'avait fait. agir. Plus t'l.Td,
daus scs interrogatoires en Franco, il Mclara. que devant. ce tefus de sa
part le ma~lJal s'emporta. ,'iolemment, le men~ de le faire fusilier sur--
le-champJ et qu'it ne dut. soo salut.qu'a l'iot.erveot.ion generel18ll dll general
Lefebvre, qui rappeta durement au Due de Dalmat.ie la promesse solen-
nelle qu'illui avail. faite (a lui, Lefebvre)J sur l'honneur, qu'Argenton ne
serait point inquieti. Il fut tl!intigr~ daus sa prison, alIOn grand l!tonne-
ment, ditril. Furieux de se voir sous 169 verrous, malgri la promesse
formelle que lui aurait faite le mar~chalJ pretend-i1, il s'obstina d'abord
dans un mutisme absolu, refusantJ pendant toute la matim!e du 9, de se
preter il. aucun nouvel interrogatoire. Cependant, sur les instances
r6iUr6es et prcssantes du lieutenant de gendarmerie Bomon, que le
mar6chal cllvoya, aplusieurs reprises, le voir dans sa plillOn, et sous la foi
do la promOSSll 80Iennclle llue lui al.porla co dcrnicr, de la JlArt du Duc,
que lui et tous les officiers cOffipromis auraient l'honneur et la vie saurs, et
qu'un voile epais serail. jete a jamais sur cette alfaire, il se deeida daus la
soiree a!!elire au mareehal qu'il consentait alui faire des aveux complets.
Maia se ra\'isantJ il lui ecrivit une deuxieme lettre oll il mettait eomme
condition a ses aveux qu'il n'r aurait qu'un 8eu/ Umoin prl!sent a S68
declarations, et qu'i1 desirait que ce tl!moin flit le general Webvre. Pour
des raisons qui sont demeurees inconnuesJ le rnarechal substitua, comme
UmoioJ au g'l!nl!ral LefebvreJ le gl!nl!ral Ricard et le lieutenant Bemon.
Argenton accepta cependant de faire SClI aveux et fllt introduita 10 hcuros
du soir dans lo salon du marechal. Le lieutCllaut Bcmon et 10 general
Ricard firClltJ des 10 10 mai, uno d€claratiou ecrite des revelatious faites
devant eux au marechal par Argenton dans l'entrevue du 9 UIai. LeUtil
declarations concordent entierement avec calles dn general Lefebvre et dn
capitaine Favre, et ce serait toujours le fameux projet de reoversement de
l'Empire qu'Argenton aurait indique comme but du Comiie.
A la suite de ces aveux, Argenton est reconduit dans sa prison et 10
m;u'echnl, fallssa]!t sa promesseJ fait arreter le colonel lafitte, qui C001-
malulait 10 rl!giment Oll servait Argellton.
.Mais cepeudaut l'armee anglaiBe se portait en avant et, a la suite do
cin:onst;lDces demeurl!es bien obscures, le marecbal Soult etait surpris
daus Oporto et sur le point de ne pouvoir sen l!chapper. ArgentoDJ conlie
a la garde dD lieutenant Bcmon et d'un dl!tachement d'infanterie, est
cmmene dans la retraite. Le SC(:ood jour il a'evade subitcmeut, dans des
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ciJ:'COnstanccs tellement roffialle5ques que, Dl81gre le rapport dll lieuteuaot
BernOll all Due de Qmcgliano, OD est qllelque pen lJorte il croirc que sa
fuite fut faciliMe par le commantlement.
1Al 14 mai, all soil', Argeuooll fugitifgagnaitOporto, et ue I.U se relldait ii.
Lisbonne d'OLL l'amiral anglais le faisait oonduire aLoodles sur un vaieseau
anglais, 81'ec des lettres de recommandation ponr le ministre de la marine.
Bien aceueilli par cc dernier, qui lui proposa meme, dit-il, de le pensionner,
il sejouma quelque temps! Londres. Mais pris billowt de la noatalgie dn
p.'l}'s natal et dcvol'e dn Msir de venir rejoindre sa femme pour vivre ell
France t ignore dans que1que coin pcrdu,' il ft\'ise It.lJX moyeua de passer la
Manche. n fabriquc un faux cartel d'eclJauge au nom lie 'Dcssort,' sous
la signature dll gelll!ral Ricard. chef u'ctat.-mlljor tlu mareebal Soult, et
Bur les reconunandations de l'Amiraut.e anglaise il s'embarque a Deal et
atterrit it. Sangatte le 26 jUin 1809. Malgre son faw: nom, Argenton ne
tarde pas en eKet aetre aneW.
Des son premier interrogatoire, il s'etait decide a reconnaitre son iden-
tite et, avouant son faux de cartel d'cchallge, il noondomle le IJseudonyme
de ' Desaort' et redeviellt Argenton. Mais ici la scene change: se pre.
taut vololltien aux illterrogatoires, il nB fait aucune difficult.e pour
Bxpliquer ses voyages pres des generau3 anglais; mais il leur donnB un
but tout autre et il assigne au Comite, dont i1 se dit toujOUl'S avoir e!.e
I'agent, des intentions totalement dilferentes de ceUes que, !!CIon Lefebvre,
RiCllrd, FI",re, ct Bernoll, il aun,it imlilluees u 0llOrto. I1 n'est plus
question de conspir"tioll contre l'Empereur, de projets do renvcncrncllt
d}'lIastique. Dien au CQutraire, le Comit.e, eutierement devoue a Napoleon
et asa cause, voulait lui rameuer une armee dont'le sort etait gravement
compromia par la ma.ladresse du marechal Soult, qui ne revait tien moins
que de faire de cette armee la sienne propre, et de s'en servir pour la
realisation de ses projets ambitieux. Devnnt ses projets ouvertement
nffiches de se fairo decerner la couronne do Rortugal, un parti de meCOD·
tents s'emit forme pour Mjouer ses vucs et le mettrc dalls l'impossibilit.e
de commettre le crime de lese-majest.e qu'il meditait. A la tete de ce
parti, se trouvait, dit Argenton, un comite compose des generaux Laborde
et wison, des colonela Lafitte et St. Gelliell et d'un colonel aide-de-camp
du general LoiBon, Le Comite devait, des que le marechal uurait mis
en exeeutiou SOli projet, uullemcnt deguise, de 8'emparor de la courouue,
66 saisir de sa peroonne, et, it la suite d'une CQnvention pa5see aI'OO les
gt1nerau.", anglais, ramener en France l'annee I't'st.ee fidele aNapoleon, et
sauvee par cette interl'cntion d'une perte infaiUible, Mais pour menCl'
a benne fin I'execution de cc projct, il faUnit obteuir des generauJ: anglais
qu'ils oonscntissent a retanIer leur attaque, qui etait immill6utcJ ct fill
fnire delivrer par eux des passe-ports pour les officien qui devaicnt aller
rendre compte al'Empereur de ce qui se pa..«sait en Portugal. ArgentOll
accepta la mission d'aller a l'armee anglaise ·soumettre lea propositions
dn Comite. On l'adressa, dit-il, nu nomme Viana, lL qui il fut preeente
par le colonel Donadieu (lui logea.it Che"l; lui, et ce fut C6 Vilma qui lui
ser\'it de guide et d'escorte jusqu'a, l'armce anglaise. 11 se rendit a I..i&-
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•bonoe, oil iI obtint du general Wellesley trois passe-porta et la pMffiesiie
d'une suspension d'armes de quelques jOUr3. Revenu lI. Oporto, il Ytesta
quatre jours cbez Vilma, qui 1ui remit, 11 destination dn ComitC, liD dialogue
intituJe '.Le 1\10iOe.1U et le Petrol/uet; qui n'ctait, parait-H, que le som·
main! a'une longue oollversatiotl entre VinllR et 10 ma~ehal, 011 Cll dernier
Ruralt developpe 8CS projets ambitieux et exposl! en detail la ligull de 600-
duite qu'il comptait 8uivre. Porteur de ce document, il 'la reudre compte
de sa mission au Comite. Le general Laborde etant maladc, il tendit
compte au colonel Lafitte et, le general Loisou survenant a Cll moment,
i1 y eut cllllZ Laborde une conference llutre ees deux generaux et Lafitte.
Lui, Argenton, o'y assists pal!; male A l'issUll de cette conference son
00100e11ui declara qu'il fallait retouroer preB des Anglais, et lui fit tenir
one lettre ecrite par le general Loison au general Wellesle}'. Toujours
a.ccompagne de Vianll, iI partit d'OportQ le 1er maiJ et se rendit ACoImbre,.
oU. iI ent, en presence de Vinna, unc eoufcrence Iwee 'l'ellesley et finitJ
apr~s Ijuelques difficult6l, par obwnir une IlOuvene SUSllCllSioll d'hostilites
pendant qllatrc jOUrIl, la la condition que le Comite tielldrait le general
IlllglaiB au eourallt des faits et gestes du Due de Dalmatie. De retour
aOporto, le 8 mai, il etait arrete an moment oll iI s'apprHait apartir pour
se rendre pres du Comite.-Telle est la these qu'Argenton ne cesse de
80utenir avee la demiere energie, depuis son retour ell France jUllque
de\'4nt le peloton d'execution qui va le fusiller. Il subit trois inter<-
togatoires a Houlogne, trois alltres all Ministere de la Police, quatre
de\'UJlt la Commission militaire chargeo d'instrllire 8iI. ClIuse. TOlljOllrs
avec la meme impa8Sibilite et le ealme le plus absolu, iI repete la meme
chose, ne variant que sur quelques questions de details. Quand on lui
donne lecture des depositions accablantes des generaux Lefebvrc et
Ricard, do l!a.pitaine Favre et du lieutenant Bemon, illeur oppose froide-
ment lee denegatioll$ les plU8 fonnelles. 11 est confronte avcc les colonels
Donadieu et Lafitte, qui, arretCs par ordre dn Mini8tre de la Guerrc,
pretendent n'avoir jamllis eu connaissallCO de l'existence d'un eomite dans
l'armee, et n'avoir jamai~ Bervi d'intemuidiaire entre Argeutou et ce
comite. Vis-a.-via d'eux, le capitaine garde toujours 1& meme attitude. Lui
Beul dit 1& verite, assnre-,t-ilJ et il s'ctonne du peu de memoire des colonels.
Tra.duit de\'3nt un conseil de guerre le 21 decembre 1009, le capitaine
Argenton se retrauche toujOUI'S derriere les memes moyens de derense
et prodllit leg memes arguments. 11 a agi par ordre (ver.bal, il est vrai),
et il :\ cm scrvir n la fois les interets do l'armce qn'il a saul'ee ct ceuJ: de
I'Empereur. l\blgrc uue l)laitloirie tres eloqllcnte et tres habile de sun
defenBeur Falconnet, qui, pour defelldre MU client, n'epargue pal:! le due
de Da.lmatie, Argenton eat oondamne a mort. Jusqu'a la dormere heure,
il proteste de la purete de sea intentions, et maintient qu'il a toUjOUTS
dit la veriM et qll'il est \'ictime de l'egolsmc do ceux qui I'out fait agir.
Avoo une ealmo resiguatiou, il commando lui-nu~IlIe sou pelotou d'oxc-
cution et tombe sous les baBes IWCC ca courage romanesque qui caraeterisait
en lui l'homme utraordinaire qui, it Tarvis, fit lIeul touto une compago.ie
prisonniere,
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VII
. MOIU'<ING STATE OF THE BRITISH FORCES
IN PORTUGAL,
UNDER SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, K.B.
HEAD QUARTERS, COll\1BRA, MAY 6,1809.
&'1'9001114, Drum-
mer", Rank and
Fi/e, ~c.
Offi- p,," On
TotoJ Effi-
c.~ cieni, Pre-
''''. ."". Skk. ='"'.
Total, sent,Officer,
and Mm.
--
----CAVALRY.
lstBrigadc~~letonCottoQ]
27 73 '49 GM14th Lig t ragooll8. . 628 21
10th" "... 3' 673 20
'"
'66 710
, 20th" ,. [two
srladronsJ.. . . . 6 23' , 63 312 243
3{'(1 ightDragOOllSK.G.L.
[one squadron]. . 3
"
2 77 139 00
--1,668
2nd Brigade [Fane]
3rd Dragoon Guards . 25 698 10 - '33 '234th Dragooll8 . . . 27 71' 13. - '56 '43
-1,466
- ---- --Total Cavalry 125 3,009 72 248 3,454 3,134-
- ----
--
INFANTRY,
Brigade ofGuards [H. Camp-
bell]
Coldstrcam Guards, 1st
1,227batt. . . . . . . 33 1,194
"
3 1,305
3rd Foot Guards, ht hatt. 34 1,228 ,. • 1,349 1,262) company 6f6Oth Foot. 2 61 4 - 67 63
-2,.552
1st Brigade [Hill]
3rd Foot, 1st batt. 28 ". 10' 56 001 74'48th" 2nd " . 32 721
"
-
005 '53
66th" 2nd " . 34 6<;' 38 10 740 '011 company a/60th Foot. 2 61 4 - 67 63
-2,204
2nd Brigade [l'\~ackenzie]
27th Foot, 3rd. hatt. 28 72' 134 2 .90 '64
31"
"
2nd
"
27 'OS 99 , 097 79243th
"
bt
"
. 22 671
'"
'ZI '40 693
-2,239
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SergC(l.l1U, Drum-
1TlIf1'1J, R(111k u1ld
Fik, <tc.
Offi- p~ On Total ~(!t-CQm- cient8 Pre-
cerl. "",. Sick. 11i(l1Id. Total. 8ellt,Officer,
mw Men.
----
-3rd Brigade [Tilson]
llj60th Foot (5 oompanies] 14 300 32 2 3ii4 320
87th ,,2nd batt. . 32 G® 88 1 790 701
88th
"
1st hatt. 20 600 143 20 809 033
Ist Portuguese, ht batt.
-
- - - - -
-1,650
4th Brigade [Sontag]
97th Foot 22 572 74 20 600
'"2nd lIatt. of Detachments 33 71f1 221 10 1,059 622
1 company 5/GOth Foot. 2 01 0 - 00 03
16thl)ortuguese,2ndhart. - - - - - -
-1,479
6th Brigade fA. Cnmllooll]
7th Foot, 2nd batt. 20 559 50 3 038 5'"63rd }J
" "
23 691 .9 3 776 714
1 co~ny 5jOOth Foot. 4 04 11 1 110 08
10th ortugucsc, ht bat\;. - - - - - -
-1,367
6th Brigade [R. StewartJ
29th Foot 20 '00 85 7 714 622
1st baU. of Detadlment8 27 803 100 24 1,023 820
16th Portuguese, Ist batt. - - - - - -
-1,462
7th Brigade [CmncroII]
9th Foot, 2nd bart. 27 Mo 227 22 821 672
88",
" " " ...
39 B33 73 23 908 872
1 oom()llOY 6/6Oth .Foot. 2 00 3 I 66 02
lOthPorlugueBe;2lld batt. - - - - - -
-1,506
King's German ~on Bri-
gade [Murrnr
1st Line batt. K.G.L. . 34 767 125 9 933 1101
2nd
" " "
. 32 804
"
9 097 0'"
6th
" " "
28 720 101 12 001 748
7th
" " "
. 22 /J88 88 to 803 710
-3,095
Unattached Troops (Lisbon)
24th Foot, 2nd hatt•. 18 joO 26 3 797 768
30th
" "
" . . 16 447 49 107 708 4U2Independent Light Co.
K.G.L.• . . . 3 35 14 4 50
'"--1,268
.- ------
Total Infantry 703 18,178 2,405 .01 21,787 lB,Bm
0:\1.1..:<1. 11 Tt
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&rgeanil, Drum--
mera, &nk and
Pile,4c.
0.Di- p,,.
""
Total Effi-
&m_ eifml, Pn-
"'.. WIt. Sick. mand. Total. 8eIlt,O.f!ictn
a1ld Men.
------ARTILLERY
British ..... 31 550 Il3 499 1,163 581
King's German Legion ,. 331 34 134 517 349
Wagon Train attached 3 61 18 Il3 165 64
-- -- 1135 --TotaI Artillery 52 342 716 1,845 964
--
--
----
ENGINEERS. . 12 27 1 - 49 39
WAGON TRAIN . 2 65 21 17 105
"'General Total llW 22,221 2,034 1,482 27,231 23,1l~
VIII
SOUL'l'S llEPORT ON GALlCIA,
JUNE 25, 1809.
N.B.-The first bnlf of this report, a lengthy narrative of the Marsbal's
march from Lugo to Puohla de Scllnbria, is omitted.
Je me permettrai, avant de tenniner cc rapport, de pn.isellter it Votre
Majeste quelques obllervations sur la situation actuella de Calice. Cett6
province est toujours en etat de fermentation. Les menaces de mort et
d'incendie qn'employe La Uomana; lea nombrelL" agents qui agiasent en
son nom; lea executions qu'it rait; lea devastations qui ont inEh'itablement
lieu par les frequents mouvements de<; troupes; la ruine de la plupart des
habitant.s; l'absenee de toute autorite qui represente \lotre l'tJajesU;
!'influence des prctrc9, qui sout tres-nombreux, et la grande majorite
opposante j I'argent que les Angbis teIJandent; la dE1tresse des generaux
fran!?isJ qui, faute des moyens, ne peuvent sOllvent payer les emi.esaires
qu'ils employent : .toutes cea causes coutribuent aa~enter de jour en
jour le nombre des ennemis, et a rendre la guene qu'on fait dans ce pays
ues-meurtrihe, inliniment desagreable, et d'un resultat fort eloigne. On
fly battra encore lougtemps avant qlle Votre Majeste en retire quelque
avantage, amoins qu'elle n'adopte le symeme de fairo fortifier sept ahuit
pastes importants, susceptibles de contenir chacun 6,000 a 6,000 hommes
de garnisou, un hopital, et des vivrcs pour quatre mois, pou,: maintenir
la population, fermer et garner les principaux debouches dout l'ellllemi ne
pourrait plus proliter, et aussi pour otrrir aux colonnes qui agiraient dans
la province des appuis, quelque direction qu'elles snivissent. Ainsi elles
pourraiont recevoir des seconl'l! et deposer lours maJades. Cette derniere
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consideration est tree-puissanre, et je ne dvis pas disaimuler Ir. Votre
Majeste qu'elle fsit beauconp sur le moral des soldata, qui, daus l't'ftat
actuel des choses, soot ex~s Apbir de misCre, ou sous lea COUpIl des
paysana, s'ils ont le malheur d'Hre blesses, on atteints de la fievre, et de
1;(1 trouver eloignes d'uo lieu sur pour y chereher des seeours.
Je crois qu'svec une depeose d'un million on parviendrait a mettre en
eut de defense la. Galiee, et certes jamais argent o'aurait ete miell%
employe, d'sutant plus que par la suite on pourrait diminuer le uombre
des troupes qui pour le moment y sont necessaires; dans cette penuasion
j'ai engage M. le Marechal Ney a {sire fortifier Lugo, et i ordonner la
coustructioD de trois blocus sur la ligne de Villa Franca; lea places de
'J'uy, de Monterey, de Viana et de Puebls de Sanabria, qui routes peunmt
cOlltenirdcs canons, ont uneeIlceilltc et un resto de fortification, pourraient
aislimellt Hre Iimblies et rcmpliraient parfaitcment <let objet; et, s'ille
fallait, il est encore cl'autres postes qui par leur situation !lCraient it memo
do cOlloourir A la defense, BallS que les frais fllSgellt cOIlsidera1Jlernellt
angrnenUs. Si cette rnesure, que je eonsidere comme urgente et d'un
resultat asllUre, n'est point adoptee, il de,·iendranecessa.ire que des renforts
soient eDvoyes AM. le Mareehal Ney, ne fusse que pour remplacer lIC!J
pertes et maintenir libres les communications, quoique aujourd'hui il
puisse etre a!l8eZ fort pour tenir rete au corps de La IWmana et de Carrera
reunis, s'ils se presentaient en ligne, Mais leur systeme etant d'harceler
sans cesse et d't!l'iter une affaire gellt!rale, al'ec le temps il.s auraient
l'a\'ance la plus forte, et il.s finiraient, meme sans combattl'e, par le Mtruire
s'il n'l!:tait soutenu, et on femit nne pert.e d'hommes incalculable sans
obtcllir le resultat qu'on se propose.
11 est probable que je ne serai plus daus le cas d'entreteuir Votre
Majeste au 8ujet de la Galice; ainsi, pour cette demiere fois, j'ai cru do
mon devoir de lui rendre compte des observations que mon sejour dalls
cette partie de ses etau et la connaissance que j'ai aequise du earactere de
ses habitauts m'ont mis ameme de {aire. J'ai doue l'honnenr de supplier
Votre Majeste de daigner excu.ser cette digression en fa\'eur et en con-
sideration des motifs qui I'ont dict.ee.
J'ai I'honneur d'Uro, &0.,
M.ut~H.u. Duo ilK D ...LM.l.TIK.
Puebla de Senabria, 25 juin 1809.
IXA
SUCHETS ARMY OF ARAGON [3&P CORPSl
MAY Hi, 1809.
Total pt'tltmUJ totu tu aromet.
1st Division, General W.VAL:
14th Lin~ (two batts,), 1,080; 44th Line (two batts.), 1,069;
2nd of the Vistula (two batts.), 680; ard ditto, 964
Tt2
APPENDICES
796
450
4,398
450
General Total 10,977
N,R-Of the nine absent battalions the 116th and U7th with a strength
ofsomewhat over3,OOOmen rejoined Suchet ou the dlto)' of Maria(June 15),
thUll raising ~his lWlI.ilahle force to about 13,000 men. The 1219t never
came up from Nav'J.rrc.
2nd Division, General MU1;N1EIt :
114t11 Line (three batts.), 1,627; 115th Line (three batts.),1,732;
1st of the Vistula (two batts.), 1,039 .
3rd Division, General MORl.()T:
n6th and 117th Line (each three batts.), ab.rellt in Oa.nile; 1218t
Line,IAm oott3. u./l$ellt i" Navarn,one present in Aragon, 400;
5th Uger (one hatt.), 400 .
TroollS detached from 6th COTIJS :
64th Line (one hatt.), one voltigenr cornpallY of 40th Line
C"VAr,IIY BRlUAm;, Geueral \VATHIBR:
4th Hussars, 320; 13th Cuirassiers, 390; Polish La.ueers (one
squadron), 00
AaTl:LLERY.
IX n
BLAKE'S ARMY OF ARAGON,
JUNE 16, 1809.
Total present under arms at Maria.
Vanguard Brigade, Colonel J. Cn&AOll :
Almeria (two batts.), Cazadores de Valencia (one batt.)
1st Division, i\1ajor-GonQrnll'. RooA:
1st of &.voia (th/'OO ll."tbl.), Gr'l1wla (ono batt.), Avila Militia,
Tiradores de Carifiena (one batt.), Tercio ofTortosa .
2nd Division, Lieut.-Gellerall\Iarquis of Wz.\N :
1st Vohmteers of Saragossa (one bott.), 3rd Caudores de
Valencia (one batt.), 1st of Valencia (three batts.), America.
(two batts.). .
Ca\'a!ry Brigade, Colonel J. O'Do:nn:LL :
Olivenza (four squadrons), Santiago (oue squlIdroll)
Artillery (ooventeen gUlls).
Sappers (three companiee) •
Total present
3rd Division, Lieut.-General C. AnEIZAGA (absent at Booorrita) :
Fernando 7th (one batt.), Grenadiers (four eompanies),
lst Volunteers of Aragon (one bntt.), 2nd ditto (onc bat1.),
Volunteers of Valencia (one hil.tt.), Camdores de Pil.lafOI
(one bat1.), Daroca (one batt.), Tiradores de Doyle (one batL),
Tiradores de Murcia (one hatt.)
Ca"alry: Husares Espanoles, Santiago (one squadron each)
Artillery (eight guns).
Sappers
Total absent at 8otorrita
2,,,,"
4,"'"
6,837
600
200
300
14,230
6,842
308
120
103
6,433
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APPENDICES RELATING TO THE
TALAVERA CAMPAIGN
I
THE BRITISH F'ORCE AT TALAVERA
FROM THE MORNING STATE OF JULY 25, 1809
Prt!Sellt and fit for Duty.
".46l
Tolal Cavalry 2,969
464
.'i25
"
CAVALRY DIVISION (Lieut.-Gen. PAYNE).
Fane's Brigade: Ansou's Brigade:
3rd Dragoon Guards 626 23rd Light DragooDs .
4th Dragoons . . 645 1st n >J K.G.L.
Cotton's Brigade:
14th Light Dragoons •
16Ut "
Ltmgwerth's Brigade:
1st Lino batt. K.G.L.
2nd"" "
Light Companies K.G.L.
INFAr.''1'RY.
ht (SUERDHOOKKS) DB'lSJOs.
H. CampbeU's Brigade:
1st kltt. Coldstrcam
Guards . . . .. 970
1st hatt. 3rd Guards . • 1,019
One compan)' 5/GOth Foot 66
694
078
106
2,045
010
'"
CarneroD's Brigade:
Ij61st }'oot. . .
2JB3rd " • . •
One company lij60tb Foot
2nd (1111.1.'8) DIVISION.
Tileon's Brigade:
1/3rd Foot .
2/48th Foot. .
2j66th " • .
One company 5/6Oth .
Low's Brigade:
77B 6th Liue batt. K.G.L.
63.5 7th"" "
"1,364 1,167
Total of the 1st Division 5,00:1
R. Stewart's Brigade:
746 29th Fcot . . . S98
667 1/40th Foot. . . 807
~26 Ist batt. of Detachmenl:.ll 009
.52
1,891 2,014
Total of the 2nd Division 3,~
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Donkin's Brigade:
2/81th
1/88th
Five companies 6/00tb
3rd (MAUKE.~lll'8)DIVISION.
Mackenzie's Brigade:
2J24th Foot. 787
2/31st " 733
1/4.5th " • 756
2,270
500
500
273
1,471
Total of the 3rd Division 3,747
4tll (C.,uIPBUL'S) Dn'IllION.
A. Carnpbell's Brigade:
2/1UI Foot . • •. 431
2/63rd Foot. . .. 637
One company 6/60tll • 64
Kemmis's Brigade:
1/4Oth Foot. •
97th "..
2nd batt. of Detachments
One company a/GOth Foot
74'
50'
625
50
1,032 1,928
Total of the 4th Division 2,000
ARTILLERY.
Rettberg and
33<l
Total of Artillery 1;011
German:
Two batteries,
Heyse
British:
Three batteries, ~W8on, SilleryJ
Elliot 681
E..~GINEERS, 22. STAFF CORPS, 63.
Total Present 20,641
The Army had also sick left in Portugal, about 3,246: sick at Plnsencia
and Talavem about 1,149: on detachment in Portugal about 1,300: Oil
detachment in Spain about 107. Total absent or nOIl-effet::tiv6 6,898.
The newly arrived regiments at Lisbon, and the troops on their way to
the front under R. Craufurd are, of course, left out of this return.
THE ARMY OF ESTREMADURA AT TALAVERA
[From an unpuhlished document in the Deposito de la Guerra,
M,.,u;d.]
General.in.Chief, Lieut.-Gen. Gregorio de la Cuesta.
. ~ond in Command, Lieut.·Gen. Francisco de Eguia.
l\Iajor-GeneraJ. of Infantry, Major-Gen. J. M. de Alos.
" "of Cavalry, Major-Gcn. R. de Villalbo., Marques tie
Mala8pillB. .
Officer Commanding Artillery, Brigadier-Gen. G. Rodrigue;.;.
" " Engineers, Brigadier-Gen. M. Zappino.
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INFANTRY,
Vangnard-Brigadier-Cen. Jooe Zayas:
2nd Voluntarios of Catalonia, Cazadores de Barbastro (2nd hatt.),
Cazadores de Campo-Mayor, Cazadores de Valencia y Albu-
querque, Cazadorcs Volunwi08 de Valencia (2nd batt.) he halts.
1st Division-Major-General Marques de Zayas :
Cantabria (three batts.), Granaderos Provinciales, Canarias,
Tiradores de Merida, Provincial de Truxillo • seven batt8.
2nd Division-Major-General Vincente Iglesias:
2nd of Majorca, Velez-.MaIaga (three batl:il.), Osuna (two batta),
Voluntari08 Estrangeros, Provincial de Burgos . eight hatts.
3rd Division-;\Iajor-General Marques de Portago:
Badajoz (two batts.), 2nd of Antequera, Imperial de Toledo, Pr0-
vincial de .Badajo1i, Provinc!al de Guadix six batts.
4th Division-Major-Gcocral R. Manglano:
Irlanda (two hatts.), Jllon (two halts.), 3rd of Seville, Leales de
Fermllldo VII (1st batt.), 2nd Voluntarios de Madrid, Volun~
tarios de I~ CorOlla . eight hatt.\!.
lith Division-Major-General L. A. Bassecourt:
Real Marina, 1st ~illlent (two batls.), Africa (3rd bat1.), l\Illreill.
(two batl:8.), Reyua (let b.~t1.), Provincial de Sigiien~.a seven halts.
CAVALRY.
1st Division, Lieut.~Gcllora.1 J. de Hcncstrosa :
Rey, CalatraVll, Voluntarios de Espafia, Imperial de Toledo, Caza-
dores de Sevilla, Rerna, Villavicioaa, Cuadores de Madrid.
2nd Division, Lieut.-Geu. Duqne de Albuquerque :
Carnbineros Realcs (onc squadron), Infante, Aleantara, Pllvia,
Almlln:M, 1st I1mI 2nd Rll!;ISILrs of Estrcmlldura.
Totab, iuclusi\"e of sick, and troop9 on dew::hment:
35,000 Infantry, 7,000 Cavalry, 30 guns.
It is most unfortunate that no regimental or dh'isional totals arc given,
but only the gross total of the whole anny.
N.R-There were at least four bllttaliolUl detached, viz. Merida and
3rd of Seville, with Sir It. 'Wilson, and two others (namM not to be
ascertained, Cuesta. does not gi\'c them) uuder Del Reino at the Puerto
de &nos. Another was Illlparently dropped at Almaraz to guard t1UJ
bridge. Allowing 3,000 for these troops, and 5,000 for sick and mllIl
'on command,' the Army of EBtremadura. marched to Talavera with about
28,000 foot, more than 6,000 horse, and 800 artillery.
The following troops which had all been with the Army of Estremadura
in April are not Damed in the above return. Most of them were in garrison
at Badajoz, but some were in the Northern Passes-Spanish Guards (one
b...tt.), \\'alloon Guards (oue bat1.), Zafra, Plascm:w., l.a SercUIIJ .LeaICll
de Fernando VU (2nd batt.), hoviilcial de Coroova, Tiradores de Cadi;r;.
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STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH ARMY AT TALAVERA
(Figureli of July Hi, e.>.:cluding sick and men detached.)
ht Corps, :M'anhal VICTOR:
Etat:.-l\Iajor • • •
1st Division (Ruffin), 9th Uger, 24th and g6th of the Line,
three batts. each
2nd Division (Lapisse), 16th LegerJ 8th, Mth, 64th of the Line,
three hatts. each
Srd Dil'ision (Villlltte), 2ith Ugcr, 63rd, 94th, 95th of the
Line, three hatts. each
Corps-Cavalry (&aumont), 2nd Hussars, 5th Chasseurs
4th Corps, General SEBAS'nAlo'l :
Etat.Major .
1st Division (Sebastiani), 2iIth, 32nd, 58th, 75th of the Line,
three batts. each
2nd Division (yalence), one regiment only,4th Polish, two
batts.
3rd Di\'ision (Lenl.I), Nassau, BadeD, Hessc-Dnrmstadt,
Holland, two bntts. cacll : Frankfort, oue batt.
Merlin's Light Cavalry, 10th and 26th Chasseurs, Polillh
Lancers, Westphalian Oheo.:auz-UgeT8
Reservll Cavalry :
1st Dragoon Division (Latour-Maubourg), 1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th,
14th, 26th Dragoons
2nd Dragoon Dhision (Milhaud), 6th, 12th, 16th, 20th, 21st
Dragoons, and 3rd Dutch HlISSIII'S
From Madrid:
One Drigade of Dessolles' Division, 12th Uger, 6ht Lino,
three hatts. each
King's Guards, infantry
" "c&,'alry
27th Chaseeul'll (two Bquadrons)
The artillerymen are included in the divisional totals.
Strength.
'7
6,286
6,862
0,135
98Q
19,310
13
8,118
1,600
4,637
1,188
10,456
3,279
2,3.16
6,63<>
3,337
1,600
,..
260
6,737
Total 46,138
BRITISH LOSSES 0.'1 JULY ~7 649
4
TALAVERA.-BRITISH LOSSES ON JULY ~7
(1) IN TJlE COMBAT OF CAlIA D~ SAU"-AS.
Killed. Wounded. Muting.
Regiment:. Offi~ Qffi- QUi- Total.
cer8. Men. Cf:rll. Men. cera. Men.
Cavalry:
14th Light Dragoons.
1st " " K.G.L.
3n1 DIVISiON
Mackenzie's Brigade:
2/24th Foot.
2/318t "
1/46th "
Donkin's Brigade:
a/GOth Foot.
2j67th .. .
IjBBth n . •
2
1
1 23
4
3
1 26
2 7
1
1 1
1 G
, 00
1 13
1 ,
10 127
"
1
4
1 9
2 '119
7 "
19 27
34 HIS
30 64
Toml 4 GO 19 2Gl.i 93 447
(2) IN THE COMBAT IN YRONT OF TALAn.-nA AT 9 P.M.
Staff . . . 1 - - - - - 1
1st DIVISION
H. Campbell's Bri£de:
1st COldBtream uarda 1 - - 2 - - 3
Camerou's Brigade:
liGht Foot. . - 3 1 3 - - 7
Langwerth's nri~de :
1st Line batt. .a.I.... - 2 - 7 - - 3
2nd
" " "
- -
- 3 - - 3
Light Companies, K.G.L. - 4 2 25 - , 3G
Low's Brigade:
5th Line batt. K.G.L.
- • - 3' - 11 417th
" " "
- 19 1 43 - 77 146
2nd DIVISION
THson's Brigade:
2/40th Foot. . . - - - 3 - - 3
It Stewart's Brigade:
129th .Foot - 10 43 - 1
"1/48tb Foot. . . . - - - • - - •1st OOtt. Detachments 1 14 - 40 2' 13 70
ARTILLERY. . - - - 2 - - 2
r.....OINEERS • . - - 1 - - - J
--
- --
- --
--
Total 3 ,. • 219 2 107 OOS
I The official report gIVes thret mlSSmg officers here. But one of them
\MS not 3 prisoner but turned up at Oropesa next Illorniug, nominally sick.
}<'or this distressing story, /lOO Leslie, pp. M5-a.
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BRITISH LOSSES AT TALAVERA
SECOND DAY. JULY 28, 1800.
Killed. WQtl71d6d. Milkillg.
Regimtnu. Qffi- Offi- Mm. Offi- Total.
ur8. Mm. cer8. eers. Mo>.
-
- -- - --
S\.af[ . 4 - 9 - - - 13
CAVALRY.
•'ane's Brigade:
3t'd Dragoon Guards.
-
-
I I - I 3
4th Dragoons. . .
- 3 - 9 - - 12
--
"Cotton's Brigade:
14th Light Dragoons.
- 3 6 6 - -
"16th
" "
- 6 1 , - 2 14
--
29
Ansoo's Brigade: .
1st Light Dragoons
37K. G. L..
- 1 2 32 - 2
23rd Light Dragoons. 2 47 4 .. 3 ,.. 2IY1
--214
-- - -- -
INFANTRY.
bt D1VI81QN (General
SIIERBROOKE) :
H. Campbell's Brigade:
1stColdstream Guards 1 33 • 261 - - 2931st ard Guards. , 49 6 261 - I 322
--615
Cameron's Brigade:
1/61st Foot. 3 43 10 103 - 16 265
2j83rd " 4 3B 11 202 - 2.' 2B3
-- ""Langwerth's Brigade:
htLineoott. K.G.I.. 2 37 10 241 - 1 291
2nd"
" "
-
61 14 2BB - 24 3B7
Lift~. L. C~m:an.ies:
-
6 - 37 - - 43
.
--721
Low's Brigade:
6th Line batt. K.G. L. 3 27 6 lIB - 101 26'
7th
" " "
- 17 4 35
- 54 110
--365
2nd DIVISlON (General
fuLL) :
Tilaon's Brigade:
1/3rd Foot.
-
26 2 107 - 7 142
2/48tll " - 12 2
"
1 - IlB
2j66th JJ - 16 11 BB - 11 126
-- "'"
BRITISH LOSSES ON .mLY j!8 651
Ki/led. JV!>ul1dtd. M'uling.
kgirnt11u. 0.Qi- 0.Qi- Offi- Total.
~•. M",. «1", Mrm. 'm. MI!TI.
- --
- -- - --
R. Sw_rt', Brigade:
29th Foot
-
26 G 08 - 2 132
ht balt. Detachment!
- 26 9 166 - 2 203
l/48th Foot
· ·
-
22 10 136 - 1 168
--603
Srd DlmIOlo' (Gencn.l
MACKE.'I'~III) :
Mackemie', Brigade:
2/24t.h Foot
-
.. I. 268 - 21
"'"2/31st
"
-
21 3 102
-
, 131
l/46th
"
· ·
-
9 2 134 1 12 J68
-632
Dookin'll Brigade:
4/6Oth Foot
·
- 7 6 25 - 12 ..,
2/87th ..
· ·
-
9 3
'"
-
, GO
1f1l8th
"
·
1 12 3
'"
-
-
..
--195
4th ThYlll10Y (General
A. c...xPULL):
Campbell'8 Brigade:
2f1th Foot.
· ·
1 6 3 ..
-
1 ...
2{63rd.. .
·
-
6 2 30
-
1 39
--134
Kemmie', Brigade:
Ij40th Foot
·
- 7 1 49 - 1 68
97th
· ·
-
G - 25 1 21 63
"2nd batt. Detachme.Jlb!I
-
7 - 13 - 1 21
-132
-- --
-
-
ARTll.LERY.
British .
·
1 7 3 21 - - 32
German .
·
-
3
-
30 - 1 34
ENGINEERS
·
- - 1 - - - 1
S1'AFF CORPS.
·
-
- 2 - - - 2
--
- -- -
Total 27 643 17I 3,23.~ 6 439 4,521
Total of the two dllfll:-kilk't1: 34 offit'el'll, 767 men; wounded: lOO
officers, 3~719 men; mi.e6ing: 8 officers, G39 mOll. Grand Total, G,303.
1 Many of the casualties of the is/60th were in the companies detached
from the head quartol"ll of the regiment, and not serving in Donkin',
llriglLtlll. It is unforlunately imllOSllible to digtillguish them, Il8 all the
regimentallofllle6 are gh"eu m bJoo ill the return.
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TALAVERA.-THE FRENCH LOSSES
N. B.-I 0'1'0 these figures to tho kintlllC~ofCommanuaot Balagny, WllO
has caused them to be copied in detail from tile French Archives.
I
491
16
23
lOO
40
",
on
4rf/4'" .2 389
632
3
--1,767
65 467
1 667
606
2
--1,632
1
2 ]]
3 19
3
I
0490M2
3 41 17 376
3 43 ]2 328
2 54 14 Mi2
3
1254159
2 2 36
1201123
21
3 35 14 340
1 92 17 45(1
3 36 19 540
2
Regimtnta.
Kilkd. WQ1.mded. Pri8tmert.
Offi- Offi- Offi- Total.
cera. Men. cera. Mell. etrl. Men.
----- f-- - --- -1--11---
CORPS-CAVALRV ~Beau­
mont):
2nd llnwl'!l
5t1l Chasseu18 .
1st CoRP!! (MARSHAL
VICTOR):
Etat-:Major General
1st DIVISION (RuBin):
9th Le~r
24th Line
!l6th Line .
Etat-Major .
2nd Dn'ISlo~ (Lapisse):
16th Leger .
8th Lille. .
45t1l Line
54th Line .
Etat.i\1ajor.
3rd DIVJSlON (VilIatte):
27th Uger •
63rd Line •
94th LiIle
95t1l Line
AAnLLERY AIm E:;GCO-
Em.
Total of 18t Corps.
4tll COIll'S (GE:s"ERAL
SElMSTJANI) : .
IstDI\'ISlON (Sebastiani):
28th, 32nd, 68th,
75th Line
2nd DIVISION (Leval) :
Baden,Hem,Nassau,
Holland,lo'raukfort
3nI DIVIS101'o- (Valence) :
4th Polish Regiment.
1 9 1 63
f-----f--
26 410 120 3,280 1 67
13 197 67 1,852 61
G fYl 24 803 77
3 31
-------
'"
64
3,001
2,180
I,M
40
Total of 4t1l Corps 19 287 91 "2,692
"18 3,227
FRENCH LOSSES AT TALAVERA 653
KU/cd. Wounded. PrilKmCT8.
.Regimenu. Offi- Mm. Qffi- Men. 0.11" Men. Total.cers. etr$. etr8.
--
--
--
--
C,,-VAIJlV "DIVIli.IOI\"S-
1st DnIS/ON of Dra-t:::llB (Lawnr<Man-
urg) :
1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th,
14th,26thDragoon8
" •
61
2nd DIVISION of Dra-
goons (Millmud) :
5th, 12th, 16th, 20th,
21st Draxoous, . • •Milhaud's rtillery. • 3l\1erlin'sLightCa\'alry
DIVIST01'1 :
10th, 26th ChllS.'lClll'S,
Polish Lancers, West,.
r;alian Che"sux-
gers . . . . 6 42 46
-- -- ----
Total of Cavalry Di-
visions I. • 109 I37
GE.'1EB..lJ. TOTAUl :--45 officers, 716 rank and tile lri/Ied;
220 officers, 6,081 milk and Iilll tt'QUllded;
1 officer, 206 rank and file mi88illg = 7,21.i8,
NOTE.-No distinction is made in the French returns between lo~ on
July 27 and July 23, which cannot tllerefore be ascertained separatelr.
TIICliC < Missing' do not illcllllle the French wounded who were left will.in
the British lines on the night of July 26, and became prisouers, but were
Creed ngnin On. Aug. 6 when Victor reoccupied Talavern and captured the
British hospitals. They must have beeu numerous in the divisions of
Ruffin, Lapisse, and Sebastiani. The French returns are those made up
Cur the Emperor's use, some weeks after the hatUe-UlO!lC of the 4th Cnrpll
as late as Sept. 19. The men in question therefore appear as 'wounded,'
but not 3IJ ' prisoners.'
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THE ROYAL ARTILLERY h'!.THE PENINSULA
IN 1809
N.B.-I owe this Appendil:: to Colonel F. A. Whinyates, a.A., who has
been good enough to IXImpile it for the volume.
STAIo'F.
Brigadier-General E. HOWORTII arrived at Lisbon in April 1809, aud
took over the command of the n.A. from Lieut..-Colonel W. Robe.
Brigade-Major R.A., Captain A. Diekson until appointed to the
l'ortuguese Artillery in June, when Captain J. May took over that
position.
fIELD-Olo'FlCERS"lN PORTUGAL.
Lieut.-Col. H. Framingham, Lieut.~Col. W. Robe, Lieut.-Col. G. B.
}'isher, Major Julius von Hartmann, K.G. L.
Troops RH.A. and Companies RA. in Portugal in 1809 :-
(a) Horse Artillery: Strength.
1. Captain H. Ross's 'A' Troop, landed at Lisbo,o, July 2,
or 3, 1009 162
2. Captain R. Bull's 'I' Troop, landod at Lisbon,
August 21, 1809 162
(b) Foot Artillery :
3. Captaio C. D. SilIery's I No. 6 compauy, 7th batt.,
landed at Lisbon, March 7, 1009 120
4. Captain A. Bredin's No. 1 company, 8th batt., lauded
at Lisbon, August 18Q8 126
6. Captain J. May's No. 2 company, 1st batt., landed
at Lisbon, March 1809 127
G. Captain F. Glubb's No. 10 compally, 6th batt., lauded
at Lisbon, March 1809 93
7. Captain R. Lawson's No. 7 company, 8th batt., landed
at Lisbon, August 1808 . 66
(c) K.G.I.. Artillery:
1. Captain Tieliug's Company (No. 2).
2. Captain Heise'g Company (No. 4).
On taking up the command, General Howorth, with Colonel Robe's
assistance, equipped five brigades of guns to take the field with the army,
1 On arrival in Portugal, No. 6 compau)", 7th batt., was under 2nd Captain
H. B. Lane; Captain C. D. Sillery joined shortly after the occupation of
Oporlo. '
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viz. one brigade of hea\'y six-pounders, three brigades of light si::r-poundcrs,
and onc brigade ofthree-pounders. Captain Glubb's company was stationed
in Fort St. Julian, Lisbon, aUlI Captain Bredin's ill the :Forl:8 at Cascaes.
The other companies were with the field army. ,
BRIGADES RA. AT OPORTO.
Captain C, D. Sillery's No. 6 company,7th batl, under 2nd' Captain
11. B. Lane. Light six-pounder gUllS.
Captain R. LaIl'SOU'S No. 7 company, 8th batt. Three-pounder guns.
Captain Tieliug's No. 2 company, K.G.L., under 2nd Captain de
Rettberg. Heavy si:J:-pounder guns.
Captain I1eise's No. 4 company, K.G.L. Light su-pounder guns.
[Captain May's brigade was detached with Mackenzie's force at
Abrantes.]
BRIGADES R.A. AT TALAVERA.
CapL1in C. D. Sillery's No. 6 company, 7th batt. Light six-pounder guus.
Captain J. May's No. 2 company, 1st batt., under 2nd Captain W. G.
EIliott. Light six-pounder guns.
Captain R. Lawson's No. 7 company, 8th ltatt, Three-pounder guns.
Captain TIeling's No. 2 company, K.G.L., under 2nd Captain de
Rettbe.-g. Heavy six-pounder guns. .
Capt;ain Heise's No. 4 company, K.G.L. Light six-pounder gullS.
CASUALTI.BS AT 'fALAVERA.
Killed: Lieut. H. \Vyatt and seven men; wounded: Lieut.-Colonel
H. Framingham,2nd Captain H. Baynes and J. Taylor and twenty-one
men, R.A.
K.G.L., killed: three men; wounded: thirty men.
In December 1809 the strength of the Royal Artillerr under General
HOl'I'orth was as follow8, viz. :
RH.A., 187 of all ranks, with lOO drivers attached.
Foot Artillery, 627 of all ranks, with 545 drivers attar:hed.
K.G.L. 332 of all ranks with 100 drivers.
There were 9.51 horses, and 132 mules with the Artillery.
XII
VENEGAS'S ARMY OF LA MANCHA
}o'UOM A RJo...·l'URJ,'" 0J0' JUNE 16, 1809.
1st Division, Brigadier-General PEllRO Gnl(lN (afterwards Brigadier-
General T. LACY]:
Burgos (two batm), 1,085, CuenCIL, 860,lst of Loxa, 703, AJeala.,
620, 1st of Espaiia, M8, 1st of Seville, 593 Total 4,427
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2nd Division, Brigadier-General GASPAR VIQODET:
Corona (two batts.), 1,130, Rooda, I,O!)o, Ordenes Militares (two
batts.), 836, Alcazar, 826, 1st of Guadb:, 622, Ciudad Real,
268 . Total 4,6G7 •
3rd Di vision, Major-Gcner"l P"J)IlOGlU)lAIUST [afterwards Brigadier-
General P. GlRON]:
2nd of Jaen, 9B5, Eeija, 902, 2nd of Cordova, 849, ThVlen (two
batts.), 1,121, 1st WallOOll Guards, GG3, Alpujarras, 579, Velez..
Malaga, 445 'rotal 5,544
4th' Division, Drigadier-Geueral FnAl'"ClSCO CASTEJON :
6th of Seville, 53.'i, 1st of Malaga, 743, 2nd Spanish Guards, 953,
Jerez, 650, 2nd of Loxa, 510, Bujalance, 469, 3td of Cordova,
422 . TotAl 4,282
5th Division, Major-General T. ZERAIl< :
2nd of F..&llaii" (l"'Q lmtta.), ] ,004, 18t of Conlova (three b.,tts.),
2,044, Provincial of Seville, 887 Total 3,995
CAVALRY:
i\lontesa,349, Reins, 183, Granada, 322, Espan8, 287, Famesio,
404, Santiago, 295,Alcantara, 343, Principe, 324, Granaderos de
Fernando VII, 627, Dragones de la Reina, 180, Cazadores de
CotdovlI,lill) , Total 3,384-
AIlTILU;RY: 30 gUllS; !!nI'pers, fivc companies, about 1,100 in all.
Total, 27,300, incllldiug sick (lI,ld men on detachment.
INDEX
lladajoz, summoned to surrender by
Victor, 1G0; Welliugton retires to,
Wl.
Ballaster09, ~'ranci.sco, general, in
OOllllnlUlI1 at Colombrcs, 372;
escapes from the advancing French,
382; llis descent on Santander,
38G; drh'en out by Bonnet, 38i.
BarcelonA., held by Duhesme against
ViI-es, 41
Barrio, Manuel Garcia~Del, colonel
sent by the Central Junta. to lead
GaHcian insurgents against Vigo,
263.
Bennett, captain, R. N. at tlle siege
of ltosaB, 50.1. 55,56.
Beresford, \V U1iam Carr, general,
appointed Commander-in-enief of
trlc Portuguese army, 216; his
reorganization of tl]e army, 217,
210; joins \Vellesley with ten
line regiments, 314; commands
flanking column at tlle afh'ance oa
Oporto, 318; at Amarante, 344,
345; pursues Soult, 351, 3GO ; hie
march to Perales ani!:' Coria, 599;
retires to Castcllo Br,lnco, 611.
nlake, Joo.quiu, general, commands
in Aragou, 414; willS battle of
Alcailiz, 418-20; defeated at
J\laria, 42.3-7; at Belchiw, 421),
''''.Blanca, Florida, Marquis, President
of the Junta, death of, 21.
.Kogicro, l'lldreBasiHo, chaplain of
Palafox, shot bl" tll(l French, 139.
Bonnet, genera, his advance into
Asturias,382; his pursuit of .Balla-
Ilwros, 386-7.
Botilho, general, commands Portu-
guese force on tbe l\Iinho, 223;
opposes Soult's advance, 237.
Bouclmrd, cll\ltaill, French cngi_
Deer officer, us ingeuious scllemc
for crossing the Tamega at Ama-
mntc, 270-1.
"'
Albergaria Nova, combat of, 32.5
Albuquerque, Duke of, attacks Di·
geon at Mora, 145; his quarrel
with Cartaojal, 145 j sent to join
CUOOW,'ll army, ]45, 157; nt tho
battle of l\fedelliu, 109-63; his
intrigues against Cuesta, 466; at
Talavera, 532, 645; at OroJ.X!S3'
583 ; routed by Soult at AnoblSPO,
58!).-!)1.
AlcaiiiOl, battle of, 418-20.
Alcantara, 113cked by Lapisse,261 ;
combat of, 440, 441.
AlmOllllCid, battle of, 614-6.
A!orna, lIarquis of, raises an 'ex-
perimelltallegiou'iu the Portuguese
army, 210.
Alvarez, Julian, Go\'ernOr of Ge-
rolH~, llis attempt to relieve llo8oUl,
61.
Amarante,defended bySilveira,267-
71; captured by Loison, 271;
LoillOIl defeated at, 344, 346.
Aranjuez, Venegas at, 568; combat
of, 612.
Areizaga, Juan Carlos, general, at
Alcafiiz, 418; his error at "'aria,
431; commands army of Andalusia,
6"'.
Argenton, captain, his conspiracy
against Soult, 279; makes overtures
to the English, 284 ; his first inter-
vielv with Wellesley, 315; bis
seeond visit to Wellesley, 321; his
arrest and confession, 322-3; his
escape and death, 323.
At'7()bispo, combat of, 591.
Astorga, Marquis of, elected Pre-
sident of the Celltrd.l J lInUI, 21.
Asturias, Juuta. and arm)' of, their sel-
fish polic)', 370-1; digsolution ofthe
Junta. by 1..110 Romana, 376, 376; in-
vaded by Ney and Kellermauu,
379; evacuated by the }'rellch,
387.
Av~, jlaSSage of, by Soult, 239.
O)t.,Uf. 1l
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Bourke, colouel, sent by Wellesley
to Cuesta, 431.
.,Brags, battle of, 236.
Cadiz, British proposal to garrison,
25; negatived by the Junta, 26 j
refusal of VilIel to allow the British
troops to land at, 28; tumult.'! in,
29-31.
Caldagues, Coude de, commands the
Catalonian troops round Ban::elonA,
38,39 j rcplllscs sortie of Duhesme,
08 ; retreats 011 :'.101i1l8 de Rey, 68 ;
taken prisoner by St. eyrJ 7l.
Canuing, GCQrge, proposes" to garri-
son Cadi-l:, 25, 26 j his correspou-
dellce with W olleslcy, 600.
Cardadeu, battle of, 64-7.
Carrara, Martin La,checks l\faucnne
at Santiago, 386.
ClI.rrol, lV. P., captnin, his ad-
ventures in Astllrias, 373, 380; ill
Galicia 30G, 40]~
Cartaojal, general, takes command
of the Army of the Centre, 33, 143;
Ilis quarrel with Albuqucnlue, 145;
attacks La...oalle's divisionatYeoones,
146 j routed by Sebastiani at Ciudad
Heal, 147; deprh'oo of his command
by tlle Junta, 148.
Casa de Salinall, combAt of, 503.
Castlere~h, Robert Stewart, Vis-
count, hIS coufidence in Wellesley,
287.
Castro, general, routed at Igualada,
70.
Catalonia, army of, its composition,
33,40; campaigns ofSt. Cyr,Vives,
and 'Reding in, 38, 89.
Cavallero. CQionel, his account of
feeling in Saragossa, 99.
Cazadores (riflemen), new battalions
of, raised in the Portuguese army,
212.
Chalot, CQlollel. surrenders Vigo,
263, 264..
Cba\'es, surrender of, to 8oult, 225,
226; reoccupied by Silveira, 264.
ChincllOn, revolt of, 7; massacre in,
by the French, B.
Cienfuegos, Captain-Gencral of As-
turias, 372,
Ciudad Real; the rout of, 143--7.
Ciudad llodrigo, resists Lapisse, 260.
Cochrnne, Lord, Ilis Mllds ou the
coast of Languedoo, 39 j his de-
fence of Rosas; 48, 60--6.
Colmenar, insurrection of, 3jl;ainst
the .French, is put down by Victor,
8.
Corunna, surrenders to Soult, 173;
evacuated by Ney, 300.
Cotton, Stapleton, general, corn-
mauds brigade at Albergaria NOVll,
325.
Cmdock, Sir John, general, dis-
patches British troops to Cad~ and
Seville, 27, 206; cotldition of his
fon;e in Portugal, 201, 202; his
timid policy, 203; retires to Passo
d'Arcos, ~; at Lumiar, 206;
advises Sir R. Wilson to retreat,
256; sllperscdocl by Welleslcr,
207; Governor of Gibraltar, 313.
Craufurd, llobert, arrives with lis:1lt
hrigadeat Talavera, after the battle,
660 ; holds Almaraz against Ney,
586, li87.
Cuesta, Gregorio, general, commands
Estremadurall army, 24, 143; his
opemtions against Victor, 162-8;
uefeatocl at Mcdcllin, 159-66; ap-
pointed Ca]ltaill-General .of tlte
Egtremaduran army, 167; his cor-
respondence with Wellesle}' about
the nUI'ance into Spain, 44li-8; his
jl'.alousy of Welleslcy, 464-7;
receives \VeUesley at Almanu;,
470--2; quarrel with Wellesleyat
Talavcrn. 489-02; pursues Victor,
492, 493; retreats 011 Talavera,
liOO ; at the battle ofTalavera, 0509-
li6; retreats on Oropcsa, 579, 580;
withstands J\Iortier, 583; his final
disputes \~..ith Wcllesley, 003; re-
tires from command, 6O.'i.
Dalmatia, Duke of: let Soult.
Dantzig, Duke of: let Lefebvre.
Deeken, von der, Hanoverian
general seut to Oporto by the
British Government, 198; llis re-
port on the Portuguese army, 213.
Delaborde, general, opposctl to
8ou1t's ambitions in Portugal, 279.
Del Ueino, Marquis, defends the
PasS of .Bailor;, 572; breaks tile
bridge of Almaraz, li7{j.
D'EsJ)alia, Carlos, raises troops at
<':iuand Jlodrigo, 2li8; follows .La-
pisse, 260. .
Digeon, general, captures artillery
of the Spanish Army of the Centre
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at Tortob, 13 ; surprised at Mora,
144.
Donadieu, colonel, one ofArgenwn's
conspirators, 279, 281; his arrest,
323.
Douglas, major, rcceil'cs Argcnbm,
2l:l4 ; iJriug9 him to meet Wellooey
at Lisbon, 315.
Doyle, Charles, colonel, British
ageut at Tarragona, sends muskets
to Saragossa, 101 ; his intrigues ill
favour of Infuutado, 464.
DulIesme, gcneraJ., at Bareeloua,37,
41,58,60; relieved b)' St. Cyr,6S.
Dulong, major, llis exploit at the
Ponte Nova, U5 j and o.t the &lt~
dOT,367.
Ebe~ Baron, Prussian colonel, sent
to uporto by the British Govern-
ment, \!la; scut to "'rei re's anny
with the 2nd batt. of the Lusitaniall
Legion, 228; takes command of
the army on }<'reire's flight, 232 ;
dcfctlwd at Hrugn, 235; at the
sicA"c of 0liOrto, 241.
~ia} Francisco, ~neral, su~eeds
Cuesta, G06; his quarrel with
Wellcsley, (lOO.
Ex('ellent, the, at Rosas, 48--9.
.Ferrol, surrenders to 8oult, 175.
Fleury, de, colonel, holds the tower
of San fo'rallCisco at s.·uagossa, and
is killed, 133.
Foy, general, routB a detachment of
Silveirn's force, 224; tnken pri80n~r
at Ol~rto, 243; delivered by 80ult,
249; surprised by the English at
Oport.o, 337; sent by Soult to
Jooellh, 4.96; pursues Iwhen Wil-
$On, 619.
Frallceschi, general, reeeives tlle
surreuder of Vigo and 'fuy, 178;
routs I...~ Romana'lI r\Jargu;,rd, 104 j
at Lanhom, 231 ; atAlbergariaNova,
32·5; at Grijoll, 32.9; at Zamora,
402; hia '~lIJtivity aud death, 402.
Freire, Bcrnardino, ~eneral, at
Braga, 224, 228; hiS timidity,
228; his flight, 232;. and death,
2:}:3.
Frere, John H., Britisll ambassador,
his negotiations regarding the
British gnrriSOll for Cmliz, 26-31 ;
correspondence with Wellesley,
:''90;. aupports Albucluerque against
Cuesta, 465; urges Wclles1ey's
claims to be Conunauder~ill-cbief,
465,466.
Galicia, Soult's operations in, 170-
!M; its insuTrCction, 367-401;
evacuated by Soult nnd Ner, 398-
402.
Galindo, Mariano, leads asortie from
Saragossa,ll9.
Gallnzzo, general, defeated by I.(l-
fcbvre at Almar~, 4.
Gamy, Don .Martin de, Secretary to
the Central Junta, dedines the
British proposal to garrison Cadiz,
~.. 27, 29; Ms dcalings with Lord
\VelJesley, 608.
Gazall, general, takes part in the
siege of SatagQssa, 104,107,100;
present at Ar'lomspo, 689.
Genuan Legion, the King's,losses of,
at Tala.vera, 510.
Git'ard, general, storms the bridge
of ArlObispo, 689.
GiNlll, I'e,fro, geneml, cormnalHls
at Aralljue2., 612 j at Almonacid,
OHio
Grijon, combat of, 328-30.
Henestrosa, Juan, general, corn·
mands cavalry of Cuesta's army,
checks Lasalle at Ben:ocal and at
lHi"jullas. 15ii ; a.t Me,lellin, 163.
flelldelet, gelleral, sent out b.y SOlllt
to relieve Tu)' and Vigo, 262; re-
lieves Tuy, 263; eVa(:uates Tu}' and
Valenza,2M.
Hill, Sir Rowla.nd, general, 'Wel-
lesley's appreciation of, 30-1, 305; ill
the advance on Oporio, 320-8;
defends the Seminary, 338-0;. at
Talavcm, 1)03,.517, 524;. wounded,
52.5.
Igua-lada, combat of, 79,
TmpCrieuu, the, frigate, commanded
by Lord Cochrane at Iwsl1,s, 48.
Illfantado, Duke of, commands Army
of the Centre, .5.; at Cuenca, .5 ;
his hesitation and delay, 0-8; starts
to join VCIlCg:U;, 12;. hi.s march to
Chincbilla, 13; joins Del Palacio
011 theDespciia I}erros,32; removed
from commllllll !ly the ,Junta, 33;
his intrigues agaillst tIle Junta,
464..
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Jaca, surrender of, 400.
Joseph Bonaparte, I\ilJg of Spain,
his position at Madrid, 2-8; makes
formal entry into the capital, 13;
Ilis anxiety about Soult aUlI Nay's
expedition, 377; dispatches an
upedition to Galieia, 378; corre-
spondence with Victor, 443, 444 ;
JC:lds Ilis GUllroS (rom Madrid to
pursue Venegas, 458; joins Victor,
499,500; at the battle or Talavera,
527-54; his mendacious report to
Nllpolcoll, 661i; retrc,'lts wWllrd
Madrid, 50g j marches against
Venegas, M9 ; his orders to Soult,
596; wills battle of Almonacid, 614.
Jourdan, Jeall-.B.aptiste, marslml,
military atll'iser to King Joseph,
Ills contrOyersy with Victor, 151;
his comments on the Sp.nnish r~
sistance, 167; sends orders to
Wllissc to go to A1C/lntuu, 259;
at Talavern., 527-fi4 j his orders
to Soult, 596.
JUliot, general, Duke of Abrantes,
besicfes Saragossa, 110-19 j sUJlcr-
wo:lec by ulIllles, Illlj removcd
from his command, 410.
Junta, tbe Celltral, flies from
ArnnjueOl W Se,·me, 21 ; its refuSRI
to allow a British garrison in Cadi...,
26,27,29,31; refuses to aprint
a siugle Commander-in-ehie fOT
Spanish troops, 36; rejccts the
offers of negotiation of Sotelo, Hill ;
the plots 3i\'ilillSt, 464 ; its nego-
tiations with Wellesley, 466; its
fears of Cnesta and intrigues with
Venegas, 468-9; elldcavours to
prevent Wellesley's return to
}Jortuga.!, &IiI.
Kellemmnn, FrulI'f'lis Christoplll~,
general, commands expedition to
Galicia, 378; forces the pass of
l'ajllres,382; evacuates thcAsturins,
388 ; commands in Loon, 575, 597.
Lacoste, general, commands cngi~
IHJers at the s.iege of Saragossa, 10,1,
109, 115; killed,126.
Lafitte, colonel, (loe of Argel.lton's
conspir:,ey, 279; his. arrest, 323.
Lamartiniere, ~er"l, left by Soult
at 1'uy, HIS; relieved by I-Ieudelet,
262.
Lallhozo, combat of, 231, 232.
Lannes, Jean, manhal, besieges and
takes Saragossa, I, 119-36.
Lapis3e, general, his instructions
from Napolooll for thc invasion of
Portugal,.253; held ill check by
Wi\son, 267, 258; escapes from
"rilson and sacks Alcantara, 260,
261 ; joins Victor at Merids, 261 ; at
Tallwern, 5Q4, fH6, 622; killed,
543.
LasaHe, general, commands cal·alry
in Victor's arml" 1(iO; at .Berrocal,
115li; at Mcdal in, ]61.
Lazan, Marquis of, bri~lgs the Ara-
gonese dh'ision to GeronaJ 52;
pursues St Cyr, 61; fails to appear
at the battle of Canh,deu, 67 ; his
suceess in the Ampurdam, 73,74;
promises to succour Saragossa, 110,
120; unites with Francisco Palafox,
131 ; retreats before Lannes, 131 ;
at AIC&lii~, 417 ; at Marill, 424.
Lefebvre, general, delates AJ"gentou
to Soult, 321-2.
Lefebvre,marshal,Duke of Dantl:ig,
defeats Galluzw at Almarnz, 4;
disobcyg Napoleon's ortlers, sent
back to Franee, 4.
Leval, geDCral, at Talavera, 530.
Lima-Har~to, general, at the de-
fence of Oporto, 241 ; killed, 2<16.
Lippc, Conde de La (Frederick of
Lippe-DUckeburg), his reorganb:a-
tion ofthe I'ortuguese regular arm}',
208,21l.
Lisbon disturbed condition of, 200-
I; 'VeHesley's plans for defence
of, 610.
1.-90011, genernl, his disinclinl\tioll to
3flvance into l'ortu..sal, 192; Imtred
of the people of Uporto for, 243;
sent out by Soult to tlle 'l'ras-oSo-
MOJlWa, 262; resisted by Sih·cira,
267; attacks Amarante, 267; llis
difficulties, 267-71; occupies Ama-
mnte, 271; and Villa Real, 272;
disapproves of Soult's ambitious
views, 279; checked by the Portu-
guese and abandons Amarante,
344,345; retrentof, to Guimaraens,
,"'-
Lusitanian Legion, the, raised by
~ir R. Wilson, 168; on the I'ortu-
guese frontier, 199, 202; 2nd batt.
of, sent under Boon to Drags, 220;
at battle of Braga, 234; 1st b...tt.
defends Alf;anlara, 441; engaged
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in Wilson's march to EBC8.lona,
479-670,
Mackenzie, general, commands
brigade sent to garrison Cadiz, 20 j
returns to Lisbon, 32 j commands
'containing forcu' left by Wullesley
on his advance to Oporto, 317 j
killed at Talavera, 641.
i\Iackinlay, captain, It.N., receives
the surrcnder of French galTison of
Vigo, 264.
Madrid, formal entry of Joseph into,
14.
Mah}', Nicolas, general, is defeated
hy FrauoosuiJi at La TrclJa., 1IH j
left in command of La Romana's
army, 375 j retreats before Ney,
380 j his descent on Lugo,384,
Maria, o.'\ttJe of, 423-8.
i\Iaucune, general, defeated by
Carrera near Santiago, 335.
Mayne, William, lieut.-col. of the
LlIsitallian Legion, governor of
Almeida, 2.56-3; occupies Alcan-
tara, 3lB; driven out by Victor,
440-1.
l\feddlill, batUeof, ]58-66,
l\Ielgarejo, governor of J.'errol, sur..
renders to Soult, 175,
Mequinem.a, refuses to surrender to
Murtier, 400,
Mezadelbor,combatof, 153; Cue6ta.
at, 586, ,592.
l\Iiajadas, combat of, 165.
i\filans,Franci.sco,lea.der ofmil[Uelelu,
dri\'en back by St. Cyr, 63 j fails
to come up at battle of Cardadeu,
67.
MinllO, Soult repulsed at the, 102.
Jlique!etiJ8, the Cataloniau, surround
Barcelona, 38, 60.
Misarella, pas81agc of the, 357.
Molins de Re}', battle of, 1, 70, 71.
.Moncey, Don Adrien de, marshal,
in charge of the siege of Saragossa,
91, 103-10; recalled to Madrid,
1l0.
Moore, Sir John, his views on the
{Icfcnce of Portugal, 280,
Morella, taken and abandoned by
Grandjean, 410,
i\Iorillo,l'ablo, lowlsHnliciallsagaillst
Vigo, 203; at combat of Santiago,
"',.
Meme1', Edouard, marshal, Duko of
Treviso, leads the 6th Corps to take
part in the siege of Sarago.'!l8l\.,
103--]2; epemtiolls of, in F..astern
Aragon, 409; recalled to Castile
by Napoleon, 410, 411 ; leads the
vanguard of Sonlt's force to Plasen-
cia, 674; meets Cuesta.'s force at
OroJICSII., fil:l3; 1ll0l'cmlluts of, ill
the I'agus ,'alley, 689,
Murray, George, general, fails to
stop the retreating .French at
0l'orto, 340, 341 j his pursuit of
Soult, 300-1.
Napoleon, Emperor, his parting
orders to Jourdau, 3; at Valla-
dolid, 16-6; quits Spain, 18; bis
plan f()rthe next campaign,]6; its
Impracticability, 18-21, 171 j his
dispatch to Sou]t on tile invasion
of Portugal, 17ii; receivll8 news of
Soult's ambitious viewlI, 276; his
estimate of Wellesley. 207; his
orders to Ncy for tbe subjection of
Galicia, 369; of tile Asturias, 388;
his criticism of Soult's advance 011
}l!aseucia, 497; lIis rebukes to
Joscph IInd ,'ourds]), 537, 565;
orders Ute cllS!;ation of active opera-
tions,618,N,!., .Michel, marshal, Duke of
E chingen, le-wes S:lf:J.gossa, 91 ;
joins .Soult, 178; his difficulties in
Halicia, 191, 367-70; captures
Oviedo, 37!J-81; his meeting I\'itll
Soult at I.ugo, 391; rcpuJSClI by
Norofia at the Oitaben, 396-7;
abandons Galicia, 39B; joins Soult
in pursuit of Wellesley, 583 j fails
at Almaraz, 594 j returtlS towanlS
Salamanca, 597; defeats Wilson at
BaDos,620,
NorOlla, Coude de, commands the
<Division of the i\finho,' repulses
Ney at the Oitaben, 394.-7,
O'Only, !'elIro, colouel, commands
garrison of Rosas, 47, 50-0.
O'Donoju, general, chief of Cue.,ia's
staff, 472.
Oitaben,the, Noyrepu1sed by Noroua
at, 395--7.
Oporto, fortifications of, 240;
stormed by Soult, 241-8 j stlrprise
and capture of, by WellesleJ'J 334-
42.
Oporto, the bishop of (Antonio de
Castro), uuwise zeal ill rousillg tho
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populace of 0l'orw, I1l8; gathers
an army for the defence of Oporto,
240, 241 ; abandons the city, 242.
O!'dellaflza, the Portuguese /etJie. en
1nJu1te, called out by the Regency,
197; its organization, 221, 222;
opposes Souft's adnwce, 223-38.
Orouse, CI(lcuflied by Soult, 189.
O\'iOOo, captured and sacked b)' Ne}',
3131.
Paget, Edward, general, crosses the
DonTo at Oporto, 336.
Pa1acio, Del, Marquis, escapes from
Victor, ]3; commands Audalusiwl
force, 2Q; Captaill-General of
Catalonia, his slowness, 40; re-
called by the Central Junta, 4l.
Palafox; Francisco, escapes from
Saragossa to seek help for the
garrison, 116; arms tile local levies,
ll!); joills wzau'l! force, 131; re-
treats before Lannes, 131; intrigues
ap;lI.inst the Junta, 464-.
Plllllfox, .IOSCjlh, defends Saragossa,
92-136 ; cap,itulates, 130--8; taken
prisonerto\ incennes,139; criticism
of his defenoo, 140-2.
Parq oe,Dukedel, commands division
of the Army of Ememadura at
1Hem de lbor, 153; at :\Jedel.lin,
161,163; commandsatCiutlad Rod-
rigo,374-
Parreiras, general, takes part in the
defence ot'Oporto, 241-fl.
Patrick, colonel, his b"3.lla.u.t defence
of the bridge of Amarante, 267.
!'eso de Rep, combat of, 344.
Philtldc/phct!, the, secret sodel)' in
France opposed to Napoleon, 279.
I'ino, general, at Cardadcu, 66 ; at
Valls,87.
Pizarro, i\lage1ha.ea, hisfntileattempt
to defend Chll.l'es, 225, 226.
POlite Nova, p~sagc of the, 3.55-8.
Portugal, condition of, in tlle spring
of 1809, 196-200; Soult'sand'\'e1-
lcsle}"s CIlmpaign in March-May,
1809,222-3(iG.
Portugue~e arm)', its history and
reorgnnimtion,208--22.
!'uerto de Dailos, combat of, 020.
Quirogn, Abbot of Casoyo, raises
Galician.B against Soult, 184.
Reding, Teodoro, general, Bent by
VivC/l againlit S1. Cvr, 62, ()3 j :1t
Cardadeu, 64, 65,"6(j 67; joins
Caldagues, at Molins de Rey, 60;
defeated by St. eyr, 70, 71; Sllper-
~es ViveE; as Captain-General of
Catalonia, 73; in Tarragolla, 76,
77; drives back Bouharn at \'alls,
84; defeated hy S1. Cyr, 86, 87 ;
wounded alld dies, 89.
Regency, the !'orluguese, fails in
orgllni7.ing national defence after
Junot's departure, 196, '197; calls
out the OrdelIQllZQ, 197; asks for a
.British Commauder-in-chief for the
Portuguese army, 211i; its rejlOrt
on the Oporto campaign, 218;
attempts to mobili.2e the militia,
21ll.
Reille, general, withdraws to
Figueras, 37; sufferings of his
troops, 39; besieges and takes
ROBas,48-.57.
llicard, general, his circular letter
on the subject of Boult's election
as King of Portugal, 276.
Hoca, general, at Alcai1i~, 417; at
Maria, 424.
ROh'lI;;lt, colonel, takes command of
U!e Prenc}} engineerll at siege of
Sara,gOSM, 126, 135.
ltomana, La, Marquis of, condition
of hill army, 23; his wanderinga,
179; retreats to Monterey, 180;
escapes from .Franeeschi, HI3-5;
cnpturcfl Villafrnncn. 374-6; his
roup d'itat at Oviedo, 375, 376;
routed by Ney at the passage of
the Kovn, 381; marches to Orense,
386; his optlratious ag'",illst Sonlt,
399-400.
ROBas, siege of, 46-57.
Ruffiu, gellcral, commands division
guarding Madrid, 3, 7; at battle
of Ucles, 10, 11; leads night-
attack at Tatal'era, lil6-8; lends
the second attack, 523, 525.
St. Cyr, l.nurellt GouI'ion, generol,
commands f<'rench army ill Cata-
lonia, 3:4; his character, 43; sends
lleille to besiege Rosas, 46-57;
proceeds against Barcelona, liB-
60; wins battle of Cardadeu, 64-
7; of Molills de Rey, 70, 71 ;
routs eastro's troOllS at l~ualada,
79; wins battle of Valls, 0/, 88.
S1. March, general, takes part ill
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the defence of SarngOSSll, 106;
l'tlceive6 military command of the
city from Palafox, 136.
&lamonde, combat of, 3ti7-8.
Sall Gcnill, COlO!lcl, fortifics SAra.-
gossa, 94; killed on the ramparts,
117. .
Sautander, .Ballasteros' descent on,
386; retakon by Bollnet, 387.
Santiago, 'combat near, 385.
Saragossa, second siege of, 90-136;
its outworks stormed, 106-14,
123; street-figllting ill, 123-.35;
capitulation of, 136; condition of,
after the siege, 139.
&SS, Santiago, parish priest of
&t.mgossa, shot by the French,
139.
SebastianiJ Horace, general,succeeds
to command of the 4th Corps, {,;
routs Cartaojal 3t Ciudad Rc:ll,
140, 147; at TalaveraJ ~22, 527,
529; eludes Venegas, 500, 667 j
wins battle of Almollaeid, 614.
Senfa,gcncml,joins VOllegas before
the battle of Udes, 9,
Silveira, Francisco,h"ellcral, military
governor of the Tras-os-Montes,
223 ; assembles his forcCil at
Chavcs, 223; rcturns to San
I'edro, 224, 226; to Villa POllca,
2211; recaptures Chaves, 266;
attacks LoillOlI, 267; defcnds
Amaraute, 267-71 j escapes across
the Douro, 'n2, 310; checks
LoisoD at Peso de Regoa, 344;
l'ursues Soult, 352, 359, 360.
Smitll, Sir (}eQrge, his endeavour to
force a British garrillOn on Cadiz,
27-0 j his death, 31.
&mweneJl, their gOOl1 work in Cata-
lonia, 36, 38.
8otelo, agent for Victor, tries to
negotiate with the Governor of
Badaj(Y'\ and Ccnlrnl Junta, 168,
169. '
Souham,general,repulsed by Reding
at Valls, 84, 86. .
Soult, Nicolas, marshal, Duke of
Dalmatia, receives instructions
from Napoleon for the invasion of
l'orluglll, 18; their illl!lraeticaLility,
18, 170-2; difficn ties of 'bis
task, 173; captures l<'errol, 174,
li6; his final orders from Napo-
leon, 176, 176; starts llis troops
for Portugal, 170; fails to cross
the )liuho, 182; difficulties of
his progress in Galicia, 104-9;
occupies Orense, 109, and Chaves,
226; willS battle of Bragn, 235,
236; storms Oporto, 242--8; his
amLitious vie'l\''S, 273--276; his
dealing9 with the Argenton con-
spiracy, 322, 323; surprised by
WelltJSlcy in Oporto, 332-41; Ilia
retreat, 343-60; meets Nay at
Lago, 390 j abaudollll GaUcia, 390-
402; his justificatory letters,403-
6 j apllointcll comnlll.utler of the
uniled army, 460, 461; advances
on Plasencia to support Jose'p;li,
497,673; pursues Wellesley, 5/7-
680; routs AlhUljllOrfJu6 at AI"IO-
bispo, 509-91; his desire to in-
vade Portugal, 595, 617; checked
by King Joaeph, 618.
Stl:wnrt, Charles, gcneral, at Ilomb.'lt
of GrijoD, 329 j at battle of Oporto,
340; at conference of Mirabete,
470-].
Sucl'ct, general. ll~kes command of
the 3w Corps, 412; llefeated at
Alcai'iiz, 41&-20; wins battle? of
Maria, 423-7; and of llelchite,
42\).
Tactics, tlie, of Wellesley, 300,
301.
'1:'llavcrll, Victor retircs to, 490; the
allied armies at, 491-2; battle of,
502-.50.
Tarragona, blockaded by S1. Cyr,
89.
Troncoso, Mauricio, Abbot of Couto,
raises the Galiciall peasantry
against Soult, ]84,
Thy, lIurrcntlen.Jd to Frauceschi,
170; occupied by Lamartinihe,
100 j relieved by Heudelet, 262 ;
(JI'ocuatcd by the French, 264,
Vdes, battle of, 10-]2; town of,
sacked by the French, 12.
Valls, battle of, 82--9.
Vaughan, Sir Charll'll, his testimony
to Palafox's character, 142.
Venegas,Francisco,general,attempts
to surprise 'faranoon,6 j defeated by
Victor at Vcles, 9-12; supersedes
Carta.ojal ill command of the Army
of the Centre, 148; advances to
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moot Seb.\stiaui 45j j fails to
c:arry out ·WeU;;Jey'g and Cuesta's
orders, 479; at Toledo, 529;
allow8 the army of Sebastiaui to
escape lllln, 566, .567; loses the
opportunity of occupying Madrid,
568; his blunders, 612; tlcfeated
at Almonacid, 014.
Victor, Claude })errin, marshal,
Duke of Helluuo, defeats Spaniards
atUcles, H-12; marehes to Alnmraz,
143, 144.; his controversy with
Jourdau, 101; drh·eg back the
Duke tiel Pm·que Ilt Meza de lOOr,
163 j wins battle of MetleIlill, 108-
GO; remains stationary at Merids,
262; joiue9. by Lapissc, 261;
seize.<! Alcautaro, 440-41; misery
of his army, 443~4; retires from
Talavera, 490; jOilled br. Joseph
alld .Iour(\80, 600; at ralavera,
604-65; his llight-atLack, 616-
8; his second attack, 522 j his
great attack, 531-54; retreats on
Madrid, 570; rtlOCCllllies Talavcrn,
580; ill La. Mallcha, G18.
Vigo, l>urrenders to Franeeschi, 178;
blockaded b)' Galichl.lls, 263; sur-
renders to Capt. Mackiuley, n.N.,
264. .
VilIafrnnca, captUTCd by La Itomana,
374,376.
Villatte, general, at the battle of
Ucles, H; at Talavera., 622, 631.
VilIel, Marquis of, special com-
missioner at Cadi2;, opposes laudiug
of Hritish troopEl, 2B j his ec<:entric
lcgilliatioll, 29, 30; recalled by the
Junta, 31.
Villiers, Hon. John, British minister
at Lisbon, oppo.ses Cradock's timid
J??licy, 205.
\lttOTJa, general, at the defence of
O!MJl'1:o, 241, 246.
Vi"es, ap,POinted Captaiu-GeueraI of
CataloUla, 41; invests Barcelona,
41; fails to send help to Rosas,
1)1 j sends miquelett8 against St.
Cyr, 61; defeated at Cardadeu, 66,
67; at l\lolillB de Rey, 71 ; super-
seded by Reding, 73.
\Vaters, colonel, seizes barges for
the crossing of the Douro,334, 335.
WelIesls}', Sir Arthur, takes com-
roam} of British troops in Portngal,
207; declinCf! the post of corn·
mander-in-cliief of the Portuguese
umy, 216; arrives ill Lisbon, 283;
his opinions 011 the defence of
Portugal, 2tI7, 290, 293; his
character and abilities, 295-300;
his limitatiolls, 302-11; his tac.
tics, 300, 301 ; his interviews with
Argenton, 316, 321; advance on
Oporto, 316-~; attacks and takes
Oporto, 3$-42; his pursuit of
Soult, 364--66; correspondence
with C'uesta, 446-8 j reviews
Cuesta's troops at Allllar;a, 470-
2; quarrel with Cueeta at 1'ala-
Yera, 491, 492; his choice of the
positions fit Talaycr;I, 603, 5(f7;
wiIl!l battle of Talayera, 613-54;
marches on l'lasencia, 373 j on
Oropcsa, 583 j holda the line of
thcTagus,GOO-l; retires to Badajoz,
606 j his plans for the Defence of
Portugal,610.
-Wellesley, Richanl, Mar1luis, his
diplomacy at Sedlle, 608.
West, captain, R.N.>oftheExcellent,
at Rosa.s, 49, 60.
\Vilsoll, Sir Robert, commands tlle
Loyal Lusitallian Legion, 168 j his
differences with the bishop of
OporOO, 199; his chardCl.er and
record, 253, 254; refuses to re-
treat as advised br Sir John
Cnulock, 256; holds L(lllisse ill
check, 257, 258; joins Wellesley's
advance illto Spain, 438; threatens
Victor's flank after Talavcrn, 670;
his escape from Escalona, 619;
defeated by Ney at Bal'los, 620.
\Yorster, lieut.-gencml, COlllmalHls
Asturian force, 372; escapek from
Ney, 383.
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